Compensation.

2. A receiver of a distillery is not entitled to compensation for collections and disbursements of government tax on whisky in bond belonging to third persons, which tax, as was customary among distillers and warehousemen, he collected from the owners on withdrawal of the whisky from bond. Though customary, such collections are merely for the accommodation of the owners, and no part of the duties of a receiver.-White v. Allen, (Ky.) 11 S. W. 364. Actions.

3. Receivers appointed by the courts of the United States are subject to suit, without leave, for the purpose of recovering a money judgment, in any court having jurisdiction over the subjectmatter, under act Cong. March 3, 1887.-Dillingham v. Anthony, (Tex.) 11 S. W. 139.

Redemption.

From mortgage sales, see Mortgages, 11-13. tax-sales, see Taxation, 27-29.

REFERENCE.

Long accounts.

1. A contractor worked on a building under a contract which fixed the sum to be paid, and provided that any additions to or deductions from the work as shown by the plans and specifications should be made according to certain rates. Held, in an action to enforce a mechanic's lien, where the account contained over 90 items for extra work, and defendant denied that there was anything due plaintiff, that a reference was proper, under Rev. St. Mo. § 3606, providing that a reference may be directed where the trial of an issue of fact will require the examination of a long account.-Ittner v. St. Louis Exposition & Music Hall Ass'n, (Mo.) 11

RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES.

Right to property.

A certain lot was conveyed to M. in trust for the "African Baptist Church," of which he was pastor. After his death the congregation continued in possession until 1882, when it divided, each branch claiming to be identical with the original congregation. In 1885, by order of the court, the members of the defendant church were appointed trustees to execute the trust of M., deceased. They sold the old lot, and purchased a new lot for the congregation with the proceeds. Held, that the defendant church was entitled to recognition as the original African Baptist Church.-African Baptist Church v. St. Louis Transfer Co., (Mo.) 11 S. W. 990.

Remand.

On appeal, see Appeal, 56, 57.

v.11s.w.-78

REMOVAL OF CAUSES.

Right to removal.

1. The petition alleged that defendant was a corporation created under the laws of Kentucky. Defendant filed an application for removal to the federal court, under act Cong. March 3, 1887, within the time required, alleging that plaintiff was a citizen of Texas and defendant a citizen of Kentucky, with proper allegations as to jurisdictional amount, and filed a bond with security as required. Held, that if the statements in the petition for removal were true, and the bond sufficient, the filing of the application and bond deprived the state court of jurisdiction, and it had no authority to allow the original petition to be amended by striking out allegations as to defendant's incorporation.Southern Pac. Co. v. Harrison, (Tex.) 11 S. W. 168.

2. As the act does not require the petition for removal to be verified, the allegations as to citizenship need not be proved, unless put in issue by a special plea under oath, or, if a plea is not filed, by evidence offered to sustain the objection.-Southern Pac. Co. v. Harrison, (Tex.) 11 S. W 168.

3. An averment in reply to the application that the attorneys had, by an agreement for continuance, waived the right of removal, which is unsworn to, cannot be considered, in the absence of any other showing as to the agreement.-Southern Pac. Co. v. Harrison, (Tex.) 11 S. W. 168.

4. It is the duty of the court, and not of the clerk, to determine the sufficiency of the security accompanying the petition.-Southern Pac. Co. v. Harrison, (Tex.) 11 S. W. 168.

5. The fact that a corporation owns property, does business, has an office and agents in a state, and is subject to be regulated by its laws, does not affect its citizenship or deprive it of the privileges conferred on it by the laws of the United States.Southern Pac. Co. v. Harrison, (Tex.) 11 S. W. 168.

Bond.

REPLEVIN.

