Εικόνες σελίδας
PDF
Ηλεκτρ. έκδοση

(45 S.Ct.)

strong in themselves to warrant cautious man | 15, 1917, c. 30, title 11, 40 Stat. 228, et seq. in belief that party is guilty of offense charged. [Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, [Ed. Note. For other definitions, see Words § 104964f]). and Phrases, First and Second Series, Probable Cause.]

[blocks in formation]

The question as to the authority of a prohibition agent to receive and execute a search warrant is disposed of by the decision of this court delivered April 13, 1925, in case No. 636, Steele v. United States, 267 U. S. 505, 45 S. Ct. 417, 69 L. Ed. 761. In that case it was held that prohibition agents or employees of the United States have the power and authority to serve a search warrant under the provisions of the Espionage Act and the National Prohibition Act. Following that decision, we hold that the warrant here was served by an authorized officer and that no right of plaintiff in error was infringed by reason of the method of service of the war

rant.

The other stated ground of the plaintiff's appeal confines us narrowly to a consideration of the question whether the affidavit on which the search warrant was issued afford

Mr. Justice STONE delivered the opinion ed sufficient ground for the issue of the warof the Court.

This case comes to this court on writ of error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, for the review of an order of the District Judge denying a motion to quash a search warrant which had been granted by him authorizing the search of a grocery store at 514 East Sixteenth street and the adjoining premises number 512 East Sixteenth street, New York City, at which last-mentioned place plaintiffs in error maintained a winery under permit from the government. The warrant directed the seizure of any intoxicating liquor possessed in violation of the National Prohibition Act (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, 8 101384 et seq.). Execution of the warrant resulted in the seizure of 74 bottles of wine from the grocery store at No. 514 and 50 barrels of wine from the winery on the premises No. 512.

The motion was made to quash the search warrant so far as it affected the premises 512 East Sixteenth street and for the return of the fifty barrels of wine seized on the premises. The sole grounds of the motion, which are the principal assignments of error here, were that the search warrant was issued without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution and that the officer serving the warrant had no authority to receive and execute it.

[1] The warrant was executed by a prohibition agent who was an agent and em

#437

ployee of the United States. He was regularly appointed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue; the appointment was approved by the Secretary of the Treasury and he was charged with enforcing the National Prohibition Act (section 2, title 2, National Prohibition Act, Act of October 28, 1919, c. 85, 41 Stat. 305, 308 [section 10138a]; section 6, title 11, Espionage Act, Act of June

rant under the laws and Constitution of the United States. We are not concerned with the question whether on trial had, the government may or may not succeed on its libel filed for the condemnation and forfeiture of the seized wines. The proceedings had and now under review do not go to the merits, but only to the sufficiency of the affidavit, on which the search warrant was issued, to set the machinery of the law in motion by way of the summary process of search and seizure.

Although the affidavit on which the warrant was granted does not disclose the fact, the plaintiffs in error, at all times material to the issues, were the holders of a permit of the Treasury Department issued pursuant to section 3 of the National Prohibition Act (41 Stat. 308 [Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, §

*438

101381⁄2aa]) authoriz*ing them to manufacture and sell wines upon the searched premises for nonbeverage purposes. By the terms of the permit they were permitted to have on hand on the premises not more than 100,000 gallons of wine. They were required to give bond, pursuant to Treasury Regulations, in the sum of $50,000. Their premises were subject to inspection of internal revenue officers during business hours. In view of these provisions of the permit and of the provisions of section 9 of the National Prohibition Act (41 Stat. 311 [section 101381⁄2dd]) authorizing revocation of the permit in the case of its violation and for its temporary suspension pending proceedings for its revocation, the resort to the summary procedure of search and seizure, without disclosing, in the affidavit submitted to the judge issuing the warrant, that a permit had been granted was, to say the least, disingenuous, and would seem to have been a harsh and unnecessary exercise of governmental power by the officials concerned.

"If the facts and circumstances before the officer are such as to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that the offense has been committed, it is sufficient."

