Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court. evidence to support their contentions in the Mr. Reeves T. Strickland, of Washington, Affirmed. (266 U. S. 144) B. FERNANDEZ & BROS. v. AYLLON. or [1] This is a suit to set aside a sale of land in Porto Rico formerly belonging to the respondents, on the ground that it purported to be made by their testamentary tutor guardian, and that the sale was void because his appointment had not been recorded in the registry of tutorships, and no bond had been given nor oath taken by him as required by law. The defendants, the petitioners here, relied upon a title by the ordinary prescription of ten years' possession under a (Argued and Submitted Oct. 16, 1924. Decided just title and in good faith, the sale to them Nov. 17, 1924.) No. 82. 1. Courts 383 (1)-Supreme Court can review on certiorari judgment of Circuit Court of Appeals overruling judgment of Supreme Court of Porto Rico holding tutor's sale void. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review, on certiorari, judgment of Circuit Court of Appeals, overruling judgment of Supreme Court of Porto Rico holding tutor's sale void, under Judicial Code, § 240 (Comp. St. § 1217). 2. Adverse possession 84-Ten years' possession by purchasers at tutor's sale, without actual notice of omissions of tutor, gave purchasers prescriptive title; "just title." Where order for tutor's sale disclosed no defect, and court had jurisdiction over minors and over tutor, purchasers, who had no actual notice of tutor's failure to record his appointment, or to give bond, or take oath, as required by law, could assume that necessary conditions had been fulfilled, and had a "just title" ripening into good title by prescription by possession for 10 years; "just title" not meaning perfect title, but one under which possession holds without notice of defects. [Ed. Note.-For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Just Title.] On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Suit by Leonor Ayllon y Ojeda, in her own right and as guardian ad litem of her minor brother and sister, Jose and Carmen Ayllon y Ojeda, against B. Fernandez & Bros., Successors. Decree for defendants was reversed and the case was remanded by the Circuit Court of Appeals (Ayllon v. Gonzalez, 288 F. 28), and defendants bring certiorari. having been made more than ten years be- ror. [2] The decision of the Supreme Court of Porto Rico turned upon local statutes and local traditions. The caution to be used before overruling such decisions was emphasized in a recent case where the action of the our assent. Supreme Court was open to greater doubt than here. Diaz v. Gonzalez, 261 U. S. 102, For here 106, 43 S. Ct. 286, 67 L. Ed. 550. apart from the respect due to the local judgment its reasoning commands The question is whether the defendants held their possessions under a "just" or "proper" title as it is called indifferently, within the meaning of the law that allows a ten-year prescription in that case in place of the *Mr. Philip N. Jones, of Boston, Mass., for thirty years for which a just title is not repetitioners. Reversed. *145 Messrs. Frederick S. Tyler, of Washington, D. C., and Frank Antonsanti, of San Juan, Porto Rico, for petitioner Julian Silva Hubadron. quired. As remarked by the Porto Rican For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes (45 S.Ct.) Mr. Chief Justice TAFT delivered the opinion of the Court. S. Ct. 579, 52 L. Ed. 881. If the title is [ Mr. Solicitor General Beck, of Washinggood on its face and the possessor under it ton, D. C., opposed. has no notice of any extrinsic defect, it will found a good title in ten years. The order of sale disclosed no defect, and the Supreme Court held that as it issued from a Court having jurisdiction over the minors and over the tutor, as we have said, the purchasers were not bound to look further. They had no actual notice of the omissions of the tutor, and for the purposes of a possession in good faith that would satisfy the law. They were entitled to assume that all necessary conditions had been fulfilled. We need not consider the further intimation of the 147 Court, also to be respected, that *the failure to register and to give bond did not make the sale void. Longpré v. Diaz, 237 U. S. 512, 35 S. Ct. 731, 59 L. Ed. 1080, has no bearing on the present case. There the conveyance assailed was made with no semblance of authority, as the parties knew, and it was held that persons holding under a conveyance that was void upon the facts known to them could not be possessors in good faith, and that a judge of first instance had no jurisdiction to validate the sale at a later date. Here the judge had the jurisdiction that we have stated and an order that on its face was a valid exercise of that jurisdiction furnished a proper title to one who believed the facts to be as the order implied. Judgment reversed. (266 U. S. 121) MELLON, Secretary of Treasury, et al. v. (Submitted on Motion to Dismiss or Affirm United States 114-Complainant entitled to enforce equitable right in fund paid into treasury under protocol with foreign country. Where complainant has equitable right in fund paid pursuant to protocol with foreign country into treasury as trust fund for beneficiaries, under Act Feb. 27, 1896 (Comp. St. § 6668), he may have equitable relief, though Secretary of State denied his request to recognize his claim. Appeal from the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. Bill by the Orinoco