Whitmore, 74 Me. 230; Manson v. New York N. H. & H. R. Co., C. C. D., Conn., 24 Blatchf. 448; 31 Fed. Rep. 297; Tiis v. Byers, 34 L. T., N. S. 526.

Where it was stipulated that a vessel was to load at a certain port and proceed to the port of destination, the lay days to begin on a fixed day in a certain month, by common consent another port for the loading was substituted. Held, that the rest of the charter party was not changed and the lay days began at the stipulated time fixed by the charter party. Jackson v. Galloway, 5 Bing. N. C. 71.

Where the charter provided that the lay days for discharge should commence from the time the vessel is ready to discharge cargo, and written notice thereof is given to the charterer's agent, and it appeared that the charterer had no agent at the port to whom such notice could be given, it was held that the charterer could not avail himself of the absence of the written notice, because he was chargeable with negligence for having no agent to whom the notice could be given. Hatton v. De Belaunzaran, 26 Fed. Rep. 780. A charter party provided, among other things, that the cargo might consist of empty petroleum barrels and iron rails, to be carried to New York, and also provided that the cargo should be discharged in the same berth where the rails should be discharged. The respondent's barrels were shipped under a bill of lading which, among other things, provided that the barrels should be taken free from on board the vessel in four running days with demurrage at £10 per day for longer detention, and contained a clause, "all other things as per charter party." The vessel arrived at the port of New York on May 21st, 1880, and upon the request of the owner of the rails went to the one basin to discharge her cargo, and not being able to reach the wharf, moored alongside another vessel. The barrels were above the rails. She remained practically in this position until the afternoon of May 31st, waiting to reach the wharf. The barrel owners having been notified on the 25th of her arrival, obtained an order for the delivery of the barrels on the 26th from the vessel's agent, and being informed that the vessel was at the Erie basin, said that they would send a lighter. On the 27th the owners notified the vessel's agent that there was no lighter alongside

the vessel to put the barrels on the dock. The agent replied that he was willing to do so if the owners would arrange with the dock owners to receive them there (the wharfowners having refused to receive them on their wharf), and at the same time notified the owners he should hold them responsible for detention if they did not get the barrels out by the night of the 29th. Nothing more was done by the owners until the morning of the 31st, when they sent a lighter and the barrels were delivered over. Her four days were occupied in delivering to the lighter. It was held that the ship owner was not in fault, because in selecting a place for the delivery of the cargo in conformity with the contract of the parties, he selected one that was not altogether convenient for the barrel owners. That the lay days began to run after the ship reached the berth to which she was directed by the consignees of the rails, and that the detention of the ship was caused by the barrel owners' delay. The ship owner was allowed four days' demurrage. Gronstadt v. Witthoff, 21 Fed. Rep. 253; 15 Fed. Rep. 265.

A ship was chartered to go to a certain point and there load with timber. The charter party provided that "from the computation of time allowed for delivering the cargo to the ship shall be excluded any time lost by reason of drought." It appeared that it was customary to float the timber down to this point for shipment from the interior in the creeks and rivers, and that by reason of an extraordinary drought the charterers' timber could not be floated down to this point, or at least necessitated transportation in such small quantities and with such delay the loading and shipping of timber at this point, and that while a drought did affect the interior creeks and rivers, it in no wise affects the waters at the point or the booms where the timber was kept or the transportation of it from the booms to the ship at anchor. Held, that the stipulation with reference to the drought applied to the creeks from which the supply of timber for shipment at this point came, and that in view of the particular port and trade to which the contract related and that the drought prevented or delayed the delivery of the cargo to the ship, the charterers and cargo are released from any liability for demurrage by the exceptions in the charter party. Paterson v. Dakin, 31 Fed. Rep. 682.

་ ་ན་

It was stipulated in a bill of lading that "cargo to be discharged with quick dispatch as customary or to pay demurrage at £5 per day. Held, that if the custom of the port made it the duty of the consignees to obtain a place for the discharging of the cargo, they were liable for demurrage occasioned by their refusing to do so after they had accepted the cargo. Terjesen v. Car

ter, 9 Daly (N. Ÿ.) 193.

Evi

It was provided in a charter party that the charterer was to be liable "for any detention of the vessel after the expiration of fifteen lay days." The lay days expired on Saturday and the loading was completed early Friday morning. But the charterer did not furnish the necessary documents for clearance until Monday afternoon just in time to clear at the custom house, but not in season to make it practicable to sail until Tuesday morning. dence was given by the charterer of a general practice and understanding in accordance with a rule of the produce exchange that allows charterers one day after loading to furnish the necessary papers and documents. Held, that the general clause giving demurrage was designed to bind the charterer for the neglect of any duty required of him to enable the vessel to sail, and that no custom was proved or could be sustained that warrants more than the allowance of one additional day to furnish the ship's documents after the loading is in fact completed, or until the end of the lay days if that be later, and that the ship cannot be detained after the lay days have expired without compensation when the loading has been actually and practically more than a day before. The charterers were held for one day's demurrage. Rumball v. Puig, 34 Fed. Rep. 665. Where a bill of lading had the following stipulation, viz: "In case consignee discharges cargo or any part thereof, they are to charge not to exceed ten cents per ton and to have four full working days after notice of arrival at dock of consignee and to pay master for any time (exclusive of Sunday) boat is detained for discharging after the expiration of said four days five dollars per day and at the same rate for portions of days." Held, that under the bill of lading the consignees had an election, upon arrival of the boat, whether they would unload the coal or

require the captain to unload. It was primarily the captain's duty to unload. That the consignees discharged all their legal duty upon the arrival of the boat by giving the captain notice that they would not unload the boat except in its regular turn, and in that case would pay no demurrage, and by offer ing the captain a berth where he could unload himself if he did not accept the offer; and that this notice to him was a rejection of their right of election to unload. That the final unloading by the consignees cannot be construed as done under the election in the bill, but as a subsequent favor to the captain, independent of the bill and imposing no liability under it. McLaughlin v. Albany and Rensselaer Iron and Steel Co., 61 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 439. See also opinion of CHOATE, J., in Tuttle v. Albany & Rensselaer Iron and Steel Co., to the same effect, reported in note, McLaughlin v. Same.

