without violation of the act, if the average weight of not less than 25 does not exceed the permitted maximum or fall short of the specified nominal weights during 24 hours after baking. Undoubt edly, very few private consumers purchase at one time as many as 25 loaves of the same standard size or unit. And it is admitted that the sale of a lesser number not within the permitted tolerance does not constitute an offense. Plaintiffs in error do not claim that it is impossible to make loaves which for at least 24 hours after baking will weigh not less than the specified minimum weights, but they insist that the difference permitted by the act between the weight of loaves when taken from the oven and their weight 24 hours later is too small, and that it is impossible for bakers to carry on their business without sometimes exceeding the maximum or falling short of the minimum average weights. Any loaves of the same unit at any time on hand during 24 hours after baking may be selected to make up the 25 or more to be weighed in order to test compliance with the act. Therefore, if only a small percentage of the daily output of the loaves in large bakeries shall exceed the maximum when taken from the oven or fall below the minimum weight within 24 hours, it will always be possible to make up lots of 25 or more loaves whose average weight will be above or below the prescribed limits.

"The parties introduced much evidence on the question whether it is possible for bakers to comply with the law. A number of things contribute to produce unavoidable variations in the weights of loaves at the time of and after baking. The water content of wheat, of flour, of dough, and of bread immediately after baking varies substantially and is beyond the control of bakers. Gluten is an important element in flour, and flour rich in gluten requires the addition of more water in bread-making and makes better bread than does flour of low or inferior gluten

content. Exact weights and me ments used in dough-making cann attained. Losses in weight while ( is being mixed, during fermentation while the bread is in the oven vary cannot be avoided or completely trolled. No hard or fast rule or formua is followed in break-making. There are many variable elements. Bread made from good flour loses more weight by evaporation of moisture after baking than does bread made from inferior flours. Defendants' tests were made principally with loaves which were wrapped so as to retard evaporation; and it was shown that by such wrapping the prohibited variations in weight may be avoided. On the other hand, the evidence clearly estab lishes that there are periods when evaporation under ordinary conditions of temperature and humidity prevailing in Nebraska exceed the prescribed tolerance and make it impossible to comply with the law without wrapping the loaves or employing other artificial means to prevent or retard evaporation. And the evidence indicates that these periods are of such frequency and duration that the enforcement of the penalities prescribed for violations would be an intolerable burden upon bakers of bread for sale. The tests which were described in the evidence and referred to in the opinion are not discredited because 'made with bread manufactured in the regular course of business.' The reasonableness of the regu lation complained of fairly may be measured by the variations in weight of bread so made. The act does not require bakers to select ingredients or to apply processes in the making of bread that will result in a product that will not vary in weight during 24 hours after baking as much as does bread properly made by the use of good wheat flour. As indicated by the opinion of the State Supreme Court, ingredients selected to lessen evaporation after baking would make an inferior and unsalable bread. It would be unreason

able to compel the making of such a product or to prevent making of good bread in order to comply with the provisions of the act fixing maximum weights. The act is not a sanitary measure. It does not relate to the preservation of bread in transportation or in the market; and it applies equally whether the bread is sold at the bakeries or is shipped to distant places for sale. Admittedly, the provision in question is concerned with weights only. The act does not regulate moisture content or require evaporation to be retarded by the wrapping of loaves or otherwise. The uncontradicted evidence shows that there is a strong demand by consumers for unwrapped bread. It is wholesome article of food, and plaintiffs in error and other bakers have a right to furnish it to their customers. The lessening of weight of bread by evaporation during 24 hours after baking does not reduce its food value. It would be unreasonable to prevent unwrapped bread being furnished to those who want it in order technically to comply with a weight regulation and to keep within limits of tolerance so narrow as to require that ordinary evaporation be retarded by wrapping or other artificial means. It having been shown that during some periods in Nebraska bread made in a proper and usual way will vary in weight more than at the rate of 2 ounces to the pound during 24 hours after baking, the enforcement of the provision necessarily will have the effect of prohibiting the sale of unwrapped loaves when evaporation exceeds the tolerance.

