(46 S.Ct.) warrant, the trial would be without due process of law. We have assumed that for the purposes of the decision, and also that the question could be raised on habeas corpus. The action of the District Court in dismissing the petition and remanding the pris oner is Affirmed. (269 U. S. 82) DEL POZO et al. v. WILSON CYPRESS CO. (Submitted on Motion to Dismiss Oct. 5, 1925. Decided Nov. 16, 1925.) No. 184. 1. Appeal and error 2-Appeal held not affected by statute enacted during its pendency. Appeal taken under Jud. Code, §§ 128, 241 (Comp. St. §§ 1120, 1218), in effect when Circuit Court of Appeals entered decree, held not affected by Act Feb. 13, 1925. 2. Public lands 221-Delay in Surveyor General's approval of survey held not established. Surveyor General's approval of survey, necessary to complete Spanish land grant, held not shown to have been made only shortly before issuance of patent many years after survey, rather than shortly following survey, as affecting time when title passed from govern ment. 3. Adverse possession 7 (3)-Public lands 223(2)-Defenses of adverse possession and laches held available against claimants under confirmed Spanish land grant. Where Spanish land grant was confirmed by Act May 23, 1828, and surveyed under Act June 28, 1848, and survey approved by Survey or General, title passed to claimants, so that defenses of laches and adverse possession were available against them, though patent was not issued for many years, and Act March 3, 1807, prohibited claimants exercising any proprietorship until their claim was recognized and confirmed. 4. Appeal and error 1094 (2)-Findings of trial court, concurred in by Circuit Court of Appeals, accepted by Supreme Court. Findings of fact of trial court, concurred in by Circuit Court of Appeals, supported by evidence, will be accepted by Supreme Court. Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. *84 *Messrs. W. W. Dewhurst, of St. Augustine, Fla., and John C. Jones and Joseph H. Jones, both of Orlando, Fla., for appellants. Messrs. Henry C. Clark, of Washington, D. C., and J. C. Cooper, of Jacksonville, for appellee. Mr. Justice VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a suit to quiet title to a confirmed land grant in Florida. The plaintiffs claim as heirs of the original grantee. The defendant claims under tax deeds, and also asserts that the plaintiffs are barred from maintaining the suit, first, by adverse possession on the part of the defendant and those through whom it claims for the period fixed in the local statute of limitation; and, secondly, by inexcusable laches. The grant was made in 1815 by Spain to Miguel Marcos, purported to cover 5,500 acres, and described the land in terms which made a survey essential to give precision to its boundaries. There was no survey during the Spanish dominion. After the cession to the United States, the heirs of the grantee presented a claim for confirmation to commissioners charged by Congress with the duty of examining and reporting on such claims. The commissioners found the grant valid and recommended it, with others, to Congress for confirmation. The report stated that the grant was without any condition. 4 Am. State Papers (Duff Green Ed.) pp. 276, 283, 471. By the Act of May 23, 1828, c. 70, 4 Stat. 284, Congress acted on the commissioners' report by confirming this and other claims, with the general qualification that, if any claim exceeded the number of acres in a league square, the confirmation was limited to such acreage, to be located by the claimants, within the original grant. That and other acts contemplated that the claims should be surveyed by way of precisely defin *85 ing their boundaries and of con*necting them with the public land surveys. Because of delay in making the surveys, possibly resulting from inaction on the part of claimants, Congress, by the Act of June 28, 1848, c. 83, 9 Stat. 242, directed that the work proceed as soon as practicable. Early in 1851 this claim was surveyed under the direction of the Surveyor General, and on June 20 of that year the survey received the approval of that officer. As surveyed the claim contained 5,486.46 acres. 1 In 1889 the grantee's heirs applied for a patent for the claim as surVeyed. The application was denied by the Commissioner of the General Land Office on Suit by Enrique del Pozo y Marcos and others against the Wilson Cypress Company. From a decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals (299 F. 261), affirming a decree for defendant, plaintiffs appealed. On motion to dismiss, or in the alternative to affirm. Mo- 1 In some parts of the record the acreage is mistion to dismiss denied, and decree affirmed. I takenly given as 5,426.82. the mistaken theory that the claim as surveyed was more than a league square, and For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes therefore more than was confirmed by the act | 491, 18 L. Ed. 88, and Boquillas Cattle Co. of 1828. On an appeal from that ruling the v. Curtis, 213 U. S. 339, 344, 29 S. Ct. 493, Secretary of the Interior recognized that a league square, in the sense of the confirmatory act, comprised 6,002.50 acres, and directed that a patent issue for the claim "in accordance with the survey." 