tificate a part of the town roll. It contemplates a separate and distinct paper, to be made and filed after the roll is completed. The scheme of taxation in the village of Little Falls for village purposes is prescribed in the village charter. The charter (Laws 1873, c. 158, § 39) declares as follows: "The trustees shall constitute the board of assessment of the village for the purpose of valuation and taxation. The trustees shall cause to be copied from the last assessment roll of the several towns, parts of which comprise the territory of said village, the names and valuation of all persons and corporations taxable within the village, as made by the town assessors, and the same shall be deposited with the clerk of the board, or one of the trustees, subject to inspection by any person interested." Then follows a provision requiring that notice shall be published that the roll has been deposited for inspection, and appointing a time and place when and where the trustees will meet to hear objections and make corrections; and the section concludes as follows: "The said town valuation shall be adopted by the trustees for the valuation of the property thereon within the village subject to be assessed for village taxes, as far as practicable, subject, however, to be corrected of any errors which may appear thereon, or for any change of ownership of property, or for increased value by reason of improvements, or for diminished value by reason of fire or damage by flood, and subject to have the names of persons added or omitted, with valuations accordingly, as changes have taken place, or when names or property have been omitted, which are subject to taxation, and may reduce or add to the valuation; and the trustees are hereby invested with the same powers within the village in respect to valuation and assessment of taxes, including the power to administer oaths, as town assessors have in respect to the valuation and assessment towns." It is contended on behalf of the relator that the village assessors, in making the assessments of the relator's property in 1886 and 1887, violated the charter, in that they did not adopt the valuation made by the towns of Little Falls and Danube, appearing on the town assessment rolls in the year preceding the respective assessments. The answer made to this complaint is two-fold: First, that the charter requires the trustees to adopt the town valuations only "so far as prac ticable," and that, as the town valuations related to the aggregate property of the relator, as well that within as that outside of the village, the adoption of those valuations was impracticable; and, second, that the provision in the charter that the trustees may "reduce and add to the valuation," and conferring upon them the powers of town assessors, authorized the trustees, in their discretion, to change the town valuation, and in substance make an original assessment of the relator's property, when in their judgment it was proper to do so. We think neither of these answers is sufficient. It is very apparent from reading the evidence that the in in crease of the village assessment of the relator's property from $20,000, in 1885, to $40,000, in 1886, originated in a mistake of the village clerk in copying the town assessment rolls. The whole acreage and valuation appearing on the town assessment roll of the town of Little Falls was copied by the clerk in preparing the village roll. It was thus made to appear that the relator owned 45.47 acres of land, of the valuation of $40,000, in the village; whereas that was the whole quantity owned by the relator in the town, and of which only about 14 acres were within the village. The clerk omitted to copy the town valuation in the town of Danube, and apparently omitted from the list the five acres owned by the relator in the village included within the limits of that town. When the trustees of the village, acting as assessors, came to examine the assessment roll copied by the clerk, they left the assessment against the relator to stand as copied, neither correcting the error in the acreage, nor changing the valuation. There is evidence that they examined the property, and considered the question of valuation, and reached the conclusion that the valuation of $40,000 was the fair and just value of the relator's property within the village. But it is clear from the evidence that in reaching this conclusion they wholly disregarded the valuation of $12,500 apportioned in the town assessment roll of the town of Little Falls as the valuation of that part of the relator's property in the town within the village. This was, we think, erroneous. By section 39 of the village charter the valuation of property in the town assessment rolls was made the general rule of valuation for village taxes. assessors of the village were required to adopt these valuations "as far as practicable," subject to certain exceptions. The