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spoke of bankers' paper as being part of the Circulating Medium of the country

In Lang v. Smyth (7 Bing., 284), TINDALL, C. J., said"The first question was whether the instruments in dispute had acquired from the course of dealing pursued in the City, the character of Bank Notes, Bills of Exchange, Dividend Warrants, Exchequer Bills, or other Instruments which form part of the Currency of this country"

And this quality of Currency or Negotiability is applied not only to Securities for Money of all sorts, but also to Securities for Securities for Money; as Scrip to deliver Bonds of a Foreign Government

*

In Goodwin v. Robarts, the plaintiff bought some Scrip of Foreign Governments, through a stockbroker, and allowed it to remain in his hands. The stockbroker pledged it unlawfully with the defendants, Robarts, Lubbock & Co., who are bankers, as security for a loan of money. The stockbroker became bankrupt and absconded; and the defendants sold the Scrip at the market price of the day. The plaintiff sued them for the amount realised by such sale. The Scrip entitled the bearer on due payment to receive definitive Bonds payable to bearer from the Foreign Governments. It was proved at the trial that "The Scrip of loans to Foreign Governments entitling the bearer thereof to Bonds for the same amount, when issued by the Government, has been well known to, and largely dealt in by, bankers, money dealers, and members of the English and foreign stock exchanges, and through them by the public, for over fifty years. It is, and has been, the usage of such bankers, money dealers, and members of the stock exchanges, during all that time, to buy and sell such Scrip, and to advance loans of money upon the security of it, before the Bonds were issued, and to pass the Scrip upon such dealings by mere delivery as a negotiable instrument transferable by delivery [i.e., as Currency], and this usage has always been recognised by the Foreign Government or their agents delivering the Bonds when issued to the bearers of the Scrip. This usage extended alike to Scrip issued by their agents in England, and it extended to the Scrip now in question, which was largely dealt in

* L. R. (1875) 10 Exch. 76; Exch. Ch. 377. 32 L. T. N. S. Exch. 199. 33 L. T. N. S. Exch. Ch. 272. 44 L. J. N. S. Exch. 57; Exch. Ch. 157.

as above mentioned. Such Scrip often passes through the hands of several buyers and dealers in succession before the issue of the Bonds represented by it"

The Court of Exchequer held that this Scrip possessed the attribute of Currency, or Negotiability, exactly the same as the Bonds themselves; and this judgment was affirmed by the Exchequer Chamber on the last day of its existence, July 7th, 1875

6. We have thus laid before our readers an authoritative exposition of the true legal meaning of the word Currency, and the subjects which are included in it. We see by a series of decisions, which are now the established Commercial Law of the country, that the word Currency means simply Negotiability, and nothing else, i.e., that the property and the honest possession of those things which possess this exceptional attribute are inseparable, contrary to the general principles of the common law regarding stolen goods, merchandise, and cattle. And what does this exceptional class of articles include? Why, Money, and all Negotiable Securities to pay money of all sorts and forms, bank notes, cheques, bills of exchange, promissory notes, bonds of all sorts; in fact, money, and every kind of negotiable engagement to pay money

It will be seen, then, that in strict legal phraseology the word Currency can only be applied to those rights which are recorded on some material. An abstract Right cannot be lost, mislaid, or stolen, and passed away in commerce. But if it be recorded on some material substance, it may then be lost or stolen, and sold like any other material substance: and the word Currency, then, simply refers to some legal rules relating to the transfer of the property in it, in the case of its being stolen and passed away in commerce. For an obligation to be capable of being Currency in law, it must be recorded on some material so as to be capable of being carried in the hand, or put away in a drawer, and dropped in the street, and stolen from the drawer or from a man's pocket, and carried off by the finder, or thief, and sold like a piece of goods. The word Currency has no reference whatever to any property it has of paying, discharging, and closing debts

Nothing, therefore, can be more unphilosophical primâ facie than to designate the articles themselves by the name of Currency, because they possess the attribute of Currency. It is quite common to speak of the Currency of an opinion; but no one ever yet, that we are aware of, thought of calling the opinion itself Currency. It is quite usual to speak of the Currency of the Session of Parliament; but nobody ever called the Session itself Currency. This very confusion is also used in speaking of bills of exchange; because it is a common expression to speak of the currency of the bill, meaning the time during which it is Current; whereas the bill itself is called Currency because the property in it passes by delivery. It would be just as rational to call a horse a velocity, or a wheel a rotation, as to call money Currency; and we have shewn that in the earlier legal reports no one ever thought of such a barbarism

Nevertheless, if the force of public usage is too strong to be shaken, and the word Currency is too firmly established as the designation of a certain class of articles to be rejected, we must disregard its literal legal meaning, and observe its philosophical sense; because there is an enormous mass of Credit, or Rights, which is not embodied in any material instrument, and which, therefore, cannot be lost, stolen, or passed away in commerce without the owner's consent: and, consequently, though these cannot be subject to the legal rules of Currency, they perform a gigantic part in commerce, just in the same way as if they were recorded on paper

