*487 Indians is merely to have the United States administer properly the trust assumed. It resembles the general right of every citizen to have the government administered according to law and the public moneys properly applied.10 Courts have no power, under the circumstances here presented, to interfere with the performance of the functions committed to an executive department of the government by a suit to which the United States is not, and cannot be made, a party.11 within the authority conferred, or that it | der obligation to account to the Indians was an improper exercise of such authority, therefor. In other words, the right of the or that Congress lacked the power to confer the authority exercised. In those cases the act *complained of either involved an invasion or denial of a definite right of the plaintiff, or it operated to cast a cloud upon his property.8 In some of those cases the defendant would have been liable individually in trespass unless he could justify under authority conferred." Morrison and the other Chippewas have no right of that character. The lands ceded are the property of the United States. It has, confessedly, power to dispose of them. It assumed the obligation of doing this properly, of accounting for the principal of the trust fund to be created thereby, and of disbursing properly the interest accruing. Each of these three grounds of complaint involves, in essence, either the charge of faliure to pay into the treasury to the credit of the Chippewas money which should be credited to them or the making of a payment from the accruing interest for the purpose not authorized. If through officials of the United States these lands, or Approximately 700,000 acres of land were *488 the proceeds thereof, or the accruing inter-reserved to satisfy claims for allotment to Under the agreeest, are improperly disposed of, it is the the Red Lake Indians. United States, not the officials, which is unments approved by the President these allotments were to be made as soon as prac*489 American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94, 23 S. Ct. 33, 47 L. Ed. 90; Santa Fé Pac. R. R. Co. v. Lane, 244 U. S. 492, 37 S. Ct. 714, 61 L. Ed. 1275; Waite v. Macy, 246 U. S. 606, 38 S. Ct. 395, 62 L. Ed. 892; Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 38 S. Ct. 529, 62 L. Ed. 1101, 3 A. L. R. 649, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 724; First National Bank of Canton v. Williams, 252 U. S. 504, 40 S. Ct. 372, 64 L. Ed. 690; Ft. Smith & Western R. R. Co. v. Mills, 253 U. S. 206, 40 S. Ct. 526, 64 L. Ed. 862; Street v. Lincoln Safe Deposit Co., 254 U. S. 88, 41 S. Ct. 31, 65 L. Ed. 151, 10 A. L. R. 1548; Tedrow v. Lewis & Son Dry Goods Co., 255 U. S. 98, 41 S. Ct. 303, 65 L. Ed. 524; Kennington v. Palmer, 255 U. S. 100, 41 S. Ct. 303, 65 L. Ed. 528; Kinnane v. Detroit Creamery Co., 255 U. S. 102, 41 S. Ct. 304, 65 L. Ed. 531; Weed & Co. v. Lockwood, 255 U. S. 104, 41 S. Ct. 305, 65 L. Ed. 532; Willard Co. v. Palmer, 255 U. S. 106, 41 S. Ct. 305, 65 L. Ed. 534; International Ry. Co. v. Davidson, 257 U. S. 506, 42 S. Ct. 179, 66 L. Ed. 341; Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44, 42 S. Ct. 453, 66 L. Ed. 822; Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U. S. 557, 42 S. Ct. 549, 66 L. Ed. 1061; Regal Drug Co. v. Wardell, 260 U. S. 386, 43 S. Ct. 152, 67 L. Ed. 318; Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U. S. 543, 44 S. Ct. 405, 66 L. Ed. 841. 8 Noble v. Union River Logging R. R. Co., 147 U. S. 165, 13 S. Ct. 271, 37 L. Ed. 123; Lane v. Watts, 234 U. S. 525, 34 S. Ct. 965, 58 L. Ed. 1440; Payne v. Central Pac. Ry. Co., 255 U. S. 228, 41 S. Ct. 314, 65 L. Ed. 598; Payne v. New Mexico, 255 U. S. 367, 41 S. Ct. 333, 65 L. Ed. 680; Santa Fé Pac. R. R. Co. v. Fall, 259 U. S. 197, 42 S. Ct. 466, 66 L. Ed. 896; Baldwin Co. v. Robertson, 265 U. S. 168, 44 S. Ct. 508, 68 L. Ed. 962. Noble v. Union River Logging R. R. Co., 147 U. S. 165, 13 S. Ct. 271, 37 L. Ed. 123; Street v. Lincoln Safe Deposit Co., 254 U. S. 88, 41 S. Ct. 31, 65 L. Ed. 151, 10 A. L. R. 1548; Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U. S. 557, 42 S. Ct. 549, 66 L. Ed. 1061; Regal Drug Co. v. Wardell, 260 U. S. 386, 43 S. Ct. 152, 67 L. Ed. 318. Compare Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 620, 32 S. Ct. 340, 56 L. Ed. 570; Greenleaf Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U. S. 251, 35 S. Ct. 551, 59 L. Ed. 939; Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R. R. Co., 109 U. S. 446, 3 S. Ct. 292, 609, 27 L. Ed. 992. Third. A mandatory injunction is sought to compel the Secretary of the Interior to permit the Red Lake Indians to receive allotments from the Red Lake Reservation, under section 2 of the General Allotment Act of February 8, 1887, c. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (Comp. St. § 4196). The plaintiff does not claim to be entitled to an allotment of any of this land. He is not a Red Lake Indian. He is not seeking to enforce the right of any Red Lake Indian to an allotment. Morrison's interest is an indirect one. His complaint appears to be this: The ticable after *the taking of a census. ceded lands. This surplus, like the other 10 Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U. S. 126, 42 S. Ct. 274, 66 L. Ed. 499; Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 486, 43 S. Ct. 597, 67 L. Ed. 1078. Compare Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U. S. 627, 34 S. Ct. 938, 58 L. Ed. 1506. 