Moore et al. v. American Transportation Co. under the decision of the appellate court given above, in a verdict for the defendants. The plaintiffs then filed their bill of exceptions, given at large in the record, showing that they requested the court to charge "that the act of Congress of March 3d, 1851, had no applicability to the case, inasmuch as the 'Spaulding,' being ased principally in navigating between the cities of Buffalo and Detroit, by way of Lake Erie and Detroit river, was engaged in river and inland navigation within the exception in the last clause of section 7 of said act;" and that the court refused so to charge, and charged to the contrary, and the plaintiffs duly excepted. Upon writ of error by the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed the judgment below, in accordance with their former decision, and the plaintiffs brought the case up to this court. It was argued by Mr. Walker and Mr. Russell for the plaintitis in error, and by Mr. Hibbard for the defendants. A motion was made to dismiss the writ for want of jurisdiction, but the arguments upon this point will not be reported, nor upou the point of the constitutionality of the act of Congress. The argument of Mr. Russell and Mr. Walker upon the main point, for the plaintiffs in error, was as follows: The question to be decided is, whether a vessel engaged in navigation and commerce between the port of Buffalo, on Lake Erie, and the port of Detroit, on the river Detroit, is within the meaning of said act of Congress, "used in rivers or inland navigation." While we most cheerfully concede that the intention of the Legislature is to be derived from the language which it has used, yet, in ascertaining that intention, the previous state of the law, the defects to be remedied, and the history of the egislation, may all be appropriately referred to. Sedgwick on Statutes, 237, 239. By the common law, the stringent rule in relation to the Moore et al. v. American Transportation Co. liabilities of common carriers was held to be as applicable to common carriers by water as by land. Morse v. Slue, Ventris, 190, (23 Car., 2d.) Same, Raymond, 220. Rich v. Kneeland, (11 Jac., 1st,) Cro. Jac., 330. Dale v. Hall, 1 Willson, 281, (A. D. 1750.) The first limitation of the liability of ship owners was by the act of 7 Geo. II, c. 15, A. D. 1734. It is not easy to determine what at this time was the liability of ship owners by the Continental law, nor was that law uniform; but it is very clear that they were not held to so strict a liability as by the common law. Thus it would seem, that in case of embezzlement or other wrong, by the master or mariners, that the owner was only liable to the extent of ship and freight. Abbott on Shipping, 395. Story on Bailments, sec. 488. Hunt v. Morris, 6 Mart. La., 676; 3 Kent., 218. The act of Parliament referred to provided substantially for the same thing, and thus put English ships upon an equality with foreign vessels. The special occasion of the passage of this act seems to have been the decision in the case of Boucher v. Lawson, which held that owners were, under some circumstances, liable for embezzlements committed by the master, without default of the owner. Abbott on Shipping, 128, 395. The liabilities of ship owners were still further limited by the act 26 Geo. III, A. D. 1786. By this act owners were exempted from liability in case of robbery, although not committed by the master or persons employed upon the vessel, and also from all responsibility in case of loss or damage by fire. Abbott on Shipping, 397, 398. This act seems to have been suggested by the case of Sutton v. Mitchell, 1 Term Reports, 18, which was an attempt to make the owners responsible for a robbery committed at the instigation of a mariner. Abbott on Shipping, 397. 72 Moore et al. v. American Transportation Co. Two other cases decided the same year (1785) may have had some influence in promoting this legislation. Forward v. Pittard, 1 Term, 27. Trent Navigation Co. v. Wood, 3 Esp., 127. The liabilities of ship owners were still further limited by 53 Geo. III, c. 159, which exempted owners from all responsibility for any damage, by reason of any act or neglect without their fault or privity, beyond the value of the ship or vessel and freight. Abbott on Shipping, 398. The object of all this legislation was to encourage British shipping, and put it at least upon an equality with that of other nations, and it has accordingly been held that these laws were only applicable to British shipping. The Dundee, 1 Hagg., 113. Pope v. Dogherty, 7 Am. Law Reg., 181. Although the rule of the common law, in relation to the liability of common carriers, has been fully recognised in this country from its earliest settlement, and the applicability of that rule to carriers by water, and although in many instances ship owners have been held liable for losses by fire occurring without neglect on their part, yet no successful attempt was made to limit their liabilities until the passage of the act of 1851. 