passengers which is so unreasonable as to practically destroy the value of the property of the companies engaged in the carrying business, deprives such companies of their property without due process of law, and is void, and the enforcement of such a tariff of rates will be enjoined in equity.15

§ 285. Same State law requiring transfer facilities at railroad intersections.-Railway companies owning connecting, crossing or intersecting lines of railroads, are not deprived of their property without due process of law by a judgment rendered by a state court pursuant to and in conformity with a statute of the state, requiring them to provide at the place of connection, crossing, or intersection, ample facilities by track connections for transferring any and all cars used in the regular business of their respective lines of road from the line or tracks of one of the companies to those of the other, and to provide at such place equal and reasonable facilities for the interchange of cars and traffic between their respective lines, and for the receiving, forwarding, and delivering property and cars to and from their respective lines, when such judgment is, under the facts of the particular case, a reasonable exercise of the power of regulation in favor of the interests and for the accommodation of the public, and does not unduly, unfairly, or improperly affect the pecuniary rights or interests of the companies; although to carry out the judgment, it may be necessary for the companies affected by it to acquire additional lands by the exercise of the power of eminent domain and will result in additional expense. 16 In deciding the case cited, the supreme court, speaking through Mr. Justice Peckham, said: "Adher

125 U. S. 181 (31:650); Minneapolis & S. L. R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 29 (32:586); Charlotte, C. & A. R. Co. v. Gibbes, 142 U. S. 386 (35:1051); Covington & L. Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578, 598 (41:560); Gulf C. S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150 (41:666); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466 (42:819).

15 St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Gill, 156 U. S. 649 (39:567); Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U. S. 307 (29:636); Dow v. Beidelman,

125 U. S. 618 (31:841); Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418 (33:970); Chicago & G. T. R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339 (36:176); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co., 154 U. S. 362 (38: 1014); Covington & L. Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578, 598 (41:560); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. North Carolina Corp. Com., 206 U. S. 1-27 (51:933). 16 Wisconsin, M. & P. R. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287, 302 (45: 194).

ing strictly to the question involved in this case, the validity or invalidity of the judgment actually rendered, we are met by the objection of the plaintiff in error that the judgment itself is necessarily and inherently illegal, because upon the conceded facts, if the judgment be enforced, it can only result in taking the property of the plaintiff in error without due process of law, and in refusing it the equal protection of the laws, and in depriving if of its liberty to contract with such persons or corporations as it may choose. We think not one of these objections tenable. At common law the courts would be without power to make such an order as was made in the case by the state court. Legislative authority would be necessary in order to give power to the courts to render a judgment of this kind. If power were granted by the legislature, and it amounted in the particular case simply to a fair, reasonable,. and appropriate regulation of the business of the corporation,. when considered with regard to the interests both of the company and the public, the legislation would be valid, and would' furnish, therefore, ample authority for the court to enforce it. Railroads have from the very outset been regarded as public highways, and the right and the duty of the government to regulate, in a reasonable and proper manner, the conduct and business of railroad corporations have been founded upon that fact. Constituting public highways of a most important character, the function of proper regulation by the government springs from the fact that in relation to all highways the duty of regulation is governmental in its nature. At the present day there is no denial of these propositions. It is because they are such highways that the land, upon which the rails are laid, and also that which may be necessary for the other purposes of the corporation, is said to be used for a public purpose, and on that ground the power of eminent domain which is given them is held to be a constitutional exercise of legislative authority. The right of the legislature to tax in furtherance of such use is founded upon the same consideration that the use is a public one, and therefore taxation in support of such use is valid. The companies hold a public franchise, and governmental supervision is therefore valid. They are organized for the public interests and to subserve primarily the public good and convenience. While this power of regulation exists, it is

also to be remembered that the legislature cannot under the guise of regulation interfere with the proper conduct of the business of the railroad corporation in matters which do not fairly belong to the domain of reasonable regulation. The only question arising as each case comes up for decision is whether in the particular case the power has been duly exercised."' 17

$286. Same-Same-Limitations of the fourteenth amendment operate on all instrumentalities of the state government.The limitations imposed by the fourteenth amendment upon the states refer to and operate upon all the instrumentalities of the state-its legislative, executive, and judicial authorities-and whoever, by virtue of public or official position under a state government, deprives another of his property without due process of law, violates the constitutional inhibition against the state; as he acts in the name of and for the state, and is clothed with the state's power, his act is the act of the state.18 The state may not, by any of its agencies, disregard the inhibitions of the amendment. Its judicial authorities may keep strictly within the letter of the statutes prescribing the forms of procedure to be followed in the courts, and which may be ample for the protection of the rights of the citizen, and may give the parties interested the fullest opportunity to be heard, and yet they may, in their final judgments and decrees, deny the rights secured by the constitutional provision. Compensation for private property taken for public use is an essential element of due process of law as ordained by the fourteenth amendment, and the final judgment of a state court, under authority of which the property is in fact taken, is to be deemed the act of the state within the meaning of the amendment; and if, by such judgment, private property be taken by the state or under its direction, for public use, without compensation made or secured to the owner, the affirmance of that judgment by the highest court of the state is a denial by the state of the rights secured to the owner by the due process clause of the amendment."