11 Among the 59 cases passed upon by this Court in which a suit to enjoin an officer of the United States was entertained but relief was denied, there are 2 (Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U. S. 50, 28 S. Ct. 690, 52 L. Ed. 954, and Lane v. Morrison, 246 U. S. 214, 38 S. Ct. 252, 62 L. Ed. 674) in which the plaintiff appears to have had only the same character of interest as is claimed by the plaintiff in the present case. In these cases, relief was denied on the ground that the action complained of was within the scope of the authority conferred, the question of the plaintiff's right to litigate the matter not having been raised. (45 S.Ct.) lands, and consequently the sale of the same. The delay in making sales has postponed the payment into the trust fund of the expected (266 U. S. 438) DELAWARE & H. CO. et al. v. UNITED STATES et al. proceeds from sales. The delay in making (Argued Nov. 19, 1924. Decided Jan. 5, 1925.) this payment has deferred the accruing of interest. Thus the plaintiff and others are deprived of part of their expected annual income. The delay in making the allotment has likewise deferred the commencement of the running of the 50-year period upon the expiration of which the trust fund is to be distributed. The postponement of the period of distribution results in unnecessary and illegal expenditure out of the income of the fund. It is to avert such indirect losses that a mandatory injunction is sought to compel the Secretary to make the allotments. [5-7] Morrison urges that he is seeking to enforce the performance of a merely ministerial duty. Relief was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that he is not a member of the Red Lake Band and has shown no authority to speak for them. Whether that ruling was correct, whether the duty of the Secretary of the Interior is merely ministerial, and whether the indirect or remote *interest of the plaintiff in the performance of the particular duty is of a nature which could, in any event, entitle him to compel its specific performance by judicial process-these are questions which we have no occasion to consider. A mandatory injunction, like a mandamus, is an extraordinary remedial process, which is granted, not as a matter of right, but in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion.12 It issues to remedy a wrong, not to promote one. No facts are shown which justify its issue in this case. It is alleged that the Secretary of the Interior has “refused and still refuses to allot a single Indian on the Red Lake reservation lands, or to permit any Indian to *490 If select or receive an allotment thereon." Affirmed. 12 Duncan Townsite Co. v. Lane, 245 U. S. 308, 311. 38 S. Ct. 99, 62 L. Ed. 309; Arant v. Lane, 249 U. S. 367, 371, 39 S. Ct. 293, 63 L. Ed. 650. 13 See United States v. Payne, 264 U. S. 446, 44 S. Ct. 352, 68 L. Ed. 782. 1. Commerce No. 212. 87-Interstate Commerce Commission's tentative valuation of railroad's property is without probative effect, prior to Commission's rulings on railroad's protest. Interstate Commerce Commission's tentative valuation of railroad's property, under Interstate Commerce Act, § 19a, as amended by Act March 1, 1913, Act Feb. 28, 1920, and Act June 7, 1922 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, § 8591), is merely an ex parte appraisement, without probative effect, and does not become final, on protest by railroad, until Commission has ruled thereon. 2. Commerce 89-Equity will not cancel Interstate Commerce Commission's tentative valuation of railroad's property prior to Commission's ruling on protest. Equity will not cancel Interstate Commerce Commission's tentative valuation of railroad's property under Interstate Commerce Act, § 19a, 28, 1920, and Act June 7, 1922 (Comp. St. Ann. as amended by Act March 1, 1913, Act Feb. Supp. 1923, § 8591), in proceeding involving same issues as were raised by protest filed by railroad under such statute, prior to Commission's ruling on protest, in absence of showing that Commission has willfully disregarded the law as honestly interpreted, or has failed to proceed in an orderly manner, or that it will not consider and pass on all matters set up in protest. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. Proceeding by the Delaware & Hudson Company and others against the United States, in which the Interstate Commerce Commission intervened. Decree of dismissal (295 F. 558), and petitioners appeal. Affirmed. Messrs. H. T. Newcomb and Walter C. Noyes, both of New York City, for appellants. *443 *Mr. Blackburn Esterline, of Washington, D. C., for the United States. #445 *Mr. P. J. Farrell, of Washington, D. C., for Interstate Commerce Commission. Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellants are proprietors of the railroads which make up the system now operated by the Delaware & Hudson Company. Purporting to proceed as required by section 19a, Interstate Commerce Act, as amended (Act March 1, 1913, c. 92, 37 Stat. 701; Act Feb. 28, 1920, c. 91, 41 Stat. 456, 493; Act June 7, 1922, c. 210, 42 Stat. 624 [Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, § 8591]), the Interstate Commerce Commission, on March 28, 1923, declared tentative valuations of the properties which the For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes several companies owned June 30, 1916, and allowed 30 days from April 12th for protests. *446 *Elaborate protests were duly presented. Before they were acted upon appellants began this proceeding-June 13, 1923-wherein they claim that defects in the valuation order prevented them from adequately protecting their rights by protests, and pray that it be annulled. The petition states that the Commission refused to investigate, ascertain, and report many facts relative to values as required by the statute; refused to investigate, ascertain, and report concerning properties used by the Delaware & Hudson Company for purposes of a common carrier; refused to apply to inventories prices existing and current on June 30, 1916; omitted to report analyses of the methods employed for ascertaining values, costs, etc.; also omitted to investigate and report the amount of working capital actually used for purposes of common carriers. Upon motion the petition was dismissed for want of equity, and the matter is here by direct appeal. Section 19a of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, provides: "(a) That the Commission shall, as hereinafter provided, investigate, ascertain, and report the value of all the property owned or used by every common carrier subject to the provisions of this act. * * "(b) First. In such investigation said Commission shall ascertain and report in detail as to each piece of property, other than land, owned or used by said common carrier for its purposes as a common carrier, the original cost to date, the cost of reproduction new, the cost of reproduction less depreciation, and an analysis of the methods by which these several costs are obtained, and the reason for their differences, if any. The Commission shall in like manner ascertain and report separately other values, and elements of value, if any, of the property of such common carrier, and an analysis of the methods of valuation employed, *447 and of the reasons for any differences *between any such value, and each of the foregoing cost values. "Second. Such investigation and report shall state in detail and separately from improvements the original cost of all lands, rights of way, and terminals owned or used for the purpose of a common carrier, and ascertained as of the time of dedication to public use, and the present value of the same. "(h) Whenever the Commission shall have erty of any common carrier, as herein directed, completed the tentative valuation of the propand before such valuation shall become final, the Commission shall give notice by registered letter to the said carrier, the Attorney General of the United States, the governor of any state in which the property so valued is located, and to such additional parties as the Commission may prescribe, stating the valuation placed upon the several classes of property of said carrier, and shall allow thirty days in which to file *a protest of the same with the Commission. If no protest is filed within thirty days, said valuation shall become final as of the date thereof. *448 "(i) If notice of protest is filed the Commission shall fix a time for hearing the same, and shall proceed as promptly as may be to hear thereto which may be presented in support of and consider any matter relative and material er hearing any protest of such tentative valuaany such protest so filed as aforesaid. If afttion under the provisions of this act the Commission shall be of the opinion that its valuation should not become final, it shall make such changes as may be necessary, and shall issue an order making such corrected tentative valuation final as of the date thereof. All final valuations by the Commission and the classification thereof shall be published and shall be prima facie evidence of the value of the property in all proceedings under the Act to Regulate Commerce as of the date of the fixing thereof, and in all judicial proceedings for the enforcement of the act approved February fourth, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven, commonly known as 'the Act to Regulate Commerce,' and the various acts amendatory thereof, and in all judicial proceedings brought to enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend, in whole or in part, any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission." [1, 2] The "tentative valuation" of the statute is no more than an ex parte appraisement without probative effect. By the authorized "protest" the carrier may offer objections to anything done or omitted in respect thereof and secure the Commission's rulings before the valuation becomes final. Prior to the present proceeding protests, raising the very issues now tendered, had been made and were awaiting action. There is nothing to indicate that the Commission willfully disregard "Third. Such investigation and report shall show separately the property held for purposes other than those of a common carrier, and the original cost and present value of the same, to-ed the law as honestly interpreted or failed gether with an analysis of the methods of valuation employed. * ** to proceed in an orderly manner, or that it *449 "(f) Upon the completion of the valuation will not consider and pass upon all the *matherein provided for the Commission shall there- ters set up in the protest and repeated here. after in like manner keep itself informed of all Pending further action by it the tentative extensions and improvements or other changes valuation will not become final and no proin the