(45 S.Ct.) 52-Conduct or statements cal culated to mislead a party, and which are acted on by him in good faith to his prejudice, can only be invoked as basis for estoppel. Conduct or statements calculated to mis lead a party, and which are acted on by him in good faith to his prejudice, can only be invoked as basis for estoppel. that the Court below was wrong. We do not | 5. Estoppel Action by the State of Oklahoma against the State of Texas, wherein the United States intervened. To a report of the special master who heard conflicting claims of Roberts and Britain and the Durfee Mineral Company to impounded proceeds of oil, the Durfee Mineral Company excepts. Claim of Roberts and Britain sustained. Claim of the Durfee Mineral Company denied. See, also, 267 U. S. -, 45 S. Ct. 510, 69 L. Ed. Mr. S. P. Freeling, of Oklahoma City, Okl., for the State of Oklahoma. Messrs. C. W. Taylor, of Corsicana, Tex., and Orville Bullington and A. H. Carrigan, Judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals both of Wichita Falls, Tex., for the State of reversed. 3. Navigable waters 44 (3)-States 12 (2)-Boundary follows changes in bank of river by accretion or erosion. Where boundary, bank of river, is changed by accretion or erosion, boundary, whether private or public, follows the change. 4. Boundaries 47 (1)-Purchasers of land, who did not rely on adverse claimants' representations as to boundary, held not entitled to assert estoppel. Purchasers of oil lands, in reliance upon their attorney's report based on record title rather than on statements made by adverse claimants, as to boundary, held not entitled to claim estoppel of such claimants. Texas. *253 *Mr. Justice VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court. As an incident of the receivership in this cause, it becomes necessary to determine conflicting claims to the royalty interest in the impounded proceeds of the oil taken from wells Nos. 152, 153 and 154, 258 U. S. 574, 581, 42 S. Ct. 406, 66 L. Ed. 771. These wells are immediately south of the south bank of Red River, and therefore in the State of Texas. 261 U. S. 340, 43 S. Ct. 376, 67 L. Ed. 687. The claimants are T. P. Roberts and A. H. Britain on the one hand and the Durfee Mineral Company on the other. Both claims are founded on Texas surveysthat of Roberts and Britain on the Lewis Powell survey made in 1861 and patented in 1868, and that of the Durfee Mineral Com1886 and patented in 1889. pany on the A. A. Durfee survey made in The principal question is whether the Powell survey extended northward to the south bank of Red River, leaving nothing between it and the bank, or stopped short of the bank, leaving a narrow wedge-shaped strip between it and the bank. The Durfee survey was made 25 years later on the assumption that the Powell survey left such a strip there. The three wells are in the wedge-shaped strip or land accreted to it. A secondary question is whether, if the Powell survey included this strip, the present owners of that survey are estopped from claiming the strip, and therefore the royalty interest, as against the Durfee Mineral Company. *254 *January 19, last, the conflicting claims For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes 45 S.CT.-32 were referred to a special master with direc- the south bank of the river and in the light tions to take the evidence and report the of the drawing or plat representing the rivsame with findings of fact, conclusions of er as the northern boundary. law and recommendations for a decree. 267 U. S. 7, par. 8, 45 S. Ct. 198, 69 L. Ed. The master made his report with findings, conclusions and recommendations favorable to the claim of Roberts and Britain; 'the Durfee Mineral Company excepted; and both claimants have been heard in briefs and oral argument on the report and exceptions. [2] We think it apparent that the survey was intended to call, and did call, for the river as a boundary and that controlling influence must be given to that call rather than to the course and distance given for that boundary. The courts of Texas, in common with other courts, recognize and apply this rule of interpretation. Anderson v. Stamps, 19 Tex. 460, 465, 466; Stafford v. King, 30 Tex. 257, 271, 272, 94 Am. Dec. 304; Schnackenberg v. State, supra; Stover v. Gilbert, supra, and cases there cited; Cordell Petroleum Co. v. Michna (C. C. A.) 276 F. [1] The master found that the Powell survey fronted on the river and had the south bank as its northerly boundary. In the exceptions it is insisted that this finding rests on an erroneous interpretation of the survey. For reasons