recommend the attainment of Wisdom so earnestly, if it were only to be rewarded with the perishable and unsatisfactory things which this world has to bestow? The declaration, that "God will bring every work into judgment,” if it merely refers to his dealings with mankind on earth, neither agrees with the scope of the whole discourse, nor forms a reason for the precept delivered immediately before. Take it, however, in its true light, and all the expressions will be found correct, and the argument cogent. Since every thing in this transitory scene is unsubstantial; since much oppression, pain, misery, and vice prevail; and since the righteous, equally with the wicked, are subject to misfortune and death, it follows that, if God be just, a period will arrive when every thing will be set to rights, when the inequalities of this world will be adjusted, and men be punished or rewarded, according as they have obeyed or disobeyed the divine commands. It must, therefore, be the great duty and principal concern of every man, in this life, to fear God in a filial and reverential manner, and to keep his commandments, because, in a future state, God will bring every work into judgment, with every secret thing, whether it be good, or whether it be evil.*

* The objections of Le Clerc to this interpretation of Ecclesiastes xii. 14 are solidly refuted by Peters, Critical Dissertation on Job, part iii. § 12.

The result of the foregoing investigation is, that the book of Ecclesiastes is not designed to inculcate the immortality of the soul and a future retribution, though it supplies some very clear intimations of that important doctrine.

The opinion most generally received respecting the scope and design of the Ecclesiastes is, that it is an inquiry into the Summum Bonum, or Chief Good, the frequent subject of speculation among the philosophers of Greece and Rome. To this opinion the Author of the present performance accedes, and upon this basis the following Paraphrase is constructed. But, in characterizing the discourse as a discussion of this interesting topic, the Chief Good is not understood in the same sense as by the ancient philosophers. Much confusion and error have arisen from applying to the illustration of this subject notions derived from the classical schools of philosophy. The real good of man, as portrayed by the Jewishs age, is essentially different, both in its nature and object, from that which was sought after by the learned of Pagan antiquity.

"The Sovereign Good," says Mr. Harris, "is that, the possession of which make us happy."*

* Harris, Dialogue on Happiness, part i. With this agree the various descriptions of the Summum Bonum enumerated by Stobæus, Eclog. Ethic. ib. ii. cap. 7, ed. Heeren; Aristotle, Rhetorica, lib. i. cap. 6; Lactantius,

The essence of the philosophical Summum Bonum, according to this definition, consists in its power of producing happiness. Amidst all the diversity of opinions as to the thing itself, in this the philosophers are universally agreed.* The very characteristic of the Chief Good, in which they are all unanimous, is, that it is desirable for its own sake, and all other things only as means conducing to it; that it is the ultimate end to which every thing is to be referred, and itself to nothing further, which shows it to have been, in their apprehension, but another term for human felicity. But it is manifestly not the sole object of the author of the Ecclesiastes to investigate

Instit. lib. iii. The Summum Bonum is ably discussed in Dr. Ireland's Paganism and Christianity compared, chap. viii. See also Rutherforth's Essay on Virtue, chap. ix.

*

Ονοματι (scil. το αγαθον) μεν ουν σχεδον υπο των πλειστων ομολογείται την γαρ ευδαιμονιαν και οι πολλοι, και οι χαριεντες Xeyovo," as to the name of the Chief Good it is universally agreed, for both the multitude and the learned call it happiness."-(Aristotle, Ethic. Nichom. lib. i. cap. 4.) In Plato's Dialogue on the Summum Bonum, entitled Philebus, it is described to be that habit or disposition of mind which renders human life happy, εξιν ψυχης και διαθεσιν, την δυναμενην ανθρωποις πασι τον βιον ευδαιμονα παρέχειν.—Opera, vol. iv. p. 209, ed. Bipont. See also Augustine, De Civit. Dei, lib. xix. cap. 1, 2, 3; Cicero, De Finibus, passim.; Stobæus, Eclog. Ethic. lib. ii. cap. 7, p. 138, and 274 et seq. ed. Heeren.

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+ Quærimus quid sit extremum et ultimum bonorum ; quod omnium philosophorum sententia tale debet esse, ut ad id omnia referri oporteat, ipsum autem nusquam."-(Cicero, De Finibus, lib. i. cap. 9. See also cap. 12; Maximus Tyrius, Diss. 19. sub. fin.; Aristotle, Ethic. Nichom. lib. i. cap. 7; Stobæus, Eclog. Ethic. vol. iii. p. 80 et seq.) Indeed, the great object of ancient philosophy was the promoting the happiness of the present life alone, as Cicero observes, in his fine treatise on the Sovereign Good, "omnis summa philosophiæ ad beate vivendum refertur."-De Finibus, lib, ii. cap. 27.

what may enable us to lead happy lives. Though the Wisdom which he panegyrizes contributed more to happiness than the fleeting pleasures of a fleeting world, it is not on this account that he emblazons it with unceasing praise. He attributes effects to it far more noble and sacred; recommending it to our esteem and cultivation, because it is the only means of living conformably to the will of Heaven, and of obtaining the favour of Omnipotence. It would not have accorded with Solomon's reputation for piety and wisdom, to propose aught as the Chief Good unconnected with religion. While Pagan philosophy never taught the glory and service which are due to the Supreme Being, he could never cease to inculcate the necessity of reverence to the divine law, and the unparalleled importance of fearing God and keeping his commandments. Educated in the strictest principles of Judaism, he must ever have considered, and ever have represented, these as man's highest interest and supreme good.

The Summum Bonum, as understood by the ancient philosophers, was that which constituted happiness in the present life. That none of the ancient philosophers believed the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, though, on account of its great utility, all the theistical ones sedulously taught it to the people, is

strenuously maintained by the learned Warburton;* but, without giving entirely into this opinion, he who impartially examines their writings will be convinced, that their ideas were confined principally to the limits of terrestrial existence; that their reasonings about the nature of the soul and immortality, when they rose the highest, were still involved in uncertainty; and that whenever they cast a glance beyond the grave, it was considered as a subject of curiosity and amusing speculation, rather than as leading to any useful and practical result. But the Jewish philosopher looks beyond the narrow bounds of this world; he contemplates the time when, after the termination of life, “the spirit shall return to God who gave it;" and elevates his thoughts to another stage of existence, where "God will bring every work into judgment." His intimations of these truths, it is confessed, are indefinite and general; and, even while he mounts to the very confines of the etherial regions, we are compelled to acknowledge, that his conceptions of a future state were surrounded with shade and obscurity. But, confused as his notions might be, he was too well convinced of a future life to regard aught as the Chief Good which is restricted to the present,

* Divine Legation, lib. iii. See Dr. Ireland's Paganism and Christianity compared, chap. v., and Dr. Leland's Advantage and Necessity of Revelation, part iii.