(46 S.Ct.) v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375, 44 S. Ct. 391, 1917E, 900. But an action in personam to The defendant insists that the saving clause refers only to rights recognized by the maritime law as existing in 1789, when the clause first was adopted, and therefore does not include rights brought into the maritime law by subsequent legislative changes. We think the clause has a broader meaning, looks to the future as well as the past, and includes new as well as old rights. if only they are such as readily admit of assertion and enforcement in actions in personam according to the course of the common law. This is the view that was taken in Steamboat Company v. Chase, 16 Wall. 522, 533, 21 L. Ed. 369. the district in which the defendant employer resides or in which his principal office is located," and argues therefrom that Congress has manifested a purpose to restrict the enforcement of the newly given rights to the federal District Courts. The provision is not aptly worded to express that purpose, and taken alone is confusing. We think it falls short of that certainty which naturally would be manifested in making an intended departure from the long-prevailing policy evidenc*562 The sections of the Judicial Code just cited, while investing the federal District Courts with jurisdiction "exclusive of the courts of the several states" of all "civil The defendant also points to the provision causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdic-in amended section 20 saying, "Jurisdiction tion," contain an excepting clause expressly in such actions shall be under the court of "saving to suitors in all cases the right to a common-law remedy where the common law is competent to give it." This clause is a continuation of a like clause in the Judiciary Act of 1789 (1 Stat. 73), and always has been construed as permitting substantive rights under the maritime law to recover money for service rendered, or as damages for tortious injuries, to be asserted and enforced in actions in personam according to the course of the common law. Chelentis v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., 247 U. S. 372, 384, 38 S. Ct. 501, 62 L. Ed. 1171; Panama R. ed by *the saving clause in the Judiciary Act Co. v. Johnson, supra, pages 388, 390. And of 1789 and in the two sections of the Judi. it uniformly has been regarded as permitting cial Code, and that the more reasonable view such actions to be brought in either the fed- is that it is intended to regulate venue and eral courts or the state courts, as the pos- not to deal with jurisdiction as between fedsessor of the right may elect. Leon v. Gal-eral and state courts. Panama R. Co. v. ceran, 11 Wall. 185, 188, 20 L. Ed. 74; Schoon- Johnson, supra, pages 384, 391; Re East Rivmaker v. Gilmore, 102 U. S. 118, 26 L. Ed. er Co., 266 U. S. 355, 368, 45 S. Ct. 114, 69 *561 L. Ed. 324; Engel v. Davenport, 271 U. S. 33, 46 S. Ct. 410, 70 L. Ed. 813 (decided April 12, 1926). 95;. Chappell v. *Bradshaw, 128 U. S. 132, 134, In so saying, we must be understood as We well might have rested our decision here on the conclusion reached in Engel v. Davenport, where we said: "It is clear that the state courts have jurisenforce the right of action established by the diction concurrently with the federal courts, to Merchant Marine Act as a part of the maritime law." But out of deference to the elaborate presentation of the question in this case we have stated and dealt with the several points advanced as making for a different conclusion. Judgment affirmed. (271 U. S. 603) MISSOURI PAC. R. Co. v. UNITED STATES. (Argued April 28, 1926. Decided June 7, 1926.) No. 280. 1. Public lands 85-Land grant railroads required to transport mails held not entitled to full compensation for post office car service; "transportation of mails" (Act June 10, 1852, 86 [10 Stat. 10]; Act Feb. 9, 1853, § 6 [10 Stat. 156]; Act July 28, 1916, § 5 [Comp. St. § 7482a]). Under Act June 10, 1852, § 6, Act Feb. 9, 1853, § 6, and Act July 28, 1916, § 5 (Comp. St. § 7482a), land grant railroads, required to transport mails "under the direction of the Post Office Department, at such price as Congress may by law direct," being 80 per cent. of compensation paid other railroads for the same service, are not entitled to receive full compensation for the furnishing of full railway post office car service, or apartment railway post office car service, on theory that carrying of distributing facilities cannot properly be construed as "transportation of mails" within such acts; the power of the Post Office Department to direct the transportation being inclusive of power to impose such conditions as are necessarily incident to transportation. 