[2] But the permit issued did not author-, S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543, decided ize the possession of intoxicating liquors for March 2, 1925, the court said, with respect beverage purposes by plaintiffs. and it could to the probable cause shown by the affidavit afford no protection to one who possessed on which the warrant was issued: such liquors with intent to use them in violation of the National Prohibition Act. Reid v. United States (C. C. A.) 276 F. 253. If possessed with such intent, they were subject to search and seizure under section 25 of the act (41 Stat. 315 [section 101381⁄2m]), and if probable cause were shown, a warrant authorizing such search and seizure might be duly and lawfully issued. Under such circumstances search and seizure are not unauthorized or unconstitutional.

Section 25 of the National Prohibition Act, so far as pertinent to the present inquiry, reads as follows:

"It shall be unlawful to have or possess any liquor or property designed for the manufacture of liquor intended for use in violating this title or which has been so used, and no property rights shall exist in any such liquor or property. A search warrant may issue as provided in *title XI of public law numbered 24 of the . Sixty-Fifth Congress, approved June 15, 1917, and such liquor, the containers thereof, and such property so seized shall be subject to such disposition as the court may make thereof."

$439

Title 11 of the Public Law approved June 15, 1917, known as the "Espionage Act," referred to in section 25 of the National Pro

hibition Act, lays down the procedure which must be followed upon the issue of search warrants. Section 5 (40 Stat. 228 [Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 104964e]) re

quires that the warrant shall be issued only on affidavit "tending to establish the grounds of the application or probable cause for believing that they exist," and section 16 (section 104961⁄4p) requires the restoration of the property seized if it appears "that there is no probable cause for believing the existence of the grounds on which the warrant was is

sued."

[blocks in formation]

$440

*Without a detailed recital of the facts appearing in the affidavit upon which the warrant in the present case was issued, it will suffice to point out that the affidavit was made by an employee of the Prohibition Bureau, who stated in it that at a time specified, he was present with another prohibition agent at the store, No. 514, adjoining the winery conducted by Dumbra & Co., who are the plaintiffs in error, at No. 512. That while in the store he saw Mrs. Dumbra and her son; that negotiations were then had by affiant with the son for the purchase of two gallons of wine; that the son went to the back of the grocery store behind a partition, turned to the right toward the winery, and in a short time returned with the two gallons of wine for which the agent accompanying affiant paid Mrs. Dumbra. As they left No. them and turned into the front door of the 514, the son of Dumbra left the grocery with winery.

The affiant states that on another occasion

he visited the grocery store where he saw the son and negotiated with him for the sale of a gallon of wine. The son again went to the back of the store; turned toward the

winery requesting affiant to wait outside. Shortly thereafter the son came out of the front door of the premises at 512, the winery, delivered the wine to affiant, and received payment for it. Affiant swore that he tasted the wine in each instance; that he was familiar with the taste of intoxicating liquor and that the wine in question contained more than one-half of 1 per cent. of alcohol; that at no time did he present any papers or authority for the buying of wine for sacramental or religious purposes. He states that from his investigation and purchases made by other agents he knew that wine was being sold from the grocery store and that the source of supply was the winery located at No. 512.

[3] The statements of fact contained in the affidavit are based upon affiant's personal knowledge of what he saw; it sets forth evi

#441

dentiary facts which in our opinion establish
probable cause for the charge that intoxicat-
ing liquors were possessed at the premises
searched with intent to use them in violation
of the National Prohibition Act. "Probable
cause" has been defined by this court as
"reasonable ground of suspicion, supported
by circumstances sufficiently strong in them-
selves to warrant a cautious man in the be- .
lief that the party is guilty of the offense

(45 S.Ct.)

with which he is charged." Stacey v. Emery, On Writs of Certiorari to the United States 97 U. S. 642, 645, 24 L. Ed. 1035. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

In determining what is probable cause, | Circuit. we are not called upon to determine whether the offense charged has in fact been committed. We are concerned only with the question whether the affiant had reasonable grounds at the time of his affidavit and the issuance of the warrant for the belief that the law was being violated on the premises to be searched, and if the apparent facts set out in the affidavit are such that a reasonably discreet and prudent man would be led to believe that there was a commission of the offense charged, there is probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant.

