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2. The receiver of such an instrument cannot be charged with laches for not presenting it in due time for payment (b); nor for not giving notice of dishonour (c); nor even can it be used to prove a debt in bankruptcy (d)

3. Neither will equity relieve on the instrument (e); but if a person bound to give a stamped instrument gives one void under the stamp laws, equity will make him a good one ()

4. Taking an instrument void under the stamp laws does not avoid the consideration (g)

(a) Ruff v. Webb, 1 Esp., 128. Wilson v. Vysar, 4 Taunt., 288.

Bond v. Warden, 1 Coll., C. C., 583

(b) Wilson v. Vysar, 4 Taunt., 288

(c) Cundy v. Marriott, 1 B. & Ad., 696

(d) Manner, ex parte, 1 Rose, 68
(e) Price v. Toulmin, 5 Ves., 235

(f) Aylett v. Bennett, 1 Anst., 45

(g) Ruff v. Webb, 1 Esp., 129.

Wilson v. Kennedy, 1 Esp., 245.

Brown v. Watts, 1 Taunt, 353. Tyte v. Jones, 1 East., 58n. Aloes v. Hodgson, 7 T. R., 241

17. All instruments not allowed to be re-issued are upon payment to be cancelled and annulled by the person paying them; and if any one re-issue or negotiate them, or if the person paying them neglect to cancel them, he is to forfeit £50. The person issuing them is also liable for the duty, and any person taking them in payment is to forfeit £20

55 Geo. 3 (1815), c. 184, s. 19

18. 1. Bills and Notes made payable after date may be issued any number of times even by the principal debtor until the time when they become payable

2. But if they be paid at maturity by or on behalf of the prin cipal debtor, they are finally extinguished, and cannot be re-issued 3. If, however, they be not paid by or on behalf of the principal debtor, they may be re-issued under certain conditions

19. 1. A Bill or Note may be negotiated for the years after it has become payable

space of six

2. The Statute of Limitations prevents any action being taken after that period, either on the instrument or on the consideration (a); without a fresh promise in writing signed by the party to be

charged (b); or his agent (c); or by part payment of principal or interest

3. Such written promise or payment will revive the remedy for six years from its date

(a) 21 Jac. 1 (1623), c. 16, s. 3
(b) 9 Geo., 5 (1828), c. 14, s. 1

(c) 19 & 20 Vict. (1856), c. 97, s. 13

20. 1. Days of Grace are not allowed on any instruments payable on or after demand or at sight or presentation (a)

:

:

2. Instruments payable on demand are due and payable immediately no demand is necessary before action brought and the Statute of Limitations begins to run from their date (b) (a) 34 & 35 Vict. (1871), c. 74, s. 2 (b) Capp v. Lancaster, Cro. Eliz., 548. Moo., 444. Rumball v. Ball 10 Moo., 38. C. & M., 322. Norton v. Ellam, 2 M. & W., 461

Collins v. Benning, 12 Megginson v. Harper, 2

21. 1. Three days of grace are allowed on instruments payable after sight (a); at or after a fixed date, or a certain event

2. Such instruments are payable on, and not before (b), the last day of grace: no action can be brought, nor does the Statute of Limitations begin to run until the last day of grace has expired (e)

3. If the instrument is payable by instalments, days of grace are allowed on each instalment (d)

4. If the last day of grace be Sunday, Christmas Day, Good Friday, or a public fast or thanksgiving, the instrument is payable the day before (e)

5. By statute 34 Vict. (1871), c. 17, the following days are declared to be Bank Holidays

In England and Ireland-Easter Monday; the Monday in Whitsun week; the first Monday in August; the Twenty-sixth day of December, if a week day

In Scotland-New Year's Day; Christmas Day; (if either of these days falls on a Sunday, the next Monday shall be a Bank Holiday:) Good Friday; the first Monday of May; the first Monday of August

