on the facts disclosed in the testimony of the| put formally under arrest; but he was taken superintendent of police, three detectives and to a secluded room. In the presence of three the chief medical officer of the jail, the trial detectives, the superintendent of police, and court erred in admitting as evidence state-Li, he was subjected there to questioning for ments made by the defendant to the police five or six hours. Late in the evening of officers before and shortly after his formal that first day, the detectives took him to Hoarrest. 2 Four of the statements were oral. tel Dewey; and, without entering his name These, if admissible, were important evi- in the hotel registry, placed him in a beddence. The fifth was a stenographic report room on an upper floor. In that room he was of an interrogation of the defendant conduct-detained continuously one week. Throughed by the detectives, after the arrest. This out the period, he was sick and, most of the report contained a full confession. The in- time, in bed. A physician was repeatedly troduction of each of the statements was du- called. It was a police surgeon who came. ly objected to on the ground that the govern- In vain Wan asked to see his brother, with ment failed to show that it had been volun- whom he lived in New York, who had nursed tarily made and that from the testimony of him in his illness, who had come to Washits own witnesses the contrary appeared.ington at his request in January, who had The court admitted the statements. It later charged the jury: *10 "The test of the case, and the inquiry that you will have to make in answer is, Did the questioning, did the physical condition, did the importunate questioning, if you choose to call it so, render the confession made by the defendant not his own; but did it substitute for his will the will of another, and thus was it or not his voluntary act?" Wan was a native of China. He had come to the United States in 1916, at the age of 22, as a student. In 1918, he engaged in a business which proved unsuccessful. Since December of that year, or earlier, his health had been bad. He had an attack of Spanish influenza. He suffered continuously from a chronic stomach trouble which led him to eat sparingly and irregularly. When the detectives entered his room unannounced they found him in bed. They had no search warrant; but they made a search of the room and his effects, including the bed in which he lay. They were accompanied by a New York police officer; but they did not arrest Wan. They requested that he return with them to Washington. He told them he was too sick. Li, who had been left waiting outside the closed door and was called in, told Wan that both of them were suspected of the murder. Then, Wan consented to go with the detectives to Washington. *11 returned with *him to New York, and whom, as he later learned, the detectives had also brought to Washington, were detaining in another room of the hotel, and were subjecting to like interrogation. Wan was held in the hotel room without formal arrest, incommunicado. But he was not left alone. Every moment of the day, and of the night, at least one member of the police force was on guard inside his room. Three ordinary policemen were assigned to this duty. Each served eight hours; the shifts beginning at midnight, at 8 in the morning, and at 4 in the afternoon. Morning, afternoon, and evening (and at least on one occasion after midnight) the prisoner was visited by the superintendent of police and/or one or more of the detectives. The sole purpose of these visits was to interrogate him. Regardless of Wan's wishes and protest, his condition of health, or the hour, they engaged him in conversation. He was subjected to persistent, lengthy, and repeated cross-examination. Sometimes it was subtle, sometimes severe. Always the examination was conducted with a view to entrapping Wan into a confession of his own guilt and/or that of his brother. Whenever these visitors entered the room, the guard was stationed outside the closed door. On the eighth day, the accusatory questioning took a more excruciating form. A On arrival in Washington, Wan was not detective was in attendance throughout the would have expired June 21, 1920, was, on that day, extended to November 1, 1920; and it was not filed until the latter date. Before it was settled, the judge who had presided at the trial died. A motion to vacate the judgment, made on this ground, was denied on November 22, 1921. Thereupon the bill of exceptions was signed by the Chief Justice of the court. It was contended here, among other things, that the judgment should be set aside because a bill of exceptions can be settled only by the judge who presided at the trial. The contention is unfounded. Roney v. United States, 