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(45 S.Ct.)

not have lost its character as such. Thustled to whatever remedial advantage inheres in construed, section 2 gives the District Court particular forum chosen. jurisdiction in such a case as this.

Decree reversed.

(266 U. S. 200)

STATE OF MISSOURI ex rel. ST. LOUIS,
B. & M. RY. CO. v. TAYLOR, Circuit
Judge of City of St. Louis.

(Argued Oct. 17, 1924. Decided Nov. 17,
1924.)

No. 89.

1. Appeal and error 77(1) — Courts 3972, New, vol. 9A Key-No. Series-Judgment denying application for writ of prohibition to enjoin court from taking cognizance of pending action final judgment.

Action of Supreme Court of state, denying application for writ of prohibition to enjoin judge of inferior court from taking cognizance of pending action, because he lacked jurisdiction, is a final judgment, which may be reviewed by federal Supreme Court on writ of error and certiorari. 2. Prohibition 10(1) — Writ denied where inferior court has jurisdiction of one of items sued on.

Prohibition to enjoin inferior court from taking cognizance of pending action is properly denied, where such court has jurisdiction of one item sued for, though it has no jurisdiction of others.

3. Commerce 81-State law providing for obtaining jurisdiction of foreign carrier through garnishment of traffic balance not unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. State law permitting consignee, having usual place of business within state, to obtain jurisdiction over carrier not doing business in state, by garnishment of traffic balance due from connecting interstate carrier having place of business in state is not an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.

4. Courts 489 (9)-Liability against initial carrier enforceable in state court whenever ordinary jurisdiction permits, though federal court in district would not have jurisdiction for lack of personal service.

Liability of initial carrier for negligence of connecting carrier, created by Carmack Amendment (Comp. St. §§ 8604a, 8604aa), is enforceable in state court whenever its ordinary jurisdiction as prescribed by local laws is appropriate to occasion, and state court may obtain jurisdiction by garnishment, if its laws so permit, even though jurisdiction could not be obtained in federal court by that means, because personal service could not be made on initial carrier; state and federal courts having concurrent jurisdiction.

5. Courts 491- Grant of concurrent jurisdiction implies plaintiff shall have choice of court and whatever remedial advantage inheres in particular forum.

Grant of concurrent jurisdiction implies that, in first instance, plaintiff shall have choice of courts, and as an incident he is enti

6. Courts 339- Peculiar state procedure will not be permitted to enlarge or abridge substantive federal right.

No peculiarity of state procedure will be permitted to enlarge or to abridge a substantive federal right.

7. Removal of causes 114-When case is removed from state court, judgment is enforced in federal court as against attached property, though federal court without jurisdiction originally.

Where state laws permit satisfaction of claim in personam against absent defendant by garnishment, and case is removed to federal court, it proceeds to judgment, and judgment is enforced as against attached property with same effect as if cause had remained in state

court, though federal court could not originally have obtained jurisdiction by garnishment.

Error and Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri.

Proceeding in prohibition by State of Missouri, on the relation and to the use of the St. Louis, Brownsville & Mexico Railway Company, against Wilson A. Taylor, Judge of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis. Preliminary rule was discharged (298 Mo. 474, 251 S. W. 383), and plaintiff brings error and certiorari. Writ of error dismissed, and judgment affirmed.

*201

*Messrs. M. U. Hayden, Edward J. White, and James F. Green, all of St. Louis, Mo., for plaintiff in error.

*203 *Mr. J. L. London, of St. Louis, Mo., for defendant in error.

*206 *Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The American Fruit Growers, Inc., a Delaware corporation with the usual place of business in Missouri, brought an action against the St. Louis, Brownsville & Mexico Railway Company in an inferior court of Missouri. Jurisdiction was asserted solely by reason of the garnishment of traffic balances due from a connecting interstate carrier having a place of business in Missouri. The Brownsville Company is a Texas corporation, operates its railroad solely in that state, has no place of business in Missouri, and has not consented to be sued there. The cause of action sued on consisted of three claims of a consignee for damages to freight originating in Texas on lines of the Brownsville Company and shipped on through bills of lading to points in other states.