In the matter of the bankruptcy of the Estate of Charles F. Boyd Company, Inc., E. H. Pringle, trustee; and in the matter of the bankruptcy of Oscar L. Gubelman and another, trading as copartners under the firm name and style of Knauth, Nachod & Kuhne, bankrupts, Middleton S. Borland, trustee. To review decrees of Circuit Court of Appeals (1 F.[2d] 860 and 864), denying priorThe apparent readiness of members of the ity to claims of James C. Davis, Federal family of a person in control of the suspect- Agent, accruing in operation of the Atlantic ed premises to sell intoxicating liquors to Coast Line Railroad Company and the Seacasual purchasers without any inquiry as board Air Line Railway Company, James C. to their right to purchase, and the actual pro- Davis brings two certiorari proceedings, and duction of the liquor sold, in one instance to review the decree of the Circuit Court of from the premises suspected and in the other Appeals (6 F.[2d] 1020), granting priority to from the vicinity of those premises, under claim of the United States, Middleton S. such circumstances as to lead to the infer- Borland, trustee, brings certiorari. Decrees ence that the suspected premises were the for E. H. Pringle, denying priority to James source of supply, gave rise to a reasonable C. Davis, affirmed, and decrees granting pribelief that the liquors possessed on the sus-ority to the United States on claim against pected premises were possessed for the pur- Knauth, Nachod & Kuhne reversed. See, pose and with the intent of selling them un- also, 267 U. S. 588, 45 S. Ct. 352, 69 L. Ed. lawfully to casual purchasers. Absence of a well-grounded belief that such was the fact | Ed. could be ascribed only to a lack of intelligence or a singular lack of practical experience on the part of the officer.

There was therefore probable cause for the issuing of the warrant, and the search and seizure made pursuant to it were authorized

$442

by the statutes of the United States *and were not a violation of the Fourth Amend

ment.

The motion to quash the warrant was properly denied, and the order of the District Court appealed from is affirmed.

(268 U. S. 315)

DAVIS, Federal Agent, v. PRINGLE. (two cases).

BORLAND v. UNITED STATES. (Argued and Submitted May 4, 1925. Decided May 25, 1925.)

Nos. 786, 787, 1085.

Bankruptcy 349-Debts due United States other than taxes not entitled to priority.

-; 268 U. S. 683, 45 S. Ct. 512, 69 L.

*316

*Messrs. Jerome Michael and A. A. McLaughlin, both of Washington, D. C., for petitioner Davis.

Mr. Godfrey Goldmark, of New York City, for petitioner Borland.

Messrs. N. B. Barnwell, of Charleston, S. C., and Godfrey Goldmark, of New York City, for respondent Pringle.

Messrs. James M. Beck, Sol. Gen., of Washington, D. C., Ira Lloyd Letts, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Harvey B. Cox, of St. Louis, Mo., for the United States.

Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.

The first and second of these cases are claims for freight, storage and demurrage proved in bankruptcy proceedings by the federal agent, for which the agent asserts priority on the ground that such claims arising during federal control of the railroads in 1918 are debts due to the United States and are preferred by Rev. Stats. § 3466 (Comp. St. § 6372), and by the Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 64, amended by Acts of February 5, 1903, c. 487, § 14, 32 Stat. 800, and June 15, 1906, c. 3333, 34 Stat.

Claims due the United States other than taxes are not entitled to priority under Bankruptcy Act, July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 64, as amended Act Feb. 5, 1903, § 14, and Act June 15, 1906 (Comp. St. § 9648), and Rev. St. $267 (Comp. St. § 9648). The third is a claim 3466 (Comp. St. § 6372), in view of sections 17a (1) and 57j, despite section 64c (5), preferring debts due a "person" entitled to priority under law of United States and section 1(19), defining person as including corporations.

by the United States for amounts paid by the Postmaster General to the bankrupts for bills of exchange and checks drawn by the bankrupts and unpaid, together with protest

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

fees, etc., as to which priority is asserted on the same grounds. The priority was denied in the first two cases by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 1 F. (2d) 860; Id. 864, but it was allowed in the Second Circuit without any reported opinion, following an earlier case in that Circuit, In re Tidewater Coal Exchange (C. C. A.)

