as entering into any contract with the community or with individuals. The postmaster-general is therefore responsible only to the government of which he is an agent, and all contracts made by him are made by and binding upon the government, and not by or upon himself personally.' But-while the postmastergeneral is not responsible either for his own default or for the default of his deputies'-yet his deputies themselves have been held liable, for want of diligence, or for fraud of their subordinates, when they themselves have not exercised a reasonable caution and discretion in their selection of agents. Generally mail contractors will be held to make no personal contracts with the senders of letters, and to be responsible only to the government from which they receive their remuneration; but it has been held otherwise. No law of the United States, in reference to the postal service, makes it a legal channel of above indicated classes, that they may be separately weighed, and the adhesive stamps above indicated must be affixed either by the department or by the proprietors. Ordinary postage stamps cannot be used for the purpose, nor can these special newspaper stamps be used for any other purpose.-—U. S. Official Postal Guide.

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1 Rowning v. Goodchild, 3 Wills. 443; Whitfield v. Le Despencer, Cowp. 754; Story on Cont. § 979; on Agency, §§ 302-307; on Bailments, §§ 462, 463, 464; 1 Bell Comm. § 468; Dunlop v. Munroe, 7 Cranch, 242; Bolan v. Williamson, 2 Bay, 551; Schroyer v. Linch, 8 Watts, 632.

2

Story on Cont. § 970; Wiggins v. Hathaway, 6 Barb. (N. Y.) 632.

* Maxwell v. McIlroy, 2 Bibb. 211; Bishop v. Williamson, 2 Fairf. 495; Dunlop v. Munroe, 7 Cranch, 242; Bolan v. Williamson, 2 Bay, 551; Dox v. Postmaster, 1 Pet. 318; Christy v. Smith, 23 Vt. (8 Wast.) 663; Teall v. Felton, 3 Barb. (N. Y.) 512; 1 Comst. (N. Y.) 537; Coleman v. Frazier, 4 Rich. 146; Fitzgerald v. Burrill, 106 Mass. 446.

* Conwell v. Voorhies, 13 Ohio, 523; Hutchins v. Brackett. 2 Fost. (11) 252. Sawyer v. Coral, 17 Gratt. 230.

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communication, which a party may adopt as compulsory upon his correspondent. When a letter is placed in a post-office, it is within the legal custody of the officers of the government, and no one has the authority to open it, even though it comes from a criminal and is suspected of containing improper information, but it is the duty of the postmaster, if the person to whom it is directed live in the same place where his office is situated (or if his office be the nearest post-office) to deliver it to that person."

The postmaster is the only judge of the fact as to which paper has the largest circulation; under the act of congress of March 3, 1845, obliging him to advertise a list of letters non-called for in such a paper, and he is not responsible in a state court for the results of his judgment. Nor will an action lie against a postmaster by publishers for refusing their proofs as to the circulation of their newspaper.

2

'Tanner v. Hughes, 53 Pa. St. 289.

United States v. Eddy, 1 Bess. 527; Id. v. Pond, 2 Curris C. C. 265.

" Nevins v. Bank, 10 Mich. 547.

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* Foster v. McKibben, 4 Pa. L. J. Rep. 303: 14 Pa. St. (2 Harris) 168.

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I

Strong v. Campbell, 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 135. And see besides generally as to post-office and postmasters, U. S. v. Bank of Necropolis, 15 Pet. 378; Postmaster-General v. Rice, Gilpin, 544; U. S. v. Hart, Pet. C. C. 390; Trafton v. U. S., 3 Story, 646; Boody v. U. S., 1 W. & M. 150; U. S. v. Davis, Deady, 294; Foster v. McKibben, 4 Pa. L. J. Rep. 303; Fitzgerald v. Burrill, 106 Mass. 46; U. S. v. Driscoll, 1 Low. 303; U. S. v. Crow, I Bond. 51; Farnam v. U. S., 1 Col. T. 309; Chouteau v. Steamboat St. Anthony, 1 Miss. 226; U. S. v. Hedges, 13 How. (U. S.) 478; Ware v. U. S., 4 Wal. (Id.) 617; Trafton v. U. S. 3 Story, 646; U. S. v. Brown, 9 How. (U. S.) 487; Id. v. Roberts, Id. 501; Id. v. Rice, 9 Gilpin, 554; Id. v. Foye, 1 Curtis C. C. 364; Id. v. Fisher, 5 McLean, 23; Id. v. Kean, 5 Id. 509; Id. v. Tanner, 6 Id. 128; Id. v. Whitaker, Id. 343; Id. v. Emerson, Id. 406: Id. v. Sander, Id.

We have already seen that the doctrine of innocence will be insisted upon by the United States postal department, and that no scurrilous, obscene, or libelous matter will be allowed in the mails. The offense of sending scurrilous postal cards through the mails will be prosecuted by government, and heavy penalties visited upon offenders. One Chamberlin, who was indicted in the United States circuit. court for the southern district of New York, for sending such postal cards, was found guilty and sentenced by the court to pay a fine of five thousand dollars."

