Junction of Streets.-Massachusetts Rev. Stat., ch. 51, requiring travellers meeting each other "seasonably to drive to the right" do not apply when one vehicle is passing along one street and another is turning into said street from a cross street. Lovejoy v. Dolan, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 495. See Morse v. Sweenie, 15 Ill. App. 486; Fales v. Dearborn, i Pick. (Mass.) 344.

In Garrigan v. Berry, 12 Allen (Mass.) 84, it was held that in the absence of a statute regulating the manner in which persons should drive when they meet at the junction of two streets, the rule of the common law applies, and each person is to use due and reasonable care to prevent accident adapted to the circumstances and place. 1. Palmer v. Barker, 11 Me. 338; Daniels v. Clegg, 28 Mich. 32; Winn v. Jones, 111 Mass. 360.

Parties lawfully using a public street owe to each other the duty of reasonable and ordinary care, and each is justified in assuming that the other will so

act.

Baker v. Fehr, 97 Pa. St. 70. Crowded Streets.-Great care should be used in driving a carriage through a crowded street. Vaugh v. Scade, 30 Mo. 600.

2. Palmer v. Barker, 11 Me. 338; Daniels v. Clegg, 28 Mich. 32; Fox v. Sackett, 1 Allen (Mass.) 535; Welling v. Judge, 40 Barb. (N. Y.) 193; Washburn v. Tracy, 2 D. Chip. (Vt.) 136; Williams v. Holland, 6 C. & P. 23; Brooks v. Schwerin, 54 N. Y. 343; Howard v. Tyler, 46 Vt. 683; Schaefer v. Osterbrink (Wis.), 30 N. W. Rep. 922; Belton v. Baxter, 54 N. Y. 245; Lewis v. Bulkley, 4 Daly (N. Y.) 156; Avegna v. Hart, 25 La. An. 235; Cotterill v. Starkey, 8 C. & P. 691.

A foot traveller who attempts to

cross a public thoroughfare ahead of approaching vehicles, under circumstances requiring a close estimate of his chance of crossing safely, cannot recover for injuries sustained in consequence of negligence on the part of the driver of a vehicle, concurring with his own mistaken estimate. A foot trayeller has no prior right of way over a passing vehicle. Belton v. Baxter, 14 Abb. (N. Y.) Pr., N. S. 404.

In an action for personal injuries occasioned to the plaintiff in being run over while crossing a street, the fact that the plaintiff does not show that he looked up and down the street before crossing is not conclusive evidence as matter of law that he was not in the exercise of due care. Bowser v. Wellington, 126 Mass. 391.

A person suing an owner of a vehicle for negligence by and through the misconduct of his servant, in running over him while crossing a thoroughfare, must, in order to succeed, give affirmative and preponderant evidence of neglect of duty on the driver's part. Cotton v. Wood, 8 C. B., N. S. 568.

Street Crossing.-A person driving a vehicle across the street must see that he does not interfere with others in the proper exercise of their right of passing. Fales v. Dearborn, I Pick. (Mass.) 344.

In an action for personal injuries occasioned to a woman sixty-seven years old by being knocked down by a horse car and wagon while crossing a street on some flagstones at a point where the street forms a junction with two other streets, all much travelled, in the compact part of a city, the fact that before attempting to cross, and while crossing, she did not look up or down the street but straight ahead, is not conclusive evidence of a want of due care on her part, but the question is rightly submitted to the jury. Shapleigh v. Nyman, 134 Mass. 118.

Opening of Private Way.-If a private way is opened leading from a public street and prepared for use in the same manner as a public street, and with nothing to show that it is not such, the public may lawfully travel over it,' although it is closed at one end, and in

so doing they are bound only to the same degree of care in respect to others who are also lawfully using it as in travelling over public streets. Danforth v. Durell, 8 Allen (Mass.) 242.

Evidence of Negligence.-The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to show not only negligence and misconduct on the part of the defendant, but also ordinary care and diligence on his own part. Daniels v. Clegg, 28 Mich. 33; Lane v. Crombie, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 177; Smith v. Smith, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 621.

In an action for death caused, or injuries sustained, through being run over by a vehicle driven by a servant, evidence that he might have seen the plaintiff or the deceased in time to pull up, if he had not been looking at his horses, owing to the want of a skid in going down hill, is sufficient evidence of negligence, and even although there was some negligence on the part of the deceased in crossing the road, yet the master is liable if his servant by the exercise of reasonable care could have seen the deceased and avoided the accident. Springett v. Ball, 4 F. & F. 472.

The mere fact that a man's driving on the wrong side of the road is no evidence of negligence in an action brought against him for running over a person who was crossing the road on foot. Lloyd v. Ogleby, 5 C. B., N. S. .667.

