6. Although a man by reformation may frequently regain the standing which he has lost, yet there are manifest indications, in the present constitution, that, after a given amount of trial has been granted, a decisive punishment is inflicted which extinguishes forever all hope, if not all possibility of recovery. A man may waste part of his youth, and may, by diligence regain the time which he had lost. But he soon arrives at a point, beyond which, such opportunity is impossible. Thus also in morals, a man may sometimes do wrong, and return to virtue and escape present punishment, but every instance of crime renders the probability of escape less, and he at last arrives at a point, beyond which nothing can avert the infliction of the merited and decisive calamity.

7. We find that some actions produce misery which extends to other beings besides those who are actually concerned in committing them.

This takes place sometimes by example, and at other times, the pain is inflicted upon those, who could not be infected by the example. Illustrations of this are seen in cases of disease propogated by hereditary descent, in misery arising from the misconduct of rulers, in the suffering of men from flagitious crimes of relatives and acquaintances. And in consequence of the constitution under which we exist, these miseries are frequently transmitted down beyond any assignable limit. Thus the condition of the Jews, is by themselves and others believed to be the result of some crime committed by their forefathers either at, or before, the time of Christ. The effects of the persecution of protestantism in Spain and Portugal, at the time of the reformation, can be clearly traced in all the subsequent history of these countries.

Now all these considerations seem clearly to indicate, that there are pains inflicted upon man for other purposes except warning; and that they are of the nature of punish

ment; that is of pain inflicted after crime has beeen voluntarily committed, in spite of sufficient warning; and inflicted by way of desert, as, what the offence really merits, and, what it behoves a righteous governor to award to transgression.

Nor will it avail to object that these inflictions are intended to be warnings to others. This is granted, but this by no means prevents their being also punishments in the sense in which we have considered them. Such is the case in all punishments inflicted by society. They are intended to be a warning to others, but this hinders not their being also in the strictest sense punishments; that is, inflictions of pain as the just desert of crime; and as clear indications of the will of society respecting the action of which they are the result.

From what has been said I think we may safely conclude.

1. That God has given man a moral and an intellectual constitution by which he may be admonished of his duty.

2. That He allows man to act freely, and either to do right or wrong as he chooses.

3. That He in the present life has connected rewards with the doing of right and punishments with the doing of wrong, and that these rewards and punishments affect both the individual and society.

4. And hence, from an attentive observation of the results of actions upon individuals, and upon society, we may ascertain what is the will of God concerning us.

5. And for all the opportunities of thus ascertaining his will by his dealings with men, that is by the light of nature, God holds all his creatures responsible.

SECTION II.

HOW FAR WE MAY DISCOVER OUR DUTY BY THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

It has been shown that we may, by observing the results of our actions upon individuals and upon society, ascertain what is the will of our Creator concerning us. In this manner we may discover much moral truth which would be unknown were we left to the guidance of conscience unassisted, and we may derive many motives to virtue which would otherwise be inoperative.

I. By the light of nature we discover much moral truth which could never be discovered by conscience unassisted.

1 Conscience indicates to us our obligations to others when our relations to them are discovered; and impels us toward that course of conduct which the understanding points out as corresponding with these obligations. But there are many obligations which conscience seems not to point out to men, and many ways of fulfilling these obligations which the understanding does not clearly indicate. In these respects we may be greatly assisted by natural religion.

Thus, I doubt whether the unassisted conscience would teach the wrong of polygamy or of divorce. The Jews, even at the time of our Saviour, had no conception that a marriage contract was between individuals for life. But any one who will observe the effects of polygamy upon families and societies can have no doubt that the precept of the Gospel on this subject is the moral law of the system under under which we are. So, I do not know that unassisted conscience would remonstrate against what might be called reasonable revenge, or the operation of the Lex Talionis. But he who will observe the consequences of revenge, and those of forgiveness of injuries, will have no difficulty in

deciding which course of conduct has been indicated as his duty by his Maker.

2. The extent of obligations, previously known to exist, is made known more clearly by the light of nature. Conscience might teach us the obligation to love our friends, or our countrymen, but it might not go farther. The results of different courses of conduct would clearly show that our Creator intended us to love all men, of every nation, and even our enemies.

3. It is by observing the results of our actions that we learn the limitations which our Creator has affixed to our desires, as we have shown in the chapter on happiness. The simple fact that gratification of our desires beyond a certain limit, will produce more misery than happiness addresses itself to our self-love, and forms a reason why that limit should not be transgressed. The fact that this limit was fixed by our Creator, and that he has thus intimated to us his will addresses itself to our conscience, and places us under obligagation to act as he has commanded on pain of his displeasure.

4. In many cases where the obligation is acknowledged we might not be able without the light of natural religion to decide in what manner it could best be discharged. Thus a man who felt conscious of his obligations as a parent, and wished to discharge them, would derive much valuable information by observing what mode of exhibiting paternal love had produced the happiest results. He would hence be able the better to decide what was required of him.

In this manner, it cannot be doubted, that much valuable knowledge of moral truth might be acquired, beyond what is attainable by unassisted conscience. But this is not all.

II. Natural religion presents additional motives to the practice of virtue.

1. It does this, in the first place, by more clearly setting before us the rewards of virtue, and the punishments of vice. Conscience forewarns us against crime, and inflicts its own peculiar punishment upon guilt; but, natural religion informs us of the additional consequences, independent of ourselves, which attach to moral action, according to the constitution under which we are created. Thus, conscience might forewarn a man against dishonesty, and, might inflict upon him the pains of remorse, if he had stolen; but, her monition would surely derive additional power, from an observation of the effect which must be produced upon individuals and societies, by the practice of this immorality; and, also, by the contrary effects which must arise from the opposite virtue.

2. Still further. Natural religion presents us with more distinct and affecting views of the character of God, than could be obtained without it. One of the first aspirations of a human soul, is after an Intelligent First Cause; and, the most universal dictate of conscience is, that this First Cause ought to be obeyed. Hence, every nation, how rude soever it be, has its Gods, and its religious services. But, such a notion of Deity is cold and inoperative, when compared with that which may be derived from an intelligent observation of the laws of nature, physical and moral, which we see pervading the universe around us. In every moral law which has been written on the page of this world's history, we discover a new lineament of the character of Deity. Every moral attribute of God, which we discover, imposes upon us a new obligation, and presents an additional motive. why we should love and serve Him. Hence, we see, that the knowledge of God, derived from the study of nature, is adapted to add greatly to the impulsive power of conscience.

We see, then, how large a field of moral knowledge is spread open before us, if we only, in a suitable manner,