[1] The Brownsville Company did not enter an appearance, general or special. Instead, it instituted in the Supreme Court of Missouri an application for a writ of prohibition-the proceeding here under reviewpraying that the judge of the inferior court

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

The argument is unsound. Congress created the right of action. It might have provided that the right shall be enforceable only in a federal court. It might have provided that state courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction only of those cases which, by the applicable federal law, could, under the same circumstances, have been commenced in a federal court for the particular state. But Congress did neither of these things. It dealt solely with the substantive law. As it

be enjoined from taking cognizance of the the state could entertain a suit to enforce pending action because he lacked jurisdic- the claim. tion. The highest court of the state denied relief. 298 Mo. 474, 251 S. W. 383. The case is here on writ of error, and also on certiorari. 263 U. S. 696, 44 S. Ct. 132, 68 L. Ed. 511. The suggestion was made, at the argument, that this court is without jurisdiction, because the judgment below was not final. The contrary is settled. The application for a writ of prohibition is an independent adversary suit which was finally determined by the judgment under review. Detroit & Mackinac Ry. Co. v. Michigan Railroad Commis-made no provision concerning the remedy, sion, 240 U. S. 564, 570. 36 S. Ct. 424, 60

*207

L. Ed. 802. The writ of error must, however, be dismissed for another reason. See Stadelman v. Miner, 246 U. S. 544, 38 S. Ct. 359, 62 L. Ed. 875.

the federal and the state courts have concurWallace, 223 U. S. 481, 490, 32 S. Ct. 205, 56 rent jurisdiction. Galveston, etc., Ry. Co. v. L. Ed. 516. The federal right is enforceable in a state court whenever its ordinary jurisdiction is prescribed by local laws is appropriate to the occasion and is invoked in conformity with those laws. Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 56, 57, 32 S. Ct. 169, 56 L. Ed. 327, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 44; Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130, 136, 137, 23 L. Ed. 833.

[5, 6] Missouri conferred jurisdiction over claims of this nature upon the court in which the consignee sued. Under its law, this jurisdiction may be exercised, to the extent of applying property attached to the satisfaction of a claim, even though personal service cannot be made upon the defendant. That remedy is one which was not available

[2, 3] The claim that the inferior court of Missouri lacked jurisdiction of the action for damages is rested on two grounds. One contention is that the Missouri attachment law, as construed and applied, is void under the rule of Davis v. Farmers' Co-operative Equity Co., 262 U. S. 312, 43 S. Ct. 556, 67 L. Ed. 996, and Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fé Ry. Co. v. Wells, 265 U. S. 101, 44 S. Ct. 469, 68 L. Ed. 928. The facts of this case differ vitally from those involved there. Here, the plaintiff consignee is a resident of Missouri —that is, has a usual place of business within the state; the shipment out of which the cause of action arose was of goods deliverable in Missouri; and, for aught that ap-to the consignee in the federal court for Mispears, the negligence complained of occurred within Missouri. To require that, under such circumstances, the foreign carrier shall submit to suit within a state to whose jurisdiction it would otherwise be amenable by process of attachment does not unreasonably burden interstate commerce.

[4] The other contention is more strenuously urged. It is argued that the cause of

action on which the consignee sues is the liability of the initial carrier for a loss occurring through the negligence of a connecting carrier; that this liability arises out of a federal law, Carmack Amendment, June 29, 1906. c. 3591, § 7, pars. 11, 12, 34 Stat. 584, 595 (Comp. St. $$ 8604a. 8604aa); that the conditions under which the federal right may be enforced are the same whether the plaintiff proceeds in the state court or the federal court; that original jurisdiction could not have been obtained by attachment in a federal court for Missouri, because personal service could not be made upon the Brownsville Company. Ex *parte Railway Co., 103 U. S. 794, 26 L. Ed. 461; Big Vein Coal Co. v. Read, 229 U. S. 31. 33 S. Ct. 694, 57 L. Ed. 1053; and that, therefore, no court of

