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Maccombie v. Davis, 7 East, 5.

Graham v.

v. Duval, 5 T. R., 604.
Dyster, 6 M. & S., 1. Boyson v. Coles, 6 M. & S., 14. Queiroz v. Trueman,
3 B. & C., 348

2. Goods were deposited as a security for a loan. The customer afterwards obtained further advances without referring to the goods. He died without paying off his debt to the banker. His executors claimed the goods on payment of the first loan only. Held, that the banker was entitled to have all the debt paid off. But if there had been bond creditors, or a bankruptcy, the banker could only have held the goods for the sum first advanced, and must have proved under the fiat for the rest

Demainbray v. Metcalf, Prec. Chanc., 419. Adams v. Claxton, 6 Ves., 229. Vanderzee v. Willis, 3 Bro., C. C., 21

3. Such transactions ought to be completed by a Bill of Sale, and registered under Act 17 & 18 Vict. (1854), c. 36

If the debtor is a trader the banker should also take possession of the goods or premises, as registration under the Bills of Sale Act only does not defeat the operation of the doctrine of "reputed ownership" in bankruptcy

Badger v. Shaw, 26 L. J., N. S., 73. Ex parte Ashby, re Daniel, 25 L. T., 188

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4. A banker cannot take a Bill of Sale on the whole property of his debtor, as such an instrument is an act of bankruptcy

Lacon v. Liffen, 32 L. J., Chanc., 315. Hassels v. Simpson, 1 Doug., 89. Giebert v. Spooner, 1 M. & W., 714. Smith v. Cannan, 2 E. & B., 35, 45, 22 L. J., Q. B., 290. Woodhouse v. Murray, L. R., 2 Q. B., 638. Ex parte Foxley, in re Nurse, L. R., 3 Ch. Ap., 515

5. An instrument, stating that goods are deposited as a security for a loan, even though containing a power of sale in default of payment, does not require to be stamped as a mortgage deed

Harris v. Birch, 9 M. & W., 591. Attenborough v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, 11 Exch., 461. See also Franklin v. Neate, 13 M. & W., 481

Policies of Life Assurance as Security

5. 1. A banker sometimes takes a Policy of Life Assurance as security for a Debt. In such case, he should give notice to the office of the assignment; as, in the event of his customer's bankruptcy, the Policy would vest in his assignees

It is a well-established principle that Choses-in-Action, or Rights, or a debt due to a trader, though assigned by him, is in his "order and disposition" in the event of his bankruptcy, even though the instrument recording the obligation be delivered over, unless notice of the assignment has been duly given to the obligor

Ryall v. Rowles, 1 Ves., sen., 348. Ex parte Arlaright, 3 M. D. & De G., 143. Ex parte Wood, 3 M. D. & De G., 315. Thompson v. Speirs, 13 Sim., 469. Ex parte Wilkinson, 13 Sim., 475. Belcher v. Bellamy, 2 Exch., 303. Thompson v. Tomkins, 2 Drew. & Sim., 8

2. Notice, as a rule, should be given to the officer representing the Company, who may either be the Chairman, the Directors, or the Secretary, according to the Deed of Constitution

Where a Company has authorised their agents to receive notices of assignments, it was held that where one of their agents had acted as attorney for the assignor and assignee of a Policy, that was sufficient notice to the Company

Gale v. Lewis, 9 Q. B., 730

3. But if the agent is not agent for that particular purpose, his knowledge of the assignment is not sufficient

Ex parte Patch, 7 Jur., 820. 12 L. J., N. S., Bank., 44

4. Such notice need not be in writing, verbal notice is sufficient; even though the office refuses to receive verbal notice

North British Insurance Co. v. Hallet, 7 Jur., N. S., 1263. Ex parte Masterman, 2 Mont. & Ay., 209. Ex parte Littledale, 6 M. D. & De G., 74

5. If the assignee has sent notice by post to the obligor, and the assignor becomes bankrupt before the notice reaches the obligor in the course of post, that is sufficient to take the case out of the Statute

Belcher v. Bellamy, 2 Exch., 303

6. Though the assignee is a partner in a mutual office, that is not sufficient notice to the Company

Thompson v. Speirs, 13 Sim., 469. Ex parte Wilkinson, 13 Sim., 475 7. In the case of an equitable mortgage by the mere deposit of the Policy, the assignees of a bankrupt cannot recover the Policy itself at law: but they may claim the debt from the Company, and give a valid discharge for it

Gibson v. Overbury, 7 M. & W., 555

8. If a Policy be deposited by way of equitable mortgage, the onus lies upon the assignees of the bankrupt to prove that the notice of assignment was not given to the office before the bankruptcy

Ec parte Sterens, 4 Dec. & Ch., 117

9. The banker must also have possession of the Policy. A memorandum of deposit of securities was given to a banker, stating that a Policy of Insurance on the life of the depositor was among them. The Policy, however, was not delivered, and was in the possession of the depositor at the time of his bankruptcy. Held that the Policy passed to his assignees, and the banker ranked among the general creditors

