Εικόνες σελίδας
PDF
Ηλεκτρ. έκδοση

of such alleged suspense. Nor has any case been cited, or found, which determines what would be its effect under the law of North Carolina. It is not contended that the Alabama corporation was dissolved ipso facto by this concentration of its stock, or that its property became, in law, that of the defendant. It may be that upon the concentration of its stock in the hands of the defendant, the franchise of the Alabama corpo*338

Mandamus by the United States, on the relation of Logan Rives, against Hubert Work, Secretary of the Interior. Judgment for relator was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia (295 F. 225), and défendant appeals. Reversed.

176

*Mr. Merrill E. Otis, of St. Joseph, Mo., and the Attorney General, for appellant. Mr. Leslie C. Garnett, of Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Mr. Chief Justice TAFT delivered the opinion of the Court.

ration became subject to *forfeiture in a judicial proceeding by the state, or that thereby its status was reduced from a corporation de jure to one de facto. But whatever might be other legal consequences of the concentration, we cannot say that, for purposes of jurisdiction, the business of the Alabama corporation in North Carolina became the busi-trict of Columbia, affirmed by the Court of

ness of the defendant.

Affirmed.

(267 U. S. 175)

This is an appeal under section 250 of the Judicial Code, par. 6 (Comp. St. § 1227), from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the Dis

Appeals, granting a mandamus compelling the Secretary of the Interior to consider and allow a claim for net losses suffered by Logan Rives, the relator, in producing and preparing to produce manganese at the instance of the government for war purposes, under section 5 of the Dent Act (March 2,

WORK, Secretary of the Interior, v. UNITED 1919, ch. 94, 40 Stat. 1272, being Comp. St.

STATES ex rel. RIVES.

(Argued Nov. 25 and 26, 1925. Decided March 2, 1925.)

No. 272.

Ann. Supp. 1923, § 311514/15е).

Relator's petition shows that he incurred losses aggregating $55,204.15, but that the Secretary awarded him only $23,047.36, refusing to allow him, among other items, $9,600 which he had to expend in obtaining a release from a contract to buy land containing manganese, after the land had lost most Mandamus issues to compel an officer to of its value because of the Armistice. The perform a purely ministerial duty, and cannot mandamus asked is to compel consideration be used to compel or control a duty in the dis-and allowance of the claim for this particucharge of which by law he is given discretion.

1. Mandamus 72-Mandamus available to compel performance of ministerial and not discretionary duty.

2. Mandamus 72-Court cannot control statutory discretion of officer in construction of statute.

Where statutory discretion given officer extends to construction of statute, court cannot control such construction by mandamus, even if it thinks officer's construction thereof erroneous.

3. Mandamus 101-Secretary of the Interior's disallowance of claims for losses sus

[blocks in formation]

tained in preparing to produce manganese held exercise of discretion not subject to court's control by mandamus. [1, 2] Mandamus issues to compel an ofSecretary of the Interior's disallowance officer to perform a purely ministerial duty. claim for losses sustained in producing and preparing to produce manganese at instance of government for war purposes under Dent Act, § 5, as amended by Act Nov. 23, 1921 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, § 311515e), held exercise of discretion not subject to court's control by

mandamus.

It cannot be used to compel or control a duty in the discharge of which by law he is given discretion. The duty may be discretionary within limits. He cannot transgress those limits, and if he does so, he may be controlled by injunction or mandamus to keep within them. The power of the court

4. Pleading 214(1)—Allegations of answer to intervene, if at all, thus depends upon taken as admitted on demurrer.

what statutory discretion he has. Under

Allegations of answer must be taken as ad- some statutes, the discretion extends to a mitted on demurrer.

final construction by the officer of the statute he is executing. No court in such a case can

Appeal from the Court of Appeals of the control by mandamus his interpretation, even District of Columbia. if it may think it erroneous. The cases

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

(45 S. Ct.)