which will be explained, | 483. The evidence, as pointed out by the we think it rests on a right interpretation. master, does not admit of the conclusion that the surveyor mistook a bayou or other body of water for the river, or that the river was not in immediate proximity to the upper corners of the survey when it was made (see United States v. Lane, 260 U. S. 662, 43 S. Ct. 236, 67 L. Ed. 448); so authorities rejecting an obviously mistaken call for a river or lake are not in point. See Jeems Bayou *256 The Powell was one of five surveys made by the same surveyor on the same day-May 8, 1861. These surveys were contiguous and were in the form required of surveys fronting on a stream like Red River. They were also so tied together that the interpretation of one involves an examination of the others. The surveyor began with the easterly one and proceeded westerly until he had finished all five. His field notes described all as "on *Fishing and Hunting Club v. United States, the south bank of Red River," and the draw-260 U. S. 561, 43 S. Ct. 205, 67 L. Ed. 403. [3] The master next found that the land ings or plats accompanying the field notes represented all as fronting on the river and lying between the south bank as now existhaving its irregular line as a northerlying and that bank as existing at the time of boundary. The field notes of all, excepting the Powell, also described the northerly line as beginning at the northwest corner of the adjoining survey on the east and running "thence up the river with its meanders" in a stated direction a given distance to a stake or mound "in the bottom" or "on the bluff" at the other end. The Powell was the fourth survey in the line, and so as between others *255 the Powell survey is accretion to the bank, and therefore part of the Powell tract. Exception is taken to this finding on grounds that are not made very clear. A short statement of what the evidence tends to show in this connection will make it plain that the exception must be overruled. During the 25year period intervening between the Powell survey and the Durfee survey there was a large addition to the south bank, but in later years most of that addition was cut away. At present the bank extends a little farther the field notes of which said "thence up the river with its meanders." The field notes of the Powell transmitted to the state land of-northward than it did when the Powell survey fice, and on which the patent issued, were like the others, save that they said "thence up the river" and omitted "with its meanders." But the field notes entered in the appropriate local records said "thence up the river with its meanders." Doubtless the discrepancy resulted from a clerical error in preparing the duplicate sent to the state land office. We put aside the question of the effect to be given to the entry in the local records; for the phrase "thence up the river" in the field notes sent to the state land office and in the patent evidently mean up the natural course of the river. Schnackenberg v. State (Tex. Civ. App.) 229 S. W. 934, 937; Stover v. Gilbert, 110 Tex. 429, 247 S. W. 841, 843; Brown v. Huger, 21 How. 305, 320, 16 L. Ed. 125. Of course, that phrase must be read with the declaration that the survey was on 1 Vernon's Sayles' Civ. Stat. Tex. §§ 5338, 5339. was made. These changes all resulted from the natural and gradual processes of accretion and erosion, which are rather pronounced in Red River. Its currents and channels shift from one side of its wide bed to the other, gradually cut away one bank and build up the other, and later on reverse that action. Where, as here, a boundary bank is changed by these processes the boundary, whether private or public, follows the change. Oklahoma v. Texas, 260 U. S. 606, 636, 43 S. Ct. 221, 67 L. Ed. 428; Oklahoma v. Texas, 265 U. S. 493, 499, 44 S. Ct. 571, 68 L. Ed. 1118. The necessary result of the two findings we have mentioned is that there was no public land between the Powell tract and the river to which the Durfee survey and patent could give any right. The next exception is to the master's conclusion that there was no sufficient evidence on which to invoke an estoppel against the (45 S. Ct.) assertion by Roberts and Britain of title to the strip in controversy or to the royalty interest arising therefrom. [4, 5] The grounds on which an estoppel is invoked are that Specht, from whom Roberts acquired the Powell tract, had theretofore made and distributed a plat of that *257 tract, *along with others, whereupon it was represented as not extending to the river bank; that Roberts after