Iron Company against Andrew W. Mellon, Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, and another, in which certain others were made parties. Decree for plaintiff (Orinoco Co. v. Orinoco Iron Co., 54 App. D. C. 218, 296 F. 965), and defendants appeal. Affirmed. *122 *Messrs. Wm. R. Harr and Edward S. Duvall, both of Washington, D. C., for the motion. The subject of this suit is $56,250, now in the Treasury of the United States, which is the undistributed balance of an indemnity of $385,000 received by the Secretary of State from Venezuela. This was in satis faction of the claim of the Orinoco Company, Limited, hereafter known as the Limited Company, against Venezuela because of her illegal annulment of the so-called Fitzgerald concession, which by mesne transfers from the original concessionaire had vested in the Limited Company and of her ouster of that company. The appellee, the Orinoco Iron Company, was the lessee of the Limited Company of mining rights in the concession covering the remainder of the term of the concession, and was in possession of them at the time of the ouster. The Iron Company had engaged actively in mining operations and had expended $175,000 in exploiting and operating the mines when its property and rights were thus confiscated. At the instance of the Limited Company, our Department of State made the claim against Venezuela for the injuries sustained, and finally a protocol was signed between the two countries whereby Venezuela agreed to pay and did pay $385,000 to the United States. By Act of February 27, 1896, chapter 34, 29 Stat. 28, 32 (Comp. St. § 6668), it is provided as follows: *123 *"Hereafter all moneys received by the Secretary of State from foreign governments and other sources, in trust for citizens of the United States or others, shall be deposited and covered into the Treasury. "The Secretary of State shall determine the amounts due claimants, respectively, from each of such trust funds, and certify the same to the Secretary of the Treasury, who shall, upon the presentation of the certificates of the Secretary of State, pay the amounts so found to be due. "Each of the trust funds covered into the Treasury as aforesaid is hereby appropriated for the payment to the ascertained beneficiaries thereof of the certificates herein provided for." After the payment was made into the Treasury of the United States, a controversy arose between the receiver of the Limited Company, who had meantime been appointed by a Minnesota state court, and the Orinoco Iron Company, the present appellee, as to who was entitled to the fund and the latter sought to have the payment ordered made to it. The Secretary of State, in a letter to the counsel of the Orinoco Iron Company said in answer: "I desire to say that the Department of State, in making its determination as to the distribution of awards or settlements of international claims, is always guided by certain fundamental rules, which may be roughly stated as follows: "The awards are distributed among the original claimants showing themselves entitled thereto, or to the heirs, representatives, devisees, or legal assignees of such claimants. On occasion the department also makes payments to such other persons in such amounts as the parties above indicated, being determined, shall agree and direct. Except as to such claimants claiming to share in the award as claimants, or their heirs, devisees, representatives, or legal assignees claiming to share in the award by *124 *reason of such relationship to such claimants, all parties who allege claims against the fund itself, as also all creditors of such claimants, or of their heirs, devisees, representatives, or legal assignees, are in accordance with the uniform rule and practice of the department remitted to the courts for the enforcement of the rights of which they consider themselves possessed, or to private agreement with the parties in interest-as they may be advised." States to which the Orinoco Company, Lim- a trustee ex maleficio. It is contended, on behalf of the Secretary of the Treasury, that his duty in this regard is entirely ministerial, that he must carry out the behest of the Secretary of State, who is charged by law with determining who the proper claimants are, and therefore that after the decision of the Secretary of State, no court may interfere between the payment by the Secretary of the Treasury to the this question to be already settled by the In Houston, Secretary of the Treasury, v. The Secretary of State accordingly direct-claimant found to be entitled. We consider ed the payment of the money to the Limited Company and to other persons designated by it, and sent proper certificates to the Secretary of the Treasury for such distribution. The Orinoco Iron Company then filed this bill in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to restrain the Secretary of the Treasury and the Treasurer of the United States from paying the fund still remaining in the Treasury to the Limited Company and its receiver Le Crone in accordance with the certificate of the Secretary of State, and asked that a receiver be appointed to receive the fund while the right of the complainant to appropriate the fund to its claim should be litigated. The Limited Company and its receiver were made parties, and the issue between the complainant and the Limited Company, with respect to this fund was heard and decided in favor of the complainant and present appellee. Both the Supreme Court of the District and the Court of Appeals found that at least $175,000 of the $385,000 of the award was based upon the contributions which the Orinoco Iron Company had made in execution of its contract to work the iron mines of the concession, and that the Limited Company in ignoring and denying all rights of the Orinoco Iron Company to share in the fund had been guilty of fraud in appropriating that which was the equitable interest of the Orinoco Iron Company. Accordingly the injunction was made permanent, *126 in the *suit pending the hearing and to ac- "In the present case it is conceded, and prop- (45 S.Ct.) joined. 