begin this important dispute, unless you are agreed to decide it by the only kind of evidence that can possibly be had-namely, by the credit that is due to those who appear as witnesses, or, in other words, by examining the facts with all the circumstances of thein, and considering, at large, the characters, the views, and the conduct of those whe reported them. * Writers, on the side of infidelity, have very rarely ventured to assert the absolute incredibility of miracles; and their precaution seems very prudent. For a miracle being an event brought about in a way contrary to the course of nature, and the course of nature being the establishment of God, every believer of his existence, it should seem, must admit, that it is in his power to reverse it. But this, we know, has been denied by a late very ingenious, but very sceptical author. "A miracle," says he, " is a violation of the laws of nature, and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can be possibly imagined."*-Now it is obvious, from this quotation, that our author's argument against the credibility of miracles, depends entirely upon this, of their being events contrary to firm and unalterable experience. But why an event should be incredible, and incapable of being proved by testimony, because it is contrary to our experience, this point, on the certainty of which alone our author's boasted argument is built, I did not, upon perusing the Essay on Miracles, find any attempt made to prove; but upon examining the other essays in the collection, it appeared that this point had been the subject of two foregoing ones; and that having established its truth there, as he supposed, he thought himself warranted in his subsequent Essay on Miracles, to lay it as the foundation of his reasoning. What then is this grand principle of our author's new philosophy?—He begins with observing, that "all reasonings concerning * D. Hume, Esq. ว่า matter of fact, seem to be founded on the relation of cause and effect, and that by means of that relation alone, can we go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses. If you were to ask a man, says he, why he believes any matter of fact which is absent; for instance, that his friend is in the country, or in France; he would give you a reason, and this reason would be some other fact; as a letter received from him, or the knowledge of his former resolutions and promises. A man, finding a watch or any other machine in a desert island, would conclude that there had once been men in that island. All our reasonings concerning fact are of the same nature: and here it is constantly supposed that there is a connexion betwixt the present fact and that inferred from it." Thus far his doctrine is unexceptionable; but when he proceeds to enquire how we arrive at the knowledge of causes and effects, here we must leave him, unless we would, with him, contradict first principles, and strike at the foundation of all certainty. For he lays it B down" as a general proposition, which admits of no exception, that the knowledge of this relation of cause and effect is not in any instance, attained by reasonings, a priori, but arises entirely from experience, when we find that particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other. Let any object be presented to a man of ever so strong natural reason and abilities; if that object be entirely new to him, he will never be able, by the most accurate examination of its sensible qualities, to discover any of its causes and effects. Adam, though his rational faculties be supposed, at the very first, ever so perfect, could not have inferred, from the fluidity and transparency of water, that it would suffocate him, or from the light and warmth of fire, that it would consume him. No object ever discovers, by the qualities which appear to the senses, either the causes which produced it, or the effects which will arise from it; nor can our reason, unassisted by experience, ever draw any inferences concerning real existence and matter of fact." It is on the truth of these assertions that the argument depends, by which our author would prove that miracles are incapable of being made credible by human testimony. I shall now endeavour to satisfy you, that one who can insist on such points has no pretensions to be followed as a guide. If no event, however well attested, be credible, which contradicts experience, then there can be no certain standard of the credibility of facts; but this will vary as does the experience of those to whom they are proposed; for all men have not the same opportunities of seeing the same events; and a thing may be familiar to one, and never heard of by another. That there are many events true, which men can have no experience of, is certain. But were the doctrine which we are now opposing to be admitted, no such thing could ever be made credible to one who has not seen it but what strange work would this make in life? and how ridiculous would a man make himself if he rejected matters of |