*179

of persons who were invited by the gov*ernment to invest money in the production and preparing for the production of certain metals or materials difficult to obtain, and need

range, therefore, from such wide discretion [ly to the government, but to relieve a class as that just described to cases where the duty is purely ministerial, where the officer can do only one thing which on refusal he may be compelled to do. They begin on one Iside with Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524, 9 L. Ed. 1181, in which Congress direct-ed for the war, and who had thereupon ined the Postmaster General to make some

curred expense therein and had suffered losses because of the coming of the Armistice and the consequent destruction of the market for such metals.

credit entries in an account found to be just by the Solicitor of the Treasury. This court held that the duty was ministerial with no discretion and required the Postmaster GenThe said Secretary was to make adjusteral to make the entries. On the other side ments and payments in each case as he is Decatur v. Paulding, Secretary of the should determine to be just and equitable; Navy, 14 Pet. 497, 599, 10 L. Ed. 559, 609. and the decision of the Secretary was to be Congress there provided for general naval "conclusive and final." There were five propensions by general act, and by resolution of visos: The first imposed a limit of total exthe same day granted a special pension for penditure under the act. The second limited the widow of Commodore Decatur. She re-claims to those filed within three months ceived the pension under the general law and then applied for the special pension, which

#178

was refused by the Secretary of the Navy, on the ground that she was given an election of one of two funds and she had elected. She sought by mandamus to compel the Secretary, who under the law administered the Naval Pension fund, to allow the special pension. This court held that Congress intended the Secretary to construe the statutes and to allow the pensions accordingly, and that although the court might, as a matter of legal construction, differ from his conclusion, it could not by mandamus or injunction constrain him in his exercise of his discretion. Between these two early and leading authorities illustrating the extremes are decisions, in which the discretion is greater than in the Kendall Case and less than in the Decatur Case, and its extent and the scope of judicial action in limiting it depend upon a proper interpretation of the particular statute and the congressional purpose.

after the passage of the act.

The third proviso declared: "That no claim shall be allowed by said Secretary unless it shall appear to the satisfaction of the said Secretary that the expenditures so made or obligations so incurred by the claimant were made in good faith for or upon property which contained ganese in sufficient quantities to be of commercial importance." The fourth proviso was:

*

*

*

*

*

man

"That no claims shall be paid unless it shall appear to the satisfaction of said Secretary incurred subsequent to April 6, 1917, and prior that moneys were invested or obligations were to November 12, 1918, in a legitimate attempt to produce ⭑ * for the prosecution of the war, and that no profits of any kind shall be included in the allowance of any of said claims, and that no investment nized in any manner by said Secretary." for merely speculative purposes shall be recog

manganese

The fifth proviso declared that the settlement of any claim under the section should not bar the government through any authorized agency or any congressional committee thereafter duly appointed from the review of such settlement, nor the right to recover any money paid by the government to any party under the section if the government had been defrauded.

180

[3] The Dent Act was passed by Congress in an effort to do justice and equity to the many persons who could not obtain from the government compensation for supplies or services furnished or losses incurred in helping the government during the war, because of a lack of enforceable contracts or equities. As to supplies and services furnished, there was to be a settlement made by the *The last paragraph of the section declarSecretary of War, and if this did not satisfyed "that nothing in this section shall be conthe claimant, he was given a right under section 2 to sue in the Court of Claims to recover greater compensation. Section 3 gave the Secretary power to settle fairly and equitably claims of foreign governments and their nationals for supplies and services rendered to the American Expeditionary Forces whether by contract entered into in accordance with applicable statutory provisions or not. By section 4, the Secretary was given power to protect subcontractors in his awards.

By section 5, provision was made, not to pay for supplies or services rendered direct

strued to confer jurisdiction upon any court to entertain a suit against the United States," and closed with a proviso that in determining the net losses of any claimant, the Secretary should take into consideration and charge to him the then market value of any ores or minerals on hand belonging to him, and the salvage or usable value of his machinery or other appliances claimed to have been purchased to comply with the request of the government.

On November 23, 1921, after the first award in this case, section 5 was amended (chapter 137, 42 Stat. 322) by adding another proviso

[ocr errors]

Unit

that all claimants who in response to the re- on equitable and moral considerations. quest of any government agency mentioned ed States v. Realty Co., 163 U. S. 427, 439, in the act expended money "in producing or 16 S. Ct. 1120, 41 L. Ed. 215; Allen v. Smith, preparing to produce" manganese, and had 173 U. S. 389, 402, 19 S. Ct. 446, 43 L. Ed. mailed their claims in time "if the proof in 741. Congress did not wish to create a legal support of said claims clearly shows them claim. It was not dealing with vested rights. to be based upon action taken in response It did not, as it did with the claims for supto such request shall be reimburs-plies and services directly furnished the goved such net losses as they may have incurred ernment under the first and second sections and are in justice and equity entitled to from the appropriation in said act. If in claims passed upon under said act awards have been denied or made on rulings contrary to the provisions of this amendment, or through miscalculation, the Secretary of the Interior may award proper amounts or additional amounts."

