PART III. complete pages, or that they may be distributed through the wrappers or advertising sheets, as he may think fit. The first provision of the part of the rule before quoted is for the case of standing advertisements forming a complete page. This seems directed to the case of a page of the former number being reprinted in the succeeding one. The second case is of the standing advertisements collected together, making one or more complete page or pages in the wrappers or advertising sheets. We think this refers to the case when the master shall direct that standing advertisements shall be printed in the same page or pages, so far as they will fill up. In such case, when they completely fill a page or pages, the advertisements are not to be chargeable according to the scale, but the compositor is only entitled to charge for his time in making up. But if any standing advertisements are left over, or if the master thinks fit to direct that they shall be distributed through the other pages of the advertising sheet, so that they do not form a complete page, we think that the latter part of the rule applies, and that the compositor is entitled to charge according to the scale." (a)

Where, therefore, in the November number of a monthly magazine there were composed and printed, on one page, two advertisements which occupied the entire page, and the type of which was left standing, and in the December number the same two advertisements were printed, but on different pages, each advertisement occupying about half a page, the remainder of the page being filled up by other advertisements, it was held that the compositor was entitled, under the latter part of the rule, to charge for the composing, and that the case did not come within the first part of the rule, under which the compositor would be entitled to charge only for his time in making up. (b)

A dispute, similar to that just referred to, having arisen in 1856 between a compositor and a master printer, the matter was referred, in pursuance of certain of the rules agreed upon, to the arbitration of three master printers, three journeymen, and a barrister, whose casting vote was to be decisive; the result being an award in favour of the master, the barrister having given his casting vote in favour of the view taken by the three masters. The plaintiff subsequently entered the defendant's service knowing of that decision, and also that the defendant was one of the three masters; but nothing was said as to the terms of payment, each party understanding that it was to be made according to the rules. It was held

(a) 3 H. & N. 12, 13.

(b) Ib.

that the decision of the arbitrators was not, at the time of the employment of the plaintiff, binding between the parties as an interpretation of the rule above set out, and that, notwithstanding their decision, it was competent for the court to entertain the question of its construction. (a)

PART IIL

insure.

If there is an express undertaking by the printer to Contract to insure the paper given him for a work which he contracts to print within six months, he is liable for a loss by fire which takes place after that time, even though the completion of the work within the specified time has been prevented by the failure of his employer to supply copy fast enough.(b) If he wishes to exonerate himself from all risk after the specified time has elapsed, he must abandon the contract altogether; if, whilst complaining of the delay in supplying copy, he continues to print, his contract to insure continues. (c)

Where certain printers were employed to print a work, Loss by fire. of which the impression was to be 750 copies, and a fire broke out on their premises before the whole number of copies had been delivered, in an action to recover the amount to be paid for the work, Tindal, C.J., held that the printers' right to recover depended on the question whether the whole 750 copies had been printed when the fire broke out, or whether the fire took place while the press was set and before the whole was printed off, in which latter case they would not be entitled to recover anything.(d)

In the case of authors, publishers, and printers, as in all megal or other cases, our law refuses to aid any of the parties to a contract of an illegal or immoral character.

No person who has had anything to do with the composition of an immoral or libellous work can maintain an action against the person who employed him, to recover remuneration for his labour. This applies to printers, as well as authors and publishers.(e)

Best, C.J., in dealing with the case of a book which recounted the amours of a courtesan, said: "I have no hesitation in saying that no person who has contributed his assistance to the publication of such a work, can recover in a court of justice any compensation for labour so bestowed. The person who lends himself to the violation of the public morals and laws of the country shall not have the assistance of these laws to carry into execution such a purpose. It would be strange if a man could be fined and

(a) 3 H. & N. 12, 13. (c) lb.

(e) Poplett v. Stockdale

(b) Mawman v. Gillett (2 Taunt. 325).
(d) Adlard v. Booth (7 C. & P. 108).
(Ry. & M. 337).

immoral contracts.