498-Unjust discrimination in fined, as it necessarily must be, to cases where | 4. Taxation the officials of the government have only a min- taxation of railroad property may be enisterial duty to perform, and one in which the party complainant has a particular interest, the practice is a convenient one, well supported by both principle and precedent." It seems to us that the present case can not be distinguished from the one cited. It is conceded by the government that the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury is ministerial and is to pay the amount ordered distributed by the Secretary of State to the persons named in his certificate. Certainly the action of the Secretary of the Treasury, in obedience to an appropriation by Congress, is neither more nor less of a ministerial duty than the obligation of the Secretary of the Treasury in the case at bar to Unjust discrimination by tax officers in assessing farm lands at 38 per cent. of their actual value, while railway property is intentionally assessed at much greater per cent. of actual value, may be enjoined; but discrimination must be intentional and adopted as a practice. 5. Taxation 498-Assessment of railroad property in lowa enjoined, if discriminatory. If farm lands in Iowa are undervalued by tax officers, and railroad property is assessed at a much greater per cent. of its actual value, and there is an intent to discriminate, assessment against railways may be enjoined, though Executive Council assesses railways directly, and acts only as equalizing tribunal on assessments on farm lands as between counties, under Code Supp. Iowa 1913, §§ 1305, 1334, and Code Iowa 1897, §§ 1336, 1350. 6. Taxation 498-Discrimination in assessment of railway property held not sufficiently clear to justify Supreme Court in setting aside conclusion of District Court that no discrimination existed warranting temporary injunction. Discrimination between farm land and railway property by state tax officials held not sufficiently clear to warrant Supreme Court in setting aside conclusion of District Court of three judges, under Judicial Code, § 266 (Comp. St. § 1243), that there was no discrimination warranting temporary injunction against assessment, especially as federal courts should not interfere with taxation by states, save in clear cases. Appeals from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of A railroad corporation of Illinois by reason of diverse citizenship could sue in federal District Court to enjoin taxation of its prop-Iowa. erty in Iowa in violation of state Constitution and laws. 2. Courts 282(3) Federal District Court has jurisdiction of bill to enjoin assessment of property in violation of due process and equal protection clauses of federal Constitu tion. Federal District Court has jurisdiction of bill to enjoin assessment of property by state authorities in such manner as to violate due process and equal protection clauses of Const. U. S. Amend. 14. 3. Courts 263-Federal District Court given jurisdiction by allegations of violation of federal Constitution has authority to determine questions of state law, irrespective of disposition of federal question. Federal District Court having jurisdiction of bill to enjoin assessment of property by state authorities in violation of federal Constitution has authority to determine all questions involved, including questions of state law, irrespective of disposition of federal question, and, where relief would be same under state law as under federal Constitution, court need not decide whether federal Constitution is violated. Bills in equity by the Chicago Great Western Railway Company and by the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company, respectively, against Nathan E. Kendall, Governor of Iowa, and others. Decrees for defendants, and plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed. #95 *Messrs. Donald Evans, of Des Moines, Iowa, and Thos. P. Littlepage, of Washington, D. C., for appellant Chicago Great Western Ry. Co. Messrs. J. G. Gamble, of Des Moines, Iowa, and Thos. P. Littlepage, of Washington, D. C., for appellant Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. Mr. Ben J. Gibson, of Des Moines, Iowa, for appellees. Mr. Chief Justice TAFT delivered the opinion of the Court. These two bills in equity, one by the Chicago Great Western Railway Company, a corporation of Illinois, and the other by the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company, a corporation of Illinois and Iowa, were brought against the Governor, the Sec For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes retary of State, the Auditor, and the Treas- | more than two years in the face of a full urer of Iowa, and another, constituting the preliminary hearing and adverse ruling by Executive Council of the state, to enjoin the three judges, and noting the evident purpose assessments for taxation