*182

of the act, make the losses recoverable in *a court, but expressly provided otherwise. It dealt with the subject with the utmost caution. It hedged the granting of the equitable gratuity with limitations to prevent the use of the statute for the recovery of doubtful or fraudulent claims or merely speculaThis amendment was brought about on the tive losses. It vested the Secretary with recommendation of the Secretary of the In-power to reject all losses except as he was terior, because he had felt obliged, under section 5 as it was, to reject some 600 claims for failure within the time limit to show a

direct personal request or demand upon the claimant by the government authorities named in the act and a response thereto by the claimant and because the Comptroller had refused to pay any changed award of the Secretary made after a rehearing or to correct miscalculation.

#181

|

satisfied that they were just and equitable
and it made his decision conclusive and final.
Final against whom? Against the claimant.
He could not resort to court to review the
Secretary's decision. This was expressly for-
bidden. By the fifth proviso, however, the gov-
ernment was permitted through any of its
even by a committee of Con-
agencies or
gress duly authorized, to review the settle-
ment by the Secretary and by necessary im-
plication to reverse it. If the government
was defrauded, it was authorized to sue to
recover any money paid under the award.

*It is urged that the refusal of the Secretary to allow the loss of $9,600 on the real Congress was occupying toward the proestate contract is in the teeth of the third posed beneficiaries of section 5 the attitude proviso, which requires him to allow for ex- rather of a benefactor, than of a debtor at penditures made or obligations incurred "for law. Congress intended the Secretary to act and upon property" containing manganese in for it, and to construe the meaning of the sufficient quantities to be of commercial im- words used to describe the elements of the portance. The Interior Department had held net losses to be ascertained and to give effrom the beginning that this proviso did not fect to his interpretation without the interembrace money spent for real estate or min-vention of the courts. This statute presents ing rights. The ruling was based in part at least on the legislative history of the bill, which showed that it originally contained an express provision for expenditures for real estate as a proper element in calculating the net losses to be reimbursed, and that this provision was objected to as involving too speculative a subject-matter and it was strick

en out.

The Department's view was that expenditures "for and upon" property containing manganese and other metals did not include cost of real estate or mining rights because too speculative under the limitations of the fourth proviso and were intended to be confined to expenditures for construction, equipment and machinery in development of such property.

We are asked to reject this interpretation as wholly at variance with the natural and necessary meaning of the words and to confirm the courts below in enforcing a view more liberal to the claimant.

a case of as wide discretion as was held to have been vested in the Secretary of the Navy in the Decatur Case.

Nor does the amendment of 1921 change the effect of the act in this regard. His counsel insist that it was adopted in order to relieve claimants from previous narrow rulings of the Secretary. There is nothing in the amendment that indicates the congressional purpose to do more than it purports to do, i. e., to enable the Secretary to entertain claims for losses incurred at the instance of any government agencies whether direct and personal or by public invitation, and to enable the Secretary to grant rehearings, correct miscalculation and award addi

#183

*tional amounts. The amendments still left all claims to his sense of justice and equity.

Two cases upon which the relator relies do not aid him. They depend on the construction of the particular statute. In Work The above summary of section 5 clearly v. Mosier, 261 U. S. 352, 43 S. Ct. 389, 67 shows that Congress was seeking to save the L. Ed. 693, we held that the statutory direcbeneficiaries from losses which it would have tion that certain income due minors of the been under no legal obligation to make good Osage Indians be paid was clear and posiif a private person. It was a gratuity based │tive and it was not left to the Secretary of

(45 S.Ct.)

