When the term "running days" is used it means the days as they run day by day from the time the vessel is ready and in condition to load or unload and notice thereof has been given to the charterers or their agents.1 If it is provided that the charterer shall pay, for every day's detention occasioned by his default, a specified sum, day by day, he is liable for demurrage for the whole period that the vessel is thus detained, and the days are to be reckoned as running days, and not working days, including all rainy or stormy days.2 The English courts do not seem to be harmonious as to whether the term "days" means working or running days.3 LEAD. See note 4. LEASE (See also ASSIGNMENTS; COVENANTS; DEEDS; ESCROW; IMPLIED COVENANTS; LANDLORD AND TENANT). I. Definition, 976. II. What Not a Lease, 976. V. Parol Leases, 978. ter party the charterers were to have thirty working days, not including "rainy days," for the purpose of loading a vessel with grain at Portland, Oreg. It was held that the term "rainy days" meant such days that the rainfall prevented the loading of the vessel with convenience and safety, and in determining this the actual facilities of the port for this purpose had to be taken into consideration. It was further held that where a contract was entered into at a foreign port to load a vessel with grain at Portland, it was in the contemplation of law, made at the latter place, and that it might be shown by parol evidence what was the condition and convenience of the port for such loading and what was the established usage at that place upon that subject in order to explain the meaning and use of dubious and uncertain phrases in the contract like "rainy days." Balfour v. Wilkins, 5 Sawyer C. Ct. 429. 1. Davis v. Pendergast, 16 Blackf. 565. 2. The Oluf, 19 Fed. Rep. 459. Where the charter party stipulated "to discharge as fast as the vessel can deliver to company's lighters, weather permitting," held that the term "weather permitting" did not apply to the time that the vessel was detained after the lay days had expired. The Oluf, 19 Fed. Rep. 459. 3. Where a bill of lading stipulated that the cargo was to be discharged in a specified number of days, it was held to mean working days, and not running days. Cockran v. Retberg. 3 Esp. 121, Eldron. Days in a charter party allowed for unloading are to be reckoned consecutively. Sundays are not to be deducted unless it is customary. The word "days" in the absence of any custom and the term "running days" mean consecutive days. Brown v. Johnson, Car. & M. 440; 10 M. & W. 331. 4. "Lead to the apprehension and conviction of thieves.' WARD. See title RE Lead Manure. In an action of case for disturbance of a way, plaintiffs claimed a right for themselves, etc., on foot to go, return, etc., and also to lead and carry away manure, but proved only a grant of way on foot and for horses. oxen, cattle and sheep. It was held that there was a variance; for the term "lead," so used, implies a drawing on a 9. Sealing of Lease, 987. 14. Adverse Possession, 990. VIII. Leases by Infants, 990. 1. To Infants, 991. 2. Leases as Contracts for Necessaries, 991. 3. Avoidance of Lease for Infancy, 991. 4. Disaffirmance of Becoming of Age, 992. 5. When Tenant May Disaffirm, 992. 6. When Infancy Does Not Avoid a Lease, 992. 7. What Is Confirmation of an Infant's Lease, 993. IX. Leases by Lunatics, 993. X. Leases by Committees and Conservators, 994. XI. Leases by Married Women, 994. XII. Leases by Agents, 995. XIII. Leases by Corporations, 997. 1. Private Corporations, 9972. Municipal Corporations, 998. XIV. Leases by Executors and Administrators, 998. XV. Leases by Trustees, 998. XVI. Leases by Guardians, 998. XVII. Partnership Leases, 999. XVIII. Leases by Joint Tenants and Tenants in Common, 1000. XIX. Conditions and Covenants, 8. Express Covenants on Part of Lessee, 1018. (a) Covenants to Repair, 1018. (b) Covenants to Pay to Pay Taxes, 1022. (d) Covenants to Insure, 1024. (e) Covenants as to Use of Premises, 1025. (f) Covenants in Restraint of Trade, 1027. (g) Equitable Interference, 1028. XX. Assignment of Lease, 1029. 