Medberry et al. v. State of Ohio. debtor, consistently with equity and humanity. Bankrupt and insolvent laws, laws allowing of attachment and ɛequestration of the debtor's estate, and for the revocation of fraudulent conveyances, creditors' bills, and criminal prosecutions for fraud or conspiracy, are some of the modes that have been adopted for the purpose. In the absence of special legislation, we may safely affirm, that a general creditor cannot bring an action on the case against his debtor, or against those combining and colluding with him to make dispositions of his property, although the object of those dispositions be to hinder, delay, and defraud creditors. The charge of the district judge is erroneous, and the judgment of that court is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings. ARNOLD MEDBERRY, JOHN LAWHEAD, ROBERT H. Nugen, and ABNER J. DICKENSON, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR, v. THE STATE OF OHIO. Whether this court has or has not jurisdiction under the 25th section of the Judiciary act may be ascertained either from the pleadings, or by bill of exceptions, or by a certificate of the court. But the assignment of errors, or the published opinion of the court, cannot be reviewed for that purpose. They make no part of the record proper, to which alone this court can resort to ascertain the subject-matter of the litigation. Therefore, where the record showed that the only question presented to the State Court, and decided by them, was, whether the provisions of an act of the Legislature were consistent with the Constitution of the State, this court has no power to review their judgment. THIS case was brought up from the Supreme Court of the State of Ohio by a writ of error issued under the 25th section of the Judiciary act. The facts or the case are stated in the opinion of the court, and also in 7 Ohio State Reports, p. 523. It came up on a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, which was sustained by Mr. Wolcott and Mr. Stanton, and op. posed by Mr. Pugh. Medberry et al. v. State of Ohio. Mr. Justice GRIER delivered the opinion of the court. The defendant in error moves to dismiss this case for want of jurisdiction, because the record does not present any question which this court has authority to re-examine, by the 25th section of the Judiciary act.' The construction of this section has been so often before this court, and the cases are so numerous which defire and establish the conditions under which we assume jurisdiction, that it would be tedious to notice them, and superfluous to repeat or comment upon them. For the purposes of this case, it is only necessary to say, "that it must appear from the record of the case, either in express terms or by clear and necessary intendment, that one of the questions which this court has jurisdiction to re-examine and decide was actually decided by the State court." This may be ascertained either from the pleadings, or by bill of exceptions, or by a certificate of the court. But the assignment of errors, or the published opinion of the court, cannot be reviewed for that purpose. They make no part of the record proper, to which alone we can resort to ascertain the subject-matter of the litigation. In this case, the declaration counts upon a contract made by the plaintiffs with the board of public works of Ohio, in 1855, for keeping a portion of the canal in repair for five years. It avers performance, and readiness to perform, and that those officers, acting under and by authority of an act of Assembly of Ohio, entitled "An act making appropriations for the public works for 1857," "in violation and in open disregard of such contract, did wrongfully hinder and prevent," &c. The Supreme Court gave judgment for the defendants on a demurrer to this declaration. It is not averred in the pleadings, or anywhere on the record, that this or any statute of Ohio was void, because it impaired the obligation of contracts. The only legitimate inference to be drawn from the face of this record is, that the Supreme Court decided that the board. of public works had no authority to make such contract. If we go out of the record to search for the reasons, we find no Porter et al. v. Foley. evidence that there was any complaint that the act of 1857 was contrary to the Constitution of the United States, or that the court gave their judgment for the defendant on account of any of its provisions. It is not referred to, except for the purpose of showing that the plaintiffs might bring their suit against the State for damages. The contract declared on was made by virtue of an act of Assembly of 1845. In 1851, the people of Ohio formed a new Constitution. This contract was made in 1855. The only question presented to the court, and decided by them, was, whether the provisions of the act of 1845 were consistent with those of the new Constitution. This is a question of which this court has no authority to take judicial cognizance. The writ of error is therefore dismissed. JAMES D. PORTER AND