ence or distinction which has a just and reasonable relation to the object sought to be accomplished by the legislatures."

§ 302. Same-Rules stated by supreme court of Wisconsin.The rules upon this subject of classification have been stated by the supreme court of Wisconsin as follows:

"Legislative discretion to classify persons for the purposes of legislation is substantially the same under the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution as under the state constitutional provision prohibiting special legislation. The rules on the subject which generally prevail, and which have received the sanction of this court, are as follows: (1) All classification must be based upon substantial distinctions which make one class really different from another. (2) The classification adopted must be germane to the purposes of the law. (3) The classification must not be based upon existing conditions only; it must not be so constituted as to prevent additions to the number included within the class. (4) To whatever class a law may apply, it must apply equally to each member thereof. Whether any particular classification made by the legislature satisfies those requisites is primarily a legislative question. The field covered by its discretionary power in the matter is very broad. It is, of course, not above judicial control, but it is safe from restraint so long as any reasonable ground can be discovered to support it. The courts can apply no test to the matter except the constitutional test. That of the mere wisdom of the measure is exclusively for legislative consideration." 58

$303. Same-State statute abolishing common law fellowservant rule in personal injury cases.-A state statute which provides that every railroad company organized or doing business in the state shall be liable for all damages done to any em

57 Missouri Pac R. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205 (32:107); Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Herrick, 127 U. S. 210 (32:109); Chicago K. & W. R. Co. v. Pontius, 157 U. S. 209 (39:675); Tullis v. Lake Erie & W. R. Co., 175 U. S. 348 (44:192); St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Mathews, 165 U. S. 1 (41:611); Atchison, Topeka & S. F. R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 69 (43:909); Ry.

Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150 (41:666); Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512, 524 (29:463); Cargill Co. v. Minnesota Railroad & Warehouse Comm., 180 U. S. 452 (45:619).

58 Julien v. Model Building, L. & I. Ass'n, (Wis.) 61 L. R. A. 668; Johnson v. Milwaukee, 88 Wis. 383, 60 N. W. 270.

ploye of such company in consequence of any negligence of its agents, or by any mismanagement of its engineers or other employes, to any person sustaining such damage, does not deprive such companies of the equal protection of the laws within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution. The hazardous character of the business of operating a railway calls for special legislation with respect to railroad corporations, having for its object the protection of their employes, as well as the safety of the public. The business of other corporations is not subject to similar dangers to their employes, and, therefore, no objections can be made to such legislation on the ground of its making an unjust discrimination. And the mere fact that the regular employment of the person injured was that of a bridge builder does not take him out of the operation of the statute, if the injury happened to him while he was engaged in labor directly connected with the operation of the railroad.60

59

§ 304. Same State statute making railroad companies absolutely responsible for damages by fire from their engines.— Railroad companies are not deprived of the equal protection of the laws, within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, by a state statute, applicable alike to those organized both before and after its enactment, providing that every railroad corporation owning or operating a railroad in the state shall be responsible in damages for property of any person injured or destroyed by fire communicated by its locomotive engines, and giving such company an insurable interest in all the property along its route, and authorizing it to insure such property for its protection against such damage. The ratio decidendi of the cases upholding such legislation is that: The motives. which have induced, and the reasons which justify such legislation may be summed up thus: Fire, while necessary for many uses of civilized man, is a dangerous, volatile, and de

59 Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205 (32:107); Chicago, K. & W. R. Co. v. Pontius, 157 U. S. 209, 212 (39:675); Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Herrick, 127 U. S. 210, 212 (32:109); Tullis v. Lake Erie & W. R. Co., 175 U. S. 348 (44:192).

60 Chicago, K. & W. R. Co. v. Pontius, 157 U. S. 209, 212 (39: 675).

61 St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Matthews, 165 U. S. 1, 27 (41:611); Atchison, Topeka & S. F. R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96 (43:909).

structive element, which often escapes in the form of sparks, capable of being wafted afar through the air, and of destroying any combustible property on which it may fall; and which, when it has once gained headway, can hardly be arrested or controlled. Railroad corporations, in order the better to carry on the public object of their creation, the sure and prompt transportation of passengers and goods, have been authorized by statute to use locomotive engines propelled by steam generated by fires lighted upon their engines. It is within the authority of the legislature to make adequate provision for protecting the property of others against loss or injury by sparks from such engines. The right of the citizen not to have his property burned without compensation is no less to be regarded than the right of the corporation to set it on fire. To require the utmost care and diligence of the railroad corporations in taking precautions against the escape of fire from their engines. might not afford sufficient protection to the owners of property in the neighborhood of the railroads. When both parties are equally faultless, the legislature may properly consider it to be just that the duty of insuring private property against loss. or injury caused by the use of dangerous instruments should rest upon the railroad company which employs the instruments. and creates the peril for its own profit, rather than upon the owner of the property, who has no control over or interest in those instruments. Such a statute is not a penal one, imposing a punishment for a violation of law; but it is purely remedial, making the party doing a lawful act for its own profit liable in damages to the innocent party injured thereby, and giving to that party the whole damages measured by the injury suffered.62