1. What May be Assigned, 1029. [1030. 2. What Interest Passes, 3. By Tenant at Will, 1030. 4. Written and Parol Assignments, 1030. 5. Lease Assigned Contrary 7. Assignee's Liability for 8. Assignee's Right to Sue, I. DEFINITION.-A lease is a species of contract for the possession and profits of lands and tenements, either for life or a certain term of years, or during the pleasure of the parties.1 A lease is a contract, express or implied, between two or more . persons, for the possession of lands or tenements, in consideration of a certain rent to be paid therefor.2 A lease is a contract for the possession and profits of lands and tenements on the one side, and the recompense of rent or other income on the other, or it is a conveyance to a person for life, or years, or at will, in consideration of a return of rent or other recompense.3 II. WHAT IS NOT A LEASE.-Several instances in which agreements have been held not to amount to leases are cited in the cart. Said COLERIDGE, J.: “If a grant had been put on, conferring a right to 'lead manure,' the term would have been construed according to the usual mode of leading; that is, by drawing in a cart." Brunton v. Hall, i Q. B. 792. 1. Bouv. L. Dict. 2. Taylor's Landlord and Tenant, par. 14. 3. Jackson v. Harsen, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 326. (Quoting Woodfall, ch, 1, par. 1.) Definitions. A contract by which a person is to pay an annual rent of a certain per cent. upon the cost of a building, with the right of becoming owner on paying the price, is a lease. Municipality No. 1 v. New Orleans, 5 La. An. 761. A writing under seal, attested and recorded in these words: "Know all men by these presents, that I do put into the hands of A. J. W. as collateral security for my board with him for the last three years and a half, my house and lot in the town of M.; and he is further authorized to control and receive the rents and profits, if there be any, until the war is over, and some of her children comes and sees to the payment of the above board, unless it should be sooner paid. If the said A. J. W. should receive any rents profits for the house and lot, he is to give me credit with the amount on my account with him for board; and he will also give me credit with the amount of sale-bill bought at Mrs. W.'s sale, amounting to $672,"-operates in the nature of a lease, and is so regarded in this case. Wells v. Sheerer, 78 Ala. 142. or An agreement, whereby one person leases his farm for a year to another person for one-third of the crop, such second person to furnish seed and tools, and keep buildings and fences in repair, is a lease. Strain v. Gardner, 61 Wis. 174. In a receipted bill of sale of hay and oats, wherein "A B bought of Č D" there was this memorandum, signed by C D, "Left at stable on O street, where A B takes possession. Rent to begin October 1st, 1870, for one year at $150." Held to be a lease. Eastman v. Perkins, 111 Mass. 30. A conveyance of school lands under the Ohio law, directing to be granted for 99 years renewable forever, reciting the laws under which it was executed, is to be construed a lease according to the statute though by its terms it imports a conveyance in fee. Hart z. Johnson, 6 Ohio 87. An agreement to construct a building to be occupied when finished by the grantee at a stipulated rent, accompanied by words of present demise, operates as a lease. People v. Kelsey, 14 Abb. (N. Y.) Pr. 372. A written agreement by the owner of land to lease same at a rent payable quarterly, to continue one year from date, and on the other to pay the rent, and signed by both the owner and the other party, is a lease for one year from its date. Hurlbut v. Post, 1 Bosw. (N. Y.) 28. An instrument giving one a right to occupy land for a certain consideration, payable as he occupies, as long as he pleases to do so, is a lease at will of the lessee and therefore at will of the lessor. Doe v. Richards, Ind. 374 The resolutions of the trustees of a town, granting A, his heirs and assigns, the rights and privileges of certain real estate upon certain conditions, cannot operate as a freehold conveyance, but upon the conditions being performed, is notes, but do not admit of the deduction from them of any general rules of law.1 A grant or franchise for a limited term after which it reverts to the State is not a lease.2 III. WHAT MAY BE LEASED.