valuation of the relator's property in the town of Little Falls lying within the village, was plainly indicated on the assessinent roll of that town. The fact that it was primarily inserted as a way of discharging the duty of the town assessors to apportion the whole assessed value of the relator's property in the town among the school-districts as prescribed by the act of 1867, does not alter the fact that it stood as a valuation by the town assessors of the relator's property within the village. The general statutes, it is true, do not require town assessors to assess the real property of an individual or corporation separately, according to the particular district or locality in the town where the property may be located. But we can perceive no objection in point of law to their exercising this discretion. In this case it was done for a particular pur pose, and, whether or not it was a compliance with the law of 1867, it did furnish on the face of the assessment roll the valuation of the relator's property in the town of Little Falls, located within the village, and this valuation the trustees were, we think, bound to adopt and follow, unless, indeed, the valuation made by the town assessors had changed by reason of circumstances mentioned in section 39, which is not claimed. The error in the assess The ment of 1886 was not cured because of the fact that in the valuation of the relator's property by the town assessors of Danube in 1885 the valuation of that part of it within the limits of the village was not separately stated, thereby rendering it necessary that the trustees should make an original valuation of that portion of the relator's property. They were bound to follow the town valuations as far as practicable, and, in making the assessment, they paid no attention to the valuation on the town roll of the town of Little Falls. That at least should have been incorporated as an element of the assess ment. The second answer to the allegation of error, viz., that the trustees had an absolute right to disregard the town valuations under that clause in section 39 of the charter which declares that the trustees "may reduce or add to the valuation,' depends upon the construction of this clause in its relation to the other parts of the section. We concur, in this respect, in the opinion of one of the judges below, that the power given by the section to "reduce or add to the valuation" is confined to the exceptional cases mentioned therein. By the prior clauses in the section power was given to the trustees to add to or change the town assessments in certain specified cases, and, among others, "for increased value by reason of improvements, or for diminished value by reason of damage by fire or flood." It is difficult to suppose that the legislature after specifying these cases, could have intended by the subsequent general words to give an unrestricted power to the trustees in every case where, in their judgment, the valuation was erroneous, to change the valuation appearing on the town rolls. The assessment of 1887 was. erroneous for the same reasons as the assessment of 1886, and for the additional reason that the assessment roll of the town of Danube for the year 1886 contained a separate valuation of the railroad property of the relator within the village. pear and object to the assessment in that year, and unavailingly sought its correction. The point that the certiorari was not brought in time is answered by the fact that no notice was ever published of the final completion of the roll, and that the limitation prescribed in section 9 of the act of 1880 does not, therefore, apply; and also by the cases of People v. Haupt, 104 N. Y. 377, 10 N. E. Rep. 871; People v. Hicks, 105 N. Y. 199, 11 N. E. Rep. 653; People v. Assessors of Taxes, 106 N. Y. 671, 12 N. E. Rep. 794. The fact that the assessment rolls of which correction is sought were not in the possession of the trustees when the writs were issued, is, we think, unimportant. Under the act of 1880, the original assessment rolls are not required to be returned in answer to the writ. They were in possession of the trustees or the clerk when the orders of the special term were made; and, moreover, the act contemplates granting of relief, although the tax may have been collected by reimbursement the following year. We think the order of the general term, reversing the order of the special term, based on the tax of 1886, should be affirmed, and that the order reversing the order of the special term, based on the tax of 1887, should be reversed, and the order of the special term affirmed, without costs of this appeal to either party. All concur. SPERB, Respondent, v. METROPOLITAN EL. (Court of Appeals of New York. Dec. 2, 1890.) No opinion. Order affirmed, with costs. All concur. See 10 N. Y. Supp. 865. PEOPLE ex rel. BALKE, Respondent, v. FRENCH et al., Commissioners, etc., Appellants. (Court