1. Under Rev. St. Tex. art. 170, requiring a replevin bond in attachment to be conditioned that, should the defendant be condemned in the action, he shall satisfy the judgment which may be rendered therein," a bond in a case where the debt is less than the value of the attached goods, conditioned "that, if the defendants are condemned in the above-entitled action, they or some other person will return the above-described property, or its value," is more onerous than the statute requires, and is void as a statutory bond.-Colorado Nat. Bank v. Lester, (Tex.) 11 S. W. 626.

2. But defendants having voluntarily executed it for the purpose of obtaining possession of the attached goods, and having then asserted their willingness to be bound by it in every event, it is good as a common-law obligation.-Colorado Nat. Bank v. Lester (Tex.) 11 S. W. 626.

3. The validity of the bond as a common-law obligation could not have been adjudicated in the attachment suit, for the reason that there could be no breach of it before judgment therein.-Colorado Nat. Bank v. Lester, (Tex.) 11 S. W. 626. Damages.

4. Under Mansf. Dig. Ark. §§ 5145, 5181, providing for a recovery in replevin of "all damages sustained by the detention" of the property, damages may be estimated to the date of the verdict. -Lesser v. Norman, (Ark.) 11 S. W. 281.

5. The actual value of the property replevied, not exceeding the amount of plaintiff's judgment, is the measure of recovery. --Colorado Nat. Bank v. Lester, (Tex.) 11 S. W. 626.

6. In replevin for a number of sheep belonging to plaintiff, which the evidence showed defendants had received from a third person, whose only title was under a contract with plaintiff's agent to keep them until fall in consideration of their wool, it was proved that defendants set up an absolute title to them, and denied plaintiff's right. Held, that defendants were liable for every sheep turned over to them, and not accounted for by death or

W. 916.

Res Adjudicata.

See Judgment, 7–12.

Rescission.

suffered loss by the spoiling of the meats he attempted to preserve. It was proved that portions of the meats were spoiled, and that an agent of plaintiff had stated that plaintiff's manager said that he knew the vinegar was of inferior grade. This the agent explained by saying that he said it in order to procure payment, even at a loss. The

Return of Service.

See Writs, 12-17.

Revivor.

Of judgment, see Judgment, 16, 17.

REWARD.

Right of officer to reward.

Deputy-sheriffs, engaged during a railroad strike in protecting railroad property, are not entitled to a reward offered by the railroad company for the arrest and conviction of persons interfering with railroad property in that county.-St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Grafton, (Ark.) 11 S. W. 702.

RIPARIAN RIGHTS.

Prescription.

1. No prescriptive right, as against the uses to which an upper riparian proprietor may employ the water of a stream, can be acquired by the lower proprietor by merely diverting and using the water below.-Mud Creek Irr., Agr. & Manuf'g Co. v. Vivian, (Tex.) 11 S. W. 1078. Joint action.

2. It is no defense to a joint action for injury to riparian rights caused by the wrongful construction of railroad tracks along the margin and on the banks of the stream that the land to which the rights pertained had been partitioned and conveyed in severalty, where it appears that the partition was without reference to the riparian rights, and that the parties had agreed among themselves that the rights should remain in common. -Organ v. Memphis & L. R. R. Co., (Ark.) 11 S. W. 96.

ROBBERY.

Indictment-Proof.

1. Where an indictment for robbery charged the taking of certain coins and bills, "current money of the United States of America," such description, though unnecessary, must be proved.Coffelt v. State, (Tex.) 11 S. W. 639.

2. Proof that the injured person delivered the money to defendant on his demanding the same, at the muzzle of a cocked pistol, supports the alle gation that defendant "took" the money; and Pen. Code Tex. art. 722, prescribing punishment for taking "by assault or by violence, and putting in fear of life or bodily injury," applies to the case; and not article 723, which prescribes a less punishment for taking by threatening to do some illegal act injurious to the character, person, or property of another.-Coffelt v. State, (Tex.) 11 S. W. 639.

SALE.

By executors, see Executors and Administrators, 28-34.