-What property may be leased. Anything corporeal or incorporeal lying in livery or in grant may be the subject of a lease-lands, houses, commons, ways, fisheries, franchises, estovers, annuities, goods, chattels and live stock.3 IV. FORM OF LEASE. No particular form of expression or technical words are necessary to constitute a lease, but whatever expressions explain the intention of the parties to be, that one shall divest himself of the possession of his property, and the other shall take it for a certain space of time, are sufficient, and will amount to a lease for years, as effectually as if the most proper and permanent form of words had been made use of for that purpose.4 a lease for an indeterminate period. Jackson v. Hughes, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 421. A writing which, for a valuable consideration, grants liberty to flow a man's land for a number of years, is a lease within the meaning of the Connecticut statute. Smith v. Simons, I Root (Conn.) 318. 1. What Is Not a Lease.-An agree ment between two tenants in common of lands, that one might occupy the whole, is not a lease. Medlin v. Steele, 75 N. Car. 154. A written authority to a person to give a lease to another on the terms before offered in writing by him, is not in itself a lease. Davis v. Thompson, 13 Me. 209. An order to surrender land to a person, stating "to whom it has been rented for 99 years," is not a lease, nor an agreement for a lease such as could be enforced by a bill in equity for specific performance. Howard v. Carpenter, 11 Md. 259. A contract between the owner of land and another person that such other person shall raise a single crop on shares, upon the land of the former, does not amount to a lease of the land. Bishop v. Doty, 1 Vt. 38. An agreement by the municipal authorities with a party, that if he would erect a market house for the town he should occupy it for twelve years, with exclusive right to keep it under ordinances requiring stalls to be rented of him for a fixed price. Held, not to be a lease, and to imply no covenants of quiet enjoyment. Brookhaven v. Baggett, 61 Miss. 383. 12 C. of L.-62 2. Bridge Proprietors v. State, 21 N. J. L. 384; s. c., N. J. L. 593. 3. Wallace. Headley, 23 Pa. St. 106; Smith v. Kerr, 3 N. Y. 144; Smith v. Simons, 1 Root (Conn.) 318; Mickle v. Miles, 31 Pa. St. 20. Conditional Sales.-A lease does not apply to personal property unconnected with realty. A lease for a piano held to be a conditional sale. Murch v. Wright, 46 Ill. 487. A lease of a piano at so much per month, until a certain amount is paid, held to be a conditional sale. Gorham v. Holden, 79 Me. 317. CONDITIONAL SALES DISGUISED AS LEASES. See CONDITIONAL SALES, vol. 3, p. 426; CHATTEL MORTGAGES, vol. 3, P. 175. 4. Taylor's Landlord and Tenant, par. 159; Hallett v. Wylie, 3 Johns. (N. Y.) 47; Thornton . Payne, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) 74; Bac. Abr., tit. Lease; Mayerick v. Lewis, 3 McCord (S. Car.) 211; Morrill. Mackman, 24 Mich. 279; Watson v. O'Hern, 6 Watts (Pa.) 362; State v. Page, 1 Spear (S. Car.) 408. or In estimating the language which constitutes a lease. the form of words used is of no consequence; and it is not necessary that the term lease" should be used. Whatever is equivalent will be equally available, if the words assume the form of a licence, covenant agreement, and the other requisites of a lease are present. Moore v. Miller, 8 Pa. St. 272; Bussman v. Ganster, 72 Pa. St. 286; Steel v. Frick, 56 Pa. St. 172; Moshier v. Reding, 12 Me. 478; Kunkle v. Phila. Rifle Club, 10 Phila. (Pa.) 52; Jackson v. Hughes, 1 Blackf. 977 And the word "lease" may vest a lease for years or for life according to the intention of the parties.1 A receipt expressing the terms and the nature of the tenancy may be a lease.2 V. PAROL LEASES.