V.

1. Fish v. 150 Tons of Brown Stone, 20 Fed. Rep. 201; Gronstadt v. Witthoff, 15 Fed. Rep. 265; Philadelphia & R. R. Co. v. Northam, 2 Ben. 1; Cross v. Beard, 26 N. Y. 85; Sleeper v. Puig, 17 Blatchf. C. Ct. 36; Randal v. Lynch, 2 Camp. 352; Williams Theobald, 15 Fed. Rep. 465; Manson v. New York N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 24 Blatchf. C. Ct. 448; Tapscott v. Balfour, L. R., 8 C. P. 46; Jones v. Adamson, 35 L. T., N. S. 287; Barrett v. Dutton, 4 Camp. 333; Conner v. Smith, 5 Taunt. 654; Barker v. Hudson, 3 M. & S. 267.

If the ship is detained in this way af ter the loading is completed the charterer is not liable. Pringle v. Mollett, 6 M. & W. So; Jamieson v. Laurie, 6 Bro. C. P. 674.

When it is provided in the charter party that detention by ice is not to be reckoned as lay days, detention of the lighter by ice in bringing the goods to the ship is included. Hudson v. Ede,

Law Rep., 2 Q. B. 566; by act of government, Bessey v. Evans, 4 Camp. 131; Hill v. Idle, Id. 327; Bright .. Page, 3 B. & P. 295; Hartman v. Clark, 4 Camp. 159; Harman v. Mant, Id. 161.

If the charter party stipulates that the discharging of cargo is to begin within twenty-four hours after arrival and notice thereof given to the consignees. The lay days begin to run at the expiration of the said twenty-four hours. Manson

v. The New York N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 24 Blatchf. 448; The Boston, I Low. 464; Choate v. Meredith, Holmes, 500.

I

1. Davis v. Pendergrast, 16 Blatchf C. Ct. 565; The Glover, 1 Brown Adm. 166; Re Two Hundred and Twenty Tons of Fish Scrap, 5 Hughes C. Ct. 141; Four Hundred Tons of Iron Ore, 18 Fed. Rep. 94; The Boston, 1 Low. 464; Choate v. Meredith, Holmes 500; Manson v. The New York N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 24 Blatchf. C. Ct. 448.

2. Fish v. 150 Tons of Brown Stone, 20 Fed. Rep. 201; Williams v. Theobald, 15 Fed. Rep. 465; Cross v. Beard, 26 N. Y. 85; Sleeper v. Puig, 17 Blatchf. C. Ct. 36; Philadelphia & R. R. Co v. Northam, 2 Ben. 1; Gronstadt v. Witthoff, 15 Fed. Rep. 265; Randall v. Lynch, 2 Camp. 352.

Generally consignee takes risk of roads and means of transportation from the wharf and is bound to take cargo as fast as delivered. Sprague v. West, Abbott Admr. 548.

Where a vessel is seized by the custom house collector, if the seizure was legal and occasioned by any act or neglect on the part of the master, the consignee will be liable for freight, only, subject to a deduction for such damages as he may have sustained by reason of the nondelivery of the cargo because it was not then delivered. If the seizure was legal and occasioned by any act of the consignee, such as a neglect to pay duties on the cargo, then the consignee will be liable for the full amount of freight and perhaps demurrage, but if the seizure was illegal the consignee is liable for the full amount of freight, but no demurrage. Brooks v. Minturn, I Cal. 481.

teen.

demurrage, notwithstanding it took thirty days to load instead of the eighThe cargo was to be delivered within reach of the ship's tackle, but as the master did not object to this delivery at the time he was deemed to have waived his right in that respect and accepted the delivery. Arreco v. Pope, 36 Fed. Rep. 606.

3. Williams v. Theobald, 15 Fed. Rep. 465; Cross v. Beard, 26 N. Y. 85; Sleeper v. Puig, 17 Blatchf. C. Ct. 36.

It was provided in a charter party "to discharge at a wharf as ordered by charterer's agents, or so near thereto as she may safely get," and "to discharge with customary dispatch." Held, that the charterer was liable for detention caused by his selecting a wharf that was already occupied. Lindsay v. Cusimano, 12 Fed. Rep. 504.

Ist.

A vessel was to be discharged at the rate of 100 tons per day, and by a computation the court determined that nineteen working days was to be allowed as lay days. She was ready to be discharged Ŏctober 24th, but was not entirely discharged until December Two days of this time the boat used in taking stiffening. The court held that the lay days began to run October 24th and included November 14th (allowance being made for three Sundays), and that she was held on demurrage from and including November 15th, and that after deducting the two days stiffening was taken the consignors were liable for fifteen days' demurrage. the charter party provided that the vessel was "to proceed to the port of San Francisco, or so near thereto as she can safely get," and was to be discharged "alongside any craft, steamer, floating dock, wharf or pier as may be directed by the consignees." The consignees directed her to deliver cargo at the wharf of the San Francisco Gaslight Co. The cause of the detention was that other vessels were unloading at the dock and she had to wait her turn. Williams. Theobald, 15 Fed.