ground of its necessity for self-defence. Hence it is contended, that whoever engages in it, unless either compelled by the lawful authority of his own rulers, or induced by the desire of serving his country, incurs the guilt of blood. Into this question, however, we need not at present enter. The precedents, showing the practice of nations, are in favour of such voluntary belligerents. They are of two kinds; one always held, though lawful, to be unspeakably despicable-as many acts strictly lawful are, both in municipal and international concerns; the other as generally allowed to be equally honourable and legal. Of the former description is the hiring out of its subjects by one government to fight the battles of another state, in whose quarrel it has no concern; or, which is the same thing, the subjects taking that part for mere hire. Of the latter kind is the taking part, not for hire merely, but out of affection for the cause in which a foreign prince or people happen to be engaged. We regard the Legion as having originally been raised in support of the cause of liberal principles, against the efforts of an arbitrary monarch to crush the freedom of his country, and help on by success in Spain the like arbitrary system in the other parts of Europe. That a number of those who embarked in this contest regarded the pay and subsistence rather than the cause, proves nothing against the general doctrine which justifies the whole operation. The discredit of such conduct belongs to the individuals alone, and does not affect the cause. It is, however, altogether undeniable, that the continuing as auxiliaries to the Queen's party may become more or less discreditable according to the general conduct of that party. The breach by them of the rules of civilized war has been already mentioned as at once rendering all further co-operation criminal. But other things may make it at least disreputable to assist them, and adviseable to withdraw, upon the earliest opportunity that presents itself, of fairly closing the connexion. If the massacres of Madrid and Barcelona were repeated-if anarchy or insurrection were to spread-if the government appeared to have no power, or no inclination to make itself respected—we do not say that an insulated act would require the cessation of the existing intercourse, but a general habit would render its farther continuance disreputable. There might be no participation by the British auxiliaries in those scenes which we are supposing, but the cause which they are in Spain to maintain being discredited, and no obligation existing to defend the wrongdoers, a continued service under their orders, and for their defence, would no longer be justified.

It may next be said, that the remarkable events which have lately occurred, in most of the towns in the Peninsula have greatly changed the aspect of affairs; and placed the contest upon a footing extremely different from its position at the commencement of hostilities. In fact, a revolution has taken place, both in Spain and Portugal; the sovereigns of both countries having been compelled to change the government in every thing but name, as the alternative to avoid being dethroned, if not put to death. In both countries, too, the revolt has been of the very worst description —a military insurrection. The people, or a small portion of the people, may have begun the movement; but the soldiery have, both at Madrid and at Lisbon, carried the design into execution, and by main force extorted the sovereign's assent to the proposed changes.

Now, one or two things are sufficiently manifest in relation to this subject. No foreign nation has any right to interfere as long as a regular government exists in those countries, whatever be its nature, and in what way soever it may have been established. It may be the wildest democracy, or the most hateful despotism, or the most corrupt and oppressive oligarchy-that is matter for the people whom these constitutions oppress, and not for any foreign power, to consider. While the people submit to the new government, and while it can maintain the relations of amity with its neighbours, no one has a right to object, or even to keep aloof, and refuse the ordinary intercourse of peace. We are now assuming the new government to be all that the friends of arbitrary power can allege against it, and still no one has a right to interfere. Again, if any such interference is attempted by one power, all others have a right to oppose it. In no other way can national independence be safe. The conduct of France in 1823, and of the Holy Alliance previously, was universally execrated only because it infringed upon this principle. Nor could any event justify a repetition of the interference now, but the Peninsula being reduced to such a state of anarchy as should be incompatible with the safety of its neighbours. Nothing certainly in the frame of the new government, or even in the manner of its formation, by military violence, or by mob violence, could afford any pretext whatever for such a proceeding. We have ambassadors at Constantinople, and St Petersburgh; so have the Americans; yet no one ever supposed that either country approved the form of the conduct of those despotic governments, or the acts of violence, indeed of murder, by which the sceptre is so often transmitted from one prince to another. When Gustavus III., by a military operation, that is, by drawing out his guards, and

planting his guns, and stationing his artillerymen, with lighted matches, round the Houses of Nobles, changed the aristocratic into an absolute monarchy, the aristocratic monarchy at that time established in England continued in amicable relations with Sweden, and was not supposed to have sanctioned a precedent for its own destruction. No one, then, can reasonably question the obligation under which France and England lie, to maintain the same relation as before the late changes, with the Court of Lisbon and Madrid. It would, indeed, be a strange doctrine in these times to hold, that the new constitution being too popular, furnishes any reason for a conduct so opposite to that held upon almost all other occasions.