Of railroad franchise, see Railroad Companies, 34, 35.

realty by guardian, see Guardian and Ward,
7-9.

On foreclosure of mortgage, see Mortgages, 9, 10.
Tax-sales, see Taxation, 13-16.
Under execution, see Execution, 6–10.

Action on warranty.

1. In an action for the price of vinegar sold and delivered, defendant pleaded that plaintiff had guarantied the vinegar to be "forty grains, standard proof," suitable for pickling pigs' feet and tongues, for which defendant designed it, but that

the vinegar, said that he would test the vinegar for himself, and return it if it was not up to standard, and defendant admitted that he might have done so. There was expert evidence that no pigs' feet, pickled at the time of year and in the manner defendant pickled his, could be preserved in that climate. Defendant diluted the vinegar used on the pigs' feet, but not more than was customary among packers. The vinegar used on the tongues was not diluted, but they were all lost. He had used nearly all the vinegar before its weakness was discovered. Held, that the evidence supported a verdict for plaintiff.-M. Foster Vinegar Co. v. Guggermos, (Mo.) 11 S. W. 966.

2. While it is error, in such case, to charge, on behalf of plaintiff, that if it furnished defendant with the vinegar sued for, and the same was used, and not returned, plaintiff could recover its price, the error is cured if other instructions inform them that the only issue is whether plaintiff furnished vinegar of the quality ordered.-M. Foster Vinegar Co. v. Guggermos, (Mo.) 11 S. W. 966.

3. It is not error of which defendant can complain that the court charged that the only question was as to the quality of the vinegar, that being the only defense made by the answer.-M. Foster Vinegar Co. v. Guggermos, (Mo.) 11 S. W. 966. 4. There being evidence that defendant said he would return the vinegar if it fell below 40 grains, and that it was to be sent in 10-barrel lots, and defendant was to test it, and that defendant said the first lot was good, and, after receiving the second, said he had no complaint to make, an instruction that, if defendant was to test the vinegar himself, to determine its quality, he could not recover on his counter-claim, is warranted by the testimony. M. Foster Vinegar Co. v. Guggermos, (Mo.) 11

S. W. 966.

5. Defendant having admitted diluting the vinegar, and submitted instructions leaving it to the jury to determine whether the dilution injured the vinegar for its intended use, cannot object to an instruction that defendant cannot recover if he diluted the vinegar, and thus made it inferior.W. 966. M. Foster Vinegar Co. v. Guggermos, (Mo.) 11 S.

Conditional sale.

6. Plaintiffs agreed to supply P. with goods, to be sold by him on commission for their account, the stock and accounts to be the property of plaintiffs subject to their demand, account of sales and remittances to be made semi-monthly, the relationship to cease at plaintiffs' option. P. ordered goods, which were billed to him as if sold to him, but the evidence showed that P. was to account for the goods at the prices as billed, his profits to be the price obtained by him in excess of the invoice price. Held, that the goods remained the property of plaintiffs, and on the death of P. they were entitled to replevy from his administrator such of the stock on hand as could be identified.-Hamilton v. Willing, (Tex.) 11 S. W. 843.

SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL-DIS-
TRICTS.

School lands, see Public Lands, 6-10.
Taxation.

1. Act Ky. May 12, 1884, art. 3, provided for a county tax "in aid of the common schools, " on condition that a majority of the voters should approve thereof. Article 8, § 7, authorized the trustees of a school-district to order a tax to be collected for the purpose of building a new school-house, if at an election to be held for that purpose a majority of the voters should favor the tax. Act May 17, 1886, (Gen. St. 1145,) substituted for the former

section a new one, which authorized a scheme of district taxation "in aid of the common schools," subject also to the approval of the electors. Said article 8, § 7, was also amended so as to provide that whenever the trustees shall be notified by the superintendent of schools that a school-house has been condemned, and that a necessity exists for repairing it, or for erecting a new one, or when it shall become necessary to build a new house, the trustees may order a tax not exceeding a certain rate, to be collected in the same manner as state taxes, which shall be used to construct or repair the school-house, and the portion of the original section providing for the submission of the question to the voters was repealed. Held, that no vote was required to be taken to authorize the levy of a tax for the purpose of building a new schoolhouse.-Macklin v. Trustees of Common-School Dist. No. 9, (Ky.) 11 S. W. 657.