§ 305. Same-State statute making proof of fire by railroad engine prima facie evidence of negligence-Attorney's fees.Railroad companies are not deprived of the equal protection of the laws by a state statute which provides that, in all actions against any railway company organized or doing business in the state, for damages by fire caused by the operating of the railroad, proof by the plaintiff of the fact that the fire com

62 St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Matthews, 165 U. S. 1, 27 (41:611). "At common law, every man appears to have been obliged, by the

custom of the realm, to keep his fire safe so that it should not injure his neighbors; and to have been liable to an action, if a fire

plained of was caused by operating the railroad and the amount of damages sustained by it shall be prima facic evidence of negligence on the part of the railroad company, and allowing the plaintiff a reasonable attorney's fee, in case of recovery, to become a part of the judgment.c

§ 306. Same-When statute allowing attorney's fee is penalty for failure to pay debt.-A state statute, enacted not in the exercise of the police power, allowing an attorney's fee to the plaintiffs in actions against railroad corporations on claims not exceeding in amount fifty dollars, for personal services rendered or labor done, or for damages, or for overcharges on freight, or for stock killed or injured, is simply a statute imposing a penalty on railroad corporations for a failure to pay the class of debts named, and is not one to enforce compliance with any police regulation, and is violative of the fourteenth amendment.6*

§307. Same-State statute requiring railroad companies to fence track-Double damages for killing stock.-A state statute which requires all railroad corporations formed or operating a railroad in the state to fence their railroads where the same passes through, along, or adjoining inclosed or cultivated fields or uninclosed lands with gates, and to construct and maintain cattle guards, and in case of failure to do so making such corporations liable in double the amount of all damages done by their agents, engines, or cars, to live stock, or damage done by live stock escaping from or coming upon such lands, fields or inclosures, does not deny such railroad corporations the equal protection of the laws.65

§ 308. Same-Regulation of warehouses and elevators.-A state statute which declares that, all elevators and warehouses in which grain is received, stored, shipped or handled, and which are situated on the right of way of any railroad, depot

lighted in his own house, or upon his land, by the act of himself or his servants or guests, burned the house or property of his neighbor, unless its spreading to his neighbor's property was caused by a violent tempest or other unavoidable accident which he could not have foreseen." St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Matthews, supra.

63 Atchison, Topeka & S. F. R Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96, 125 (43:909).

64 Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 174 U. S. 96, 125 (43:909).

65 Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512 (29:463); Minneapolis and St. Louis R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26 (32:585).

grounds, or any lands acquired or reserved by any railroad company in the state, to be used in connection with its line of railway at any station or siding in the state, other than at terminal points, shall be public elevators, and shall be under the supervision and subject to the inspection of the railroad and warehouse commission of the state, and known and designated as public country elevators or as country ware houses, and requiring the owners thereof to obtain a license from the state before receiving, shipping, storing or handling any grain in such elevators or warehouses, but not requiring a license of the owners of elevators and warehouses differently situated, does not deprive the owners so required to procure a license of any rights secured to them by the fourteenth amendment. Such a statute is not invalid by reason of its not applying to persons or corporations who own or operate elevators not situated on the right of way of the railroad company.66

§ 309. Same-Life and health insurance companies-State statute imposing damages and attorney's fees for failure to pay policy when due. The placing of life and health insurance companies in a different class from fire, marine and inland insurance companies, and in a different class from mutual benefit and relief associations doing business through lodges and benevolent associations, is not an arbitrary classification, but rests on sufficient reason; and the Texas statute, authorizing the recovery from life and health insurance companies, in addition to the amount of the loss or policy, twelve per cent damages on the amount of such loss, together with reasonable attorney's fees for the prosecution and collection of the loss, in all cases where the company liable therefor shall fail to pay the loss within the time specified in the policy, does not violate the fourteenth amendment.67

§ 310. Same-Limiting hours of labor in mines.-The police power extends to the protection and preservation of the health of persons engaged in noxious employments, and a state statute limiting the employment of working men in all underground mines, and smelters and all other institutions for the

66 W. W. Cargill Co. v. Minnesota ex rel. Railroad & Warehouse Com., 180 U. S. 452, 470 (45:619).

67 Fidelity Mutual Life Association v. Mettler, 185 U. S. 308, 336 (46:922); Iowa Life Insurance Co. v. Lewis, U. S. (48:-).