getting the title made and distributed a plat with a like representation of the northern boundary; that Roberts pointed out to the Durfee Company and its predecessors as the northern boundary a line running south of the land in dispute; and that, acting upon those plats and Roberts' statement, the Durfee Company and its predecessors purchased the land in dispute from a claimant under the Durfee survey and paid a valuable consideration for it. The evidence bearing on the asserted estoppel is in several respects conflicting. It is fully and fairly reviewed by the master in his report and need not be restated here. The master concluded, and we agree with him, that as a whole the evidence shows that the Durfee Company and its predecessors purchased with full knowledge of the record title, including the surveyor's field notes before described; that the plats made by Specht and Roberts were too vague to have been relied upon as a representation of the nature or location of the northern boundary; that the conveyance from Specht to Roberts, which was part of the record title, described the Powell tract as extending to the meanders of the river; that the Durfee Company and its predecessors in purchasing did not in fact rely upon the Specht and Roberts plats or any statement of Roberts, but upon a report made by their attorneys based on the record title, including the field notes; and that the alleged statement by Roberts to them, if made, was made after they had purchased, gone into possession and paid the purchase price. In this situation the assertted estoppel must fail. Only where conduct or statements are calculated to mislead a party and are acted upon by him in good faith to his prejudice can he invoke them as a basis of such an estoppel. And if they relate to the title of real property "where the condition of the title is known to both par *258 § 807. There was no laches on Roberts' part in asserting his claim after the company purchased. He soon went to the land with a surveyor to run out his lines and make his claim known, but was prevented from doing so by an armed guard. With reasonable promptness he brought a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction to enforce his rights. Proceedings in that suit were soon suspended by reason of this receivership, and he promptly asserted his claim here. An order will be entered overruling the exdirecting payment of the royalty interest to ceptions, confirming the master's report and Roberts and Britain. The costs will be ad justed in the order. PER CURIAM. On consideration of the report made by Joseph M. Hill, Esquire, as special master, under paragraph 8 of the order of January 19, last (267 U. S. 7, 45 S. Ct. 198, 69 L. Ed. —), and of the exceptions of the Durfee Mineral Company to such report, it is ordered: 1. The exceptions are overruled and the report is confirmed; 2. The claim of T. P. Roberts and A. H. Britain to the royalty interest in the impounded proceeds of the oil and gas taken from receiver's wells 152, 153 and 154 is sustained and the claim of the Durfee Mineral Company to such royalty interest is denied; 3. The receiver is directed to pay out of such royalty interest the following costs incurred in the determination of those claims: To Joseph M. Hill, $2,250.00 for services as special master and $223.36 for expenses; and to the clerk of this court the clerk's costs and printing charges in so far as they may exceed the advance payments made by Robv.erts and Britain and the Durfee Mineral Company under paragraph 8 of the order of January 19, last; ties, or both have the same means of *ascertaining the truth, there can be no estoppel." Brant v. Virginia Coal & Iron Co., 93 U. S. 326, 336, 337 (23 L. Ed. 927); Crary v. Dye, 208 U. S. 515, 521, 28 S. Ct. 360, 52 L. Ed. 595; Westbrook v. Guderian, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 406, 22 S. W. 59; Hunter v. Malone, 49 Tex. Civ. App. 116, 121, 108 S. W. 709; Bender Brooks, 61 Tex. Civ. App. 464, 130 S. W. 653, 657; Barclay y. Dismuke (Tex. Civ. App.) 202 S. W. 364, 365; Pomeroy's Eq. (4th Ed.) 4. The net balance of such royalty interest remaining after making the required deduction for receivership expenses and paying the costs named in paragraph 3 of this order shall be paid by the receiver to Roberts and Britain as the rightful claimants; 5. No allowance shall be made to either Roberts and Britain or the Durfee Mineral Company by way of reimbursement for expenses incurred and paid in producing witnesses before the special master and having the evidence reported; 6. All moneys advanced for costs under paragraph 8 of the order of January 19, last, by claimants other than Roberts and Britain and the Durfee Mineral Company shall be refunded to such claimants by the clerk. If the advance payments which were made by Roberts and Britain and the Durfee Mineral Company exceed the clerk's costs and printing charges, the excess shall be returned to them in equal proportions. (268 U. S. 678) (268 U. S. 263) SOUTHERN PAC. CO. v. UNITED STATES. (Argued Nov. 19-20, 1924. Decided May 11. 