43 App. D. C. 533. With the exception of these statements, the government introduced only circumstantial evidence. The defendant testified on his own behalf, asserting his innocence. He described the conditions under which the statements had been made, denied or explained them, and insisted that the confession was a suggested one. day. In the evening, Wan was taken from Hotel Dewey to the Mission. There, continuously for ten hours, this sick man was led from floor to floor minutely to examine and re-examine the scene of the triple murder and every object connected with it, to give explanations, and to answer questions. The places where the dead men were discovered; the revolver with which presumably the murder was committed, the blood stains and the finger prints thereon; the bullet holes in the walls; the discharged cartridges found upon the floor; the clothes of the murdered men; *12 the blood stains on the *floor and the stairs; a bloody handkerchief; the coat and pillow which had been found covering the dead (45 S.Ct.) * * ordered certain tests by the laboratory; had his blood examined and his ab * con men's faces; photographs, taken by the police, of the men as they lay dead; the doors and windows through which the murderer domen X-rayed and had him removed from the might have entered or made his escape; pho-cell to the Red Cross room; tostat copies of writings, by means of which cluded he was suffering from spastic colitis [involving contraction of the bowels]. * it was sought to prove that Wan was impli- The result of that contraction would be alcated in a forgery incident to the murder; most constant pain, excited by any further adall these were shown him. Every supposed ditions to the contents of the tract at that fact ascertained by the detectives in the point, and vomiting and persistent constipacourse of their investigation was related to tion. Witness knows defendant was in him. Concerning every object, every inci- bed at least a month after his treatment was dent detailed, he was, in the presence of a prescribed. From witness' observation and stenographer, plied with questions by the su-ant's emaciation and history he gave witness, medical experience, judging from the defendperintendent of police and the detectives. and his condition generally, would say that By these he was engaged in argument; some- when witness saw the defendant on February times separately, sometimes in joint attack. 13th he had been ill for a matter of weeks. The process of interrogation became ever * *He told me he had been talked to all more insistent. It passed at times from in- one night and had not received any medical quiry into command. From 7 o'clock in the attention, and had been in constant pain all of evening until 5 o'clock in the morning the this time and had been unable to eat for days, and considering all those facts I came to the questioning continued. Before it was con*14 cluded, Li, who was again in attendance, had con*clusion that he was so exhausted that he left the Mission about midnight, worn out by was really-he told me also that he had signed the long hours. The superintendent of po- a confession." lice had returned to his home, apparently exhausted. One of the detectives had fallen asleep. To Wan, not a moment of sleep was allowed. On the ninth day, at 20 minutes past 5 in the morning, Wan was taken from the Mission to the station house and placed formally under arrest. There the interrogation was promptly resumed. Again the detectives were in attendance, day and evening, plying their questions, pointing out alleged contradictions, arguing with the prisoner, and urging him to confess, lest his brother be deem ed guilty of the crime. Still the statements secured failed to satisfy the detectives' craving for evidence. On the tenth day, Wan was "bundled up," was again taken to the Mission, was again questioned there for hours, and there "the whole thing was again talked of and enacted." On the eleventh day, a formal interroga*tion of Wan was conducted at the station house by the detectives in the presence of a stenographer. On the twelfth day, the verbatim typewritten report of the interrogation (which occupies 12 pages of the printed record) was read to Wan, in his cell at the jail. There he signed the report and initialed each page. On the thirteenth day, for the first time, Wan was visited by the chief medical officer of the jail, in the performance of his duties. This experienced physician and surgeon testified, without contradiction, to the condition of the prisoner: *13 a * Then the witness was further questioned by the court: mentally that he would not know what he was Would he know what he was "Answer. He would know what he was signing, yes. "Question. Would he be liable to sign a confession that would lead him to the gallows in that condition? "Answer. I think he would, if he wanted to be left alone. "Question. With spastic colitis, if he was accused of crime he would simply sign a paper and say, 'You hang me'? That is your opinion as a medical man? "Answer. I say, if he was as sick as that, and in as great pain as that, he would do anything to have the torture stopped." [1-4] The Court of Appeals appears to have held the prisoner's statements admissible on the ground that a confession made by one competent to act is to be deemed voluntary, as a matter of law, if it was not induced by was evidence sufficient to justify a finding a promise or a threat, and that here there of fact that these statements were not so induced. In the federal courts, the requisite of voluntariress is not satisfied by establishing merely that the confession was not induced by a promise or a threat. A confession is voluntary in law if, and only if, it was, in fact. voluntarily made. A confession may have been given voluntarily, although it was made to police officers, while in custody, and in answer to an examination conducted by them. 3 But a confession ob "[He] found [Wan] lying in bunk in the cell, very weak, very much exhausted, very much emaciated; he complained of abdominal pain, which was rather intense. He told witness, and witness afterwards saw, v. United States, 160 U. S. 355, 357, 16 S. Ct. 321, that he vomited if he attempted to take food; that it was difficult or impossible for his bowels to move unless they were assisted by an enema; witness thought he was very seriously ill; Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S. 574, 584, 4 S. Ct. 202, 28 L. Ed. 262; Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U. S. 51, 65, 15 S. Ct. 273, 39 L. Ed. 343; Pierce 40 L. Ed. 454; Wilson v. United States, 162 U. S. 613, 623, 16 S. Ct. 895, 40 L. Ed. 1090; Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532, 558, 18 S. Ct. 183, 42 L. Ed. 568; Hardy v. United States, 186 U. S. 224, 229, 22 S. Ct. 889, 46 L. Ed. 1137; Powers v. United States, 223 U. S. 303, 314, 32 S. Ct. 281, 56 L. Ed. 448; Bilokumský v. Tod, 263 U. S. 149, 157, 44 S. Ct. 54, 68 L. Ed. 221. See also Wilson v. United States, 162 U. S. 613, 623, 16 S. Ct. 895, 40 L. Ed. 1090; Hardy v. United States, 186 U. S. 224, 229, 22 S. Ct. 889, 46 L. Ed. 1137; Kent v. Porto Rico, 207 U. S. 113, 119, 28 S. Ct. 55, 52 L. Ed. 127; Powers v. United States, 223 U. S. 303, 313, 32 S. Ct. 281, 56 L. Ed. 448, Compare Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 12 S. Ct. 195, 35 L. Ed. 1110; Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 596, 597, 16 S. Ct. 644, 40 L. Ed. 819; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 71, 26 S. Ct. 370, 50 L. Ed. 652; Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361, 379, 31 S. Ct. 538, 55 L. Ed. 771, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 558; Perlman v. United States, 247 U. S. 7, 13, 38 S. Ct. 417, 62 L. Ed. 950. This testimony occupies, in its condensed form, fifty pages of the printed record. The character of the pressure applied is illustrated by the following extracts from the testimony of the detectives: . Sometimes witness has sat and talked to him, or rather talked at him twenty minutes or half an hour, and asked him could he explain certain phases of this case, without his uttering a word or making any reply whatever." "A good many times during the course of the investigation he would ask to be left alone, but we did not leave him alone, and we would ask him a question, and if it was rather pointed he would say he was tired, to leave him alone, 'I will talk Sometimes would be 20 or 30 no more to you.' minutes before he would answer or say a word; asked him the same questions over and over again a great many times without getting any answer at all. Defendant had continuously asked to be alone and not bothered whenever he was asked a pointed question and if he answered it it might implicate him or embarrass him; he would say, 'Let me alone, I talk no more to you tonight, I don't feel well.' This was done repeatedly whenever he was pressed for an answer to a pointed question; sometimes we would leave him alone and witness sometimes stayed there and talked at him for a while until we got tired of it; told defendant witness thought his sickness was more in his mind than in his body." On the eighth day, at the Mission: "Well, he sat and rolled his eyes when I asked him why he came out to the house the second time, why he did not go to the café instead of coming away out to the house, and he sat there and rolled his eyes at me and Burlingame [another of the detectives] said, 'Answer his question,' and then he turned to his brother and started in the Chinese language, and Burlingame said, 'Here, don't speak Chinese; answer Kelly's question.' Then he raised up with a coat hanger and Burlingame caught him on the shoulders and said, 'We don't want anything like compulsion was applied. As to that matter there was no issue upon which the jury could *17 properly have been required or permitted *to pass. The alleged oral statements and the written confession should have been excluded.6 Reversed. that here.' This was about 1 o'clock in the morning, and we left somewhere around 4 o'clock; not much was said after 4 o'clock, just talking; Burlingame objected to defendant talking in Chinese, because he wanted him to answer questions; requested him once and then sat him down in the chair. Defendant was not permitted to sleep or ་་. to go back to hotel. Witness did try to force an answer out of him by asking him to answer the questions, but not by physical force or anything of that kind: it was on that occasion [on the ninth day, at the station house, after the allnight interrogation at the Mission] that witness told defendant, 'If you are guilty, and your brother is innocent, I want to know, for I am holding your brother just the same as I am holding you.' Witness thinks he said, 'Now is the time to tell me,' intimating to him that he had been in confinement a long time and witness wanted to know something about it; they were both in confinement and witness was anxious for him to tell about his brother; was satisfied he was guilty but did not tell him so at that time; was just about that time witness said 'things look bad for you,' or 'things look black for you,' and you ought to tell me the truth. . Went over practically and rehashed all the case as far as they had learned about it and related all the circumstances against him; told him a lot of things, but never offered any inducement, because witness has had too much experience in that line." Witness went to the station house Sunday night for the purpose of still talking to him about the case. "I wanted to straighten out a great many circumstances which pointed to him; ・・・ ed to know from him whether he was guilty; wanted him to tell the truth; asked him on a number of occasions to tell the truth, and those circumstances which pointed very strongly against him, strongly indicated to witness' mind that he knew a great deal more about the case than he told of; that we had caught him in several contradictory statements and witness said; 'We are all firmly want of the belief that you know who killed those men ;' sat and watched him and looked at him carefully and for a long time after I would tell him those things and would say, 'Now you think it over,' and stayed right there with him. "Q. Your purpose in telling him those things was to make him talk? "A. My purpose was to get him to tell me the truth about this case. "Q. Answer the question will you? "A. Well, he had to talk." Practically every admission he made was in answer to question witness asked himself; 'had gotten practically everything that I thought was important,' and left the details to Burlingame and Kelly." Compare Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 631, 6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746; Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 398, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652, L. R. A. 1915B, 834, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1177; Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385, 392, 40 S. Ct. 182, 64 L. Ed. 319; Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, 41 S. Ct. 261, 65 L. Ed. 647; Amos v. United States, 255 U. S. 313, 316, 41 S. Ct. 266, 65 L. Ed. 654; Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U. S. 149, 155, 44 S. Ct. 54, 68 L. Ed. 221; and "Progress of the Law 1921-1922, Evidence," (Chafee) 35 Harv. Law Rev. 428, 439. (45 S.Ct.) (266 U. S. 17) ing is to be limited by specification of details TERMINAL R. ASS'N OF ST. LOUIS et al. v. in same section of decree. UNITED STATES et al. (Argued March 3, 4, 1924. Decided Oct. 13, 1924.) No. 115. 1. Contempt 40-Proceeding based on violation of decree held civil and remedial, and not criminal proceeding. Contempt proceeding, based on violation of decree and instituted to enforce rights claimed by parties thereunder, and not to vindicate court's authority is a civil and remedial, and not a criminal, proceeding. 2. Courts380-Justice of United States Supreme Court could allow appeal and grant supersedeas on appeal from District Court's decree in contempt proceedings. Under Expedition Act Feb. 11, 1903 (Comp. St. §§ 8824, 8825), a justice of the United States Supreme Court could allow appeal from decree of District Court in contempt proceedings, and on appropriate security grant supersedeas, notwithstanding Rules of Supreme Court, No. 36, authorizing allowance of appeal and granting supersedeas in cases provided for in Judicial Code, §§ 238, 252 (Comp. St. §§ 1215, 1229), in view of Rev. St. §§ 999, 1012 (Comp. St. § 1659, 1673), and appeal is not limited to question of jurisdiction. 3. Contempt 66(7)-Appellees' right to amendment of original decree, claimed to have been violated, not considered, in absence of cross-appeal. On appeal from decree holding appellants in contempt for violation of decree, the Supreme Court, in absence of cross-appeal, will not consider question of appellees' right to amendment of original decree, so as to impose additional condition. 4. Contempt 20, 63(4)-Decree not expanded by implication in contempt proceedings for its enforcement. In contempt proceedings for its enforcement, a decree will not be expanded by implication or intendment beyond the meaning of its terms, when read in the light of the issues and the purpose for which the suit brought, and the facts found must constitute a plain violation of the decree so read. was 5. Contempt 63(4)-Statement in decree held too general to constitute specification of facts amounting to contempt. Statement in decree, rendered in contempt proceedings for violation of decree under Sherman Anti-Trust Act (Comp. St. § 88208823, 8827-8830), that terminal railway association and its subsidiaries are not acting in good faith as the impartial agents of the various proprietary lines, held too general and vague, when considered by itself to constitute specification of facts amounting to contempt of court. 6. Contempt 63(1)-Meaning of general language of decree limited by specification of details. 9. Contempt 20-Refusal of certain railroads to bear transfer charges on through freight held not violative of decree warranting contempt proceedings. Where decree rendered in suit by the United States against the Terminal Railroad Association, its subsidiary and proprietary railroads, for violation of Sherman Anti-Trust Act (Comp. St. §§ 8820-8823, 8827-8830), did not purport to regulate rates, or prescribe divisions of joint rates, or fix liability for transfer charges, and expressly provided that decree should not affect Interstate Commerce Commission's power to determine rates, the refusal of certain railroads entering from the east to bear transfer charges on west-bound through freight held not to constitute contempt. 10. Carriers 5-Terminal Association and subsidiaries held "common carriers," subject to regulation by Interstate Commerce Commission. Terminal Railroad Association and subsidiary companies held "common carriers," subject to regulation by Interstate Commerce Commission. [Ed. Note.-For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Common Carrier.] 11. Contempt 43-Defendants not held in contempt for noncompliance with decree, in absence of injury to petitioners. Defendants will not be held in contempt for violating decree, in absence of showing that injury has resulted to petitioners, or that they are entitled to relief. Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. Suit by the United States against the Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis and On petition of the Missouri, Kansas others. & Texas Railway Company and others to have the named defendant and some of the unnamed defendants adjudged guilty of contempt of court for violating the decree rendered. From the decree holding them in contempt, Meaning and application of general lan- such named and unnamed defendants apguage in decree rendered in contempt proceed-peal. Reversed. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes #19 *Messrs. R. V. Fletcher, of Chicago, Ill., T. M. Pierce, of St. Louis, Mo., and Alex P. Humphrey, of Louisville, Ky., for appellants. The Attorney General and Messrs. J. M. Bryson, Edward J. White, and Lon O. Hocker, all of St. Louis, Mo., for appellees. companies and from operating any of the properties belonging to it or its constituents otherwise than as terminal facilities for the railroad companies using the same, and from making charges otherwise than for and according to the nature of the services so lawfully authorized to be rendered: Provided, however, that the right of said Terminal Railroad Association as an accessory to its strictly terminal business to carry on transportation as to busi*Mr. Justice BUTLER delivered the opin-ness exclusively originating on its lines, exion of the Court. $23 In November, 1905, the United States filed complaint in the Circuit (now District) Court for the Eastern District of Missouri against the Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, two bridge companies, and a ferry company, subsidiaries of the association, certain railroad companies which owned the capital stock of the association, and the individuals who represented the shareholders on the board of directors of the association. The names of the defendants are given in a note printed in the margin of the opinion in United States v. St. Louis Terminal, 224 U. S. 383, 390, 32 S. Ct. 507, 56 L. Ed. 810. The complaint alleged a combination in vio lation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, c. clusively moving thereon, and exclusively intended for delivery on the same is hereby recognized and nothing in this decree shall be construed to deny such rights." Paragraph 2 of the decree directs a reorganization of the contracts between the defendant railroad companies and the Terminal Association by providing for the admission of any railroad to joint ownership and control of the combined terminal properties on terms of equality with the then proprietary companies, and for the use of the terminal facilities by any railroad not a joint owner upon such terms as will, in respect of use, character and cost of service, place every such railroad upon as nearly an equal plane as may be, with respect to expenses and charges, as that occupied by proprietary companies, and by eliminating from the existing agreement any provision which restricts any proprietary company to the use of the facilities of the Terminal Association. *25 *Paragraph 3 abolishes the practice of billing to East St. Louis or other junction points, and then rebilling traffic destined to St. Louis or points beyond. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (Comp. St. §§ 8820-8823, 8827-8830), and prayed a dissolution of the association. Under the Expedition Act of February 11, 1903, c. 544, 32 Stat. 823 (Comp. St. §§ 8824, 8825), four Circuit Judges heard the case and entered a decree dismissing the complaint. On appeal to this court, there was a reversal. The case was remanded, and, March 2, 1914, a final decree was entered in the District Court in favor of the United States, in accordance with the mandate of this court. United States v. St. Louis Terminal, supra, 411, (32 S. Ct. 507). See also Ex parte United States, 226 U. S. 420, 33 S. Ct. 170, 57 L. Ed. 281. There was another appeal (236 U. S. 194, 35 S. Ct. 408, 59 L. Ed. 535) and, February 7, 1917, the Dis- Paragraph 5 extends the effect of the detrict Court modified its decree in accordance cree to all railroad companies thereafter adwith the direction of this court. The sub-mitted to ownership or use of the terminal stance of the decree, as modified, so far as facilities. here material, is as follows: "(1) The Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis is an unlawful combination contrary to the Anti-Trust Act of July 2, 1890 (26 Stat. 209), when it and the various bridge and terminal companies composing it are operated as railroad transportation companies. The combination may, however, exist and continue as a lawful unification of terminal facilities upon abandoning all operating methods and charges *24 as and for railroad transportation and con*fining itself to the transaction of a terminal business such as supplying and operating facilities for the interchange of traffic between railroads and to assist in the collecting and distributing of traffic for the carrier companies, switching, storing and the like, and modifying its contracts as herein specified. An election having been made to continue the combination for terminal purposes, the defendants are therefore perpetually enjoined from in anywise managing or conducting the said Terminal Railroad Association or any of its constituent Paragraph 4 abolishes any special or socalled arbitrary charge for the use of the terminal facilities in respect of traffic originating within the so-called 100-mile area that is not equally applied in respect of traffic originating outside of that area. Paragraph 6 is as follows: "Nothing in this decree shall be taken to affect in any wise or at any time the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission over the rates to be charged by the Terminal Railroad Association, or the mode of billing traffic passing over its lines, or the establishing of joint through rates or routes over its lines, or any other power conferred by law upon such commission." The cause was reserved for such further orders and decrees as might be deemed necessary. Certain defendant railroad companies, for convenience, are called the west side lines.1 Certain others are called the east side lines.2 1 Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company, St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company, Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, and Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company. 2 Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern Railroad Com pany, Chicago & Alton Railroad Company, Cleve |