All Bills and Notes due and payable on these days shall be payable on the following day and in case of non-payment may

be noted and protested on the day next following on which they may be lawfully protested

If the day on which any notice of dishonour of an unpaid bill or note should be given; or any bill presented or received for acceptance, or accepted or forwarded to any referee or referees, is a bank holiday, such notice of dishonour shall be given, and such bill or note shall be presented or forwarded on the day next after such bank holiday

(a) Coleman v. Sayer, Stra., 829. Bellasis v. Hester 1 Ld. Raym., 280

(b) Wiffen v. Roberts, 1 Esp., 261

(c) Wittersheim v. Lady Carlisle, 1 H. Bla., 631

(d) Orridge v. Sherborne, 11 M. &. W., 374

(e) 7 & 8 Geo. 4 (1827), c. 15, s. 3

22. If any Bill, Note, Obligation, or Valuable Security made or become payable to bearer, be taken in exchange for any goods, merchandise, money, or other Bill, Note, Obligation, or Valuable Security, without the indorsement of the transferor, it is an unconditional sale of the security, and the transferee has no right of action against the transferor if it be not paid, either on the instrument or on the consideration

Bank of England v. Newman, 1 Ld. Raym., 442.

Ward v. Evans,

2 Ld. Raym., 298. Fenn v. Harrison, 3 T. R., 787. Ex parte
Shuttleworth, 2 Ves., jun., 368. Fydell v. Clarke, 1 Esp., 447.
Emlye v. Lye, 15 East., 7. Camidge v. Allenby, 6 B. & C., 373,
Guardians of Lichfield Union v. Green, 1 H. & N., 884.

23. 1. The transferor of a Bill or Note by mere delivery warrants the genuineness of the instrument, i.e., that it is not forged or fictitious; he does not warrant the solvency of the parties to it

2. But if he knew that the parties to it had failed, or if it be forged or fictitious, he is liable to refund payment to the transferee

Jones v. Ryde, 5 Taunt., 488. Bruce v. Bruce, 1 Marsh, 165. Gurney v. Womersley, 4 E. & B., 133. Gompertz v. Bartlett, 2 E. & B., 849. Fuller v. Smith, 1 C. & P., 197

24. A Bill, Note, Chose-in-action, Obligation, or Valuable Security is included under the words "goods and chattels" or "effects," in an Act of Parliament (a); or under an extent (b);

or a writ of fieri facias (c); in a will, unless there be words to negative such an inference (d); and in the clause of "reputed ownership" in bankruptcy (e)

(a) Slade v. Morley. 4 Co. Rep., 92b. Ford's Case, 12 Co. Rep, 1. Clayton's Case, Lytt., 86. Ryal v. Rowles, 1 Ves., sen., 348 (b) Byles on Bills, 3

(c) 1 & 2 Vict. (1838), c. 110, s. 12

(d) Anon., 1 P. Wms., 267. Campbell v. Prescott, 15 Ves., 500. Kendall v. Kendall, 4 Russ., C. C., 360. Parker v. Marchant, 1 Y. & Coll., C. C., 290

(e) Ryal v. Rowles 1 Ves., sen., 348. Ex parte Colvill, Mont., C. B., 110. Bozon v. Bolland, M. & Bl., 74. Hornblower v. Proud, 2 B. & Ald., 327. Ex parte Burton, 1 Gl. & J., 207. Belcher v. Campbell, 8 Q. B., 1. Ex parte Richardson, Buck, 483. Bartlett v. Bartlett, 1 De G. & J., 127. Edwards v. Cooper, 11 Q. B., 33. Bullock v. Dodds, 2 B. & Ald., 258. Cumming v. Bailey, 6 Bing., 366. Harman v. Fisher, 1 Cowp., 117

25. The property in an instrument remains in the owner until he has entirely parted with it: if he cuts it in two and sends one part by post, he does not lose the property in it till he has sent the other part, and he may reclaim the first part sent