condition and value of the property of all common carriers, and shall ascertain the ceedings thereon can be taken. Under the cirvalue thereof, and shall from time to time, recumstances disclosed appellants must pursue vise and correct its valuations, showing such the remedy provided by the statute and give revision and correction classified and as a whole the Commission opportunity to take final ac (45 S.Ct.) tion before they can properly ask interposi- | agreement on the part of the government to tion by the courts. The decree below is affirmed. Mr. Justice BUTLER took no part in the consideration or decision of this cause. (266 U. S. 541) purchase wool. 5. Courts 463-Wool importer's petition for breach of contract to purchase wool held insufficient for failure to show agreement. Wool importer's petition against United States for breach of contract to purchase wool, alleged to have been created by Wool Administrator's letter to importer, stating that he had notified its agent that he would take cer L. RICHARDSON & CO., Inc., v. UNITED tain amount of wool or "scoured product" on STATES. (Argued Dec. 10, 11, 1924. Decided Jan. 5, 1925.) No. 142. 4. United States 65-Quartermaster General's letter to Wool Administrator held not exercise of options to purchase wool. Quartermaster General's letter to Wool Administrator, stating that War Industries Board had fixed the price of wool and that he would until further notice exercise import license option on imported wool, was not exercise of options granted to government by importers on application for import licenses, under regulation of War Trade Board, issued pursuant to President's proclamation of November 28, 1917, but was merely an nouncement of the Quartermaster General's intentions, and at most an instruction to Wool Administrator in reference thereto. an 2. Courts 463-Petition for breach of contract to purchase wool held insufficient, for failure to allege that regulation claimed to constitute exercise of option was in force when wool imported. Petition by wool importer against the United States for breach of contract to purchase wool, based on alleged regulation claimed to constitute exercise of option granted government, held insufficient for failure to allege that the regulation was in force when claimant's wool was imported. 3. Courts 463-Petition for breach of contract held insufficient for failure to show that government officers had or assumed to have authority to purchase wool. Wool importer's petition against United States for breach of contract to purchase wool, based on government's exercise of option to purchase wool granted by importer on application for import licenses, alleging that "government officers" canceled claimant's import licenses and issued new ones, requiring consignment of wool to designated government agency and assignment of bills of lading to Quartermaster General, held insufficient for failure to show that such officers had or assumed to have authority to purchase wool for the government. 4. United States 65-Wool Administrator's letter to wool importer held not to constitute contract to purchase wool. basis of certain per cent. shrinkage, not alleging that importer had given government options to purchase wool on such basis, or that administrator's proposal to take it on such basis was ever accepted by importer, held insufficient. breach of an agreement al*leged to have been made by the United States for the purchase of a quantity of wool, grading higher than fifty-sixes, imported by the claimant from South Africa. The United States demurred to the petition on the ground that it did not state a cause of action. This demurrer was sustained, without opinion, and judgment entered dismissing the petition. 58 Ct. Cl. 717. In November, 1917, the President issued a Proclamation prohibiting the importation of wool and other enumerated articles into the United States, except under licenses granted by the War Trade Board, in accordance with its regulations or orders.1 In December, the Board issued a regulation requiring every applicant for a wool import license to sign an agreement granting the United States an option to purchase all or any part of the wool covered by the application, for ten days after its custom house entry, at a specified price basis. In January, 1918, this was superseded by another regulation issued by the Board, requiring that the importers of wool should sign agreements granting such options of purchase to the United States, before the delivery or release of the wool to them. Thereafter, as appears from exhibits to the petition, the Quartermaster General of the Army wrote certain letters containing Wool Administrator's letter to wool importer, stating that administrator had notified its agent that he would take specified amount 140 Stat. 1721. This Board had been established of wool or "scoured product" thereof, with- by the President by an Executive Order of Oct. 12, out mention of prices, held not to constitute an 1917. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes *543 to transport a part of the wool, it was required to guarantee that only wool destined for the Quartermaster General would be carried; that on December 23, 1918, the Wool Administrator, who "was authorized by the Quartermaster General and by the Government to buy and accept said wool," wrote the claimant a letter stating that he had notified its agent that he would take 17,200 bales of wool therein described, including the said 7,168 bales and 1,518 bags, which, it is alleged, "he so agreed to buy"; that the claimant imported said wool and offered delivery thereof to the Government, but that although the Government accepted and paid for part of said 17,200 bales it arbitrarily refused to accept and pay for said 7,168 bales and 1,518 bags; that the claimant was forced to dispose of this wool, and obtained the best possible price therefor, realizing, after deducting the cost of resale, $270,746 less than the price fixed by the War Industries Board; and that the claimant was caused to lose this sum by the Government's refusal to accept and pay for this wool "as it had agreed to do." The claimant prays judgment for this sum on account of the violation of "said agreement" of the United States to purchase and pay for the wool, and for general relief. announcements as to the grades of wool on which it was intended to exercise the options granted to the Government by the importers. These are described in the petition as "regulations issued by the Quartermaster General in behalf of the War Department;" and it is alleged that under them he exercised the options on the grades of wool enumerated and thereby made "purchases" of such wool. Two of them were written to the Wool Administrator, an official in the Quartermaster Corps. In one of these, dated April 1, 1918, the Wool Administrator was directed to announce, among other things, that the *Quartermaster Corps would not exercise the option in respect to wool finer than fifty-sixes that had been bought prior to April 1, but reserved the right to exercise it on wool bought on or after that date. In the other, dated May 17, the Quartermaster General announced that the War Industries Board having then fixed the price of wool in the United States, he would "until further notice" exercise the import license option on all import ed wool, except that grading above fifty-sixes bought prior to April 1, and certain wool grading forties and below; and directed the Wool Administrator to distribute this information to all importers interested. The petiThe petition does not show whether the tion alleges that this "regulation" was issued claimant bought this wool before or after the through the Wool Top and Yarn Branch of "regulation" of May 17. And it does not the Quartermaster General's Office, and was show the dates on which the claimant either an exercise of the option retained by the Gov-applied for the import licenses, executed the ernment under the "regulation" of April 1, on all wool imported into the United States after April 1 that graded above fifty-sixes. The petition further alleges, in general and indefinite terms, without giving details, and omitting many specific dates, that "subsequent to April 1, 1918, and prior to July 12, 1918," the claimant purchased 7,168 bales and 1,518 bags of South African wool of the grade finer than fifty-sixes, and duly executed the proper import license applications and the options and agreements to sell to the Government as required under the January regulation of the War Trade Board; that under said options and agreements and by the "regulation" of May 17, the Government agreed to buy this wool and to pay the claimant therefor "$1,434,045.60, being the price fixed by the War Industries Board"; that "subsequent to May 17," the "Government officers" canceled the claimant's import licenses and issued new ones requiring that the wool be consigned to a designated Government agency and that the bills of lading be *544 assigned to the Quartermaster Gen*eral; 2 that on July 18, when the claimant sought to charter a vessel from the Shipping Board 2 It appears from the petition that on July 12 the War Trade Board, after consultation with the War Industries Board and War Department, issued a "ruling" revoking all outstanding licenses for the importation of wool from South Africa and other countries on shipments made after July 28, and providing that no licenses for such importations should be issued except to the Quartermaster General. option agreements, shipped the wool from South Africa, imported it into the United States, or tendered delivery to the Government. *545 *It is clear that the demurrer was rightly sustained. [1, 2] The facts alleged do not show that any authorized officer of the Government entered into any "agreement" to purchase the claimant's wool, as claimed in the petition. The letter of May 17 from the Quartermaster General to the Wool Administratorwhich is incorrectly characterized in the petition as a "regulation" issued in behalf of the War Department-manifestly did not constitute an exercise of the options granted to the Government to purchase any or all wools finer than fifty-sixes bought after April 1, but was merely an announcement of the intention of the Quartermaster General as to the exercise of such options, and, at the most, an instruction to the Wool Administrator in reference to the exercise thereof. It neither constituted an agreement to purchase any or all of the wools that might be imported by any particular importer, nor a purchase of them. Nor is it alleged in the petition that at the time the claimant's wool was imported, the "regulation" of May 17 was in force, or that the Quartermaster General had not given "further notice" in reference to the exercise of the options on wools imported after the Armistice. [3] There is no averment that either the |