18 Land Dec. 64. In 1895 a patent was issued under that direction. The tax deeds under which the defendant claims were issued-the earliest in 1852 and others before 1872. The one of 1852 may be put out of view. The plaintiffs say in their bill that the others "are fair upon their face," but otherwise invalid. The bill contains a like statement respecting the mesne convey ances whereby the defendant succeeded to the tax title. This suit by the heirs was begun in 1907. The present appeal is the second one to this court. Originally the District Court and the Cir cuit Court of Appeals ruled that the title was in the United States, and the land not taxable, until the issue of the patent, and therefore that the tax deeds, all of which preceded the patent, were absolutely void, and did not give even color of title. In that *86 view the District Court gave and the *Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a decree for the plaintiffs, without considering the conformity of the tax proceedings to the local law, or the questions arising out of the evidence bearing on the defenses of adverse possession and laches. On the first appeal to this court that view was disapproved and the decree reversed. 236 U. S. 635, 35 S. Ct. 446, 59 L. Ed. 758. In keeping with prior decisions this court held, in substance, that (1) The purpose of the confirmatory act of 1828 was not to create a new right, but to recognize, in fulfillment of treaty obligations, a right conferred by Spain while the land was under her dominion. (2) As the grant contained a less acreage than a league square, the confirmation by that act was subject only to a needed survey giving precision to the boundaries of the grant. (3) When the survey was made and received the approval of the Surveyor General, the confirmation was complete, and the land was thenceforth effectively separated from the public domain and subject to the taxing power of the state. (4) The survey did not require the special approval of the Commissioner of the General Land Office, for under the law and practice of that period the approval of the Surveyor General sufficed. (5) The patent was in the nature of a convenient muniment or record of the confirmation already effected by the act of 1828 and the approved survey rather than a conveyance speaking from the date of its issue. 53 L. Ed. 822, were cited in support of the last proposition and were pertinent; but the proposition has further and special support in other cases, where rights based on tax sales, adverse possession, etc., occurring after a like legislative confirmation and before the issue of patent, were upheld, such as *87 Langdeau v. Hanes, 21 Wall. 521, 529, 22 L. Ed. 606; Morrow v. Whitney, 95 U. S. 551, 554, 555, 24 L. Ed. 456; Joplin v. Chachere, 192 U. S. 94, 24 S. Ct. 214, 48 L. Ed. 359. On the first appeal this court did not pass upon the question of the conformity of the tax proceedings to the local law, nor on those arising out of the evidence bearing on the defenses of adverse possession and laches. They had not been considered in the courts below, and were of a kind that should be ex amined and determined in the first instance by the District Court, and then, if need be, of reversal was so framed as to require that by the Circuit Court of Appeals. The decree this course be taken. When the case got back to the District Court, it was heard anew on the record be fore made. That court found that the defenses of adverse possession and laches were well taken in fact and in law, and accordingly entered a decree dismissing the bill on the The Circuit Court of Appeals afmerits. firmed that decree. 299 F. 261. The plaintiffs then brought the case here on the present appeal. Various motions have been submitted on briefs. One by the appellee asks that the appeal be dismissed, as taken where an appeal was not admissible, or, in the alternative, that the decree be affirmed, on the ground that the questions presented are so unsubstantial as not to need further argument. See rule 6, par. 5, 222 U. S. appendix and 266 U. S. appendix. [1] The motion to dismiss must be denied. The appeal was taken under sections 128 and 241 of the Judicial Code (Comp. St. §§ 1120, 1218), as existing when the decree of affirmance by the Circuit Court of Appeals was entered, and is not affected by the subsequent Act of February 13, 1925, c. 229, 43 Stat. 936. Section 128 provided that the decisions of the Circuit Courts of Appeals in certain classes of cases should be final, in the sense of being not reviewable by this court on writ of error *88 or appeal; and section 241 provided that *the decisions of those courts in other cases should be subject to such a review where the matter in controversy, exclusive of costs, exceeded $1,000. This suit was not within any of the classes named in section 128, and the matter in controversy exceeded $1,000, apart from costs. Therefore the suit was one in which an appeal was admissible. The motion to affirm is