280 F. 648.

*317

*318

It is incredible that after the

tion 64, taken according to the *normal usages of speech. conspicuous mention of the United States in the first place at the beginning of the section and the grant of a limited priority, Congress should have intended to smuggle in a general preference by muffled words at the end. The States are mentioned in (5) before the United States, showing that their laws were *All the three cases depend upon the ques- primarily in mind. The United States seems tion whether the Government has a right to added to avoid some possibly overlooked the priority it claims. If that is denied the case. The ordinary dignities of speech additional inquiries that would be necessary would have led to the mention of the United before the federal agent could prevail in the States at the beginning of the clause, if railroad cases need not be gone into. There- within its purview. Elsewhere in cases of fore we take up that first. It may be as- possible doubt when the Act means the Unitsumed that the priority must be found if at ed States it says the United States. We are all in the Bankruptcy Act and in its sup- of opinion that to extend the definition of posed incorporation of Rev. Stats. § 3466. "person" here to the United States would That Act, as was said in Guaranty Title & be "inconsistent with the context" and thereTrust Co. v. Title Guaranty & Surety Co., 224 fore is within the exception at the beginning U. S. 152, 160, 32 S. Ct. 457, 460, 56 L. Ed. 706, of section 1. We are confirmed in our opin"takes into consideration * 2 the whole ion by the fact that in earlier bankruptcy range of indebtedness of the bankrupt, na-acts a priority was given to the United States tional, state and individual, and assigns the order of payment." It was passed with the United States in the mind of Congress as is shown by the exception of debts due as taxes levied by the United States from the discharge in section 17, pt. 1 (Comp. St. § 9601), the limitation on debts owing to the United States as a penalty in section 57j (section 9641), and the provisions as to priority in section 64 with which we are principally concerned. By a of that section

[blocks in formation]

This taken by itself would seem to exclude other debts. But the section goes on in b to give priority in the order named to "(5) debts owing to any person who by the laws of the States or the United States is entitled to priority," and the Government argues that by section 1 (19) being section 9585, "persons" shall include corporations and that the United States is a corporation and therefore within these words. Being within them, it is said, it is entitled to priority by a law of the United States, the well known Rev. Stat. § 3466. It is said that no other person except the United States itself can be discovered who is given the right by its laws.

We attach little value to this logical concatenation as against the direct effect of sec

in express terms, and that, for instance in the Act of March 2, 1867, c. 176, § 28; 14 Stat. 517, 530, "Fifth," persons entitled to priority by the laws of the United States are mentioned when the United States could not have been meant having been fully secured by the same section, "Second." If it be legitimate to look at them (Schall v. Camors, 251 U. S. 239, 250, 40 S. Ct. 135, 64 L. Ed. 247), the bills that were before Congress when the present law was passed contained the clause relied upon but showed by their context that they could not refer to the United States. There was a change of purpose from that of the earlier acts. Guaranty Title & Trust Co. v. Title Guaranty & Surety Co., 224 U. S. 152, 158, et seq., 32 S. Ct. 457, 56 L. Ed. 706. Public opinion as to the peculiar rights and preferences due to the sovereign has changed. We agree with the view of this point taken by the Chief Justice and Justices Van Devanter and Clarke in United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation v. Wood, 258

*319

U. S. 549, *574, 42 S. Ct. 386, 66 L. Ed. 762, at
a time when it was not necessary for the
majority to speak upon it. The priority
claimed by the United States is not given to
it by the law.

Decrees in 786 and 787 affirmed.
Decree in 1085 reversed.

Mr. Justice SUTHERLAND was absent and took no part in this decision.

(268 U. S. 295)

(45 S.Ct.)

See, also, 259 U. S. 344, 42 S. Ct. 570, 63 L. CORONADO COAL CO. et al. v. UNITED | Ed. 975, 27 A. L. R. 762; 42 S. Ct. 587; 258 MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA et al. F. 829, 169 C. C. A. 549.

(Argued January 7, 1925. Decided May 25,

1925.) No. 671.