But are France and England bound to continue the kind of assistance lent to the Queen's party against the Pretender to her crown? This is quite a different question. The maxim is no doubt undeniably true, that the obligations of a treaty are contracted with the state, and not with the prince personally, or with the powers which one form of government establishes in that state, and a change of the government destroys; and if a treaty had bound the allies to give Spain assistance against any third party, no change of dynasty, or revolution in the government, could have affected the validity of the obligation. But the case here is materially different. The allies had either bound themselves to help one party in Spain against another; or (which has been represented to mean the same thing, and which may, at least, be admitted to produce the same conduct) they had bound themselves to terminate the civil broils there prevailing, and prevent the worse anarchy threatened by the Carlist insurrection. If the former view of the treaty is taken, there can be no question that a total change in the position of one party to the Spanish contest, and the violent means by which this change was effected, may justly be taken into consideration by the allies, before they resolve to continue the same course of conduct. If the latter view be taken, it seems equally indisputable, that the proceedings at Madrid, as well as their result, enter most fairly into the question, when the preventing confusion is, by the supposition, the very object of the contract. That neither party, then, is any longer under the precise obligations of the treaty, may be admitted. But does it follow that it would be wise to withdraw our assistance at the moment when it may most be wanted? Has any thing happened to make it less the interest, either of England or of France, that the Queen's Goverment should prevail over the Carlists? If the country generally submit to the constitution of 1812--if there is about as large a por

tion of Spain still attached to the Queen, and hostile to the Infante, as there was before the late revolutionary movementssurely no reason can be assigned for discontinuing the aid by which it was deemed wise, both in France and England, to facilitate the re-etablishment of general tranquillity in the Peninsula. A more vigorous interposition might, indeed, have long ago settled the dispute; and would in all probability have prevented the insurrections. But there seems no great consistency in the argument, that because we might have compassed our object more speedily by acting more promptly, we should now cease to act at all, when that object is as desirable as ever, and only has become more difficult of attainment, in consequence of our past supineness.

And, after all, is the new difficulty in the nature of the thing or only in the minds of the parties? Do the late proceedings, and above all, does the restoration of the Constitution of 1812 make the Queen's cause more hopeless ? or do they only endanger it by their tendency to alienate the allies, France especially, from its support? A short time will show how far the new Government has vigour enough to maintain public tranquillity, and above all, to curb and control the soldiery. If it has this force, then all must admit that the late revolution is more likely to animate the exertions of the people, and increase the chances of success against the Carlists, whose hostility to the principles of the Constitution is still more rooted than their enmity to the person of the Queen. In these circumstances, with all the disposition which must so inevitably arise in the people of England and of France, from observing the atrocities committed in Spain, to withdraw and leave the contending parties to fight out their own quarrel in their own way, there cannot be any doubt that, retiring in this manner at the present moment, would be premature, and a departure from the spirit of the policy in which the Quadruple alliance originated.

In nothing that has been said, we trust any one will suppose us to point at such proceedings as might endanger the first of all blessings, to England as well as France,-the peace of the two countries. Nothing more needs be said to guard the friends of peace against a charge of that kind. But again, we must express the disgust and indignation which all true friends of liberty have felt at the spectacle of military revolutions. There cannot be any thing of more dreadful example-any thing more fatal to freedom. That the soldiers in a free state should so far have a fellow feeling with their countrymen as to refuse being made the instruments of overthrowing their liberties, is the very best secu

rity against tyrants; nay, is the only chance which a popular government has of being compatible with a standing army. But no man can without dismay see the troops, or a handful of the troops, taking the lead in effecting political changes; and such a sight may well make every one reflect on the insecure tenure by which the rights of the people are held in every country where they are not, as in France, armed and disciplined, whilst a vast military force is arrayed on the side of power.

ART. XI.-The Statesman. BY HENRY TAYLOR, Esq. Author of Philip Van Artevelde. 12mo. London : 1836.

HIS is a book full of excellent matter, on a subject which has

Thitherto occupied very little attention. It consists of Essays

on various points connected with the administration of Government; written, it would seem, at different times and in different moods, as the sundry experiences of a life occupied in public business have happened to suggest them. Its more immediate and especial importance lies in its bearing upon our present system of Executive Government; the manifold defects of which, both in theory and in practice, are well held up to the public view, and a plan of reform suggested and urged with earnest eloquence upon the general attention, which needs nothing but a strong call from without to be introduced with the greatest ease and advantage. It is in the hope, we imagine, of awaking such a call, that the book has been published in its present somewhat immature and undigested state. The essays, though composed with the intention of working them up afterwards into a complete body of doctrine, have been hurried into the world almost as they were originally written,-for the professed purpose of 'diverting the ' attention of thoughtful men from the forms of Government to 'the business of governing; '--with a view (we may add) to such a reconstitution of our executive establishment as may ensure for the public service, both a more plentiful supply of able men and a fairer scope for the exercise of their abilities. But although, to those who are capable of entering fully into the author's views, this will form the point of main and central interest, it is not by any means the only point of interest which the book possesses. Though the questions discussed in it relate especially to government and present governing, the manner in