2. The legislature has the constitutional power to authorize the trustees to levy a tax not exceeding a given rate.-Macklin v. Trustees of CommonSchool Dist. No. 9, (Ky.) 11 S. W. 657.

3. The trustees have no power under said statute to order the tax, unless the necessity for the house exists, or they have been notified that the old one had been condemned by the superintendent.-Macklin v. Trustees of Common School Dist. No. 9, (Ky.) 11 S. W. 657.

4. Act Leg. Ky. April 3, 1878, relative to the taxing of railroads, provides for a return to the state auditor for taxation of the length of the road "in each county, city, and incorporate town, " and that the rolling stock and real estate shall be taxed for the purposes of each county, city, town, or precinct in which any portion of any railroad is located. Held, that a common-school district is not a "precinct," and, there being no provision for finding the length of the road within a school-district, there could be no valid assessment for schooldistrict purposes.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Johnson, (Ky.) 11 S. W. 666.

School lands.

5. Under Const. Tex. art. 7, § 6, relating to county school lands, and providing that "each county may sell or dispose of its lands in whole or in part," a county is not limited to sell, but may also lease, its school lands; and having leased them, or indicated its policy to lease and not to sell them, settlers have no right to occupy any part of them.-Falls County v. De Laney, (Tex.) 11 s. W

defendant's attentions, an instruction in regard to reformation was unwarranted.-State v. Primm, (Mo.) 11 S. W. 732.

SET-OFF AND COUNTER-
CLAIM.

Actions against state.

1. In a suit for the use of the state of Alabama defendants pleaded as a set-off that they were the owners of certain overdue coupons, representing the interest on certain bonds issued by the state, and tendered the same to the court in payment of the demand. Plaintiff asked leave to dismiss the suit, which the court denied, and allowed defendants to turn over so many of the coupons as were necessary to pay the claim of the state, and gave judgment for the plaintiff for costs. Held that, though by Code Tenn. §§ 3628, 3629, mutual demands against plaintiff, held by defendant, may be pleaded by way of set-off or cross action, an independent claim cannot be set off against a demand of a state, defensively or otherwise, without the affirmative consent of the state, and the bringing of the original suit by the state is not such a consent.-Moore v. Tate, (Tenn.) 11 S. W. 935. Unliquidated damages.

2. In an action for the price of merchandise, damages arising from the non-performance by plaintiff of a building contract with defendant are not available by way of counter-claim, under Civil Code Ky. § 96, defining a "counter-claim" as a cause of action in favor of a defendant against a plaintiff, which arises out of the contract or transaction stated in the petition as the foundation of plaintiff's claim, or which is connected with the subject of the action.-Forbes v. Cooper, (Ky.) 11 S. W. 24.

3. But such damages, although unliquidated, are available to the defendant as a set-off, where plaintiff is a non-resident, having no property in the state.-Forbes v. Cooper, (Ky.) 11 S. W. 24.

4. One cannot maintain a suit for the purpose of having an unliquidated claim, founded on a breach of covenant, set off against a judgment held against him by the estate of a decedent, although the estate is insolvent; Rev. St. Tex. art. 649, providing that, in a suit founded on a certain demand, the defendant shall not be permitted to set off unliquidated or uncertain damages, founded on a tort or breach of covenant on the part of the plaintiff.-Howard v. Randolph, (Tex.) 11 S. W.

495.

Pleading-Summons.