2. Constitutional law 70 (3)-Congressional determination of compensation payable land grant railroads for transportation of mails is not open to judicial review (Act June 10, 1852, § 6 [10 Stat. 10]; Act Feb. 9, 1853, § 6 [10 Stat. 156]; Act July 28, 1916, § 5 [Comp. St. § 7482a]). Congressional determination of compensation payable land grant railroads under Act June 10, 1852, § 6, Act Feb. 9, 1853, § 6, and Act July 28, 1916, § 5 (Comp. St. § 7482a), for transportation of mails, is not open to judicial review. Appeal from the Court of Claims. Suit by the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company against the United States. From a judgment for the United States (59 Ct. Cl. 524; 60 Ct. Cl. 183), plaintiff appeals. Judg ment affirmed. "under the direction of the Post Office Department, at such price as Congress may by law direct." By the Act of July 28, 1916, c. 261, § 5. 39 ter by railway common carriers and the serv- grant lines, the act provides: *605 allow to railroad companies whose railroads "The Interstate Commerce Commission shall were constructed in *whole or in part by a land grant made by Congress on condition that the mails should be transported over their roads at such price as Congress should by law direct only eighty per centum of the compensation paid other railroads for transporting the mails and all service by the railroads in connection therewith." The act confers upon the Postmaster General the power to state railroad mail routes and authorizes mail service thereon of four classes, the first two of which are: (1) Full railway post office car service; (2) apartment railway post office car service. For the first class, service is to be "by cars forty feet or more in length, constructed, fitted up, and maintained for the distribution of mails on trains." For the second class, the service is the same "by apartments less than forty feet in length," etc. The service is to include the carriage of mail matter, equipment, and supplies for the mail service and the employees of the Postal Service or Post Office Department, as the Postmaster General shall direct for the service are to be of such construction, to be carried. All cars and parts of cars used such manner as the Postmaster General shall style, length, and character, and furnished in require, and are to be constructed, fitted up, maintained, heated, lighted, and cleaned by Mr. Fred H. Wood, of New York City, for and at the expense of the railroad companies. appellant. The railroad companies are required to fur Mr. Alfred A. Wheat, of Washington, D. C.,nish all necessary facilities for caring for and for the United States. *604 handling the mails while in their custody. The act further provides that all railway common carriers are required to transport *Mr. Justice SUTHERLAND delivered the such mail matter as may be offered for transopinion of the Court. portation, etc., and shall be entitled to reJune,ceive fair and reasonable compensation “for such transportation and for the service connected therewith." [1] Appellant operates, and since 1917, has operated, a system of railroads which includes a number of land grant lines in Missouri and other states. These lines received land grants in aid of their construction and are bound to carry the United States mails, under the provisions of land grant acts, passed in 1852 and 1853 (section 6, c. 45, 10 Stat. 8, 10; section 6, c. 59, 10 Stat. 155, 156), both of which provide that the United States mails shall be transported on the railroads receiving the grants at all times The Interstate Commerce Commission, after a hearing, made an exhaustive report and determined that mail should be carried upon the basis of space, instead of weight. Upon *606 that basis, the Commission fixed rates for *all services required to be performed by the act and declared that the land grant railroads were entitled to 80 per cent. thereof under * (46 S.Ct.) the law. It was urged before the Commis- al cars originated after the passage of the *608 pri*ately employed in the transportation of Unmistakably, the act of 1916 authorized the Commission to do precisely what it did, * *607 namely, to determine the *fair and reasonable less piecemeal, and then assorted and put in partment." The authority is a continuing one and not to be limited to such methods of direction as were customary at the dates of the acts. The mail was to be transported "at all times" under this direction. The power of the Post Office Department to direct the transportation is of the same quality as the power of Congress to fix the price, and includes not only the authority to say when the transportation shall take place and between what points, but to impose such conditions as are necessarily incident to the