—A parol lease is where the parties agree, either orally or by a writing not under seal.3 (Ind.) 421; Mickie v. Lawrence, 5 Rand. (Va.) 571; Waller v. Morgan, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 142; Brauch v. Doane, 17 Conn. 411; Ball v. Peck, 43 Ill. 482; Boone . Stover, 66 Mo. 430; Smith v. Simons, 1 Root (Conn.) 318; People v. Kelsey, 38 Barb. (N. Y.) 269; Bacon v. Bowdoin, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 401. 1. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Co. v. Chandler, 9 Allen (Mass.) 159; Berridge v. Glassey, 112 Pa. St. 442. 2. Berrington v. Casey, 78 Ill. 317; Eastman v. Perkins, 111 Mass. 30; Gibbons v. Dayton, 4 Hun (N. Y.) 451; Munn v. Wray, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 403; Alcorn v. Morgan, 77 Ind. 185; Moring v. Ward, 5 Jones (N. Car.) 272. 3. Parol Leases.—À letting by parol for a sum certain per month, nothing being said about a year, constitutes a lease from month to month, and the fact that the tenant holds over for more than a year cannot make him a tenant from year to year. Hallis v. Burns, 100 Pa. St. 206. A verbal agreement to give a lease is not binding if any essential matter affecting the rights of the parties-as here the time of commencement-is left open to future consideration and remains unsettled. Sourwine v. Truscott, 17 Hun (N. Y.) 432. A lessee who occupies premises cannot avoid paying the rent agreed upon in a parol lease for five years made by a married woman without her husband's concurrence. His liability for rent results from his occupancy, and the terms are properly regulated by a lease other wise void. Nash v. Berkmeir, 83 Ind. 536. A verbal agreement changing a contract under seal is valid if supported by a new consideration and not within the statute of frauds. Wilyes v. Whitehead, 89 Pa. St. 131. A parol licence by lessor to lessee to remain in possession after the expiration of the lease, made without consideration, is subject to revocation. Walker v. Wilson, 52 Ill. 352. A parol lease for one year is valid, and if the tenant under such a lease holds over for a portion of another year the lessor may elect to treat him as tenant from year to year, and recover the value of the premises as upon a lease from year to year. Shepherd v. Cummings, I Coldw. (Tenn.) 354 A parol lease "by the year" is for one year and binds the parties no longer. Pleasants v. Claghorn, 2 Miles (Pa.) 302. Although a lease may be void by the statute of frauds if the tenant goes into possession thereunder and remains for a time, the lease may be looked to in determining the amount of rent due. Evans v. Winona Lumber Co., 30 Minn. 515. There may be a parol reservation of the landlord's share in growing wheat from a written lease, under which the lessee takes possession before the maturity of the crop Hisey v. Troutman, 84 Ind. 115. Where the owner of certain lands enters into an agreement with another person by which the last named party is to raise a crop of wheat, corn and fodder upon the land, the owner to furnish all the teams, horses, etc., all seed, wheat and corn, and all the carts, etc., and some guano; the second party to do all the labor and cultivate and tend the crops, etc; the owner to have a certain portion of the crop and the other person the residue; held not to be a parol lease. Currey v. Davis, 1 Houst. (Del.) 598. Where a party enters into possession of premises under a verbal letting, which is voidable under the statute of frauds, agreeing to pay rent monthly, which he pays as it accrues, he becomes a tenant from month to month. Browell v. Welch, 91 lil. 523. A parol lease of premises for a year to commence in futuro, is not an executory contract prior to the time of taking possession. It vests a present interest in the term and cannot be rescinded by either party alone. In case therefore, of a refusal of the lessee to perform the lessor is not required to lease to another if he has an opportunity, and is not confined to his remedy for actual damages, but may refuse to ac |