well taken. A refThe cases of Beard v. Federy, 3 Wall. 478, | erence to the questions presented and to what (46 S.Ct.) is plainly shown in the record will make this the period of limitation should not begin to clear. run "until the passage of the title" from the government. The answer to the last contention is equally good here. Such title as the United States possessed passed to the claimants when the confirmation became effective through the approved survey. The cases just cited are conclusive on this point. [4] Lastly, complaint is made of the findings of fact sustaining the defenses of adverse possession and laches. The courts.below concurred in these findings and explained them in considered opinions. The record shows with certainty that the findings had very substantial support in the evidence. This court accepts concurrent findings with such support. Morewood v. Enequist, 23 How. 491, 495, 16 L. Ed. 516; *Stuart v. Hayden, 169 U. S. 1, 14, 18 S. Ct. 274, 42 L. Ed. 639; National Bank of Athens v. Shackelford, 239 U. S.,81, 82, 36 S. Ct. 17, 60 L. Ed. 158; Yuma County Water Ass'n v. Schlecht, 262 U. S. 138, 146, 43 S. Ct. 498, 67 L. Ed. 909; United States v. State Investment Co., 264 U. S. 206, 211, 44 S. Ct. 289, 68 L. Ed. *90 The appellants seek to reopen the questions determined on the first appeal. A full hearing was had at that time. The questions were not novel, but covered by prior decisions. As a result of the hearing those decisions were reaffirmed and applied. There was also a petition for rehearing, which was denied. In this situation the questions reasonably cannot be regarded as now debatable. [2] The contention is made that the decision on that appeal proceeded on the assumption that the survey was approved by the Surveyor General in 1851, whereas according to the record the approval was given shortly before the patent issued, which was in 1895. But the record is plainly otherwise. It contains a certified copy of the original plat of the survey, as made in January, 1851, by Marcellus A. Williams, deputy surveyor; and the plat bears an indorsement signed by the then Surveyor General, showing that he examined it, compared it with the field notes, and approved it, June 20, 1851. In addition, the patent recites that the description there given of the land was "taken from the approved field notes" of Williams' survey made No question is presented which can be rein January, 1851. True, the patent also re-garded as debatable in this court; so there fers to a descriptive plat and notes "authen- is no need for holding the case for further ticated and approved" by the Surveyor General shortly before the date of the patent; but it is obvious from the patent and other parts of the record that the descriptive plat and notes so mentioned were made up from the approved survey of 1851 merely as a means of providing a suitable *and convenient description of the land for insertion in the patent. Their authentication and approval by the then Surveyor General amounted to no more than a certificate by him that they were accurately taken from the survey made and approved in 1851, as shown on the records of his office. See Joplin v. Chachere, supra, 102, 107 (24 S. Ct. 214). *89 [3] A further contention is that there could be no laches, nor any adverse possession, prior to the issue of patent, because the claimants were prohibited by the Act of March 3, 1807, c. 46, 2 Stat. 445, from exercising acts of proprietorship until their claim was "recognized and confirmed" by the United States. A complete answer to this is that their claim was both recognized and confirmed by the act of 1828, and the confirmation became effective when the claim was surveyed and the survey approved in 1851. The subsequent patent, although serving as a convenient muniment of title as confirmed, added nothing to the force of the confirmation. Langdeau v. Hanes, supra, 530, and other cases before cited. Reliance is also had on a provision in the local statute of limitation declaring that, as respects lands derived from the United States, 639. argument. Decree affirmed. (269 U. S. 148) KANSAS CITY STRUCTURAL STEEL CO. v. STATE OF ARKANSAS, for Use and Benefit of ASHLEY COUNTY. (Submitted Oct. 15, 1925. Decided Nov. 16, 1925.) No. 54. 1. Courts 366 (2)-Supreme Court will accept decision of state court as to what constitutes doing business in state, but will determine what constitutes interstate commerce. Supreme Court will accept decision of highest court of state as to what constitutes "doing business" in that state, within the meaning of its laws, but will determine for itself whether what was done was interstate commerce, and whether regulatory state statutes, as applied, are repugnant to commerce clause. 2. Corporations 642 (4)-Corporation held to have engaged in intrastate business as affects its liability for penalty for doing business without license. Missouri corporation, which by contract signed in Arkansas contracted to there construct bridge, and which sublet part of work City to itself in Arkansas, and there delivered to partnership, shipped materials from Kansas them to subcontractor, held to have engaged in business of local and intrastate character, as affects its liability under Crawford & Moses' Dig. Ark. §§ 1825-1832, for penalty for doing business without license. Mr. Justice Stone, dissenting. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes In Error to the Supreme Court of Ar-(ed; plaintiff in error had made certain shipkansas. Action by the State of Arkansas, for the use and benefit of Ashley County, against the Kansas City Structural Steel Company. Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Arkansas (161 Ark. 483, 256 S. W. 845), and defendant brings error. Affirmed. *149 ments of steel, consisting of reinforcing rods, steel piers, tubes and angles from Kansas City, Mo., to itself at Wilmot, Ark., for use in the construction of the bridge; and these mator and used in the performance of the work terials had been delivered to the subcontracdone by it. The steel for the superstructure was fabricated by plaintiff in error in its plant in Kansas City, some before and some after the permission was obtained. *Messrs. Armwell L. Cooper, of Kansas City, Mo., and Charles T. Coleman and J. W. that the things done by plaintiff in error be[1, 2] The Supreme Court of Arkansas held House, Jr., both of Little Rock, Ark., for fore August 17, 1921, constituted intrastate plaintiff in error. business in Arkansas. Mr. J. R. Wilson, of El Dorado, Ark., for error contends that all was interstate comBut the plaintiff in defendant in error. merce. We accept the decision of the Supreme Court of Arkansas as to what consti Mr. Justice BUTLER delivered the opinion tutes the doing of business in that state withof the Court. Plaintiff in error, a corporation organized under the laws of Missouri, brings here for review (section 237, Judicial Code [Comp. St. § 1214]) a judgment of the Supreme Court of Arkansas which affirmed a judgment of the circuit court of Shelby county imposing a fine of $1,000 on plaintiff in error for doing business in Arkansas without obtaining permission. The laws of the state require every corporation incorporated in any other state, doing business in Arkansas, to file in the office of the secretary of state certain evidence of its organization and a financial statement, to designate its general office and place of business in Arkansas, and to name an agent there and authorize process to be served upon him. It is provided that any corporation which shall do business in Arkansas without having complied with these requirements shall be subject to a fine of not less than $1,000. Sections 1825-1832, Crawford & Moses' Digest of Laws of Arkansas. Plaintiff in error contends that, as applied in this case, the state enactments are repugnant to the commerce clause of the federal Constitution. *150 in the meaning of its own laws. Georgia v. Chattanooga, 264 U. S. 472, 483, 44 S. Ct. 369, 68 L. Ed. 796. But this court will determine for itself whether what was done by plaintiff in error was interstate commerce and whether the state enactments as applied are repug *151 nant to the commerce clause. Plain*tiff in error cites Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282, 42 S. Ct. 106, 66 L. Ed. 239. It was there held that "such commerce [among the states] is not confined to transportation from one state to another, but comprehends all commercial intercourse between different states and all the component parts of that intercourse" (page 290 [42 S. Ct. 108]), and that "a corporation of one state may go into another, without obtaining the leave or license of the latter, for all the legitimate purposes of such commerce; and any statute of the latter state which obstructs or lays a burden on the exercise of this privilege is void under the commerce clause" (page 291 [42 S. Ct. 109]). In that case, a Tennessee corporation, in pursuance of its practice of purchasing grain in Kentucky, to be transported to and used in its Tennessee mill, made a contract for the purchase of wheat to be delivered in Kentucky on the cars of a public carrier, intending to forward it as soon as delivery was made. It was held that the transaction was interstate commerce, notwithstanding the contract was made and was to be performed in Kentucky. All the things done in Kentucky had reference to and were included in the interstate transaction. *The material facts are these: May 3, 1921, plaintiff in error made a bid to the Wilmot road district for the construction of a steel bridge near Wilmot, in Ashley county, Ark. Its offer was accepted, and on that day a contract covering the work was signed in Arkansas by the representatives of the parties. The contract was not to become effective until a bond was given by the contractor to secure But in the case now before the court the its faithful performance. The bond was exe-construction of the bridge necessarily involvcuted in Missouri two days later. June 14, ed some work and business in Arkansas, 1921, plaintiff in error sublet all the work except the erection of the steel superstructure to the Yancy Construction Company, a partnership whose members were residents