PART III.

imprisoned for doing that for which he could maintain an action at law. Every one who gives his aid to such a work, though as a servant, is responsible for the mischief of it."(a)

A printseller cannot recover the price of libellous or immoral publications sold by him.()

Where the plaintiff, a printer, agreed to print for the defendant a certain number of copies of a treatise to which a dedication was to be prefixed, and, after the treatise was printed, and the proof sheet of the dedication was revised by the defendant and returned to the plaintiff, the latter, for the first time, discovered that it contained libellous matter, and on that account refused to complete the printing, it was held that he was justified in so refusing, and was also entitled to recover for printing the treatise. "I told the jury," said Pollock, C.B., in this case, (c) "that if the plaintiff agreed to print the dedication and the treatise, and so undertook to print that which he knew to be libellous, and afterwards said that he would not print both; in such case he could not recover. I think his right to recover rests entirely on this ground, that he had been furnished with the treatise without the dedication. The dedication was afterwards sent, but he had no opportunity of reading it until after it was printed; he then discovered that it was libellous, and refused to permit the defendant to have it. I think that if a contract is bona fide entered into by a printer to print a work consisting of two parts, and at the time he enters into the contract he has no means of knowing that one part is unlawful, and he executes both, but afterwards suppresses that which is unlawful, there is an implied undertaking on the part of the person employing him to pay for so much of the work as is lawful."

Although the illegality or immorality of an intended publication would be a good defence to an action brought against the author for breach of contract to deliver his manuscript for publication, this illegality or immorality is not to be presumed where the work itself is not produced at the trial. (d)

A printer whose name did not appear on the periodical paper printed by him, as was required by 38 Geo. 3, c. 78 (since repealed by 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 32), was held not entitled to maintain an action for work and labour done in printing it. (e) And the proprietor of a newspaper,

(a) Poplett v. Stockdale (Ry. & M. 338).

(b) Fores v. Johnes (4 Esp. 97). (c) Clay v. Yates (1 H. & N. 73) (d) Gale v. Leckie (2 Stark. N. P. 110).

(e) Marchant v. Evans (2 B. Moore, 14).

published before the filing of the affidavit required by that statute, when in force, was, on the ground of having done an act prohibited by law, nonsuited in an action brought to recover damages for breach of contract to print certain copies of his newspaper. (a) For the same reason a printer was held not entitled to recover for labour or materials used in printing a pamphlet, on which he had not printed his name, and the name of the city or place where he dwelt, as required by sect. 27 (now repealed) of 39 Geo. 3, c. 79. (b)

But to an action by the proprietor of the copyright in a book against a defendant for having, without the proprietor's consent in writing, printed for sale copies of the work, and also for having in his possession for sale and selling copies of the work so unlawfully printed, it was held no defence to plead that the book was printed and published without the name and place of abode of the printer upon the first or last leaves thereof, as directed by 2 & 3 Vict. c. 12, s. 2.(c)

Whilst the enactment (6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 8) requiring the filing at the Stamp Office of a declaration as to the proprietorship of newspapers was still in force, it was held that where a person entered specifically into a contract with the real proprietor, who was not registered as such, a person whose name was registered could not be made liable on the contract. (d)

(a) Houston v. Mills (1 M. & Rob. 325).
(b) Bensley v. Bignold (5 B. & Ald. 335).

(e) Chappell v. Davidson (18 C. B. 194; 25 L. J. 225, C. P.).
(d) Holcroft v. Hoggins (2 C. B. 488).

PART III.

Libels in general.

PART IV.-LAW OF LIBEL.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

WE have been treating hitherto of the rights and privileges of the authors and proprietors of literary and artistic works; but such works, besides conferring rights and privileges, also impose duties and entail liabilities. Writing, printing, and other modes of publication furnish, unhappily, no exception to the general rule that there is nothing, however beneficial its normal tendency, which may not be perverted to the worst of uses. Those arts which have done so much to enlighten mankind, to elevate their moral, social, and political condition, and to diffuse innocent gratification and amusement, have also been made the instruments of wanton attack upon religion and morals, upon the government and constitution of the state, and upon all that is most dear in private life. Of injuries thus caused either to the community at large or to its individual members the law takes cognizance, and those injurious publications which it punishes are designated libels.(a)

There is no satisfactory definition of libels in generalwhich really explains what they are and fully describes their various species; nor is it of importance to endeavour to obtain such a definition, since its very wide generality would render it practically valueless. (b) A definition may

(a) The word libel is derived from the libellus (dim. of liber, a book) famosus of the Roman law.

(b) Lord Lyndhurst, in his evidence before the Committee of the House of Lords, on whose report the Act of 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96 was framed, says on this subject, A definition in order to satisfy the requisites of a good logical definition, ought not only to be sufficiently precise so that it shall take in nothing except what was intended to be specified, but also sufficiently comprehensive to omit nothing which ought to be included. I have never yet seen, nor been able myself to hit upon anything like a definition of libel, or even of sedition which possessed those requisites of a definition; and I cannot help thinking that the difficulty is not accidental, but essentially inherent in the nature of the subject matter.”