transportation, having regard to the peculiar nature of the things to be transported. We fully agree with the court below that the land grant acts are not to be so narrowly construed as to render their operation impracticable. "When they declare that the mails shall be transported under the direction of the Post Office Department, we think they imply more than the mere placing of the mails in bulk in a car to be carried between given termini. The bulk changes by additions to it and subtractions But it is urged that thus to construe the act from it. The making of these additions and of 1916 is to enlarge the authority of Con-subtractions as the different stations are gress under the land grant acts, so as to per- reached involves space additional to that ocmit that body to require the land grant roads, cupied by the bulk itself. What is to be transwithout compensation, to perform service in ported is not mere weight, bulk or freight, buț addition to that embraced within the word the 'mails,' and the act must be construed to "transportation." It is said that railway post-give effect to its purpose." *609 [2] *We fairly may assume, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that, in fixing the allowance to be paid to the land grant roads at 80 per cent, of the fair and reasonable compensation to be paid railroads generally, Congress has given due weight to all the circumstances-not only to the kind and character of the service, but to the fact that the companies are required to furnish all facilities incidental thereto. In any event, it was for Congress to say what reduction should be made from the amount of full compensation in consideration of the land grants, and its action in that respect is not open to judicial review. Judgment affirmed. (271 U. S. 528) ALEJANDRINO v. QUEZON et al. (Submitted May 4, 1926. 1. Courts 1926.) No. 309. 4. Courts 387(4)-After main question as to validity of suspension of Philippine Senator became moot, Supreme Court, being unable to derive sufficient information from petition to afford remedy as to emoluments, will treat whole cause as moot. Where petition for mandamus and injunction against order suspending Philippine Senator did not contain sufficient information on which to afford remedy against proper officers as to emoluments of suspended Senator, the Supreme Court, on main question as to validity of suspension becoming moot, will treat the whole cause as moot. 5. Courts 387 (4)-Where main features of case became moot pending certiorari, and incidental feature did not present proper subject for determination, judgment will be reversed, with directions to dismiss, without costs. Where, before hearing on certiorari, main features of case had become moot, and incidental feature did not present proper subject for determination, judgment will be reversed Decided June 7, and cause remanded, with directions to dismiss without costs. 387(4)-Whether Philippine Senator was properly suspended becomes moot question, where period of suspension had expired before hearing in Supreme Court on certiorari (Philippine Autonomy Act, §§ 12, 17, 18 [Comp. St. §§ 3813, 3814d, 3814e]). Where period of suspension fixed in resolution suspending Philippine Senator had expired, the question whether or not the suspension authorized under Philippine Autonomy Act, $$ 12, 17, 18 (Comp. St. §§ 3813, 3814d, 3814e), becomes a moot question, and cannot be considered on certiorari in action for injunction was and mandamus. 2. Courts 387(4)-Jurisdiction of Philippine Supreme Court to require Senate by mandamus or injunction to rescind resolution suspending member and to readmit him became moot question, where period of suspension expired before hearing on certiorari. On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands. Action by José Alejandrino seeking a mandamus and an injunction against Manuel L. Quezon and others. Judgment sustaining a demurrer to the petition and dismissing the action, and petitioner brings certiorari. Judgment vacated, with directions. Mr. Claro M. Recto, of Manila, Phil. Islands, for petitioner. Messrs. Pablo G. Corinsta, of Washington, D. C., and Guillermo B. Guevara, of Manila, Phil. Islands, for respondents. Mr. Chief Justice TAFT delivered the opinion of the Court.1 *530 This cause was brought here by certiorari under section 5 of the Act of September 6, 1916, to amend Judicial Code, *c. 448, 39 Stat. Whether Supreme Court of Philippines had 726 (Comp. St. § 1225b). That act repealed jurisdiction by extraordinary writ of mandasection 248 of the Judicial Code, re-enacted mus or injunction to require the Senate to rescind a resolution suspending one of its mem- by section 27 of the so-called Philippine Aubers and to readmit him became a moot ques-tonomy Act, c. 416, 39 Stat. 545, 555 (Comp. tion, where period of suspension had expired St. § 1225a), which gave jurisdiction to this before hearing in Supreme Court on certiorari. court to examine by writ of error the final judgments and decrees of the Supreme Court of the Islands in all cases in which the Constitution or any statute, treaty, title or privilege of the United States was involved, or in causes in which the value in controversy exceeded $25,000, and a review of such judgments by writ of certiorari was substituted. The certiorari here was granted be cause a statute of the United States, to wit, the Autonomy Act, was involved. 