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598; Id. v. Beatty, Hemp. (U. S.) 487; Id. v. Parsons, 2 Blatchf. 104; Id. v. Marselis, Id. 108; Id. v. Collingham, Id. 470; Id. 4. Mulvaney, 4 Parker (N. Y.) 164; Id. v. Collins, 4 Blatchf. 142; Id. v. Kirby, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 482; Tanner v. Hughes, 53 Pa. St. 289; Sawyer v. Corse, 17 Gratt. (Va.) 230; Wingate v. McNamar, 28 Ind. 481. As to what is mailable matter, see U. S. v. Bromley, 12 How. (U. S.) 88; Teal v. Felton, Id. 284.

A common carrier cannot on the ground of its employment by government set up that it is an agent of the government, so as to escape liabilities for the negligence of its own servants. Truex v. Erie Ry. Co., 4 Lans. (N. Y.) 198.

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This case is as yet unreported. The indictment was filed. June 30th, 1875. The trial began December 15th, 1874, and lasted nine days. The indictment contained fourteen different counts (four of which were afterwards consolidated); upon one of which counts, the jury finding the defendant guilty, he was sentenced to pay the above fine. See New York Times, December 15-24, 1874. And the offense of writing defamatory matter on a postal-card is also one civilly cognizable, and sounding in damages. In Crane v. Walker, in the Marine Court of the city of New York, the plaintiff, a collector of past-due claims, applied to the defendant, a tailor, on Fifthavenue, in 1871, with a letter of introduction, for employment. A number of bills were given him, upon which a percentage was to be paid in case of collection, rising to thirty per cent. if suit had to be brought, the plaintiff, however, to pay all expenses. Two or three bills were collected and returned, the plaintiff in the meantime ordering and receiving a pair of pants, which remain unpaid for, although defendant claimed that pay

The same rule will be applied to the sending of messages by private telegraph companies. A telegraph company would have the right to decline the transmission of all messages of an illegal or immoral character, or such as were in furtherance of fraud or against public policy; or where the message was for the purpose of aiding or concealing crime, or would in any other way tend to thwart the course of public justice. If this were not so, the agents of the company would, in some cases, become particeps criminis; and would, in all such cases, be lending their aid, for a reward, to purposes not sanctioned by the law. The same moral and legal obligation rests upon the company as upon individuals, in reference to their contracts and dealings with each other; and whatever the law would not compel it to perform, it has the ment was promised within a month. Among the claims was one against a person named Salmonson, against whom suit was brought, judgment obtained, and examination on supplementary proceedings had, the plaintiff in the end getting forty dollars from Salmonson, not in reduction of the judgment, but in payment of referee's fees, costs, &c. This collection comingto Mr. Walker's ears, and supposing it to have been a payment on account of the bill, of which no return was made to him, and, as he says, being unable to get an explanation, he wrote the following words on a postal-card, and sent it to the plaintiff through the mail:-"It seems to me you are acting like a regular fraud in your treatment of me. You admit of having collected forty dollars from Salmonson, and yet you have made no return to me, and not on your own account which you got on false pretenses. It is more than thieving to do as you have done, and if it is possible I'll have you put in jail for collecting my money without making any return." It was shown that this was read by several parties while lying on the plaintiff's desk before his arrival at his office. The court charged the jury that a publication was established, and that the amount of their verdict would be governed by the injury done and the intent of the defendant in writing it.

A verdict was rendered for the plaintiff for three hundred dollars.-N. Y. Herald, May 19th, 1875.

right to refuse. In some of the American states the transmission of such messages is expressly prohibited by statute, and in some of them it is made a criminal offense so to do.' By the California statute" it is provided: "If any agent or operator in any telegraph office shall knowingly send by telegraph any false or forged message, purporting to be from such officer (or telegraph company), or any other person, or if any other person or persons shall furnish, or conspire to furnish, to such operator, to be so sent any such message knowing the same to be false or forged, with the intent to deceive and injure, or defraud any individual or corporation, or the public, such agent, operator, or persons, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or imprisonment, not to exceed six months, or both, such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court."

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There is a similar provision in Pennsylvania3 and in Oregon. In Ohio, it is provided that if any agent officer, or manager of any telegraph line, operating in this state, or any other person, shall knowingly transmit, by such telegraph line, any false communication or intelligence, with intent to injure any one, or to speculate in any article of merchandise, commerce, or trade, or with intent that another may do so, or shall knowingly send or deliver any dispatch that is thereto, he shall, on conviction, pay a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars. By the California act of April 18, 1862, sec. 4, it is provided that nothing in the act

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Scott & Jarnagin on the Law of Telegraphs, § 119.

Act of April 22, 1850.

* Purdons's Digest, 1861, Crimes, 185.