of the railway prop-of Congress in the enactment of section 266 erties of the complainants in Iowa as fixed to prevent undue delay in enforcing state by the Council. The injunction was sought legislation and action through federal judion the ground that although under the laws cial intervention, this court has denied this and Constitution of Iowa, all property, real request for a continuance and has heard the and personal, including railways must be as- case. sessed at its actual value, there was an intentional discrimination by the Executive Council against complainants, in that farm lands in the state were assessed at slightly *96 In the cases before us, we are relieved from considering and deciding the alleged infringement of the federal Constitution because in view of the basis for jurisdiction of the District Court, the cases can be disposed of as a question of state law. [1] Jurisdiction of the bill in the Great Western Case exists because of the diverse citizenship of the parties. The District Court therefore has jurisdiction to enforce the rights of the complainant under the state Constitution and laws and prevent their violation. We over 38 *per cent. of their actual value, while the railway of the Great Western Railway Company in the state was intentionally as sessed at 111.5 per cent. of its actual value, and that of the Rock Island at 75 per cent. There were averments that the amounts involved in the cases were more than $3,000 in each. It was charged that such action was a denial to the railroad companies of the [2-4] Jurisdiction of the bill in the Rock equal protection of the laws, in violation of Island Case depends on the averment that the the Fourteenth Amendment. The complain- attempted assessment of complainant's railants asserted their right to relief in equity road property in Iowa complained of was at by injunction, because if the Executive Coun- a rate and upon a basis greater than the cil certified their assessments and distributed assessment of other property of the same them to all the counties through which the class subjected to taxation in Iowa, and that railways ran, it would entail on the companies a multiplicity of suits to vindicate the suit arises under the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution forbidding their constitutional rights. Complainants any state to deprive any person of his propmoved for temporary injunctions under section 266 of the Judicial Code (Comp. St. §erty without due process of law or to deny 1243). The court, consisting of a circuit him the equal protection of the laws. judge and two district judges, on the evi- think this averment in view of the allegadence adduced found that it did not disclose tions of the bill invoked a substantial conintentional discrimination by the state tax-troversy under the federal Constitution and ing tribunals, and denied the motions. Ap- gave the District Court jurisdiction. peal was taken in both cases to this court jurisdiction thus established gave the Disunder section 266, and a continuance of the trict Court the authority to determine all restraining orders originally granted on the questions in*volved, including questions of filing of the bill was asked pending a hearstate law, irrespective of the disposition of ing of the appeal. This was resisted, but was finally allowed to the extent of enjoining up the federal question, and as the relief to on a proper bond the Executive Council from which the complainant might be entitled certifying for collection, to the taxing of would be the same as that which should be ficials of the counties through which the rail- allowed him by the federal court upon a conways ran, assessments more than 92 per cent. struction of the state Constitution and laws in value of the assessments the subject of such as he contends for, the question whethcomplaint. When these causes were called er the acts complained of violated the federal Constitution need not be decided. for hearing in this court, application was made for a continuance, on the plea that since November, 1922, when this appeal was allowed, the issue on the complete pleadings in the District Court had been referred to a *98 Its Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co., 244 U. S. 499, 508, 37 S. Ct. 673, 61 L. Ed. 1280, Ann. Cas. 1917E, SS; Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U. S. 576, 586, 34 S. Ct. 372, 58 L. Ed. master who had found that there was inten- 737; Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., tional discrimination, and an early final hear- 213 U. S. 175, 191, 29 S. Ct. 451, 53 L. Ed. ing on the merits was probable. It was sug-753. gested that this court would save time by *97 awaiting the coming of a second *appeal on the merits. The counsel for the state resisted continuance and insisted that the state was embarrassed by withholding taxes due it and that it should not be delayed longer. Considering the fact that the railroad companies had succeeded in stopping the state from collecting part of the taxes for now It follows, therefore, that in both the cases under consideration, the District Court has jurisdiction to consider and decide whether the complainants in these cases are so injured by a violation of the state Constitution and laws in the taxation of their property as to entitle them to the equitable remedy of injunction against the taxing officials made defendants. The averments of both bills make a case of unjust discrimination against complainants' property in that |