party, as the sole beneficiary under the act. | dered in one of the courts and pleaded in The railway company asked for an arbitra- the other, the effect of that judgment is to tion. The widow answered, asserting that be determined by the application of the printhe Compensation Act did not apply because ciples of res judicata by the court in which the company and the deceased were both en- the action is still pending in the orderly exgaged in interstate commerce at the time of ercise of its jurisdiction, as it would deterthe accident. Arbitrators were appointed, mine any other question of fact or law aristhough the widow did not join in their ap- ing in the progress of the case. The rule, pointment. The arbitrators found that de- therefore, has become generally established ceased was engaged in intrastate commerce that where the action first brought is in perand that the case was governed by the Com- sonam and seeks only a personal judgment, pensation Act, and awarded compensation to another action for the same cause in another the widow. Thereupon, the widow filed an jurisdiction is not precluded." Kline v. application in review with the commissioner. Burke Constr. Co., 43 S. Ct. 79, 81, 260 U. S. That officer reviewed the facts, specifically 226, 230, 67 L. Ed. 226, 24 A. L. R. 1077. [4] It is urged in behalf of respondent that the federal act is supreme and supersedes all state laws in respect of employers' liability in interstate commerce. That is quite true; but it does not advance the solution of the point in dispute, since it is equally true that, in respect of such liability arising in intrastate commerce, the state law is supreme. Judicial power to determine the question in a case brought under a state statute is in no way inferior or subordinate to the same power in a case brought under the federal act. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the plea of res judicata was bad for two rea- [5] The Iowa proceeding was brought and sons: (1) That "the substantive right given determined upon the theory that Hope was the employee or his representative by Con- engaged in intrastate commerce; the Minnegress under express constitutional grant, with sota action was brought and determined upthe courts to which he may go for its enforce- on the opposite theory that he was engaged ment pointed out to him, is a superior sub-in interstate commerce. The point at issue stantive right; and that when he or his rep resentative has chosen the forum to which to submit his cause, he cannot, against his objection and upon the initiative of his employer, be required to submit it in a summary proceeding commenced later under a Compensation Act"; and (2) that there was a lack of identity of parties, since under the Iowa statute the right of recovery is in the beneficiary while under the federal act the right is in the personal representative. [1-3] 1. It is evident from the opinion, that the court formulated the first reason with some hesitation. It is elementary, of course, that, in any judicial proceeding, the arrange ment of the parties on the record, so long as was the same. That the Iowa court had jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding and decide the question under the state statute, cannot be doubted. Under the federal act, the Minnesota court had equal authority; but the Iowa judgment was first rendered. And, upon familiar principles, irrespective of which action or proceeding was first brought, it is the first final judgment rendered in one *617 *of the courts which becomes conclusive in the other as res judicata. Boatmen's Bank v. Fritzlen, 135 F. 650, 667, 68 C. C. A. 288; Merritt v. American Steel Barge Co., 79 F. 228, 234, 24 C. C. A. 530; Williams v. Southern Pac. Co., 202 P. 356, 54 Cal. App. 571, 575. And see Insurance Co. v. Harris, 97 they are adverse, or the fact that the party U. S. 331, 336, 24 L. Ed. 959, where the rule against whom the estoppel is pleaded was an objecting party, is of no consequence. A judgment is as binding upon an unwilling defendant as it is upon a willing plaintiff. Nor is it material that the action or proceeding, in which the judgment, set up as an estoppel, is rendered, was brought after the commencement of the action or proceeding in which it is pleaded. Where both are in personam, the second action or proceeding "does not tend to impair or defeat the jurisdiction of *616 the court in which a prior action for *the same cause is pending. Each court is free to proceed in its own way and in its own time, without reference to the proceedings in the other court. Whenever a judgment is ren as stated was recognized. [6] The Iowa court, under the Compensation Law, in the due exercise of its jurisdiction, having adjudicated the character of the commerce in which the deceased was engaged, that matter, whether rightly decided or not, must be taken as conclusively established, so long as the judgment remains un (46 S. Ct.) arose under the federal Liability Law. Dennison v. Payne (C. C. A.) 293 F. 333, 341, 342; Williams v. Southern Pac. Co., supra, pages 574, 575 (202 P. 356). 2. In the Iowa proceeding, the widow of the deceased was a party in her own right and clearly was bound by the judgment. The action in Minnesota, however, was brought by the administrator, and the state Supreme Court on the authority of Dennison v. Payne, supra, pages 342, 343, held that there was a want of identity of parties. The decision in the Dennison Case rests entirely on Troxell v. Del., Lack, & West. R. R., 33 S. Ct. 274, 227 U. S. 434, 57 L. Ed. 586. The effect of the last-named case we pass for later consideration. [7] Hope's death as the result of the negligence of the railroad company gave rise to a single cause of action, to be enforced directly by the widow, under the state law, or in the name of the personal representative, for the sole benefit of the widow, under the federal law, depending upon the character of the commerce in which the deceased and the company were engaged at the time *618 "But if the United States, representing the owners of restricted lands, is entitled to bring a suit of this character, it must follow that the decree will bind not only the United States, but *619 the Indians whom it represents in the litigation. This consequence is involved in the rep*resentation. Kerrison v. Stewart, 93 U. S. 155, 160, [23 L. Ed. 843]; Shaw v. Railroad Co., 100 U. S. 605, 611 [25 L. Ed. 757]; Beals v. Ill., etc., R. R. Co. [10 S. Ct. 314] 133 U. S. 290, 295 ly with any principle, be tolerated that, after [33 L. Ed. 608]. And it could not, consistentthe United States on behalf of its wards had invoked the jurisdiction of its courts to cancel conveyances in violation of the restrictions prescribed by Congress, these wards should themselves be permitted to relitigate the question." And, conversely, in United States v. Des Moines Valley R. Co., 84 F. 40, 28 C. C. A. 267, where a suit in the name of the government was brought to enforce the right of a private party, it was held that a prior adverse adjudication by a state court in a suit against him personally, determining the same issues, was available as an estoppel against the government. The ground of the decision was thus stated (pages 44, 45 [28 C. C. A. 272]): "Inasmuch, then, as the government sues for the sole benefit of Fairchild, and for the professed purpose of reinvesting him with a title which he has lost, we are of opinion that, whether the present action be regarded as brought under the Act of March 3, 1887 (24 Stat. 556, c. 376 [Comp. St. § 4895 et seq.]), or as brought in pursuance of its general right to sue, the government should be held estopped by the previous adjudications against the real party in interest in the state court. The subject-matter and the issue to be tried being the same in this proceeding as in the former actions, the losing party on the former trials ought not to be permitted to renew the controversy in the name of a merely nominal plaintiff, and thereby avoid the effect of the former adjudications. Southern Minnesota Railway Extension Co. v. St. Paul & S. C. R. Co., 12 S. App. 320, 325, 55 F. 690, 5 C. C. A. 249. This doctrine was applied by this court in the case of Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. U. S., 32 U. S. App. 311, 319, 67 F. 975, 15 C. C. A. 123, which was a suit brought by the United States under of the accident. In either case, the control- in the other. #620 the Act of March 3, 1887, wherein we *held that the United States was bound by an estoppel which might have been invoked against the real party in interest if the suit had been brought in his name, because it appeared that the United States had no substantial interest in the controversy, and was merely a nominal plaintiff." The first proposition finds support in Heckman v. United States, 32 S. Ct. 424, 224 U. S. 413, 445-446 (56 L. Ed. 820) where this court held that the United States had capac- [8] Since the statutory authority of the ity to maintain a suit to set aside convey-administrator is to sue, not in his own right ances made by Indian allottees of allotted or for his own benefit, or that of the estate, lands and that the allottees need not be joined. The defendant in that case insisted that, unless the allottees who had executed the conveyances were brought in as parties, he was in danger of being subjected to a second suit by the allottees. Answering that contention, this court said: but in the right and for the sole benefit of the widow, the same principles are applicable, in accordance with the general rule that "whenever an action may properly be maintained or defended by a trustee in his representative capacity without joining the beneficiary, the latter is necessarily bound by the judgment." 1 Freeman on Judgments (5th Ed.) § 500. Identity of parties is not a mere matter of form, but of substance. Parties nominally the same may be, in legal effect, different (Bigelow on Estoppel [6th Ed.] 145); and parties nominally different may be, in legal effect, the same (Calhoun's Lessee v. Dunning, 4 Dall. [Pa.] 120, 121, 1 L. Ed. 767; Follansbee v. Walker, 74 Pa. 306, 309; In re Estate of Parks, 147 N. W. 850, 166 Iowa, 403. In the Follansbee Case, a judgment against Joshua Follansbee alone was held available as an estoppel in another action brought by Walker & Follansbee for the use of Joshua. Justice Sharswood, speaking for the court, said: "The parties in that suit and in the action tried below were substantially the same. In the former Joshua Follansbee was the legal, in the latter he is the equitable, plaintiff. The subject-matter of the two suits appeared by the record to be identical. The presumption would be upon the issues, that the merits had been passed upon in the former proceeding. Such being the case, if no technical objection appeared to have been raised upon the record to the right of Joshua Follansbee to maintain the action as legal plaintiff, the judgment in that action would be a bar to a subsequent action by *621 him as equitable plaintiff. If it appeared that only the equitable, not the legal right, was in Joshua Follansbee, it would be presumed that the defendant had waived that purely technical objection. It would be very unreasonable and contrary to the settled rules upon the subject, to permit the plaintiff having once been defeated on the merits, to try the same question over again in a different form." In the Parks Case, a judgment against the sole beneficiary of an estate in her individual capacity was held conclusive in a subsequent action by the same plaintiff against the same defendant as administratrix, on the ground that, while theoretically the former suit was not against the same defendant as administratrix, nevertheless she was the sole beneficiary of the estate, and represented only herself in each case. In Corcoran v. Chesapeake, etc., Canal Co., 94 U. S. 741, 745, 24 L. Ed. 190, this court, holding that a judgment against a trustee for bondholders was conclusive in a suit involving the same subject-matter, brought by him in his individual character, said: "It would be a new and very dangerous doctrine in the equity practice to hold that the cestui que trust is not bound by the decree against his trustee in the very matter of the trust for which he was appointed." now under review, it was held in Williams v. Southern Pac. Co., supra, pages 571, 576 (202 P. 356), that there was a substantial identity of parties, and that a judgment for the widow under the California Compensation Act was available as an estoppel in a prior action brought by her as administratrix under the federal act. It remains only to consider the bearing of the Troxell Case, supra, upon this point. * 622 Mrs. Troxell, the widow of *a deceased employee, sued the railroad company under a state statute, for the benefit of herself and minor children, to recover for the death of her husband resulting from a negligent fail ure to provide safe instrumentalities. There was a judgment against her. She then brought suit under the federal Employers' Liability Act, as administratrix, averring the negligence of a fellow servant, a ground of recovery which was not available to her in the action under the state statute. It was held, following the general rule, that, the cause of action in the two cases being different and the issue determined in the first not being involved in the second, there was no estoppel. This was decisive of the case, but the court proceeded to say that, furthermore, there was not an identity of parties in the two actions. Two former decisions of this court are cited, Brown v. Fletcher's Estate, 28 S. Ct. 702, 210 U. S. 82, 52 L. Ed. 966 and Ingersoll v. Coram, 29 S. Ct. 92, 211 U. S. 335, 53 L. Ed. 208. Both cases, following the well-established rule, simply decide that there is no privity between administrators appointed in different states, since the authority of an executor or administrator appointed in one state does not extend to the property or administration in another state. Whether, in the light of the foregoing views, we now should hold that where, as in the Troxell Case, the rights of additional beneficiaries, not actual parties to the first judgment, are involved, the requirement of identity of parties is unsatisfied, is a question we do not feel called upon here to re-examine, since we are clear that such requirement is fully met in the situation now under consideration, where the sole beneficiary was an actual party to the proceeding under the state law, and present by her statutory representative in the action under the federal law, and no other rights were involved. No. 684. *623 [9] In the Elder Case, as in the case just considered, the railway company began a proceeding before the industrial commissioner. Elder answered, averring that he was engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the injury. The parties stipulated that the commissioner or his deputy should take the place of the arbitration committee; and the deputy commissioner, pursuant to the Upon facts almost identical with those stipulation, heard the matter and filed his See, also, Kerrison, Assignee, v. Stewart et al., 93 U. S. 155, 160, 23 L. Ed. 843; Spokane & Inland R. R. v. Whitley, 35 S. Ct. 655, 237 U. S. 487, 496, 59 L. Ed. 1060, L. R. A. 1915F, 736; Estate of Bell, 95 P. 372, 153 Cal. 331, 344; Chandler v. Lumber Co., 173 S. W. 449, 131 Tenn. 47, 51. (46 S. Ct.) [Ed. Note.-For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Case (in Practice).] decision. Thereupon Elder applied for a re- [March 3, 1891, § 6, re-enacted in Judicial Code, view by the commissioner, under the stat- $128, and Act Feb. 13, 1925 (Comp. St. Supp. ute, but no action had been taken upon that 1925, § 1120), giving Circuit Court of Appeals application by the commissioner at the time jurisdiction to review the final decision of the District Court "in all cases," in view of Act the judgment was rendered in the Minne-March 26, 1790; Act Jan. 29, 1795, and Const. sota court. Under the Iowa statute, there- art. 3, § 2. fore, the decision had not ripened into an enforceable award, and we are not called up on to determine what, in that event, would have been its effect as an estoppel. The pro- 3. Action 16. ceeding being still in fieri when the Minnesota case was tried and determined, the doc-grant is a judicial one depends, not on the thing Whether a proceeding which results in a trine of res judicata is not applicable. There granted, but on the nature of the proceeding. must be a final judgment. Bigelow on Estoppel (6th Ed.) p. 64; Webb v. Buckelew et al., 82 N. Y. 555, 559, 560, It follows that the judgment in the Hope Case must be reversed, and that in the Elder Case affirmed. No. 683: Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. No. 684: Judgment affirmed. (270 U. S. 568) TUTUN v. UNITED STATES. NEUBERGER v. SAME. 4. Courts 281-Where remedy enforceable in courts is pursued, a "case," within Constitution, arises, whether subject of litigation be property or status (Const. art. 3, § 2). Whenever the law provides a remedy enforceable in the courts according to regular course of legal procedure, and that remedy is pursued, there arises a "case," within Const. art. 3, § 2, whether the subject of litigation be property or status. 5. Aliens 68 (5)-Section of Naturalization Act conferring exclusive jurisdiction to naturalize aliens does not deny appellate jurisdiction of Circuit Court of Appeals (Naturalization Act, § 3 [Comp. St. § 4351]). Naturalization Act, § 3 (Comp. St. § 4351), (Argued March 3, 1926. Decided April 12, conferring on federal and state courts there 1. Courts 1926.) Nos. 762, 824. 405 (12) - Order of District Court, granting or denying petition for naturalization, is a "final decision," within statute relating to appellate jurisdiction of Circuit Court of Appeals (Act June 29, 1906, § 3 [Comp. St. § 4351]; Act March 3, 1891, § 6. re-enacted in Judicial Code, § 128, and Act Feb. 13, 1925 [Comp. St. Supp. 1925, § 1120]; Naturalization Act, §§ 9, 11 [Comp. St. §§ 4368, 4370]; Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4). Order of District Court, under Act June 29, 1906, § 3 (Comp. St. § 4351), granting or denying petition for naturalization. is a "final decision," within Act March 3, 1891, § 6; reenacted in Judicial Code, § 128, and Act Feb. 13, 1925 (Comp. St. Supp. 1925, § 1120), conferring on Circuit Court of Appeals jurisdiction to review the "final decision of the District Courts * * * in all cases." Naturalization Act, §§ 9, 11 (Comp. St. §§ 4368, 4370); Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4. [Ed. Note. For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Final Decision.] 2. Courts 405 (12)—Petition for naturaliza tion is a "case," within statutes relating to appellate jurisdiction of Circuit Court of Appeals (Act June 29, 1906, § 3 [Comp. St. § 4351]; Act March 3, 1891, § 6, re-enacted in Judicial Code, § 128, and Act Feb. 13, 1925 [Comp. St. Supp. 1925, § 1120]; Act March 26, 1790; Act Jan. 29, 1795; Const. art. 3, § 2). specified "exclusive jurisdiction to naturalize aliens as citizens," does not deny appellate jurisdiction of Circuit Court of Appeals. 6. Aliens 68 (5) — Naturalization Act held not to manifest congressional intent to deny usual method of appellate review in naturalization proceedings (Naturalization Act, § 15 [Comp. St. § 4374]). Naturalization Act, § 15 (Comp. St. § 4374), providing for bill in equity to cancel certificates of citizenship, does not manifest a congressional intent to deny the usual method of appellate review in naturalization proceedings. On Certificate from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. On Certificate from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Petitions for naturalization by Jacob Joseph Tutun and by Moritz Neuberger were denied by the respective District Courts, and petitioners appealed to the Circuit Court of Ap peals. On questions certified by the Circuit Courts of Appeals (9 F.[2d] 1020). Questions answered. Messrs. Louis Marshall, of New York City, William H. Lewis, of Boston, Mass., and Matthew M. Levy and Eugene Untermyer, both of New York City, for Tutun and Neuberger. *572 *The Attorney General and Mr. Assistant Attorney General Donovan, for the United States. *Mr. Justice *574 BRANDEIS delivered the A petition for naturalization, heard by District Courts under Act June 29, 1906, § 3 (Comp. St. § 4351), is a "case," within Act opinion of the Court. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes These cases present, by certificate, the ques- | as citizens of the United States" is conferred tion whether the Circuit Courts of Appeals by Act of June 29, 1906, c. 3592, § 3, 34 Stat. have jurisdiction to review a decree or order 596 (Comp. St. § 4351) upon the District of a federal District Court denying the peti- Courts, among others. Jurisdiction to retion of an alien to be admitted to citizenship view the "final decision in the *District Courts in the United States. * * * *576 The existence of the jurisdiction was asin all cases," except as otherwise sumed by this court, without discussion, in provided, was conferred by Act of March 3, Ozawa v. United States, 43 S. Ct. 65, 260 U. S. 1891, c. 517, § 6, 26 Stat. 826, 828, upon Cir178, 67 L. Ed. 199. It has been exercised by re-enacted in Judicial Code, § 128, and by Act cuit Courts of Appeals. This provision was the Circuit Courts of Appeals in most of the *575 of February 13, 1925, c. 229, 43 Stat. 936, in circuits.1 In the Fifth circuit *jurisdiction section 128 (a) (Comp. St. Supp. 1925, § 1120). was denied in United States v. Dolla, 177 F. The order granting or denying a petition for 101, 100 C. C. A. 521, 21 Ann. Cas. 665. Al-naturalization is clearly a final decision withthough the correctness of the decision was in the meaning of that section. Ex parte Tifquestioned by Judge Amidon in United States | fany, 40 S. Ct. 239, 252 U. S. 32, 64 L. Ed. 443. v. Leonore (D. C.) 207 F. 865, 869, and by Judge Hough in United States v. Mulvey (C. C. A.) 232 F. 513, 521, 522, it has been followed in the Third circuit and in the Eighth.2 In the state courts judgments granting or denying petitions for naturalization have generally been held to be reviewable on appeal, like other cases.3 This is true, although a certificate granted may be canceled under section 15 of the Naturalization Act (Comp. St. § 4374). United States v. Ness, 38 S. Ct. 118, 245 U. S. 319, 62 L. Ed. 321. And a denial of the petition may not preclude another application for naturalization. In re Pollock (D. C.) 257 F. 350. Compare Salinger v. Loisel, 44 S. Ct. 519, 265 U. S. [1, 2] The "jurisdiction to naturalize aliens | 224, 230, 68 L. Ed. 989. The substantial ques In the following cases appellate courts entertained jurisdiction over petitions for naturalization without expressly considering the existence of a right of appeal: First Circuit: Harmon v. Unit ed States, 223 F. 425, 139 C. C. A. 19. Second Circuit: United States v. George, 164 F. 45, 90 C. C. A. 463; 324; United States v. Cohen, 179 F. 834, 103 C. C. A. 28, 29 L. R. A. (N. S) 829; United States v. Balsara, 180 F. 694, 103 C. C. A. 660; United States v. Fokschauer, 184 F. 999, 106 C. C. A. 668; Yunghauss v. United States, 218 F. 168, 134 C. C. A. 67; United States v. Meyer, 241 F. 305, 154 C. C. A. 185, Ann. Cas. 1918C, 704; United States v. Vogel (C. C. A.) 262 F. 262. Third Circuit: United States v. Martorana, 171 F. 397, 96 C. C. A. 353. Fourth Circuit: Bessho v. United States, 178 F. 245, 101 C. C. A. 605; Dow v. United States, 226 F. 145, 140 C. C. A. 649. Seventh Circuit: United States v. Doyle, 179 F. 687, 103 C. C. A. 233. Eighth Circuit: United States v. Brelin, 166 F. 104, 92 C. C. A. 88; United States v. Ojala, 182 F. 51, 104 C. C. A 491; United States V. Peterson, 182 F. 289, 104 C. C. A. 571. Ninth Circuit: United States v. Rodiek, 162 F. 469, 89 C. C. A. 389. District of Columbia: United States v. Daly, 32 App. D. C. 525. See In re Centi (D. C.) 217 F. 833. See 2 United States v. Neugebauer, 221 F. 938, 137 C. C. A. 508; Appeal of Cook, 242 F. 932, 155 C. C. A. 520; Marx v. United States (C. C. A.) 276 F. 295. United States v. Nopoulos (D. C.) 225 F. 656, 659; United States v. Koopmans (D. C.) 290 F. 545, 547; United States v. Wexler (D. C.) 8 F. (2d) 880, 881. In re Fordiani, 120 A. 338, 98 Conn. 435; United States v. Hrasky, 88 N. E. 1031, 240 Ill. 560, 130 Am. St. Rep. 288, 16 Ann. Cas. 279; United States v. Gerstein, 119 N. E. 922, 284 II. 174, 1 A. L. R. 318: Ex parte Smith, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 395; Dean, Petitioner, 22 A. 385, 83 Me. 489, 13 L. R. A. 229; State v. District Court, 120 N. W. 898, 107 Minn. 444, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1041; Ex parte Johnson, 31 So. 208, 79 Miss. 637, 89 Am. St. Rep. 584; v. District Court, 202 P. 387, 61 Mont. 427; State v. Judges of Inferior Court, 32 A. 743, 58 N. J. Law, 97, 30 L. R. A. 761; United States v. Breen, 120 N. Y. S. 304, 135 App. Div. 824; In re Karasick, 204 State tion is whether a petition for naturalization is a case within the meaning of the Circuit Court of Appeals Act. [3, 4] The function of admitting to citizenship has been conferred exclusively upon courts continuously since the foundation of our government. See Act of March 26, 1790, c. 3, 1 Stat. 103. The federal District Courts, among others, have performed that function since the Act of January 29, 1795, c. 20, 1 Stat. 414. The constitutionality of this exercise of jurisdiction has never been questioned. If the proceeding were not a case or controversy within the meaning of article 3, § 2, this delegation of power upon the courts would have been invalid. Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409, 1 L. Ed. 436; United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40, 14 L. Ed. 42; Muskrat v. United States, 31 S. Ct. 250, 219 U. S. 346, 55 L. Ed. 246. Whether a proceeding which results in a grant is a judicial one does not depend upon the nature of the thing granted, but upon the nature of the proceeding which Congress has provided for securing the grant. The United States may create rights in individuals against itself and provide only an administrative remedy. United States v. Babcock, 39 S. Ct. 464, 250 U. S. 328, 331, 63 L. Ed. 1011. It may provide a legal remedy, but make re *577 sort to the courts available *only after all administrative remedies have been exhausted. Compare New Orleans v. Paine, 13 S. Ct. 303, 147 U. S. 261, 37 L. Ed. 162; United States v. Sing Tuck, 24 S. Ct. 621, 194 U. S. 161, 48 L. Ed. 917; American Steel Foundries v. RobN. Y. S. 919, 208 App. Div. 844; In re Vura, 5 Ohio ertson, 43 S. Ct. 541, 262 U. S. 209, 67 L. Ed. App. 334; Ex parte Granstein, 1 Hill (S. C.) 141. 953. It may give to the individual the opThe right of appellate review was denied in Retion of either an administrative or a legal Wilkie, 208 P. 144, 58 Cal. App. 22; State v. Supe- remedy. Compare Clyde v. United States, 13 Wall. 38, 20 L. Ed. 479; Chorpenning v. Unit rior Court, 134 P. 916, 75 Wash. 239, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 425. |