OTHERS, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR, v. BUSHROD W. FOLEY. Where an act of Assembly of the State of Kentucky was objected to in the State court because said act and supplement were unconstitutional and void, the court properly considere l the question as relating to the power of the Legislature to pass the act under the Constitution of the State, and not under the Constitution of the United States. There is therefore no ground for the exercise of jurisdiction by this court under the 25th section of the Judiciary act. THIS case was brought up from the Court of Appeals for the State of Kentucky by a writ of error issued under the 25th section of the Judiciary act. A motion was made by Mr. Mooar to dismiss it for want of jurisdiction, under the following circumstances: Porter and others, the plaintiffs in error, filed a petition in the State court to recover the title and possession of a lot of land in the town of Covington. They claimed under a grant Porter et al. v. Foley. from the Commonwealth of Virginia, in 1787, to James Welsh, and a series of mesne conveyances to themselves. The defendants below claimed under the same original title, and also under two acts of the Legislature of Kentucky passed on November 10 and November 26, 1823, by which William Porter was authorized to sell and convey certain parcels of ground which had been conveyed to his children. The plaintiffs objected to the admission of these acts as being unconstitutional and void. The court below, however, and the Court of Appeals, sustained them. The reader can now understand the points made by the counsel. In support of the motion to dismiss, Mr. Mooar made the following points: 1. As the bill of exceptions does not state that the statutes were repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, it must be presumed that the State Constitution was referred to; and this court has decided, in numerous cases, it had no jurisdiction on a writ of error from a State court to declare a State law void on account of its collision with a State Constitution. 3 Peters, 289. 4 Peters, 563. 20 Howard, 84. 2. The ground of jurisdiction must be stated with precision, and the ruling of the court, to bring the case under the 25th section, must appear on the record to have been decided against the right claimed.. 18 Howard, 196. The only ruling of the court in this case was in overruling the objections of the plaintiffs to the introduction of the two State legislative acts as evidence in the cause. The reasons of the court for admitting the evidence are not stated in the record; nor did the counsel who made the objection rely upon any clause of the Constitution of the United States which renders said statutes unconstitutional and void. In Maxwell v. Newbold, 18 Howard, 517, Mr. Chief Justice TANEY said, Porter et al. v. Foley. "the clause in the Constitution should have been specified by the plaintiffs in error in the State court, in order that this court might see what was the right claimed by them, and whether it was denied to them by the decision of the State court." Neither the Constitution of the United States, nor any clause thereof, was specified or referred to in this case; nor is it sufficient that the judges of the State court, in their opinion, may have stated that certain clauses of the Constitution of the United States were involved in the decision, because, as Mr. Justice Story said, in the case of the Ocean Insurance Company v. Polleys, 13 Peters, 165, the opinion of the judges in the State court "constitutes no part of the record; and it is to the record, and the record only, that we can resort to ascertain our appellate jurisdiction in cases of this sort." As the record in this case does not show that the acts of the Legis. lature of Kentucky were objected to because of their repugnancy to the Constitution of the United States, or any clause thereof, no case is presented for the appellate jurisdiction of this court, and the writ of error should therefore be dismissed. Mr. Headington opposed the motion to dismiss the writ upon the ground that the statutes in question violate the seventh section of the compact of 1789 between Virginia and Kentucky, (1 Stanton's Ky. Stat., 82,) and are therefore repugnant to the tenth section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States. Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheaton, 1. The defendant in error now moves to dismiss the case on the ground that the record does not show that it falls within the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary act of 1789. 1 Stat. at Large, 85. The verdict and judgment in the Circuit Court were in favor of the defendant; and an appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals, and the judgment affirmed. The whole title of the defendant rested upon the above acts of the Legislature, the validity of which was sustained. If, therefore, the claim now made under the compact with Virginia, and the Constitution of the United States, was made in the Circuit Court, or Court |