5. Under Mansf. Dig. Ark. $$ 5033, 5046, 5047, providing that a plaintiff must file his reply to a set-off on or before the calling of a cause for trial, and not requiring notice of any kind to be given him, it is not necessary to summon a plaintiff to answer a set-off pleaded by defendant before rendering judgment thereon.-Heer Dry Goods Co. v. Shaffer, (Ark.) 11 S. W. 517. Evidence.

*

* *

6. Pleading a set-off 18, in effect, a cross-action, and the set-off may be proved by defendant's uncontradicted affidavit, under Mansf. Dig. Ark. § 2915, which enacts that "in suits upon accounts, the affidavit of the plaintiff that such account is just and correct shall be sufficient to establish the same, unless the defendant shall under oath deny the correctness of the account. "Heer Dry Goods Co. v. Shaffer, (Ark.) 11 S. W. 517.

SHERIFFS AND CONSTABLES. Action against, see Appeal, 54.

Action against sheriff-Limitations.

1. The statute of limitations does not begin to run against an attachment creditor's claim to the proceeds of attachment in the hands of the sheriff, from the date of an order made before the deter

before the creditor's right has become absolute, directing the sheriff to pay such proceeds to the clerk of court.-State v. Finn, (Mo.) 11 S. W. 994.

2. Payments by the sheriff's sureties, during the statutory period, of portions of the creditor's claim against the sheriff for the proceeds of attachment, are a waiver of the bar of the statute.State v. Finn, (Mo.) 11 S. W. 994.

SLAVERY.

Purchase of slave by free parent.

H., once a slave, was a free woman in 1839, owning the land in suit. She had two daughters, R. and A.; born slaves, but whom the mother had bought at that time. A son of R. was born after she was purchased by her mother. A. had several children, who were slaves until freed by Const. U. S. amend. 13. Both of the daughters died before their mother. Held, that it will be presumed that H., in purchasing her daughter R., did so to give her freedom, and not to keep her as her slave, and also, after 50 years, that she was legally manumitted, and that the son was born free.-Powell v. Conn, (Ky.) 11 S. W. 814.

Societies.

1. Const. Ark. 1874, art. 5, § 22, provides that every bill shall be read at length three times in each house, and that, on its final passage, the names of the persons voting for and against it shall be entered on the journal, and it shall be a law if a majority of each house be recorded therequirement as to what must appear on the journal. on as voting in favor of it. There is no other reSenate Bill No. 54 (act Jan. 23, 1875, the general election law) is shown by the journal to have been read once, and thereupon a senator "moved a suspension of the rules, and the reading of the bill a second time by title. Adopted." He subsequently moved that the bill "be read a third time, and placed upon its final passage, which was adopted.

ties.

Evidence.

SODOMY.

The testimony of the person on whom the offense was committed must be corroborated, if he consented, and the jury should be so instructed where the question of consent is in doubt.-Medis v. State, (Tex.) 11 S. W. 112.

Special Judge.

See Judge, 9-12.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. Jurisdiction.

1. Equity can enforce the specific performance of an oral agreement to assign an interest in a patent, and can compel a divestiture of defendant's interest.-Blackmer v. Stone, (Ark.) 11 S. W. 693. Pleading.

2. In an action to compel a conveyance of land in accordance with a bond therefor, a description of the land as "fifty acres of land on Pond waters in Morgan county, Ky.," is not definite enough to authorize the relief asked.-Caskey v. Williams, (Ky.) 11 S. W. 11.*

Mistake in contract.

3. An agreement was made in the name of a corporation, by its president, to convey a lot to plaintiff as soon as he would erect a store-house thereon. There were stipulations forming the consideration for the agreement, that the store was to be erected in a fixed time, and that a dwelling was also to be erected on the lot, all of which were by mistake omitted from the agreement, owing to the haste with which it was executed. It did not appear that the corporation ever authorized the president to make such contract, and plaintiff erected only a rough plank store-room of undressed lumber, at a slight cost, which he soon after abandoned. Held, that it was error to decree specific performance.-Enterprise Imp. & Manuf'g Co. v. Wilson, (Ky.) 11 S. W. 437. Price paid.