2 Kent's Com., 599 and 609. McClure v. Hammond, 1 Bay., 99. 1810, Scheiffelin v. Harvey, 6 Johnson, 170. Cases of Fire. 1834, Harrington v. Shaw, 2 Watts, 33. 1838, Patton v. McGrath, Dudley, 159. 1843, Hale v. N. J. S. Nav. Co., 15 Conn., 539. 1848, N. J. S. Nav. Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How., 334. These last two cases, which grew out of the burning of the Lexington, very strongly attracted the attention of shipping and commercial men, and led to the enactment of March 3, Moore et al. v. American Transportation Co. 1851. Although the law upon this subject was perfectly well settled, losses by fire upon the ocean had been of such rare occurrence, that ship owners had not fully recognised their liabilities until these decisions The history of that act during its passage is curious, suggestive, and instructive. 23 Congressional Globe, 713-718. When first introduced into the Senate, the last clause of the act was as follows: "The preceding sections shall not apply to the owner or owners of any canal boat, nor to the owner or owners of any lighter or lighters employed in loading or unloading vessels, or in transporting goods or other property inland from place to place." Thus limiting the exception to canal boats and lighters engaged in inland commerce, or, in other words, extending the benefits of the law to all other vessels of every description within the jurisdiction of Congress. The bill had been carefully prepared by the Committee on Commerce, and was called up by Mr. Hamlin, Senator from Maine, one of that committee. He said: "It is a bill which I think is just in its provisions, and it places our commercial marine upon the same basis as that of England." Its consideration was opposed by several distinguished Senators, and urged by others as a measure of great importance. Mr. Davis, of Massachusetts, said "that it is by a recent decis ion some two or three years since that the owners of ships have comprehended their liabilities," and urging the consid eration of the measure as a system which had been for many years in operation in England, and said, "it is simply putting our merchant marine upon the same footing as that of Great Britain. We are carriers side by side with that nation in competition with them, and we cannot afford to give them any very great advantage over us without affecting our interest very seriously." Mr. Cass urged its consideration with great earnestness, for similar reasons; and when before the Senate upon its merits, Mr. Hamlin said: "It is true that the changes are most radical from the common law upon the subject, but they are rendered Moore et al. v. American Transportation Co. necessary, first, from the fact that the English common-law system really never had any application in this country; and second, that the English Government has changed the law, which is a very strong and established reason why we should put our commercial' marine upon an equal footing with hers. Why not give to those who navigate the ocean as many inducements to do so as England has done? Why not place them upon that great theatre where we are to have the great contest for the supremacy of the commerce of the world? This is what this bill seeks to do, and it asks no more." Mr. Butler, of South Carolina, opposed the bill, and said: "Great Britain has more interest in relieving itself from liabilities upon the ocean than any other." Mr. Underwood, of Kentucky, as representing the agricultural interests of the West, opposed the bill, and especially that portion of it exempting the owners of the vessel from liabilities for loss by fire; he said: "The argument is, that we cannot compete with our great rival upon the ocean, with Great Britain, and that we must pass the first section of this bill in order to come into competition with her;" and he thought the bill would be injurious to the agriculturists, who produced articles of commerce, but who were not their own carriers; that it would lessen the security without lessening the cost of freight.. It was to obviate, these objections coming from the interior that Mr. Pearce, of Maryland, moved to strike out the clause of the bill, and to insert the clause under consideration: "This act shall not apply to the owners of any canal boat, barge, or lighter, or any vessel of any description whatsoever used in rivers or inland navigation." Mr. Hamlin, who had charge of the bill, said: "If those who represent the interior waters of the country desire such an amendment, I am perfectly willing that it should be made." Mr. Phelps, of Vermont, living upon the banks of Lake Champlain, opposed the amendment, and said: "If there is any portion of our navigation which is entitled to the benefit of this change in the common law of the country, it is our inland navigation. From my own experience in my own imme |