*208

This is true only of one of the three shipments on account of which the action was brought. But if the inferior court had jurisdiction as to any one, it was obviously proper to deny the writ of prohibition.

cance.

souri. But this fact is not of legal signifi-
Compare Red Cross Line v. Atlantic
Fruit Co., 264 U. S. 109, 44 S. Ct. 274, 68
L. Ed. 582.
not affect the manner of administering the
The origin of the right does
remedy. The grant of concurrent jurisdic-
tion implies that, in the first instance, the
plaintiff shall have the choice of the court.
As an incident, he is entitled to whatever
remedial advantage inheres in the particular
forum. Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R. Co.

*209

v. Bombolis, 241 U. S. *211, 221, 36 S. Ct. 595, 60 L. Ed. 961, L. R. A. 1917A, 86, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 505. No peculiarity of state procedure will be permitted to enlarge or to abridge a substantive federal right. Central Vermont Ry. Co. v. White, 238 U. S. 507, 511, 35 S. Ct. 865, 59 L. Ed. 1433, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 252; Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Burnette, 239 U. S. 199, 36 S. Ct. 75, 60 L. Ed. 226; New Orleans & Northeastern R. R. Co. v. Harris, 247 U. S. 367, 371, 38 S. Ct. 535, 62 L. Ed. 1167; Yazoo & Mississippi Valley R. R. Co. v. Mullins, 249 U. S. 531, 39 S. Ct. 368, 63 L. Ed. 754. But to enforce a claim by subjecting property within the state to its satisfaction, through attachment proceeding, does not enlarge the substantive right.

[7] The practice of obtaining in this way satisfaction of a claim in personam against

(45 S. Ct.)

an absent defendant is not one abhorrent to, or uncommon in, federal courts. In admiralty, district courts take original jurisdiction under such circumstances. Atkins v. Disintegrating Co., 18 Wall. 272, 21 L. Ed. 841. At law, they do so on removal. When the case is removed, it proceeds to judgment in the federal court and the judgment is enforced there as against the attached property with the same effect as if the cause had remained in the state court. Clark v. Wells, 203 U. S. 164, 27 S. Ct. 43, 51 L. Ed. 138. Writ of error dismissed.

Judgment affirmed.

(266 U. S. 292)

Mr. Justice SANFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a suit in equity brought in the District Court by the Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the World, a fraternal society organized under the laws of Nebraska, against twentyfive of its members, all citizens of Texas. Federal jurisdiction was based upon the diversity of citizenship, and the matter in controversy, which it was averred, exceeded, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of three thousand dollars. Judicial Code, § 24, subd. 1 (Comp. St. § 991 [1]).

The bill alleged, in substance, that the defendants had entered into an agreement and conspiracy to embarrass and attempt to ruin the Society; that pursuant to this agreement and conspiracy they endeavored at a meeting of the Head Camp of Texas to secure their election as delegates to a session of the Sovereign Camp at New York; that Decided Nov. 17, they were defeated and other persons were duly elected and certified to the Sovereign

SOVEREIGN CAMP W. 0. W. v.
O'NEILL et al.

(Submitted Oct. 9, 1924.

1924.) No. 58.

1. Courts385 (4)-Where bill dismissed for want of jurisdiction, direct appeal properly allowed.

Where bill was dismissed by District Court on specific ground of want of jurisdiction, direct appeal to Supreme Court was properly allowed, under Judicial Code, § 238 (Comp. St. § 1215).

2. Courts 328 (4)-Federal court held to have jurisdiction of bill to enjoin number of suits, each for less than $3,000.

Federal District Court had jurisdiction, under Judicial Code, § 24, subd. 1 (Comp. St. § 991[1]), of bill based on diversity of citizenship to enjoin number of actions in state court alleged to be result of conspiracy to embarrass and ruin plaintiff, where aggregate of claims in state court exceeded $3,000, though no particular suit was for that amount.