"No question is presented as to the power of the state to make regulations safeguarding or affecting the qualities of bread. Concretely, the sole purpose of fixing the maximum weights, as held by the Supreme Court, is to prevent the sale of a loaf weighing anything over 9 ounces for a half-pound loaf, and the sale of a loaf weighing anything over 18 ounces for a pound loaf, and so on.

The per

mitted tolerance, as to the half-pound loaf, gives the baker the benefit of only 1 ounce out of the spread of 8 ounces, and as to the pound loaf the benefit of only 2 ounces out of a like spread. There is no evidence in support of the thought that purchasers have been or are likely to be induced to take a 92 or a 10-ounce loaf for a pound ( 16-ounce) loaf, or an 181⁄2 or a 19-ounce loaf for a pound and a half (24-ounce) loaf, and it is contrary to common experience and unreasonable to assume that there could be any danger of such deception. Imposition through short weights readily could have been dealt with in a direct and effective way. For the reasons stated, we conclude that the provision, that the average weights shall not exceed the maximums fixed, is not necessary for the protection of purchasers against imposition and fraud by short weights and is not calculated to effectuate that purpose, and that it subjects bakers and sellers of bread to restrictions which are essentially unreasonable and arbitrary, and is therefore repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment."

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS.

DEATH FROM TYPHOID FROM DRINKING POLLUTED WATER AS WITHIN ACCIDENT POLICY.-The Supreme Court of Illinois, in the case of Christ v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 141 N. E. 161, holds that where a railroad employee drank water from pipes intended to carry drinking water, but which in fact contained polluted water due to a defective gate valve intended to keep the polluted water separate from the drinking water, with the result that he became ill with typhoid and died, death was caused by "external, violent and accidental means" within an insurance policy.

The Court stated in part: "Typhoid fever is a disease, and, as stipulated, it is idiopathicthat is, a primary disease, not preceded and occasioned by any other disease. It is due to a specific germ, which is ordinarily taken into the system with food or drink. A death by typhoid fever cannot be regarded as accidental unless it appears that the disease itself was occasioned by accidental means. The means by which disease is acquired being the entrance of the

typhoid bacilli into the system, if the means of such entrance are accidental the resulting typhoid fever and its fatal effect may also be said to be accidental.

"Typhoid fever is always a disease, but it does not follow, as is argued for the plaintiff in error, that the manner in which the disease is contracted is immaterial, or, as is assumed in the argument, that there was no bodily injury. Disease causes bodily injury when it prevents the organs of the body from performing their functions and finally produces death. An accident causing a disease which produces these results is the proximate cause of these results. Death from blood poisoning following an accident is the direct or proximate result of the accident."

In Lewis v. Ocean Accident Corp., 224 N. Y. 18, 120 N. E. 56, 7 A. L. R. 1129, the insured punctured an ordinary pimple on his lip with a pin, the lip became infected, and his death followed in a few days from inflammation of the brain, caused by the infection. The court said the puncture of itself was harmless; that the infection unexpectedly caused "was something unforeseen, unexpected, extraordinary, and unlooked-for mishap, and so an accident." Two other cases grew out of this same occurrence (Interstate Business Men's Accident Ass'n v. Lewis, 257 Fed. 241, 168 C. C. A. 325; Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n v. Lewis, 257 Fed. 552, 168 C. C. A. 536), in which judgments recovered upon accident policies were affirmed.

In Aetna Life Ins Co. v. Portland Gas Co., 229 Fed. 552, 144 C. C. A. 12, L. R. A. 1916D, 1027, a suit was brought upon an employer's liability policy by which the insurance company agreed to indemnify the insured against damages on account of bodily injuries or death accidentally suffered by its employees. Certain employees of the assured in the course of their work contracted typhoid fever from the water furnished to them by the employer, on account of which the employer was compelled to pay damages to such employees. Action was brought to recover the amount of the damages which the employer was compelled to pay, and the only question presented for review was whether the harm done the workmen constituted a bodily injury accidentally received or suffered by them within the meaning of the policy. The argument was made that there was no accident, but that in drinking the water the workmen were only satisfying an actual want, but it was held that there was an accident which occurred by reason of the unexpected fact that the water contained typhoid germs, the court holding that there was no substantial distinction between the case before it and the case which would have been presented if the water the employees had

