Suit by Fred N. Crouch, guardian of Kathleen Konstovich, against the United States. Writ of error to the District Court to review an order dismissing the petition was transferred from the Circuit Court of Appeals, under Act Sept. 14, 1922. Remanded to Circuit Court of Appeals, with directions.

Messrs. James G. Martin and E. S. Merrill, both of Norfolk, Va., for plaintiff in error. Mr. Assistant Attorney General Donovan, for the United States.

Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.

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Under the Act of Congress approved October 6, 1917, c. 105, 40 Stat. 398, 409 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 514k et seq.), the United States in February, 1918, issued to Stephen Konstovich a policy of insurance, *with Kathleen, his wife, as beneficiary. He went down with the Cyclops March 31, 1918, and the full amount of the policy, payable in monthly installments, was awarded to plaintiff Crouch as her guardian. Another award of $25 per month was made to him, as such guardian, on account of the husband's death. Payments were regularly made until July 12, 1921, when the Bureau of War Risk Insurance gave notice that the beneficiary had terminated her claims for both insurance and compensation by misconduct. Thereupon the guardian commenced this proceeding in the District Court. The petition prays for judgment against the United States and that they be directed to pay all installments which have or may accrue. The trial judge concluded that by misconduct the widow had terminated her right to the insurance as of September 17, 1920; further, that the United States had not consented to be sued upon the award of compensation; and it dismissed the petition, April 7, 1922. The cause went to the Circuit Court of Appeals. That court, being of opinion that it was without jurisdiction, transferred the proceeding here. 291 F. 1016. Act Sept. 14, 1922, c. 305, 42 Stat. 837 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, § 1215a).

"That upon its own motion or upon application the bureau may at any time review an award, and, in accordance with the facts found upon such review, may end, diminish, or increase the compensation previously awarded, tinued, may award compensation." Comp. St. or, if compensation has been refused or disconAnn. Supp. 1919, § 514rrrr.

[1] No authority to sue the United States for compensation has been expressly granted, and that none exist under circumstances like those here presented is determined by Silberschein v. United States, 266 U. S. 221, 45 S. Ct. 69, 69 L. Ed. decided today. Article IV, Act Oct. 6, 1917, provides generally for the insurance of officers and enlisted men. Section *405:

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"That in the event of disagreement as to a claim under the contract of insurance between the bureau and any beneficiary or beneficiaries brought against the United States in the disthereunder, an action on the claim may be trict court of the United States in and for the district in which such beneficiaries or any one of them resides."

See Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 514vvv.

Section 13, as added to Act Sept. 2, 1914, by section 2 of the Act of 1917, as amended by the Act of May 20, 1918, c. 77, 40 Stat. 555, 556 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 514kk), includes the language just quoted from section 405.

[2] In United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U. S. 547, 41 S. Ct. 569, 65 L. Ed. 1084, we considered the question of jurisdiction under a statute similar to the one now before us and, in the course of discussion, pointed out that the Act of May 20, 1918, conferred upon district courts original jurisdiction over controversies arising out of claims against the United States under contracts of insurance. We adhere to the statement and hold that the applicable statutes in force when the present proceedings began did not authorize a direct writ of error from this court. The Circuit Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review the challenged judgment.

Section 19 of the Act approved June 7, 1924, has no application to the present claim. The cause must be returned to the Circuit Court of Appeals with directions to proceed.

(266 U. S. 243)

ROBERTSON.

ROBERTSON v. MILLER, Alien Property Custodian, et al.

(Argued May 1, 2, 1924. Decided Nov. 17, 1924.)

Nos. 35, 145.

1. War 12-Provision of Trading with the Enemy Act should be liberally construed.

Trading with the Enemy Act, § 9 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp 1919, § 31151⁄2e), providing for suit to establish "debt" owing from alien enemy, to which Alien Property Custodian or Treasurer of the United States shall be made party defendant, is highly remedial and should be liberally construed, and purpose thereof should not be defeated by narrow interpretation.

2. War 12-"Debt," within Trading with the Enemy Act, providing for suit to establish debt, held not restricted to demands enforceable by action of debt.

Trading with the Enemy Act, § 9 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, 8 31151⁄2e), providing for suit to establish debt owing from alien enemy, to which Alien Property Custodian or Treasurer of the United States shall be made party defendant, held not restricted to demands for which actions of debt may be maintained.

natural and ordinary sense.

Words of statutes are to be read in natural and ordinary sense, giving them a meaning to their full extent and capacity, unless some strong reason to the contrary appears.