1925.) No. 285. 1. United States 118-Land-agent railroad held to acquiesce in reduced rates accepted without protest. Action by land-grant railroad in charging government for transportation of applicants for enlistment in the army, discharged, retired, and furloughed soldiers, and employees of the War Department, at land-grant rates, and accepting payment therefor without protest or objection, held to establish acquiescence by railroad, operating as discharge of claims for full passenger rates. 2. United States 118-Indorsement of "protest" on vouchers held sufficient notification payment of land-grant rates was not accepted in full for passenger transportation. Where land-grant railroad presented voucher to the government for gross amount of passenger rates for transportation of applicants for enlistment in the army, discharged, retired, and furloughed soldiers, and employees of the War Department, and made deduction on account of land grant, its indorsement of "accepted under protest" on vouchers was sufficient notification that payment of land-grant rates was not accepted in final settlement of transportation claims nor acquiescence in payment of land-grant rates discharging claim for 45 S. Ct. 499, 69 remainder of full fares; "protest," however, having no definite legal significance in connec. tion with receipt of money. STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Complainant, v. (Decided May 11, 1925.) See, also, 267 U. S. PER CURIAM. On consideration of the fourteenth report of the receiver it is ordered: 1. The accounts, disbursements and transactions of the receiver shown in the report are approved; 2. The receiver is directed to apply to receivership expenses the balance of approximately $6,800.00 remaining in his hands to the credit of the river-bed wells; 3. The receiver is directed to pay to the several claimants interested in the Texas or flood-plain wells the balance remaining in his hands to the credit of such wells and heretofore reserved to meet possible receivership expenses; 3. United States 118-Failure of land-grant railroad to indorse protest on voucher held acquiescence in land-grant rates. Where land-grant railroad adopted method for preserving its rights to full passenger rates by indorsement of its protests on separate vouchers, its failure to indorse protest on each voucher was acquiescence by railroad of land-grant rates in vouchers not so indorsed. Appeal from the Court of Claims. Action by the Southern Pacific Company against the United States. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Claims (59 Ct. Cl. 36), and the claimant appeals. Reversed and remanded. *264 Mr. Justice SANFORD delivered the opinion of the Court. 4. The receiver is instructed, as soon as *Messrs. Wm. R. Harr and Charles H. may be convenient, to make any needful Bates, both of Washington, D. C., for appelpreparation for promptly closing the receiv-lant. ership; to store the books of account, rec- Mr. Merrill E. Otis, of St. Joseph, Mo., ords and files of the receivership with the for the United States. Security Storage Company of Washington, D. C., in such manner as will make them readily accessible to the clerk of this Court; to pay the storage charges thereon in advance The Southern Pacific Company, having for a period of three years; to deliver such carried certain persons as passengers at the books, records, and files as so stored to the request of the Government and received payclerk of this court; and to make and sub- ment for such transportation at land-grant mit a final report covering his disbursements rates, brought this action to recover the and transactions since the fourteenth report.difference between the rates thus paid and For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes (45 S.Ct.) the full tariff rates. The Court of Claims, ing the claimant's right to present a further on its findings of fact, being of opinion that the claimant by its course of proceeding and acceptance of the land-grant rates was precluded from the recovery of the balance of the full tariff rates, entered judgment dismissing the petition. 