drunk had contained virulent poisons. The court cited and relied upon the case of Hood & Sons v. Maryland Casualty Co., 206 Mass., 223, 92 N. E. 329, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1192, 138 Am. St. Rep. 379, which was also a suit upon an employer's liability policy. The action was to recover damages which the employer had been compelled to pay to a hostler employed in its stables who had the care of horses which were afterward found to have been suffering from glanders and were killed. Barry, the employee, was directed to assist in cleaning up the stalls, but no notice was given to him that the horses had suffered from glanders. He was subsequently attacked by the disease, and brought an action against the employer for negligently putting him to work on the horses and exposing him to the disease. He recovered a judgment, and the employer brought suit against the insurance Company and recovered the amount which it was compelled to pay. It was held that the disease from which the employee suffered was due to an accident, and that he sustained bodily injuries accidentally suffered. It was said:

"The intention is, as has been said, to afford full protection and indemnity to the assured. Any accident that causes bodily injury in any way is included. Bodily injury is more commonly associated perhaps with physical force of some sort, but in the absence of anything in the policy limiting it to that we do not see how or why it can or should be so restricted. A liability growing out of an accident which results in infecting the workman with a loathsome and dangerous disease and thereby causes him great and perhaps lasting . . . injury, would seem to be as much within the spirit and intent of the contract as if the injury had been caused by a blow or some other equally obvious manifestation of force."

In Vennen v. New Dells Lumber Co., 161 Wis. 370, 154 N. W. 640, L. R. A. 1916A, 273, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 293, water for the boilers was car ried in a different set of pipes from those in which water for drinking by the employees was carried, but the water from the two sets of pipes became mixed, and the deceased by reason thereof drank the polluted water, which caused him to have typhoid fever and die. In an action under the Wisconsin Compensation Act, which provided for compensation where the injury was proximately caused by accident, it was held that the employee had sustained an accidental injury. It was an accident that the insured drank water containing typhoid bacilli as much as if he had drunk from a glass containing carbolic acid supposing it was clear water. The agency causing the accident-the bacilli-was external.

In Paul v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 112 N. Y. 472, 20 N. E. 347, 3 L. R. A. 443 (a case in which

death was caused by inhaling gas), the New York Court of Appeals held that the gas in the atmosphere, as an external cause, was a violent agency in the sense that it worked on the intestate so as to cause his death, and the fact that death was the result of accident, or is unnatural, imports an external and violent agency as the cause.

STATE CANNOT REGULATE PRICE OF GAS CHARGED BY INTERSTATE PIPE LINE COMPANY.-The case of State of Missouri ex rel. v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 44 Sup. Ct. 514, and two other cases consolidated with it, hold that a State Public Utilities Commission cannot regulate wholesale prices chargeable to local distributing companies, operating under state franchises for gas, by one transporting gas in interstate commerce by pipe line and exercising no state franchise right, though Congress has not acted.

"The business of the Supply Company, with an exception not important here, is wholly interstate. The sales and deliveries are in large quantities not for consumption, but for resale to consumers. There is no relation of agency between the Supply Company and the distributing companies, or other relation except that of seller and buyer (Public Utilities Comm. v. Landon, 249 U. S. 236, 244-245, 39 Sup. Ct. 268, G3 L. Ed. 577), and the interest of the former in the commodity ends with its delivery to the latter, to which title and control thereupon pass absolutely. The question is therefore presented in its simplest form, and, if the claim of state power be upheld, it is difficult to see how it could be denied in any case of interstate transportation and sale of gas. Both federal courts denied the power. The state court conceded that the business was interstate and subject to federal control, but rested its decision the other way upon the fact that Congress had not acted in the matter and that, in the absence of such action, it was within the regulating power of the state.

The question is controlled by familiar principles. Transportation of gas from one state to another is interstate commerce, and the sale and delivery of it to the local distributing companies is a part of such commerce. In Public Utilities Comm. v. Landon, supra, at page 245 (39 Sup. Ct. 269) this court said:

"That the transportation of gas through pipe lines from one state to another is interstate commerce may not be doubted; also, it is clear that as part of such commerce the receivers might sell and deliver gas so transported to local distributing companies free from unreasonable interference by the state."'