Smith v. Munday, 3 E. & B., 22

26. 1. Instruments payable by a banker must, in general, be presented for payment during banking hours, otherwise such presentment is void (a)

2. But if the banker has a clerk stationed to give answers after hours, and the same answer is given as would have been given during hours, such presentment is sufficient (b)

3. Instruments payable by other persons may be presented for payment at any reasonable hour (c): between 8 and 9 p.m. is the latest hour yet decided to be reasonable (d)

(a) Parker v. Gordon,, Esp., 41; 7 East., 385. Elford v. Teed, 1 M. & S., 28. Whitaker v. Bank of England, 1 C. M. & R., 744 (b) Garnet v. Woodcock, 6 M. & S., 44. Henry v. Lee, 2 Chit., 124. Crook v. Jadis, 6 C. & P., 191

(c) Barclay v. Bailey, 2 Camp., 527.

Morgan v. Davidson, 1 Stark., 114. Wilkins v. Jadis, 1 Mo. & R., 47; 2 B. & Ad., 188 (d) Triggs v. Newnham, 1 C. & P., 631; 10 Moo., 249

27. A Bill, Note, or Valuable Security may be the subject of donatio mortis causá

Bank Notes. Drury v. Smith, P. Wms., 404. Ashton v. Dawson, 2 Coll., C. C., 363n. Clavering v. Yorke, 2 Coll. C. C., 363n. Miller v. Miller, 3 P. Wms., 356. Hill v. Chapman, 1 Bro., C. C.,

612

Bills of Exchange. Rankin v. Weguelin, 27 Beav., 309
Promissory Notes payable to donor's order unindorsed. Veal v.
Veal, 27 Beav., 19

Cheques.* Lawson v. Lawson, 1 P. Wms., 440. Snellgrave v.
Bayly, Ridg., ca. t. Hard., 202. Ward v. Turner, 2 Ves., sen., 431.
Tate v. Hilbert, 2 Ves., jun., 111. Bouts v. Ellis, 17 Beav., 121
Bank Deposit Receipt. Witt v. Amiss, 1 B. & S., 109.
Witt, 33 Beav., 19

Amiss v.

28. 1. If any Bill, Note, or Security for money be lost or destroyed, the right owner may sue any party to it, upon giving him an indemnity to the satisfaction of a court, judge, or master, against the claims of any other person upon it (a)

2. And such a security may be proved in bankruptcy (b)

3. If half of an instrument be lost or destroyed, the owner of the other half may enforce payment of it with or without an indemnity (c)

(a) 17 & 18 Vict. (1854), c. 125, s. 87

(b) Ex parte Greenway, 6 Ves., 812

(c) Mossop v. Eadon, 16 Ves., 430. Redmayne v. Burton, 2 L. T., N. S., 324

29. 1. If any Valuable Security be lost in its transmission through the post, or by any conveyance which the person who should receive it directs, the loss falls upon him (a)

2. No action lies against the Postmaster-General for the loss of any instrument during its transmission through the post (b) * In several text books of authority it is laid down absolutely that a cheque cannot be the suject of a gift mortis causâ (Roper on Legacies vol. i., p. 11; Williams on Executors, vol. i., p. 723; Byles on Bills, 9th Edit., p. 170; White and Tudor's lead. ca. in Eq., vol i., p. 743), and in the case of Hewitt v. Kaye (L. R., 6 Eq., 189), Lord Romilly, M. R., laid it down as an absolute doctrine that a cheque is incapable of being made a gift mortis causa. But having been obliged to investigate the question in my Digest of the Law of Bills of Exchange, as prepared for the Digest of Law Commissioners, I was satisfied that the doctrine stated by the writers, and the decision of Lord Romilly, above mentioned, is erroneous; and I accordingly excluded the case of Hewitt v. Kaye from my Digest. My reasons for so doing are given at full length in that Digest; but are, of course, far too long. to be inserted here. I merely state this that I may not be supposed to have overlooked the case of Hewitt v. Kaye

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