59 Ct. Cl. 36. claim for full commercial fares to the ac- The facts found, shortly stated, are as follows: The claimant in 1911 became a party *On October 1, 1914, the claimant began to the so-called land-grant equalization "systematically" to endorse in typewriting agreements" with the Quartermaster Gener- on the land-grant vouchers, before presental, by which it agreed (subject to certain ment, a so-called long form of protest, readexceptions not here material) to transport ing as follows: troops of the United States at the net rates effective over land-grant lines, that is, at fifty per cent. of the rates charged private parties.1 Thereafter, between March 1, 1912, and June 18, 1916,2 the claimant transported, upon Government requests, a number of applicants for enlistment in the Army, discharged, retired and furloughed soldiers, and civilian employees in the War Depart-ices performed." ment. *265 "As U. S. Government accounting officers claim they have no authority to allow or pay for the transportation of discharged soldiers more than the fares for troops of the U. S. such fares are shown herein but under protest and S. P. Co. for itself and connecting carriers does not waive any of its rights to full published tariff fares and any payment at any less amount will be accepted as part payment only for the serv This form of protest was used on 516 *It had been previously ruled by the Comp- vouchers between October 1, 1914 and June troller of the Treasury that such persons 18, 1916; 5 but 212 of the vouchers presentwere to be regarded as troops of the United ed and paid within this period bore no form States and that their transportation could of protest whatever. be paid for only at land-grant rates; and The claimant brought the present action disbursing officers, as the claimant knew, in March, 1918, shortly before the decision were authorized to make payments on that in United States v. Union Pacific Railroad, basis only. Because of this ruling the 249 U. S. 354, 39 S. Ct. 294, 63 L. Ed. 643. claimant presented its bills for all such In that case the railroad company, a party transportation on the form of voucher pre- to the land-grant equalization agreement, scribed for transportation at land-grant having transported persons of all the classrates, in which it stated in appropriate es that are here in question except civilian columns the "gross amount" of the regular employees, had presented to the Auditor for fares, the "amount to be deducted on ac- the War Department claims for such transcount of land-grant," and, in the final col-portation at the full tariff rates, and the umn, the "amount claimed" (the gross Auditor and Comptroller having successively amount less the land-grant deduction); and refused to allow these claims at more than certified the accounts to be correct. All the land-grant rates, had then brought suit these vouchers were presented to the Dis- in the Court of Claims to recover the full bursing Quartermaster at San Francisco, and were paid by him in the amounts claimed; and all these payments were accepted by the claimant. Prior to January 1, 1914, the claimant, except in one instance, accepted payment of these bills without protest or other objection. passenger fares. It was held by this court that such persons were not troops of the United States within the meaning of the landgrant acts and the equalization agreements, and that the railroad company was entitled to recover the full amount claimed. In the present case the Court of Claims held that in the light of this decision none of the After January 1, 1914, however, there was classes of persons here in question could be written, typewritten or stamped by the regarded as troops of the United States, claimant upon a part of the land-grant and recognized that the claimant would vouchers, before they were paid, a so-called short form of protest, reading as follows: "Amounts claimed in this bill accepted under protest." This form of protest was understood by the clerk who handled these bills in the office of the Disbursing Quartermaster as being "addressed to the matter of land-grant rates," for the purpose of reserv *267 This is have been en*titled originally to compensa- 1 See United States v. Union Pacific Railroad, 249 the balance of the full rates to which it U. S. 354, note 1, 39 S. Ct. 294, 63 L. Ed. 643. 2 The date on which the so-called "interterritorial military arrangement" became effective as to the claimant and the other railroads. See 14 Comp. Dec. 967. would otherwise have been entitled. The question when the substantive right Also on one previous voucher. |