3. Courts 508 (1)-Statute held not to deprive federal District Court of jurisdiction to enjoin actions in state court.

Judicial Code, § 265 (Comp. St. § 1242), providing that injunction shall not be granted to stay proceedings in state court, does not deprive federal District Court of jurisdiction otherwise conferred by federal statute, but merely goes to question of equity in particular bill, making it duty of court to determine whether specific case presented is one in which relief by injunction is prohibited or may nevertheless be granted.

Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Texas. Suit in equity by the Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the World against E. E. O'Neill and others. Decree for defendants (286 F. 734), and plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.

*293

*Mr. T. D. Gresham, of Dallas, Tex., for appellant.

*294

Camp; that they contested the election and appealed to the Sovereign Camp, which decided that they had not been elected and were not entitled to be recognized as delegates or to any privileges or perquisites as such, and seated the delegates certified by the Head Camp; that under the constitution and by-laws of the Society this decision was final; that nevertheless, acting in concert and pursuant to their joint agreement and conspiracy, they had brought twentyfive separate actions at law against the Society in a local court of Texas to recover amounts ranging from $987.00 to $1,170.00, which they severally claimed as per diem

and mileage allowances and traveling expenses by reason of attending the Sovereign Camp as delegates, 1 that in each of these suits the same cause of action was alleged, in involved in all of them; that there was no identical language, and only one issue was merit in the cause of action set up by the defendants and the suits were wholly without any foundation; that if the Society was compelled to defend each of these separate suits, it would be subjected to an enormous expense; and that its remedy at law was in

1 The bill also alleged that one of the defendants in pursuance of the conspiracy originally brought suit in the state court against the Society for $28,882, alleging that the other defendants had transferred their claims to him, but that, upon notice of a petition for removal of the suit to the federal court, he had amended his original petition by striking out the averment of such assignments and limiting his claim to the amount claimed to be due him individually; and that thereafter the other defendants had brought their separate suits in the state

court.

2 It appears from the averments of the bill that the contention of the defendants was that by a secret exchange of ballot boxes forged and fraudulent votes were substituted for the true votes, and that they were elected at the original meeting after a minority of the delegates to the Head Camp had withdrawn to hold a pretended separate meeting.

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes 45 S.CT.-4

adequate wherefore it prayed that the defendants be enjoined from prosecuting their separate suits in the state court or endeavor*295

ing to collect in any other manner *any sums of money from the Society by reason of the matters alleged.

The District Court, on motion of the defendants, dismissed the bill on the ground that the court was "without jurisdiction" thereof; being of opinion that as jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship, the requisite jurisdictional amount was not present, since each of the defendants claimed in his suit in the state court an amount less than $3,000, and that Section 265 of the Judicial Code (Comp. St. § 1242) also deprived the court of jurisdiction. 286 F. 734.

[1] As the bill was dismissed upon the specific ground of want of jurisdiction, the direct appeal to this Court was properly allowed. Judicial Code, § 238; Smith v. Apple, 264 U. S. 274, 277, 44 S. Ct. 311, 68 L.

Ed. 678.

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class of cases to which Walter v. Northeastern R. Co. belonged, the court said:

*

* * * can

"The case before us. however, is presented by the bill in an entirely different aspect. The case may be regarded as exceptional in its facts, and maybe disposed of without affecting former decisions. There is no dispute as to the amount of any particular claim. So far as the bill is concerned, if any one of the specified claims is good against the estate of Hiram * * The matter Evans, then all are good. in dispute is whether the lands be sold to pay all the claims, in the aggregate, which the defendants, by combination and conspiracy, procured the Probate Court to allow against the estate of Hiram Evans. The essense of the suit is the alleged fraudulent combination and conspiracy to fasten upon that estate a liability for debts of John Evans, which were held by the defendants and which they, acting in combination, procured, in co-operation with James Evans, to be allowed as claims against the estate of Hiram Evans. By realowance of all those claims in the Probate son of that combination, resulting in the alCourt, as expenses of administering the estate of Hiram Evans, the defendants have so tied their respective claims together as to make them, so far as the plaintiffs and the relief sought by them are concerned, one claim. The validity of all the claims depends upon the The lien on the lands which is same facts. *297