1. Conspiracy 19-Evidence held insufficient to show international union in connection with strike conducted by subordinate organizations.

In action for damages for destruction of property pursuant to an alleged conspiracy, evidence held insufficient to show that an international labor union, whose constitution provided for general strikes and also for local strikes on responsibility of subordinate district organizations, had initiated, participated in, or ratified interference with plaintiff's business in connection with strike declared or conducted by district organization. 2. Conspiracy

21-Evidence held sufficient to go to jury on question whether subordinate labor organization intended interference with interstate commerce in conducting local strike.

In action for damages for destruction of property pursuant to alleged conspiracy, evidence held sufficient to go to jury on question whether local labor organization, in conducting a local strike and attempting to break up a mine operators' plan to operate nonunion mines, intended to interfere with interstate commerce or nonunion competition in such commerce with union operators.

3. Monopolies

[ocr errors]

13-Illegal prevention of manufacture or production of article for purpose of preventing it from entering or moving in interstate commerce is violation of Anti-Trust Act.

Mere reduction in supply of article to be shipped in interstate commerce, by illegal or tortious prevention of its manufacture or production, is ordinarily an indirect and remote obstruction to that commerce; but, when intent of those unlawfully preventing the manufacture or production is shown to be to restrain or control the supply entered and moved in interstate commerce or the price of it in interstate markets, their action is a direct violation of Anti-Trust Act.

*296

*Messrs. Henry S. Drinker, Jr., of Philadelphia, Pa., and James B. McDonough, of Ft. Smith, Ark., for plaintiffs in error.

Mr. Wm. A. Glasgow, Jr., of Philadelphia, Pa., for defendants in error.

Mr. Chief Justice TAFT delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a suit for damages for the effect of an alleged conspiracy of the defendants unlawfully to restrain and prevent plaintiffs' interstate trade in coal in violation of the first and second sections of the federal AntiTrust Act (Comp. St. §§ 8820, 8821). The charge is that the defendants in 1914, for the purpose of consummating the conspiracy, destroyed valuable mining properties of the plaintiffs. Treble damages and an attorney's fee are asked under the seventh section of the act. The suit was brought in the District Court for the Western District of Arkansas. The plaintiffs are the Bache-Denman Coal Company and eight other corporations, in each of which the first named owns a controlling amount of stock. One of them is the Coronado Company, which gives the case its name. The corporations were correlated in organization and in the physical location of their mines. They had been operated for some years as a unit in the Prairie Creek Valley in Sebastian county, Ark. Immediately after the destruction of the property, the District Court in a proper proceeding appointed receivers for the mines, and they or their successors are also parties to this

*297

suit. The original com*plaint was filed in September, 1914. It was demurred to, and the demurrer sustained. On error in the Court of Appeals the ruling was reversed. Dowd v. United Mine Workers of America, 235 F. 1, 148 C. C. A. 495. The case then came on for trial on the third amended complaint and the answers of the defendants. The trial resulted in a verdict of $200,000 for the plaintiffs, which was trebled by the court, and a counsel fee of $25,000 and interest to

In Error to the United States Circuit Court the date of the judgment were added. The of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

Action by the Coronado Coal Company, Clyde H. Finley, receiver, and others, against the United Mine Workers of America, the United Mine Workers, District No. 21, and others. To review a judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals (300 F. 972) affirming a judgment of the District Court for defendants, plaintiffs bring error. Judgment in favor of the International Union of United Mine Workers of America affirmed, and judgment in favor of District No. 21 and other defendants reversed and remanded for new trial.

Court of Appeals reversed the judgment as to interest, but in other respects affirmed it. United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado, 258 F. 829, 169 C. C. A. 549. On error to this court under section 241 of the Judicial Code (Comp. St. § 1218), the judgment of both courts was reversed, and the cause remanded to the District Court for further proceedings. The opinion is reported in 259 U. S. 344, 42 S. Ct. 570, 66 L. Ed. 975, 27 A. L. R. 762. The new trial in October, 1923, resulted in a directed verdict and judgment for the defendants, which was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. The case is here on error for a second time.

« ΠροηγούμενηΣυνέχεια »