The Democratic ConstitutionOxford University Press, USA, 26 Αυγ 2004 - 320 σελίδες In this fascinating debunking of judicial supremacy, Devins and Fisher argue that nonjudicial contributions to constitutional interpretation make the Constitution more stable, more consistent with constitutional principles, and more protective of individual and minority rights. This highly readable narrative of how the Court and elected officials work in concert with the American people to shape constitutional values is an impressive affirmation of public participation in the political process. |
Περιεχόμενα
Judicial Supremacy as Orthodoxy | 9 |
Federalism | 53 |
Separation of Powers | 77 |
Πνευματικά δικαιώματα | |
11 άλλες ενότητες δεν εμφανίζονται
Άλλες εκδόσεις - Προβολή όλων
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