REPORT OF VISIT TO LONDON BY STAFF CORRESPONDENT

The purpose of the visit to London, as expressed in many speeches before the Bar Association, was education-a broadening of American knowledge of both ancient and modern England. It turned out to be one of splendid entertainment and diversion as well.

If the success of an enterprise may be measured by the absence of friction and the presence of a well ordered program, perfectly executed, one is justified in voting in the affirmative regarding the American visit to London. Those persons acquainted with the thoughtful and methodical habits and hospitality of the cultured Englishman have no surprise awaiting them; others were deeply gratified.

The average mind turns readily to the material where questions of comfort play an important part in an enterprise. The committee in charge had so well performed its duty with reference to transportation that the voyage on the three chartered ships of the Cunard Line was one of pleasure in itself. The pleasures and benefits derived from close association with some of the most splendid and eredite people in the world needs no comment and that measure may be used with a sense of conservatism in describing the American and the English Bench and Bar. The American judges and lawyers were at their best; were sober-minded and deeply thoughtful. One could not help observing the impression that they were going to visit a shrine, the home of the Common Law that they had studied and the spirit of which they wished thoroughly to understand. They were seeking inspection instead of entertainment or diversion. The conversation on the boat tended towards the biography of Blackstone and Hale and the law givers and historians. To this end careful study was given to the many maps that had been prepared by our thoughtful English hosts.

These greatly facilitated prompt and beneficial visits in London and its environs, prevented much hesitation and doubt and saved a great deal of valuable time. There was no observable seasickness. The gigantic size of the ships gave assurance against anything but a very rough and stormy sea which was not encountered and one soon became accustomed to periodic rains in London and provided against them.

The boats carrying the lawyers arrived at different English ports on Friday and Saturday, July 18th and 19th. The "Berengaria," on which was the headquarters and the officers including the Hughes, arrived at Southampton, Saturday morning, July 19th, at daybreak, There was no hurry. The first special train followed by two others, was boarded without hurry or worry and arrived in London at Victoria Station at ten o'clock, where it was met by a special committee of English lawyers who paid their respects to President Hughes and the other officials, of the Association, extending to them a genuine welcome to England. It was the first appearance of the silk hat, cutaway coat and cane that soon became as common as necessary. Headquarters were established at Hotel Cecil on The Strand with the regular officers in charge assisted by several very competent English girls. A few doors up the corridor the English had established an office with a staff of about twenty. The thoroughness of English organization was everywhere apparent. It was not necessary to know what one needed in order to enquire for it. Suitable signs designated the various things that the American visitor ought to know, where he should go and what entertainment would be provided for him. A beautifully engraved card of invitation and a gold button or badge proved an open sesame and the former a guide. Many of these invitations were artistic gems, that will be treasured as souvenirs. This went so far as to supply information regard

ing tours on the Continent, in Wales, Scotland and Ireland and the attendant outlay of time and expense.

Saturday afternoon was devoted largely to shopping, because many members had not equipped themselves with silk hats, cutaway coats, walking sticks and gloves. They would have been marked men without them. These they thought could be acquired in London with less trouble than would have been incident to transporting them across the ocean. The result was that Sunday morning found the American contingent equipped to the last sartorial detail with a few exceptions.

The first item on the official program were services Sunday morning, July 20th, in Westminster Abbey. Although it would appear that the entire American

Canadian delegation and many Englishmen were present, all visitors seemed to have been accommodated. The second event of real significance was an official welcome by the English lawyers and the Canadian Bar Association on Monday, July 21st, at ten o'clock at Westminster Hall, erected by William Rufus. On behalf of the hosts, addresses of welcome were made by the Lord High Chancellor (Viscount Haldane), Sir James Aiken, President of the Canadian Bar, the Attorney-General of England and the Chairman of the Law Society (The Solici tors). On behalf of America, responses were made by Secretary of State Hughes, and we wish here to refer to him as Presi dent Hughes of the American Bar Association, and Mr. Justice Sutherland of the Supreme Court. The Americans were delighted with their speakers and felt proud of the dignified and wholesome manner in which America's "best foot had been put forward." It is well to say here that throughout the visit the American speakers did credit to their country.

Monday afternoon, between four and seven, Lord and Lady Phillimore's Garden Party was well attended. It afforded an unusual opportunity for the renewal of old acquaintances between English and