In an action for personal injuries sustained by coming into collision with a horse and sleigh, it appeared that there was about a foot of snow on the ground; that a way for teams had been broken out in the road, and also another track outside of it; and that plaintiff was walking on the latter track when the projecting shafts of defendant's sleigh, which was being driven at great speed, struck him. Held, that the mere fact that plaintiff did not step out of the track into the snow, was not conclusive evidence of his negligence. Kendall v. Kendall, 147 Mass. 482.

1. Harpell v. Curtis, 1 E. D. Smith

So in order to excuse a collision

(N. Y.) 78; Wood v. Luscomb, 23 Wis. 287; Cotton v. Wood, 8 C. B., N. S. 568; Parker v. Adams, 12 Metc. (Mass.) 417; Smith v. Garnder, 11 Gray (Mass.) 418.

Under the N. Y. statutes of 1879 (ch. 186), an ambulance has the right of way in preference to an ice wagon, and the ambulance driver has a right to assume that the driver of the ice wagon will heed the ambulance bell and give way. So held in an action against an ice company whose wagon came into collision with the ambulance which plaintiff was driving. Byrne v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 21 N. Y. St. Rep. 469; 4 N. Y. Supp. 531.

The New Hampshire statute providing that anyone travelling with a vehicle on a highway and meeting another so travelling, "shall seasonably turn to the right of the center of the travelled part of the_road,” etc. (Gen. L., ch. 75, §§ 11-14), does not render a traveller liable for a collision, if he is ignorant of the approach of another carriage. Lyons v. Child, 61 N. H. 72.

2. Center v. Finney, 17 Barb. (N. Y.) 94; Foster v. Goddard, 40 Me.64; Welling v. Judge, 40 Barb. (N. Y.) 193; Washburn v. Tracy, 2 D. Chip. (Vt.) 136; Daniels v. Glegg, 28 Mich. 33.

It is no defence to an action to recover damages for an injury received from the running of the defendant's horse against the plaintiff on the highway that the plaintiff was in a use of the highway not justified by law, provided no negligence or want of ordinary care on his part contributed to produce the injury. Bigelow v. Reed, 51 Me. 325.

The mere fact that a carriage is unnecessarily on the left of the middle of the travelled part of the road, does not, under Massachusetts Rev. Stat., ch. 51, § 1, prevent its owner from recovering damages for a collision with another carriage turning in from a cross road and negligently driven against plaintiff's. Smith v. Gardner, 11 Gray (Mass.) 418.

Runaway Horses.-If a horse runs

1. Clifford v. Tyman, 61 N. H. 508. 2. Knowles v. Crampton, 55 Conn. 336; Simmonson v. Stallenmeri, 1 Edw. (N. Y.) Sel. Cas. 194.

When a driver attempts to pass another on the public road, he does so at his peril. At least, he must be responsible for all damages which he causes to the one whom he attempts to pass, and whose right to the proper use of the road is as great as his, unless the latter is guilty of such recklessness or even gross carelessness as would bring disaster upon himself. Avegno v. Hart, 25 La. An. 235.

Upon trial of an action for damages for collision on a highway, between defendant's wagon, which was in motion, and plaintiff's, which was standing somewhat crosswise, there was some evidence that the collision was

caused by plaintiff's horse backing his wagon against defendant's. Held, that a verdict for defendant was warranted, and should not be set aside on motion for a new trial. Patten v. Paul, 7 Atl. Rep. 267.

Plaintiff, driving with two other persons in the same seat of his buggy, with two horses, one wild and both hard mouthed, attempted, in a road sufficiently wide, to pass the defendant going in the same direction and driving a lumber wagon. Defendant whipped and urged his horses. Thereupon plaintiff's horses ran off, broke the buggy, and one horse broke his leg. Held, that these facts, it not appearing that defendant knew plaintiff's team or situation, did not justify an instruction that, if defendant knew that plaintiff was acting imprudently, and could have avoided the injury with reason

able care, plaintiff should recover. Aznoe v. Conway (Iowa), 34 N. W. Rep 422.

3. A highway is a public way for the use of the public in general, for passage and traffic without distinction. Persons making use of horses as the means of travel or traffic by the highways have no rights therein superior to those who make use of them in other permissible modes; improved methods of locomotion are admissible, and cannot be excluded from existing public roads if not inconsistent with the present methods. Macomber v. Nichols, 34 Mich. 212.

4. In Bennett v. Lovell, 12 R. I. 166; 34 Am. Rep. 628, POTTER, J., said, “It cannot be doubted that the defendant had a right to transport his machinery over the highway. This right is undoubted, but it is to be so exercised as not to endanger the lives of or property of others who have equal rights upon the highway. The man who, claiming to be in the exercise of his own right to drive along the highway an object or animal, which from its appearance, noise or other offensiveness, is calculated to frighten horses, without taking precautions by having a sufficient number of persons in charge of it to warn others of the danger, and if need be to aid them in passing it, for women and children have a right to drive on the highway as well as men, or who leaves such an object on the highway without proper precautions, cannot be said to be using that due care he ought to use, and which the law and a proper regard for the lives of his fellow men and the common duty of humanity require of him."