of Appeals of New York. Dec. 2, 1890.) D. J. Dean, for appellants. Louis J. Grant, for respondent. No opinion. Appeal dismissed, with costs, on authority of People v. Commissioners, 106 N. Y. 257, 12 N. E. Rep. 596. All concur, except RUGER, C. J., dissenting. See 11 N. Y. Supp. 181. ents. The point is urged that the relator has lost his remedy under the act of 1880 by laches. This court held in the case of People v. Commissioners of Taxes, 99 N. Y. 254, 1 N. E. Rep. 773, that a party complaining of an assessment, who had neglected to appear before the assessors or body authorized under the system provided by the tax laws to correct an erroneous assessment, and seek his remedy there, could not, after the tax had become confirmed, avail himself of the remedy CASE, Appellant, v. MANNIS et al., Respondgiven by the act of 1880. We are of opinion that this case applies, and bars this proceeding as to the tax of 1886. The relator did not appear on grievance day to have the assessment corrected, but relied on information, not officially given, that the assessment would be the same as in 1885. This is rather a case of overassessment than of a void assessment, as to which possibly a definite rule would apply. The trustees had jurisdiction to assess the relator. They adopted an erroneous principle of valuation. The proceeding as to the assessment of 1887 stands on a different footing. The relator did ap (Court of Appeals of New York. Dec. 2, 1890.) L. H. Northup, for appellant. R. O. Bascom, for respondents. No opinion. Order affirmed, with costs. All concur. See 11 N. Y. Supp. 243. PEOPLE ex rel. WELLING, Respondent, v. MEAKIN, Commissioner, etc., Appellant. CAMPBELL, Respondent, v. ARBUCKLE, Appellant. (Court of Appeals of New York. Dec. 2, 1890.) John E. Parsons, for appellant. C. E. Rushmore, for respondent. No opinion. Judgment affirmed, with costs. All concur, except ANDREWS, PECKHAM, and MERCHANT, Respondent, v. JORDAN, AppelGRAY, JJ., who dissent. See 4 N. Y. Supp. 29. NORTHAMPTON NAT. BANK, Respondent, v. WYLIE et al., Appellants. (Court of Appeals of New York. Dec. 2, 1890.) Geo. H. Adams, for appellants. E. W. Tyler, for respondent. No opinion. Judgment affirmed, with costs. All concur. See 4 N. Y. Supp. 907. MCNAIER, Respondent, v. Manhattan RY. Co., Appellant. (Court of Appeals of New York. Dec. 2, 1890.) Brainard Tolles, for appellant. Joseph S. Wood, for respondent. No opinion. Judgment affirmed, with costs. All concur. See 4 N. Y. Supp. 310. HANSCOM, Respondent, v. HENDRICKS, Appellant. (Court of Appeals of New York. Dec. 2, 1890.) Abram Kling, for appellant. Chas. E. Hughes, for respondent. No opinion. Judgment affirmed, with costs. All concur. See 5 N. Y. Supp. 109. KAMPING, Appellant, v. HORAN, Respondent. ¡Court of Appeals of New York. Dec. 2, 1890.) John A. Kamping, for appellant. R. J. Moses, for respondent. lant. (Court of Appeals of New York. Dec. 2, 1890.) W. J. Groo, for appellant. D. S. Richards, for respondent. No opinion. Judgment affirmed. All conSee 3 N. Y. Supp. 468. cur. TUCKER, Respondent, v. ABBOTT et al., Appellants. CLAPP, Appellant, v. CLAPP et al., Respond- (Court of Appeals of New York. Dec. 16, 1890.) ents. (Court of Appeals of New York. Dec. 16, 1890.) W. H. Peckham, for appellant. Geo. C. Holt, for respondents. No opinion. Order affirmed on opinion of general term below, with costs. All concur. See 1 N. Y. Supp. 919; 7 N. Y. Supp. 495. V. P. Abbott, for appellants. C. H. Walts, for respondent. No opinion. Order of general term affirmed, and judgment absolute on stipulation ordered for plaintiff, with costs. All concur, except EARL, J., not voting. See 1 N. Y. Supp. 842. HYMAN et al., Appellants, v. KAPP et al., | FIFIELD, Respondent, v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., Appellant. Respondents. IMPORTERS & TRADERS' NAT. BANK OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v. BURGER et OTTIWELL, Respondent, v. MUXLOW et al., al., Appellants. (Court of Appeals of New York. Dec. 16, 1890.) Wm. W. MacFarland, for appellants. H. A. Kingsbury, for respondent. No opinion. Judgment affirmed, with costs. All concur, except GRAY, J., not sitting. See 6 N. Y. Supp. 189. BUHRENS, Respondent, v. DRY DOCK, E. B. & B. R. Co., Appellant. (Court of Appeals of New York. Dec. 16, 1890.) John M. Scribner, for appellant. Wm. H. Toumley, for respondent. No opinion. Judgment affirmed, with costs. All concur. See 6 N. Y. Supp. 224. Appellants. (Court of Appeals of New York. Dec. 19, 1890.) Wilder, Wilder & Lynch, for appellants. Arthur Hurst, for respondent. No opinion. Judgment affirmed, with costs. All concur. See 6 N. Y. Supp. 518. JEWETT, Appellant, v. BROWNELL, Respond ent. (Court of Appeals of New York. Dec. 19, 1890.) F. W. Betts, for appellant. Westfall & Whitcomb, for respondent. No opinion. Judgment affirmed, with costs, on opinion of general term below. All concur. Sce 4 N. Y. Supp. 764. |