17 Wisconsin, M. & P. R. Co. v. Jacobson, supra.

18 Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 263 (41:979); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 347 (25:676); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370 (26:567); Yeck Wo

v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (30: 220); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 579 (40:1078); Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34 (38:896); Ry. v. Taylor, 86 Fed. Rep. 184.

19 Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 263 (41:979).

§ 287. Same-State statute denying non-resident corporation equality in distribution of insolvent's assets. A state statute which denies to corporations of other states equality with resident creditors in the distribution of the assets of an insolvent corporation doing business in the state, does not deprive such non-resident corporations of their property without due process of law; 20 nor is a non-resident mortgagee deprived of his property without due process of law by a state statute which subordinates his claim to the claims of resident creditors.21

§ 288. Due process of law in state taxation-Strict judicial procedure not required.-Neither in the states of the American union, nor in England prior to the revolution, have taxes, as a general rule, been collected by regular judicial proceedings in the regular and ordinary courts of justice; but the necessities of government, the usages of the people, and the nature of the governmental power exercised, and the duties to be performed by public officials, have established a mode of procedure in the levy, assessment, and collection of taxes, which is less formal and materially different from strict and formal judicial procedure, but which, however, is and always has been regarded and held as due process of law.22 Where life, or liberty, or the title, or possession of property, is involved, due process of law requires that there be a regular course of judicial proceedings, which imply that the party to be affected shall have notice and an opportunity to be heard; but where the taking of property is in the enforcement of a tax, the proceeding is necessarily less formal, and whether notice to the owner is at all necessary may depend upon the character of the tax and the manner in which its amount is determinable. The necessity of revenue for the support of the government does not admit of the delay attendant upon regular proceedings in a court of justice, and they are not required for the enforcement of taxes and assessments. In determining what is due process of law, the courts will take into consideration the cause and object of the taking, whether under the power of eminent domain, or the taxing power, and, if under the latter, the nature of the tax, whether general, or a

20 Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239 (43:432).

21 Sully v. American Nat. Bank, 178 U. S. 289 (44:1072).

22 Kelly v. Pittsburg, 104 U. S. 78, 83 (26:658).

local assessment for local improvements; and if the procedure or process adopted be suitable to the special case and adapted to the end to be attained, it will be adjudged due process, but if found to be arbitrary, oppressive and unjust, it will be declared to be not due process of law.23 There are some kinds or forms of taxation, in which the owners of the property upon which the tax or burden is to be imposed are entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard at some stage of the proceeding; and in all such cases the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution is an inhibition upon the states, imposing a limitation not upon the taxing power itself, but upon the mode and manner of its exercise; and this constitutional restraint upon state procedure in taxation will be enforced by the federal judiciary, and more especially by the supreme court upon writ of error to the highest court of the state, in all cases where the objection is duly made and the right under the constitutional provision is set up in the manner and at the time required by the laws and regulations controlling federal procedure.24

23 Hagar V. Reclamation District, 111 U. S. 701, 715 (28:569); Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 115 U. S. 321, 339 (29: 414); Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232 (33:892); McMillen v. Davidson, 95 U. S. 37, 42 (24:335); Winona & St. Peter Land Co. v. Minnesota, 159 U. S. 526, 539 (40:247); Pittsburg, C., C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 241 (38:1031).

24 Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 108 (24:616); Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U. S. 701, 715 (28:569); Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. 356 (31:768); Winona Land Co. v. Minnesota, 159 U. S. 537 (40:251); Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 155 (41:387); Walston v. Nevin, 128 U. S. 578, 582 (32:544); Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 332 (29:417); Lent v. Till

son, 140 U. S. 316, 334 (35:419); Paulson v. City of Portland, 149 U. S. 30, 44 (37:637); Warts v. Hoagland, 114 U. S. 615 (29:232); Bellingham Bay & British Columbia Railroad Co. v. City of New Whatcom, 172 U. S. 314, 320 (43: 460); Stanley v. Albany Co., 121 U. S. 550 (30:1003); Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691 (26: 238); United States v., Memphis, 97 U. S. 284 (24:937); Laramie County v. Albany Co., 92 U. S. 307 (23:552); Palmer V. McMahon, 133 U. S. 660 (33:772); Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232 (33:892); Pittsburg, C., C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421 (38:1031); Kelly v. Pittsburg, 104 U. S. 78 (26:658); Webster v. Fargo, 187 U. S. 394 (45:912); Shumate v. Heman, 181 U. S. 402 (45:922); Farrell V. West Chicago Park Comm'rs, 187