4. War 12-Seller's right to damages for breach of contract held "debt," within Trading with Enemy Act.

Seller's right to damages for breach of contract to purchase zinc ore held "debt," within Trading with the Enemy Act, § 9 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 31151⁄2e), providing for suit against Alien Property Custodian or Treasurer of the United States to establish "debt."

[Ed. Note.-For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Debt.] 5. Contracts 10(4)-Contract for sale of

ore held not void for lack of mutuality and

want of consideration.

Contract binding seller for definite period of time to dispose of ore in manner provided for by the contract, requiring seller to deliver and buyer to accept and pay for all ore of specified grade to be produced by seller,

giving buyer option on lower grade of ore and contemplating increase in output by completion of new plant and use of new equipment and methods, held not void for lack of mutuality and want of consideration.

6. Contracts 147(3) Contract construed according to whole instrument, and not single sentence.

Intention of parties is to be gathered from the whole instrument. read in the light of the

7. Sales 52 (5)-Opinion of seller's manager as to seller's obligations expressed after execution not considered on question of validity.

Opinion of seller's manager as to seller's legal obligations under the contract, as reflected by statements in correspondence after execution thereof, is not entitled to weight in determining validity of contract.

8. Sales181 (11)-Evidence held to prove weekly shipments of ore in compliance with contract.

Evidence held to show seller's compliance with contract providing for weekly shipments of ore.

9. Corporations

378-Contract by one subsidiary corporation held not to affect contract of other subsidiary corporation not party.

Where two subsidiary corporations of a third corporation had separate general managers and operating staffs, and neither had control over the other, or authority to sell other's product, a contract by one for sale of ore, was not affected by other's contract, to which neither first corporation nor its buyer were parties.

10. Sales 384 (7)-Profits made by corporation on purchase of subsidiary corporation's ore should not be charged against subsidiary corporation in determining its damages for third party's breach of contract to to purchase ore.

Profits made by one corporation, on sale to it by its subsidiary corporation of ore which subsidiary corporation had contracted to sell to third party, on third party's breach of the contract, should not be charged against subsidiary corporation in determining damages sustained by subsidiary corporation because of such breach of contract, in view of showing that first corporation could have purchased ore in the market on equally favorable terms.

11. War 12-Seller, suing under Trading with Enemy Act to establish debt created by buyer's breach of contract, held entitled to interest from time of demand.

Enemy Act, § 9 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. In seller's suit, under Trading with the

Property Custodian and United States Treasurer, to establish as a debt damages sustained from breach of contract of purchase, interest was allowable from date of seller's demand on buyers for difference between contract price and amount received on resale; the rule of sovereign immunity from liability for interest under Judicial Code, § 177 (Comp. St. § 1168), being inapplicable.

Ann. Supp. 1919, § 3115%e), against Alien

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[2, 3] *There is nothing in the language of the act or the reasons for its enactment to indicate a purpose to restrict the right to institute suits in equity as authorized in section 9 to causes of action cognizable in debt under technical procedural rules. The words of a statute are to be read in their natural and ordinary sense, giving them a meaning to their full extent and capacity, unless some strong reason to the contrary appears. Birks, App., Allison, Resp., 13 C. B. (N. S.) 12, 23; Minor v. Mechanics' Bank, 1 Pet. 46, 64, 7 L. Ed. 47; De Ganay v. Lederer, 250 U. S. 376, 381, 39 S. Ct. 524, 63 L. Ed. 1042. [4] We think it immaterial whether plaintiff's cause of action is one for which an action of debt might be maintained. It would be unreasonable and contrary to the intention of Congress to exclude claims like that here in question, and we hold them to be included.

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[5] 2. Was there a lack of mutuality and want of consideration? Appellants contend that the parties failed to make a contract, and asserted the seller promised only such ore as *it might ship from the mine and was not bound to ship all the ore produced or to mine or ship any ore. They also argue that certain statements made by the seller's manager, in correspondence between him and the agent of the buyers, after the instrument was signed, show that the seller itself so interpreted the writing. The provision to which they refer is this: "The product covered by this contract is the total production of zinc crude ore shipped by the seller from its properties in Shasta county, California." The statements of the manager 376; Hyman v. Newell, 7 Colo. App. 78, 80, 42 P.

1016; Hunt v. Norris, 4 Mart. O. S. (La.) 517, 532; Wilson v. Wilson, 8 Gill (Md.) 192, 194, 50 Am. Dec. 685; Baumgardner v. Dowagiac Mfg. Co., 50 Minn. 381, 52 N. W. 964; Cheney v. Straube, 35 Neb. 521, 53 N. W. 479; Barber v. Robeson, 15 N. J. Law, 17, 19; Lenox v. Howland, 3 Caines (N. Y.) 323; Ward v. Howard, 12 Ohio St. 158, 163; Peter v. Butler, 1 Leigh (Va.) 285; State v. Superior Court, 93 Wash. 98, 101, 159 P. 1193. Receivership laws: Kalkhoff v. Nelson, 60 Minn. 284, 290, 62 N. W. 332; Rosenbaum v. Credit System Co., 61 N. J. Law, 543, 548, 40 A. 591; Steel & Iron Co. v. Detroit R. Co., 154 Mich. 182, 185, 117 N. W. 645. Stockholders' liability laws: Mill Dam Foundery v. Hovey, 21 Pick. 417, 455; American Ice Cream Co. v. Economy Laundry Co., 148 Ga. 624, 97 S. E. 678; Dryden v. Kellogg, 2 Mo. App. 87, 93; Green v. Easton, 74 Hun (N. Y.) 329, 330, 26 N. Y. S. 553. Probate laws: Frazer v. Tunis, 1 Binney (Pa.) 254, 263; Insurance Co. v. Meeker, 37 N. J. Law, 282, 300, et seq.; Hebert v. Handy, 29 R. I. 543, 72 A. 1102. Set-off: Moore v. Weir, 3 Sneed (Tenn.) 47, Russell v. Miller, 54 Pa. 154, 164. Fraudulent conveyances: Woodbury v. Sparrell Print, 187 Mass. 426, 428, 73 N. E. 547; Anderson v. Anderson, 64 Ala. 403, 405. Statutes of limitation: Davies v. Texas Central R. R. Co., 62 Tex. Civ. App. 599, 605, 133 S. W. 295. See also Irving Bank-Columbia Trust Co. v. New York R. Co. (D. C.) 292 F. 429, 433; Lothrop v. Reed, 13 Allen (Mass.) 294; State v. Sayre, 91 Ohio St. 85, 94, 109 N. E. 636; Little v. Dyer, 138 111. 272, 277, 27 N. E. 905, 32 Am. St. Rep. 140; Allen v. Distilling Co. of America, 87 N. J. Eq. 531, 539, 100 A. 620; Melvin v. State, 121 Cal. 16, 24, 53 P. 416.

50;

were made in October and November, 1914, in answer to inquiries of the buyers' agent, and were to the effect that the tonnage of ore to be shipped depended altogether on the market price of spelter, and that with spelter quotations below $5 per hundred weight shipments would be very light, and that if prices rose above that figure, the seller would probably ship about 200 tons

per month.

[6] The intention of the parties is to be gathered, not from the single sentence above quoted, but from the whole instrument read in the light of the circumstances existing at the time of negotiations leading up to its execution. The buyers had a large business in the smelting of zinc ore in the United States. The seller had been engaged for a long time in the mining of copper ore from the Mammoth mine. Early in 1914, there was discovered in that mine a large body of zinc ore, containing about 40,000 tons. The sellers desired to dispose of, and the buyers wanted, zinc ore. While there had been no regular weekly or monthly production or shipments prior to the signing of the writing, the seller had made a number of shipments to the buyers. The work of developing the ore body in preparation for production was in progress. The mine was already equipped and capable of producing ore. The writing shows that the completion of a picking plant was contemplated. The year covered was to commence on the date of the first shipment after its completion. When *the instrument was executed, September 29, 1914, both parties knew the quality of the ore and that the quantity was substantial.

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The parties intended to make a contractone to sell, and the other to buy, zinc ore. By plain statements and manifest implications, the seller was bound for a definite time not otherwise to dispose of its ore; the buyers were given an option on the lower grade ore; the seller was bound at all times, when not prevented or delayed by some cause beyond its control, to mine and to ship to the buyers the total production of zinc ore of the specified grade; and the buyers were bound to take and pay for all such ore when not prevented or delayed by causes beyond their control as specified in the contract. The quantities of ore to be mined and shipped were not limited to those to be produced by the equipment and methods employed at the time of the execution of the contract. The proposed picking plant was to be added, and increased output was expected and bargained for.

[7] The opinion of the manager of the seller as to its legal obligations under the contract, as reflected by his statements in correspondence after the execution of the instrument, is not entitled to any weight in determining whether a valid contract was made. The writing did not give the seller