4. Specific performance of a verbal contract for the sale of land will not be enforced at the instance of the purchaser who has paid the full price, but he has a lien on the land for the amount paid, and the value of the improvements placed thereon, less the value of the rents and profits while he was in possession. -Blackburn v. Blackburn, (Ky.) 11 S. W. 712.

Decree.

5. Judgment cannot be had for the value of the land where defendant is unable specifically to perform, where there is no allegation that any sum

read three times at length, the journal not affirmatively showing the contrary.-Glidewell v. Martin, (Ark.) 11 S. W. 882.

Amendment.

which amends a former act by adding three new 2. Act Mo. March 29, 1883, (Acts 1883, p. 89,) sections thereto, and by amending one of the former sections, setting out such section as amended in full, is hot, as to one of the new sections, in violation of Const. Mo. art. 4, § 34, which provides that "no act shall be amended by providing that designated words thereof be stricken out, or that designated words be inserted, or that designated words be stricken out and others inserted in lieu thereof; but the words to be stricken out, or the words to be inserted, or the words to be stricken out and those inserted in lieu thereof, together with the act or section amended, shall be set forth in full as amended.' W. 930.-State v. Hendrix, (Mo.) 11 S. W. 728. Following State v. Thruston, 4 S.

1. A. and B. bought two lots of land jointly for $800, of which they paid $500, and gave their note for $300; the deed to them reciting the purchasemoney note. Thereafter they partitioned by a deed reciting that A. had fully paid B. $500 for the lot thereby conveyed to him, and that B. had paid A. $300 for his lot. This deed contained a provision "giving and granting each to the other full power to sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of his said portion of said lots," etc. Held, that a purchaser from A. was not bound to inquire who had paid the purchase money due to the original vendor, and that no right of subrogation and lien existed against him in favor of B. on the latter's payment of $100, which A. by agreement ought to have paid to equalize the values in partition, unless it could be shown that he had actual notice of the facts.-Brick v. Bual, (Tex.) 11 S. W. 1044.

2. Where G. paid more than his share of a joint debt owing by himself and B., in accordance with an agreement that he should be credited therefor on his general account with B., the fact that G. had agreed to deliver certain railroad bonds to B., in consideration of moneys advanced by the latter, which he was unable to do, was a sufficient consideration for such excessive payment, though it did not appear that the bonds had been demanded, and G. was not entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the creditor against B.-Greenlaw v. Pettit, (Tenn.) 11 S. W. 357.

Of administrator.

3. Where, on an administrator's sale of an intestate's land under order of court, the purchase price is not paid, and no deed made to the purchaser, who claims the benefit of his purchase, but the sale is confirmed, and the administrator charges himself with the price in his accounts, and after settlement is discharged, he is subrogated to the rights of the estate against the purchaser, and has an equitable lien on the land for the amount of the price, as against a purchaser under execution sale against the former purchaser.-Parker v. Smith, (Tex.) 11 S. W. 909.

Substitution.

Of parties, see Parties, 6.

Sureties.

Remedies against, see Bonds, 3.

Surface Water.

5. The validity of an assessment of taxes cannot be contested on a motion to vacate for irregularity a judgment for the recovery of the taxes and the sale of the land assessed.-State v. Hunter, (Mo.) 11 S. W. 756; Id. 758.

6. Where a city charter provides that taxes not paid by the time prescribed by the ordinances shall bear interest from that time, and the tax imposed is as large as is authorized, an ordinance declaring taxes to be due January 1st will be construed to make them due at that time, provided the collector has then received the rolis, and they will not become due until he does receive the rolls; as to construe it otherwise would be to make the tax bear interest before the collector can receive it, and thus to make it exceed the authorized limit.Lufkin v. City of Galveston, (Tex.) 11 S. W. 340.