of Kansas. August 17, 1921, plaintiff in error secured permission, as required by the laws of Arkansas, to do business in that state. Before such permission was obtained, the greater part of the work sublet had been complet From which were separate and distinct from any (46 S.Ct.) *152 mission, it made the bid and signed the con- secure mortgage bonds of railroad should contract in Arkansas; it shipped from Kansas tinue, and that royalty of 2 cents per ton of City to itself at Wilmot the materials for the coal mined provided for in mortgage should performance of the work it had sublet, and, continue to be paid to trustee. Later the coal after the interstate transit had ended, deliver-it, after unsuccessfully suing railroad and truscompany and another company that controlled ed them to the subcontractor who used them tee in state court, by intervening petition in ment of mortgage lien and royalty as constitutoriginal proceedings sought to enjoin enforceing a relation between the railroad and coal companies, violative of main decree and trust law. Held, relief sought was unwarranted, first, because order directing and approving terms of sale had become final; second, decree in state court was res judicata; third, the illegality, if any, of the relation between railroad tal complaint, the coal company was without and coal company being matter for governmenstanding in court. in the work. We need not *consider whether, under the circumstances shown, the making of the bid, the signing of the contract, and execution of the bond would be within the protection of the commerce clause, if these acts stood alone. But it is certain that, when all are taken together, the things done by plaintiff in error in Arkansas before obtaining the permission constitute or include intrastate business. The delivery of the materials to the subcontractor was essential to the building of the bridge, and that was an intrastate and not an interstate transaction. The fact that the materials had moved from Missouri into Arkansas did not make the de Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division. livery of them to the subcontractor inter- Hocking Valley Railway Company and othSuit by the United States against the state commerce. So far as concerns the ques-ers to dissolve an illegal combination, wheretion here involved, the situation is the equiv- in the Buckeye Coal & Railway Company alent of what it would have been if the ma- and the Sunday Creek Coal Company filed an terials had been shipped into the state and intervening petition seeking to enjoin the held for sale in a warehouse, and had been Hocking Valley Railway Company and Cenfurnished to the subcontractor by a dealer. tral Union Trust Company from enforcing We think it plain that the plaintiff in error mortgage liens and royalty, and wherein the did business of a local and intrastate char- United States filed a similar petition asking acter in Arkansas before it obtained permis- dissolution of association between Railroad sion. General Railway Signal Co. v. Virgin- Company and Coal Company by cancellation ia, 246 U. S. 500, 38 S. Ct. 360, 62 L. Ed. 854; of same lien, with or without compensation. Browning v. Waycross, 233 U. S. 16, 34 S. Ct. From an order denying the petition of the 578, 58 L. Ed. 828; York Manufacturing Co. Coal Companies, and dismissing the petition v. Colley, 247 U. S. 21, 38 S. Ct. 430, 62 L. Ed. of the United States, the Coal Companies 963, 11 A. L. R. 611. alone appeal. Affirmed. Judgment affirmed. Mr. Justice STONE dissents. (269 U. S. 42) BUCKEYE COAL & RY. CO. et al. v. HOCK- 1925.) No. 51. Decided Nov. 16, Courts 508 (3)-Judgment 828 (1)-Monopolies 24(1)-Injunction against enforcing mortgage lien on coal land given to secure railroad mortgage bond, and against collection of royalty to be applied in payment of such bonds, held unwarranted. In proceedings under Act July 2, 1890, as amended by Act. Feb. 11, 1903, dissolution of combination between railroads and coal companies as to stock ownership was ordered, and thereafter on an intervening petition by the United States, stock of coal company owned by one of defendant railroads was ordered sold, the order approving sale providing that lien on coal company's lands under prior mortgage to See, also, 203 Fed. 295. *44 *Mr. Chief Justice TAFT delivered the opinion of the Court. The suit in equity in which this is an appeal was begun by the United States in the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, against the Hocking Valley Railway Company, five other railway companies, and three coal companies, and was heard before the three Circuit Judges of that circuit. It was a proceeding under the Anti-Trust Act to dissolve an illegal combination of the defendants to monopolize the from the coal fields of Ohio in interstate business of transporting and selling coal commerce. Act July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209, as amended by Act Feb. 11, 1903, 32 Stat. 823, c. 544. A full hearing resulted, March, 1914, in finding that the illegal com For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes |