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(46 S. Ct.)

puted as of the date of each quarterly pay-spondents petitioned the Supreme Court of ment on the amount by which that payment the District of Columbia for a writ of manexceeded one-fourth of the proper tax, damus to compel him to compute and allow but only entitled to interest on and from the interest demanded. The Commissioner, the date of payments made after amount al- the petitioner here, filed an answer, to which

ready paid exceeded total amount of proper tax, in view of Revenue Act 1918, §§ 250, 252 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 6336%tt, 6336%uu).

the respondents demurred.

The Supreme

Court of the District sustained the demurrer and granted the writ; and, upon appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the judgment,

On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Ap-modifying it in only one particular, not impeals of the District of Columbia.

Action by the United States, on the relation of G. Thomas Birkenstock and Gerald Ronon, executors of the last will of Margaret Murphy, deceased, for writ of mandamus to be directed against David H. Blair, Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Decree for plaintiffs was modified and affirmed by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia (55 App. D. C. 376, 6 F.[2d] 679), and defendant brings certiorari. Judgment reversed with costs to the respondent.

Mr. William D. Mitchell, Sol. Gen., Mrs. Mabel Walker Willebrandt, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Messrs. T. H. Lewis, Jr., and Sewall Key, both of Washington, D. C., for petitioner.

Messrs. James Craig Peacock and John W. Townsend, both of Washington, D. C., for respondents.

*349

portant to the decision in this case. This court granted certiorari. 269 U. S. 545, 46 S. Ct. 102, 70 L. Ed.

[1] The government having expressly waived the point made below that mandamus will not lie, only two questions are presented for consideration here. One is the date from which, the other is the date to which, interest allowed on the refund should be computed. Since the certiorari was allowed, the second question has been decided by this court in Girard Trust Co. v. United States, 270 U. S. 163, 46 S. Ct. 229, 70 L. Ed. 524, March 1, 1926. In that case we held that the date of allowance of the refund, and therefore the date to which interest should be computed under section 1019 of the Reve

nue Act of 1924, c. 234, 43 Stat. 253, 346

(Comp. St. Supp. 1925. § 6371m), is the date

on which the Commissioner signed the authorization to the disbursing clerk of the Treasury, directing him to pay the refund.

*Mr. Justice STONE delivered the opinion The court below therefore correctly held that of the Court.

interest should be computed to that date, which was August 12, 1924, and that, as this date was subsequent to the enactment of section 1019 of the Revenue Act of 1924, the allowance of interest must be in accordance

*351

with that *section, and not section 1324 of the Act of 1921, which had been repealed. Hence we are not concerned with the ruling of the Commissioner, applying the 1921 act, that interest ran only from six months after filing of the claim for refund, because it was based on his erroneous conclusion as to the date when the refund was "allowed."

In 1920, Margaret Murphy, testatrix of respondents, paid without protest, to the collector of internal revenue at Philadelphia, the sum of $88,956.92 as income tax for the year 1919. On May 18, 1923, a claim was filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for a refund of $35,054.85 as an overpayment of her taxes for 1919. On May 19, 1924, the Commissioner signed a "schedule of overas sessment and allowance of abatement, credit and refund," in the amount claimed, and gave certain instructions to the collector with respect to it. On a statement from the collector that the amount claimed was subject to refund, the Commissioner, on August 12, 1924, signed an authorization to the disbursing clerk of the Treasury to pay to respond-of 1924, which provides: ents the refund demanded, with interest com- "Upon the allowance of a credit or refund puted from November 18, 1923 (six months of any internal revenue tax erroneously or il* interest after the filing of the claim for refund, as legally assessed or collected, provided by section 1324 of the Revenue Act shall be allowed and paid on the amount of such credit or refund at the rate of 6 per centum of 1921 [Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, § 6371%j], per annum from the date such tax refund, or in case of a credit, to the due date was paid to the date of the allowance of the of the amount against which the credit is

*350

which he deemed applicable) *to May 19, 1924, the date on which the Commissioner signed the schedule of overassessment.

Respondents protested the amount of interest allowed, and demanded that it be computed on the excess of each quarterly payment from the date when it was made, in 1920, to August 12, 1924, the date upon which the Commissioner signed the authorization to the disbursing clerk. Upon the refusal of the Commissioner to allow this claim, re

[2] The question remaining for decision is from what date interest on the refund is to be computed. under section 1019 of the Act

taken.

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The respondents contend that, as each of the quarterly installments paid by the taxpayer was in excess of one-fourth of the proper amount of the tax for the year, interest allowed on the refund should have been computed, as the court below held, on the excess of each quarterly payment, from

the date on which it was paid. But the gov- installment is by section 250 (b) to be treaternment argues that such an excess quarterly ed as a payment on account of the whole tax. payment is not a "tax erroneously or illegally It is clear that a taxpayer who, anticipating assessed or collected," within the meaning the required quarterly installments, pays the of section 1019, if, when it is made, any part entire tax in one payment, is not entitled to of the proper tax for the year has not been interest or a discount, on the anticipated inpaid; that such overpayment becomes a "tax stallments, as upon a "tax erroneously or ilerroneously or illegally assessed or collect- legally assessed or collected" under section ed" only when the amount paid, added to the 1019 of the Act of 1924. previous quarterly payments, exceeds the whole tax due for the year. In support of this position, it relies on sections 250 and 252 of the Revenue Act of 1918, c. 18, 40 Stat.

1057 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 6336%tt, 6336uu), in force when the tax was paid. Section 250 (a) provides (page 1082):

"That *

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the tax shall be paid in four install*ments, each consisting of one-fourth of

the total amount of the tax. * *

"The tax may at the option of the taxpayer be paid in a single payment instead of in installments. *

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*We think that under any reasonable interpretation of section 1019, the payment of a lesser amount which is in excess of the rethe same footing. Under sections 250 and 252 quired quarterly installments must stand on of the Act of 1918, there is no provision for a refund to the taxpayer of any excess payment of a quarterly installment, when the whole tax for the year has not been paid. Read together, these sections show that the mere overpayment of an installment is treated as a payment on account of the tax which is assessed for that year, and is not a "tax erroneously or illegally assessed or collect

Subdivision (b) of section 250 provides ed" within the meaning of the refund provi(page 1083):

"As soon as practicable after the return is filed, the Commissioner shall examine it. If it then appears that the correct amount of the tax is greater or less than that shown in the return, the installments shall be recomputed. If the amount already paid exceeds that which should have been paid on the basis of the installments as recomputed, the excess so paid shall be credited against the subsequent installments; and if the amount already paid exceeds the correct amount of the tax, the excess shall be credited or refunded to the taxpayer in accordance with the provisions of section 252."

Section 252 provides (page 1085): "That if, upon examination of any return of income made pursuant to this act * it appears that an amount of income

tax has been paid in excess of that properly due, then, notwithstanding the provisions of section 3228 of the Revised Statutes, the amount of the excess shall be credited against any income, war-profits or excess profits taxes, or installment thereof, then due from the tax

payer under any other return, and any balance of such excess shall be immediately refunded to

the taxpayer.

By section 250 (a) the payment of the whole tax in a single payment is expressly made optional with the taxpayer, and any payment in excess of the correct amount of a quarterly

sions of section 1019 of the Act of 1924, and so is not subject to its provisions regulating the allowance of interest. Payments in excess of the total amount of the tax, then and subsequently made, are subject to refund or credit under the provisions of section 1019, and interest must be allowed on them at the rate of 6 per cent. from the date of payment.

The provision of section 1019, that "in case of a credit" interest is to be allowed "to the due date of the amount against which the credit is taken," relates to a credit properly allowed of a "tax erroneously or illegally assessed or collected," and has no application to excess payments of quarterly installments which the government was entitled to treat as an advance payment of later installments, under the provisions of section 250.

The judgment below was erroneous, in so far as it allowed interest on payments made prior to September 27, 1920, on which date the total amount of the installments paid first exceeded the total amount of tax due, by the sum of $12,815.62.

Interest should have been allowed on that amount from that date, and on the full amount of the fourth installment from December 13, 1920, when it was paid.

Judgment reversed with costs to the respondent.

(271 U. S. 251)

(46 S. Ct.)

[1] By an interstate shipment made under CHICAGO & N. W. RY. CO. v. ALVIN R. the uniform order bill of lading the Chicago DURHAM CO, et al.

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1. Garnishment 55-Where consignee surrendered uniform bill of lading and commenced unloading car of apples, whether carrier was liable on garnishment process for apples in car when service was made depended on state garnishment law, and not on federal law (Uniform Bill of Lading Act Aug. 29, 1916, § 23 [Comp. St. § 86047]).

Where consignee of car of apples, shipped under uniform bill of lading providing that property not removed within 48 hours after notice of its arrival might be kept by carrier as warehouseman, surrendered bill of lading, paid freight, receipted for apples, and commenced unloading car, held, that question whether carrier was liable on garnishment process served thereafter, but within the 48-hour period, for apples in car when service was made, depended on state garnishment law, and not on federal law, Uniform Bill of Lading Act Aug. 29, 1916, § 23 (Comp. St. § 86041) presenting no obstacle to, nor giving any right of, garnishment.

& Northwestern Railway received in 1921 at its yards in Ironwood, Mich., a box car containing apples consigned to the shipper's order "notify F. M. Larson." The car was placed on the "team track," which is one of the public delivery tracks used for unloading freight received in carload shipments and is not connected in any manner with a railway freight warehouse. The next morning at 8:20 o'clock Larson surrendered the bill of lading duly indorsed, paid the freight charges, gave to the railway his receipt for the apples, and commenced unloading the car. On the same day the Alvin R. Durham Company sued out a writ of garnishment against the railway, which was served at 9:45 a. m. At that time about one-quarter of the apples had already been taken from the car by Larson. In spite of the service of the writ of garnishment, the railway did not prevent the further unloading. This was not completed until four days later. Meanwhile the car was locked every night by Larson. During this period of

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un*loading, the car was shifted several times by the railway for its own convenience in the use of the team tracks.

The trial court directed a verdict for the

2. Courts 400—Judgment of state Supreme Court, erroneously based on assumption that railroad was subject to liability on garnish-garnishee, on the ground that the railway did ment process under federal statute, will be reversed by United States Supreme Court (Uniform Bill of Lading Act Aug. 29, 1916, § 23 [Comp. St. § 86047]).

Judgment of state Supreme Court, erroneously based on assumption that railroad was subject to liability on garnishment process under Uniform Bill of Lading Act Aug. 29, 1916, § 23 (Comp. St. § 86041), served on it after consignee had surrendered uniform bill of lading and commenced unloading car, will be reversed by United States Supreme Court.

not have the custody, control, or possession of the shipment. The Supreme Court of Michigan reversed that judgment (Durham Co. v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 224 Mich. 477, 194 N. W. 1014), and held the carrier liable on the ground that, "under the interpretation of Section 5 of the uniform bill of lading, as appears in Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. [Mark] Owen [& Co.], 256 U. S. 427, 41 S. Ct. 554 [65 L. Ed. 1032], the railway did have the custody, control, and possession of the interstate shipment." Id., 229 Mich. 468, 201 N.

*

*

On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court W. 503. See, also, Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. of Michigan.

Garnishment by the Alvin R. Durham Company and others against the Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company, as garnishee of defendant F. M. Larson. Judgment for garnishee was reversed by the Supreme Court of Michigan (229 Mich. 468, 201 N. W. 503), and garnishee brings certiorari. Reversed and

remanded.

See, also, 224 Mich. 477, 194 N. W. 1014. Messrs. R. N. Van Doren, of Chicago, Ill., Frank A. Bell, of Negaunee, Mich., and Samuel H. Cady, of Chicago, Ill., for petitioner.

Mr. Julius J. Patek, of Ironwood, Mich. (Messrs. Joseph L. Hooper, of Battle Creek, Mich., Myron H. Walker, of Grand Rapids, Mich., and Solomon W. Patek, of Ironwood, Mich., of counsel), for respondents.

*254

Durham Co., 265 U. S. 580, 44 S. Ct. 455, 68 L. Ed. 1189. This court granted a writ of certiorari. Id., 268 U. S. 684, 45 S. Ct. 635, 69 L. Ed. 1156. The sole question for decision is whether the railway is liable as garnishee.

The facts in the two cases are similar, but the legal questions presented for decision are wholly different. In the Mark Owen Case it was sought to enforce under the federal law an alleged liability in contract of an interstate carrier to the consignee. Whether the railroad was liable depended upon the construction to be given the contract for an interstate shipment contained in the uniform bill of lading. Compare Southern Railway Co. v. Prescott, 240 U. S. 632, 36 S. Ct. 469, 60 L. Ed. 836. The question was whether, in the absence of negligence, the railroad was liable

*Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the to the consignee for grapes stolen from the opinion of the Court. car while on the team track after the unload

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

*256

#258

3

6

ing had begun, but before the expiration of, ly, of procedure, and as such governed by 48 hours after giving notice of arrival. The varying views of local policy, legislation and practice. Thus, a garnishee may be under *railroad contended that, under section 5 of no liability, because the property could have the bill of lading, there was no liability, be- been reached by direct levy. He may be uncause the surrender of the car to the con- der no liability because of the nature of the signee, followed by breaking the seals and claim sought to be enfored, or because of the commencement of unloading, constituted a character of the plaintiff, of the principal delivery, and that, in any event, its responsi- defendant,5 of the garnishee, or of the propbility for the unloaded part of the contents had become that of warehouseman. This erty sought to be reached." And, although court held that, since the theft occurred with- no objection may exist upon any of these in the 48-hour period, there had not been, un-grounds, the garnishee may be held immune der the contract of the parties as expressed from liability, because the highest court of in section 5 of the bill of lading, such a de- the state had declared that to allow garnishlivery as would terminate the carrier's lia- ment, under the circumstances, would be bility as insurer or reduce the liability to against public policy, as where a carrier havthat of the warehouseman's exercise of rea- ing possession, custody, and control of propsonable care. erty is held not chargeable by garnishment because the goods were in process of transportation.s

[2] Whether under the law of Michigan the railway was liable as garnishee, we have

In the case at bar it is sought to hold the railroad liable as garnishee to a stranger. It is not sought to enforce a liability arising under a federal law. As the order bill of lading had been surrendered, the Uniform Bill of Lading Act presented no obstacle to garnishment. Act of August 29, 1916, c. 415, § 23, 39 Stat. 538, 543 (Comp. St. § 86047). But that act obviously confers no right to garnishment. Nor is there anything in the bill of lading which conceivably could be construed as either conferring or denying the right of garnishment. The plaintiff does not seek to enforce, as a derivative right, a claim of the 38 Mo. 545; Selheimer v. Elder, 98 Pa. 154. consignee against the carrier under the bill of lading. It seeks to reach tangible property confessedly belonging to the principal defendant and to which the carrier confessedly. makes no claim either of title or possession. Section 5 of the bill of lading clearly does not authorize a carrier, who had surrendered to the consignee control of the shipment upon surrender of the bill of lading, payment of charges and signing of the usual receipt, any right to recapture control of the unloaded part of the shipment in the event that garnishee proceedings are commenced within 48 hours after such surrender.

2 Madden v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 89 Kan. 282, 131 P. 552, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 78; Wood v. Edgar, 13 Mo. 451; Gleason v. South Milwaukee Bank, 89 Wis. 534, 62 N. W. 519. Compare Hooper v. Day, 19 Me. 56, 36 Am. Dec. 734; Balkham v. Lowe, 20 Me. 369. Baker, 104 Ala. 160, 16 So. 68, 53 Am. St. Rep. 27; Holcomb v: Winchester, 52 Conn. 447, 52 Am. Rep. Martz 669; Clark v. Brewer, 6 Gray (Mass.) 320; v. Detroit Fire Ins. Co., 28 Mich. 201; Thorp v. Preston, 42 Mich. 511, 4 N. W. 227; Weil v. Tyler,

3 Nesbitt v. Ware, 30 Ala. 68; Cunningham v.

The liabilities consequent upon the character of the custody and control exercised by

*257

carrier or consignee arise from and are dependent upon the state statutes conferring the right of garnishment, and as such are unaffected by the provisions of the bill of lading. Thus the question whether, under the circumstances, the apples remaining in the car were subject to garnishment, is not one of uniform carrier liability, but, primari

1 Section 1 of the uniform bill of lading provides: "The carrier or party in possession of any of the property herein described shall be liable for any loss thereof or damage thereto, except as hereinafter provided. *

Section 5: "Property not removed by the party entitled to receive it within forty-eight hours after notice of its arrival has been duly sent or given may be kept in car, depot, or place of delivery of the carrier, or warehouse subject to a reasonable charge for storage and to carrier's responsibility as warehouseman only.

"

Davis v. Millen, 111 Ga. 451, 36 S. E. 803; Shivers v. Wilson, 5 Har. & J. (Md.) 130, 9 Am. Dec. 497.

Compare Disconto Gesellschaft v. Umbreit, 208 U. S.

570, 28 S. Ct. 337, 52 L. Ed. 625.

Edmondson v. De Kalb County, 51 Ala. 103; Danley v. State Bank, 15 Ark. 16; Lovejoy v. Albee, 33 Me. 414, 54 Am. Dec. 630.

• Buchanan v. Alexander, 4 How. 20, 11 L. Ed. 857; Fischer v. Daudistal (C. C.) 9 F. 145; Pringle v. Guild (C. C.) 118 F. 655; Moscow Hardware Co. v. Colson (C. C.) 158 F. 199; Allen-West CommisIn re Arsion Co. v. Grumbles (C. C.) 161 F. 461; gonaut Shoe Co., 187 F. 784, 109 C. C. A. 632; Glass v. Woodman, 223 F. 621, 139 C. C. A. 167; Forbes v. Thompson, 2 Penn. (Del.) 530, 47 A. 1015; Columbia Brick Co. v. District of Columbia, 1 App. D. C. 351; Millison v. Fisk, 43 III. 112; Bivens v. Harper, 69 Ill. 21; Wallace v. Lawyer, 54 Ind. 501,

23 Am. Rep. 661; Allen v. Wright, 134 Mass. 347; Id., 136 Mass. 193; School District v. Gage, 39 Mich. 484, 33 Am. Rep. 421; White v. Ledyard, 48 Mich. 264, 12 N. W. 216; Hudson v. Saginaw Circuit Judge, 114 Mich. 116, 72 N. W. 162, 47 L. R. A. 345, 68 Am. St. Rep. 465; McDougal v. Hennepin County, 4 Minn. 184 (Gil. 130); Clarksdale Compress Co. v. Caldwell County, 80 Miss. 343, 31 So. 790; Ross v. Allen, 10 N. H. 96; Burnham v. City of Fond du Lac, 15 Wis. 193, 82 Am. Dec. 668. Compare Dunkley v. City of Marquette, 157 Mich. 339, 122 N. W. 126, 17 Ann. Cas. 523.

1 Compare Smith v. Gilbert, 71 Conn. 149, 41 A. 284, 71 Am. St. Rep. 163; Stowe v. Phinney, 78 Me. 244, 3 A. 914, 57 Am. Rep. 796; Massachusetts National Bank v. Bullock, 120 Mass. 88; Rozelle v. Rhodes, 116 Pa. 129, 9 A. 160, 2 Am. St. Rep. 591. 8 Stevenot v. Eastern Ry. Co., 61 Minn. 104, 63 N. W. 256, 28 L. R. A. 600; Bates v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. Co., 60 Wis. 296, 19 N. W. 72, 50 Am. Rep. 369. Compare Adams v. Scott, 104 Mass. 161; Rosenbush v. Bernheimer, 211 Mass. 146. 97 N. E. 984, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 1317; Clifford v. Brockton Transp. Co., 214 Mass. 466, 101 N. E. 1092, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 909; Landa v. Holck & Co., 129 Mo. 663, 31 S. W. 900, 50 Am. St. Rep. 459.

(46 S. Ct.)

no occasion to inquire. There is nothing in
the uniform bill of lading which would pre-
vent the state court from holding that, al-
though the freight car was in the carrier's
possession, it was not liable as garnishee of
the contents, because the apples were in the
consignee's possession although not unloaded.
A person breaking open and taking the con-
tents of a chest in his custody has been held
guilty of larceny. Union Trust Co. v. Wilson,
198 U. S. 530, 537, 25 S. Ct. 766, 49 L. Ed.
1154. The state court, however, reversed the
judgment of the trial court because it as-
sumed that the liability of the garnishee was
fixed by the federal law, and that, under the
rule declared in the Mark Owen Case, the
railroad was liable. As this was error, the
judgment must be reversed and the cause
remanded for further proceedings not incon-
sistent with this opinion. Ebert v. Poston,
266 U. S. 548, 45 S. Ct. 188, 69 L. Ed. 435.
Compare Industrial Commission v. Norden-
holt Corp., 259 U. S. 263, 42 S. Ct. 473, 66 L.
Ed. 933, 25 A. L. R. 1013; Red Cross Line v.
Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U. S. 109, 44 S. Ct.
274, 68 L. Ed. 582.
Reversed.

(271 U. S. 236)

MELLON, Director General, Agent U. S. Railroad Administration, v. MICHIGAN TRUST CO.

(Argued April 27, 1926. Decided May 24, 1926.)

No. 272.

Appeal from and on Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

In the matter of the receivership of the Rathbone Manufacturing Company. Judgment denying priority of a claim filed by James C. Davis, Director General of Railroads and Agent of the United States Railroad Administration (Grand Rapids and Indiana Railroad), opposed by the Michigan Trust Company, receiver, was affirmed (2 Fed. [2d] 194), and Andrew W. Mellon, Director General and Agent of United States Railroad Administration (Grand Rapids and Indiana Railroad), appeals and brings certiorari. Appeal dismissed, and decree affirmed.

Messrs. Sidney F. Andrews, of Washington, D. C., A. A. McLaughlin, of Des Moines, Iowa, and George M. Clapperton and Charles M. Owen, both of Grand Rapids, Mich., for appellant.

Messrs. S. E. Knappen, of Grand Rapids, Mich. (Knappen, Uhl & Bryant, of Grand Rapids, Mich., of counsel), for appellee.

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*Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Creditors of the Rathbone Manufacturing Company filed a bill against it in the United States District Court, Western District of Michigan, wherein they alleged its inability to pay lawful debts in due course, etc., and asked for a receiver. Answering, the corporation (which was, in fact, insolvent) admitted the allegations and gave consent to the relief prayed. Thereupon the Michigan Trust Company was appointed receiver, took possession of the property and entered upon administration of the trust.

1. United States 76-Though United States, in taking over and operating railroads, acted in sovereign capacity, rights of Director General as to priority of claims arising out of operation rest on statutory provisions, and noted claims for transportation charges and conon sovereign prerogative.

Though, in taking over and operating the railroads, the United States acted in sovereign capacity, rights of Director General relative to priority of claims arising out of such operation rest on statutory provisions, and not on any sovereign prerogative of the United States. 2. United States 76-Claim of Director General of railroads for transportation charges against insolvent corporation was not entitled to priority, though receiver was appointed under circumstances amounting to voluntary assignment of property (Act March 21, 1918, § 10 [Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 311534j]; Rev. St. § 3'56 [Comp. St. § 6372]).

The Director General of Railroads present

version of a shipment of pig iron. He asked priority of payment, which was denied by both the trial court and the Circuit Court of Appeals. 2 F. (2d) 194.

As pointed out in United States v. Butterworth-Judson Corporation, 269 U. S. 504, 46 S. Ct. 179, 70 L. Ed. 380 [January 11, 1926], the things done by the Rathbone Manufacturing Company amounted, in substance, to a voluntary assignment of all its property within the meaning of R. S. § 3466 (Comp. St. §

*238

6372)1. Consequently, if the Director *Gener

1 Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent, or whenever the estate of any deceased debtor, in the hands of the executors or Under Act March 21, 1918, § 10 (Comp. St. administrators, is insufficient to pay all the debts 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 31154j), due from the deceased, the debts due to the Unitclaim of Director General of Railroads for ed States shall be first satisfied; and the priority transportation charges against insolvent corpo- hereby established shall extend as well to cases ration was not entitled to priority, though rein which a debtor, not having sufficient property ceiver was appointed under circumstances to pay all his debts, makes a voluntary assignment amounting in substance to a voluntary assign- absconding, concealed, or absent debtor are attachthereof, or in which the estate and effects of an ment of property, within meaning of Rev. St. Sed by process of law, as to cases in which an act 3466 (Comp. St. § 6372).

of bankruptcy is committed.

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