U. S. 378, 26 L. Ed. 167, were all cases in which the court found that all the conditions had been fulfilled upon which the relator in the mandamus was entitled to call upon the officer to do an act beneficial to the relator and that the act was thus a ministerial duty as in the Kendall Case.

the Interior to vary it, i. e., he was not given | Butterworth v. Hoe, 112 U. S. 50, 5 S. Ct. 25, discretion finally to construe it. In Work 28 L. Ed. 656; United States v. Schurz, 102 v. McAlester, 262 U. S. 200, 43 S. Ct. 580, 67 L. Ed. 949, it was held that by virtue of the statute a lessee had a vested right to buy the land at an original appraisement and that the Secretary had no authority to affect that right by ordering another appraisement. Ness v. Fisher, 223 U. S. 683, 32 S. Ct. 356, 56 L. Ed. 610, Riverside Oil Co. v. Hitchcock, 190 U. S. 316, 23 S. Ct. 698, 47 L. Ed. 1074, Alaska Smokeless Co. v. Lane, 250 U. S. 549, 40 S. Ct. 33, 63 L. Ed. 1135, and Hall v. Payne, 254 U. S. 343, 41 S. Ct. 131, 65 L. Ed. 295, were all cases in which it was sought to control and reverse rulings of the Secretary of the Interior, on the ground that he had in the administration of the land laws made a ruling contrary to law against an applicant for action by him. In each case it was held that as the statute intended to vest in the Secretary the discretion to construe the land laws and make such rulings, no court could reverse or control them by mandamus in the absence of anything to show that they were capricious or arbitrary. It was pointed out that a mandamus could not be made to serve the function of a writ of error, and the mere fact that the court might deem the ruling erroneous in law gave it no power to intervene. These cases are supported by earlier authorities to the same effect. United States ex rel. Tucker v. Seaman, 17 How. 225, 15 L. Ed. 226; Gaines v. Thompson, 7 Wall. 347, 19 L. Ed. 62; Litchfield v. The Register and Receiver, 9 Wall. 575, 19 L. Ed. 681; United States ex rel. Dunlap v. Black, 128 U. S. 40, 9 S. Ct. 12, 32 L. Ed. 354. All rest upon the Decatur Case. Compare United States v. Babcock, 250 U. S. 328, 331, 39 S. Ct. 464, 63 L. Ed. 1011.

*184

There is nothing in the award by the Secretary in the case at bar which would justify characterizing it as arbitrary or capricious or fraudulent or an abuse of discretion. The Secretary's view that it was not just or equitable to include loss by a land purchase within the gratuity of the government as defined by the statute must therefore prevail against mandamus.

Lane v. Hoglund, 244 U. S. 174, 37 S. Ct. 558, 61 L. Ed. 1066; Ballinger v. Frost, 216 U. S. 240, 30 S. Ct. 338, 54 L. Ed. 464; Garfield v. Goldsby, 211 U. S. 249, 29 S. Ct. 62, 53 L. Ed. 168; Roberts v. United States, 176 U. S. 221, 20 S. Ct. 376, 44 L. Ed. 443;

[4] There is a class of cases in which a relator in mandamus has successfully sought to compel action by an officer who has discretion concededly conferred on him by law. The relator in such cases does not ask for a decision any particuar way but only that it be made one way or the other. Such are Louisville Cement Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 246 U. S. 638, 38 S. Ct. 408, 62 L. Ed. 914, and Interstate Commerce Commission v. Humboldt S. S. Co., 224 U. S. 474, 32 S. Ct. 556, 56 L. Ed. 849. They follow the decision in Commissioner of Patents v. Whiteley, 4 Wall. 522, 18 L. Ed. 335. They are analogous to Hohorst, Petitioner, 150 U. S. 653, 14 S. Ct. 221, 37 L. Ed. 1211; Parker, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 221, 9 S. Ct. 708, 33 L. Ed. 123; Ex parte Parker, 120 U. S. 737, 7 S. Ct. 767, 30 L. Ed. 818, and others which hold that mandamus may issue to an inferior judicial tribunal if it refuses to take jurisdiction when by law it ought to do so, or where, having obtained jurisdiction, it refuses to proceed in its exercise. It is sought to bring the present case within this class by the averment in the petition that the Secretary of the Interior has refused to take jurisdiction of the claim for the loss of $9,600 through the real estate contract. This aver

*185

*ment is met by a denial in the answer and the affirmative allegation that the Secretary did consider the claim and disallowed it for cause deemed by him to be good. This mandamus was granted by the courts below on demurrer to the answer. Its allegations must be taken as admitted. Moreover, it is clearly shown by the exhibits to the pleadings that the Secretary decided that on its merits the claim was not for the kind of loss which Congress intended the Secretary to reimburse.