[2] 1. It is the settled general rule, frequently applied by this Court in tax cases, that in a suit based on diversity of citizenship brought against several defendants to enjoin the collection of claims against the plaintiff which are separate and distinct-although depending for their valid-asserted by each defendant *has its origin as well in the combination to which all were parties as in the orders of the Probate Court which, in furtherance of that combination, were procured by their joint action."

ity upon a common origin-the test of jurisdiction is the amount of each separate claim, and not their aggregate amount. Walter v. Northeastern R. Co., 147 U. S. 370, 372, 13 S. Ct. 348, 37 L. Ed. 206; Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Walker, 148 U. S. 391, 392, 13 S. Ct.

650, 37 L. Ed. 494; Fishback v. Telegraph Co., 161 U. S. 96, 100, 16 S. Ct. 506, 40 L. Ed. 630; Citizens' Bank v. Cannon, 166 U. S. 319, 322, 17 S. Ct. 89, 41 L. Ed. 451. An exception to this general rule was, however, recognized in McDaniel v. Traylor, 196 U. S. 415, 427, 25 S. Ct. 369, 49 L. Ed. 533. There the heirs of one Hiram Evans, an intestate, brought suit in the circuit court against several defendants to enjoin the enforcement of claims that had been allowed as liens upon his real estate by orders of a probate court. Each claim was less than the requisite jurisdictional amount, but their aggregate exceeded that sum. The bill alleged that these claims were not debts of the intestate, but that the defendants had con*296

spired and confederated with the ad*ministrator to secure their payment out of the estate, and that the orders allowing them had been procured as the result of the conspiracy and the fraud practiced in pursuance there

of. This court reversed a decree of the circuit court dismissing the bill, on demurrer, for want of jurisdiction, and held that, on the face of the bill, the value of the matter in dispute was "the aggregate amount of the claims fraudulently procured by the defendants acting in combination to be allowed in the Probate Court as claims against the estate." In the opinion, after referring to the

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And in McDaniel v. Traylor, 212 U. S. 428, 433, 29 S. Ct. 343, 344 (53 L. Ed. 584)-on a second appeal-in affirming a decree of the Circuit Court, made on return of the case, again dismissing the suit for want of juristhat the defendants had conspired in procurdiction, upon a finding that the allegation ing the allowance of the claims, had not been

established, it was said:

"As we have already seen, it was the fraudulent combination and conspiracy which united the claims and made the aggregate of the claims the matter in dispute. By reason of that combination we decided the claims were 'so tied' together as to make them, 'so far as the plaintiffs and the relief sought by them are concerned, one claim.'"

We find that under the allegations of the present bill the case comes fairly within the reason of the exception recognized in the McDaniel Cases. It is not only alleged that the defendants' claims are without founda. tion, but that they originated and are being prosecuted in the state court in pursuance of

On the first appeal this Court had said (page 428 [25 S. Ct. 373]): "If the plaintiffs do not prove such a combination and conspiracy, in respect, at least, of so many of the specified claims as in the aggregate will be of the required amount, then their suit must fail for want of jurisdiction in the Circuit Court; for, in the absence of the alleged com

bination, the claim of each defendant must, according to our decisions, be regarded, for purposes of jurisdiction, as separate from all the others."

(45 S.Ct.)