Taking a banker and his customer as the standard case of debtor and creditor, if I have a right of action against my banker for money, it makes not the slightest difference in the nature of the Right whether it is recorded on paper or not. If I wish to transfer the right to some one else, I may do it by means of a bank note or cheque, or a verbal order to my banker to transfer a certain quantity of the credit in my name to some one else's name. We have already shewn that in Roman law, where written instruments were not used, the creditor, the debtor, and the assignee were obliged to meet, and the creditor transferred the debt orally to the assignee. This was a valid transfer. And such a mode of proceeding is a valid transfer in English Law at the present day. But in a vast number of cases this is a very

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clumsy and inconvenient way of transferring debts. It is infinitely more convenient to do it by writing. But whether the transfer be effected orally or by writing, it can make no possible difference in the nature of the Right. Consequently, if I have a Right against my banker, and if I write a cheque for the purpose of transferring this Right to some one else, this does not affect the nature of the existing Right: it is nothing more than a convenient way of transferring it to some one else. Writing a cheque does not create a new Right; it merely records on paper an existing Right. And it equally exists whether it is recorded on paper or not. Payment, therefore, by means of a bank note, a cheque, or a bank credit, is absolutely the same. Now, bank notes and cheques are Currency in strict legal phraseology; but bank credits are not Currency, because they cannot be lost, mislaid, stolen, and passed away in commerce without the consent of the owner

So, also, of a book credit, or book debt, in a tradesman's books. If I buy goods from a tradesman on credit, that credit has performed exactly the same part in Circulating the goods as money because we have expressly defined Circulation to be the sale of goods for money or credit, and the credit has been equally the medium of circulation, or sale, whether it is recorded on paper or not; but it is not Currency, because it cannot be dropped in the streets, stolen, and transferred to some one else by manual delivery

If, then, we are compelled to adopt this barbarism, and employ the word Currency as a philosophical term, it must most manifestly be extended to include bank credits or deposits, book credits, and verbal credits of all descriptions

And this is exactly what commercial law does. It treats any form of credit payable by a banker on demand, as money or cash, no matter whether it be a bank note, a cheque, or a bank credit. They are all, in the eye of the law, equally payment: that is, none of them are legal money: that is, a debtor cannot compel his creditor to take them in payment of a debt: but if he chooses to do so without objection, they all stand on exactly the same footing as payment. The case of bank notes is so well known that we need not cite any authorities. With regard to cheques, Lord Mansfield said, in Grant v. Vaughan, that a cheque is the

same thing as a bank note. In Pearce v. Davis (1 Moo. & Rob.), PATTESON, J., said that a cheque "operates as payment until it has been presented and refused.” So in Jones v. Arthur (8 Dowl., 442), COLERIDGE, J., held that tender of payment by cheque is good unless objected to on that account. Also in Bevan v. Hill (3 Camp., 381), where a person having accepted a cheque in payment, and lost it, and the banker failed, having funds to meet the cheque, Lord ELLENBOROUGH held that the cheque was payment

And the very same doctrine is true regarding a Bank Credit or Deposit. In Gillard v. Wise (5 B. & C., 134), HOLROYD, J., said "The defendants, instead of sending a clerk to receive cash for the notes, sent them to the persons who ought to have paid them; but they sent them, not for the purpose of being paid in money, but of being placed to their credit in account. When that credit was given, the legal effect was the same as if the notes had been paid to them in money"

Thus a Right of action against a banker payable on demand is, in commercial circles, considered as money, or cash, whether it be in the form of a bank note, a cheque, or a bank credit: and though, of course, in the strict legal sense, only the two former can be Currency, yet, in a philosophical sense, if we are compelled to adopt the word, all three forms must be Currency

7. And so, in other points of Law, Bank Notes and Bank Credits are held to be included in the term money, or cash. In the case of Lord Aylesbury's Will, Lord Hardwicke held that bank notes passed under the title of cash and in Miller v. Race, Lord Mansfield said-" Bank notes pass by a will which bequeaths all the testator's money or cash"

But the very same doctrine is held regarding a Bank Credit, or deposit, or a balance on a banking account. Thus, in Vaisey v. Reynolds (5 Russ., 12), the testator bequeathed "to his wife all his book debts, monies in hand; and to his executors all his monies out at interest or mortgage, notes of hand, or any security whatsoever." Lord LYNDHURST said-"The testator has referred to two descriptions of money, monies in hand, and monies out at interest or mortgage, notes of hand, and other securities. The balance in the banker's hands, though it carries interest, was not out at interest or security, and it was in the same order and

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