Our conclusion makes it unnecessary for us to consider the contention of the government that the relator here is estopped to urge the present claim by his acceptance of the award already made.

Reversed.

(267 U. S. 185)
WORK, Secretary of the Interior, v. UNITED
STATES ex rel. CHESTATEE PYRITES

& CHEMICAL CORPORATION.
(Argued Nov. 26, 1924. Decided March 2,
1925.)

No. 401.

Mandamus 101-Secretary of the Interior's exercise of discretion in passing on claim for loss incurred in preparing for and producing pyrites not controllable by court.

The Secretary of the Interior had discretion to determine whether interest paid on borrowed capital should be considered as part of the net losses incurred in preparing for and producing pyrites under Dent Act, § 5 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, § 311515e), providing for payment of claims for losses so sustained, and court could not control Secretary's exercise of such discretion by writ of mandamus.

Appeal from the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.

Mandamus by the United States, on the relation of the Chestatee Pyrites & Chemical Corporation, against Hubert Work, Secretary of the Interior. Judgment for relator was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia (298 F. 839), and defendant appeals. Reversed.

*186

rowed was disallowed. The mandamus herein issued to compel the consideration and allowance of this interest.

It is sought in this case, as it was in the Rives Case, to avoid the objection that the mandamus would control and restrict the statutory discretion vested in the Secretary by the averment that he had not taken jurisdiction of the claim for interest and had not considered it. This case, like the Rives Case, was heard on demurrer to the answer, and the answer shows clearly that the claim for *interest was fully considered by two Secretaries of the Interior and denied.

#187

The only issue is whether the Secretary had discretion under section 5 finally to determine whether interest paid upon the capital borrowed is to be considered as part of the net losses incurred by the relator in preparing for and producing the pyrites. We

think he had.

Great reliance was placed by the courts below on the ruling of this court in United States v. New York, 160 U. S. 598, 16 S. Ct. 402, 40 L. Ed. 551. That was an appeal from a decision of the Court of Claims in a case brought by the state of New York against the United States under a statute of the United States, by which the Secretary of the Treasury was directed to pay out of any money in the treasury not otherwise apMo.,propriated, to the governor of any state, the costs, charges and expenses properly incurred by such state for enrolling, subsisting, clothing, supplying, arming, equipping, paying and transporting its troops employed in

*Mr. Merrill E. Otis, of St. Joseph, and the Attorney General, for appellant. Mr. Edgar Watkins, of Atlanta, Ga., for appellee.

Mr. Chief Justice TAFT, delivered the aiding to suppress the insurrection against opinion of the Court.

This is an appeal under section 250 of the Judicial Code, par. 6 (Comp. St. § 1227), from a writ of mandamus compelling the Secretary of the Interior to consider and allow a claim of the Chestatee Pyrites & Chemical Corporation, under section 5 of the Dent Act (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. § 31151se). It presents questions very similar to those heard in Work v. United States ex rel. Rives, 267 U. S. 175, 45 S. Ct. 252, 69 L. Ed. just decided.

The relator owned a pyrites mine before the war. In compliance with the request of the government to enlarge its plant to meet the war necessities, it borrowed the sum of $695,000, on which it obligated itself to pay interest at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum. After three hearings before the Secretary of the Interior, it was awarded $693,313.79. In making the award the item of interest claimed of more than $40,000 on the amount bor

the United States. It was held that the state could recover interest on the bonds issued by it to do the things provided for in the act.

The act did not vest in the Secretary of the Treasury discretion finally to decide the extent of the indebtedness, and the claim was duly transferred to the Court of Claims in order that a judgment might be rendered thereon. The judgment was carried to this court. The issue, therefore, was merely a question of law whether under the statute interest was payable, and it was held that it was.

The circumstances of the case were different from this, and it is doubtful whether the conclusion as to interest in such case would be applicable to the claim made by the relator, even if we could hear it on its merits. But it is not here on its merits. The question was one for the Secretary of the Interior to decide, and that finally. Reversed.

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

« ΠροηγούμενηΣυνέχεια »