TAXATION.

See Constitutional Law, 7-16.

7. Gen. St. Ky. c. 92, art. 1, § 6, provides that the indebtedness which may be deducted by property owners in preparing their lists for taxation must be just debts owing as principal, which the person intends to pay. A property owner purchased a railroad at judicial sale, a lien being retained for the price, the property being primarily liable laterals as security. A stock company was formed and the purchaser conveyed the property to trustees, they to take the purchaser's place, and withdrew his collaterals, the trustees depositing others in lieu thereof. Afterwards, in an action against the trustees and the purchaser's heirs, the purchase was declared to have been made in trust for the railroad company, but the suit was compromised, and the road was transferred to another company on its assumption of the indebtedness. The purchaser's administrator was a party to the compromise. It appeared that the administrator had disbursed a large amount of property, leaving nothing in his hands to pay the debt. Held, that the debt for the purchase price was not one which could be deducted from the taxable property of the purchaser's estate, as the estate had been released therefrom, and the administrator never intended to pay it.—Baldwin v. Hewett, (Ky.) 11 S. W. 803.

For highways, see Highways, 2.

Of insolvent bank, see Receivers, 1.

railroads, see Railroad Companies, 36-39. Tax-deed, action to cancel, see Executors and Administrators, 38.

as color of title, see Adverse Possession, 17. Taxable property.

1. The easement in the streets of a city, which a street-car company has acquired by contract with the city, is an interest in realty, and taxable as such; and an assessment of the corporate franchise, together with such easement, at a gross sum, is not objectionable as being a separate and independent assessment upon the franchise. South Nashville St. R. Co. v. Morrow, (Tenn.) 11 S. W. 348.

2. The situs of shares of corporate stock for purposes of taxation may properly be fixed by statute at the place where the corporation is located.-South Nashville St. R. Co. v. Morrow, (Tenn.) 11 S. W 348.

Exemption.

3. It devolves upon the tax-payer, when he is assessed upon omitted property, or when the assessment is ancillary to that of the regular assessor, to show that he had not previously been allowed his statutory exemption; as the presumption is that the regular assessor did his duty in that respect.-South Nashville St. R. Co. v. Morrow, (Tenn.) 11 S. W. 348.

Assessment.

4. Failure of the assessor to append the proper oath to his return is not ground for enjoining the county clerk from extending the assessment on the tax-books. Stell v. Watson (Ark.) 11 S. W. 822.

and rendered by him as required by law; that the commissioners' court again met for further examination of the assessment rolls; and that they examined them, corrected errors therein, and ordered them to be received, approved, and certified, which was done; and that they contained the valuation of plaintiff's land as increased by the assessor. Held, that under the findings and Rev. St. Tex. arts. 4715, 4718, 4721, 4722, Sayles' Civil St. art. 1517a, requiring the assessor to submit the original lists to the board, who, after examining and approving them, are to return them to him. and from which he is to make the tax-rolls' to present to the court for examination and approval, and at the same time return to the court the original lists to be filed in the county clerk's office, the valuations placed on the tax-rolls were the valuations fixed by the board, and not by the assessor. Duck v. Peeler, (Tex.) 11 S. W. 1111.

9. Defendant should have been allowed to prove by the assessor that the abbreviation "Bd. Eq." meaning "Board of Equalization, " upon the original list, was placed there by the judge, who, under order of the board, so placed the increased valuation thus shown, and carried it to the taxroll as the act of the board, though such facts were not shown by the minutes of the judge.Duck v. Peeler, (Tex.) 11 S. W. 1111. Equalization.

10. Failure to give the notice required by act Ark. 1887, § 52, p. 172, providing that when the valuation of property is raised by the board of equalization it shall give notice thereof, "by postalcard or otherwise, through the mails," does not affect the board's jurisdiction.-Stell v. Watson. (Ark.) 11 S. W. 822.