In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of North Carolina.

an agreement and conspiracy to embarrass titled to jury trial will be accepted by the fedand attempt to ruin the Society. There is eral Supreme Court as a correct determination no dispute as to the amount of any particu- of the local law. lar claim; and the validity of all of them depends upon the same issue. A conspiracy to prosecute, by concert of action, numerous baseless claims against the same person for the wrongful purpose of harassing and ruining him, partakes of the nature of a fraudulent conspiracy; and in a suit to enjoin *them from being separately prosecuted, it must likewise be deemed to tie together such several claims as one claim for jurisdictional purposes, making their aggregate amount the value of the matter in controversy. We conclude, therefore, that, on the face of the bill, the District Court had jurisdiction of the suit by reason of the diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy.

*298

[3] 2. The jurisdiction thus acquired was not taken away by Section 265 of the Judicial Code, providing that, except in bankruptcy cases, "the writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in any court of a state." This section does not deprive à district court of the jurisdiction otherwise conferred by the federal statutes, but merely goes to the question of equity in the particular bill; making it the duty of the court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, to determine whether the specific case presented is one in which relief by injunction is prohibited by this section or may nevertheless be granted. Smith v. Apple, supra, p. 278, 44 S. Ct. 311. The decree is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

(266 U. S. 178)

SOUTHERN RY. CO. et al. v. CITY OF
DURHAM, N. C.

Mardamus, on the relation of the City of Durham, N. C., against the Southern Railway Company and others, to compel the elimination of a grade crossing. An order denying a continuance and jury trial was affirmed by the state Supreme Court on appeal (185 N. C. 240, 117 S. E. 17), and the Judgrespondents prosecute writ of error.

ment affirmed.

Messrs. W. M. Hendren, of Winston-Salem, N. C., F. M. Rivinus and Theodore W. Reath, both of Philadelphia, Pa., James F. Wright, of Norfolk, Va., and L. E. Jeffries, of Washington, D. C., for plaintiffs in error.

Messrs. James S. Manning, of Raleigh, N. C., and S. C. Chambers, of Durham, N. C., for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice MCREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.

By ordinance the city council of Durham declared a certain grade crossing dangerous

*179

and ordered plaintiffs *in error to eliminate it by constructing an underpass with proper approaches, etc. They failed to comply; the city instituted a mandamus proceeding to compel obedience.

The petition, after setting out the facts and circumstances, asked an appropriate decree. Answering, plaintiffs in error attacked the ordinance as arbitrary, unreasonable and subversive of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment; also because it conflicted with the federal Act to Regulate Commerce (Comp. St. § 8563 et seq.) by imposing undue expense upon them. The facts relied upon to support these claims were specified.

Having heard the cause upon complaint, answers and argument of counsel the trial court, "being of the opinion that no issue of

(Argued Oct. 14, 1924. Decided Nov. 17, 1924.) fact for trial by jury is raised upon the

No. 71.

1. Constitutional law 249, 313 Denial of jury trial in mandamus to compel railroads to eliminate grade crossings not violative of Fourteenth Amendment.

Denial of jury trial in mandamus action by city to compel railroads to eliminate grade crossings is not violative of the Fourteenth Amendment; neither the federal laws nor Constitution giving a right to trial by jury when local statutes and practice prescribe otherwise. 2. Courts 394 (25)-Determination of state Supreme Court as to right of jury trial accepted by federal court.

pleadings," made findings of fact, declared the ordinance valid and directed compliance therewith. The railroads offered no evidence, but asked continuation of the cause until the next term and that no further proceedings should be taken until the issues of fact raised by the answers could be decided by a jury. This was denied and they appealed. The Supreme Court held refusal to continue the hearing and transfer the cause to the civil docket for trial by jury was not erroneous, and said that "the judge was ready to hear and determine the action but the railroads failed to offer testimony or evidence of any kind whatever."

Determination of the state Supreme Court [1, 2] We are unable to find that plaintiffs that respondents in mandamus to compel rail-in error have been deprived of any federal roads to eliminate grade crossings are not en-right. They had full opportunity to present

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

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