Ex parte Halifax, 2 M. D. & De G., 544

10. A condition of a Policy of Life Assurance was that it should be void if the assured died by his own hand, unless it had been assigned for valuable consideration six months before his death. The holder deposited it with his bankers, with a letter charging it with the payment of any debts that might be due to them at the time of his death; and three years afterwards committed suicide, being indebted his bankers. Held that the bankers were entitled to recover

Jones v. Consolidated Investment and Insurance Co., 26 Beav., 256 11. Bankers who had two Policies of Life Assurance deposited with them gave no notice to the offices; but the assured mentioned in conversation with the secretaries that the Policies were held by his bankers. He died bankrupt, and Stuart, V. C., held that the Policies remained in his order and disposition, and that his assignees were entitled to the proceeds

Eduards v. Martin, L. R., 1 Eq., 121

On Title Deeds taken as Security

6. 1. A banker frequently takes a deposit of Title Deeds by way of equitable mortgage to secure an advance. In all such cases he should have a written memorandum distinctly stating the purpose for which the deposit is made. A written memorandum of deposit is not, indeed, necessary, for there may be a valid deposit in equity without even a word spoken, when the possession of the securities cannot be accounted for in any other

way, the holder being a stranger to the title and deeds (a). But it is laid down that if there is no memorandum of deposit, the Court leans against considering the deposit as security for an antecedent debt (b)

(a) Bozon v. Williams, 3 Y. & J., 150

(b) Ex parte Martin, 4 Deac. & Ch., 457

2. If deeds are deposited with a person expressly as a security for a future advance, the creditor has no lien on them for an antecedent debt

Mountford v. Scott, 1 Turn. & Russ., 274

3. But if a banker has completed his equitable title by obtaining possession of the title deeds along with a memorandum stating the purpose of the deposit to be to secure payment of the mortgagor's antecedent debt and interest, as well as all future advances, he will be able to enforce his claim against all judgments of any sort recovered against the mortgagor after the date of the equitable mortgage

Whitworth v. Gaugain, 3 Hare, 416 affirmed, 1 Phil., 728. Casbert v. Att. General, 6 Price, 411

4. There must be an actual deposit of the title deeds to exclude the operation of the Statute of Frauds. An order to a third party to deposit a lease, when executed, is not sufficient

Ex parte Perry, 3 M. D. & De G., 252

5. An agreement to execute a mortgage with a delivery of the title deeds to have the agreement carried out, is an equitable mortgage from the date of the agreement

Edge v. Worthington, 1 Cox, 211. Ex parte Bruce, 1 Rose, 374. Hockley v. Bantock, 1 Russ., 141. Keys v. Williams, 3. Y. & Col., C. C., 55. Bulfin v. Dunne, 12 Ir. Ch. Rep., 67

6. To constitute an equitable mortgage it is not necessary that all the title deeds should be deposited, provided that real and material portions of them are

Ex parte Chippendale, 1 Deac., 67. Lucas v. Allen, 26 L. J., Ch., 18 7. A memorandum accompanying title deeds, stating the purpose for which they are deposited, is not an agreement for a mortgage, and does not require to be stamped

Meek v. Bayliss, 31 L. J., Ch., 448

8. A verbal agreement to deposit a lease when executed is not an equitable mortgage

Ex parte Coombe, 4 Madd., 219

9. To create an equitable sub-mortgage by deposit of deeds originally deposited as an equitable mortgage, it is not necessary to deposit with the second depositee the written memorandum deposited with the first

Ex parte Abel Smith, 2 M. D. & De G., 587

10. The expression "may advance," in the memorandum given with title deeds as an equitable mortgage, may include past as well as future advances, if it appears that the parties intended it

Ex parte Farley, 1 M. D. & De G., 683. Ex parte Abel Smith, 2 M. D. & De G., 587

11. A legal mortgage cannot be extended by parol (a); but an equitable mortgage may (b)

(a) Ex parte Hooper, 2 Rose, 328

(b) Ex parte Langston, 1 Rose, 26. 79. Ex parte Lloyd, Gl. & Jam., 389. De G., 124

Ex parte Kensington, 2 Ves. & Bea.,
Ex parte Nettleship, 2 M. D. &

12. An equitable mortgage is the same in effect as a legal mortgage, and a mortgagor will have six months to redeem

Parker v. Housefield, 2 My. & K., 419. Throp v. Gartside, 2 Y. & Col. Ex. Eq., 730. Meller v. Woods, 1 Keen, 16. But see 15 & 16 Vict. (1852), c. 86, s. 48

13. An equitable mortgagee, by deposit of a lease, is not compellable to take a legal assignment of the lease at the suit of the lessor, even though he has entered into possession of the premises and paid rent: nor is he liable to the lessor upon the covenants of the lease, as there is no privity of contract between him and the lessor

Moore v. Greg, 2 Phil., 717

14. If deeds are deposited with a person as an equitable mortgage, they are not to be considered as an equitable mortgage for a loan by another person, without a memorandum in writing

Ex parte Whitbread, 1 Rose, 299

15. A person conveyed certain property to trustees by a post nuptial settlement. Having obtained the deeds from the trustees, he deposited them with his bankers as an equitable mortgage for a loan. Held that the banker was not a purchaser within 27 Eliz. (1585), c. 4, s. 2, and the trustees were entitled to recover the deeds

Kerrison v. Dorrien, 9 Bing., 76

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