3. Courts 387(4)-Incidental issue of whether suspended Philippine Senator could recover emoluments should be tried in separate proceeding against proper officer, after main question of validity of suspension had become moot. Where the main question in action for injunction and mandamus, as to validity of suspension of Philippine Senator, had become moot because of expiration of period of suspension, the incidental issue as to remedy which suspended Senator may have in recovery of his emoluments should be tried in separate proceeding against proper executive officer. This proceeding was an original action in 1 The opinion was announced by Mr. Justice Holmes, the Chief Justice being absent. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes (46 S.Ct.) the Supreme Court of the Philippines, brought | Houses, the Senate and the House of Repre- "Resolved, that the Honorable Jose Alejan (Comp. St. § 3814e) provides that the Senate and House respectively shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns and qualifications of their elective members, and each house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and with the concurrence of two-thirds expel an elec drino, Senator from the Twelfth district, be, and "Resolved, further, that the Honorable Jose Alejandrino be, as he is hereby, deprived of all of his prerogatives, privileges and emoluments as such Senator during one year from the first of January, nineteen hundred and twenty-four; "And resolved, lastly, that the said Honorable Jose Alejandrino, being a Senator appointed by the Governor General of these Islands, a copy of this resolution be furnished said Governor General for his information." *531 tives shall receive an annual compensation for their services to be ascertained by law and paid out of the treasury of the Philippine Islands. Senators and Representatives shall in all cases, except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective houses and in going to and returning from the same, and for any speech or debate in either house they shall not be questioned in any other place. the Senate to expel a member appointed by the Governor General. It is further argued that the power to suspend is only a less power than the power to expel and of the same character, and therefore that the Senate had no power to suspend an appointed Senator, and therefore that the Senate exceeded its authority in attempting to do so in this resolution, and its action was null. *The petitioner charged that this resolution It is argued that as the only power of exwas unconstitutional and of no effect and pulsion given to the Senate is in respect of its asked a preliminary injunction against the re-elected members, no power is conferred on spondents enjoining them from executing the resolution, a judicial declaration that it was null and void, and a final order of mandamus against the respondent ordering them to recognize the rights of the petitioner and his office as Senator, and all of his prerogatives, privileges and emoluments and prohibiting them from carrying the order of suspension into effect. The respondents made a special appearance through the Attorney General and objected on demurrer to the court's jurisdiction. The court held that it was without jurisdiction, sustained the demurrer, and as it did not appear that the petition could be amended so as to state a cause of action, it was dismissed without costs. [1, 2] We do not think that we can consider this question, for the reason that the period of suspension fixed in the resolution has expired, and, so far as we are advised. Alejandrino is now exercising his functions as a member of the Senate. It is therefore in this court a moot question whether or not he could be suspended in the way in which he was. Equally so is the still more important question whether the Supreme Court of the Phil *533 ippines had any *jurisdiction by extraordinary writ of mandamus or injunction to require the Senate, a part of the Island Legislature, and a separate branch of the government, José Alejandrino was appointed under the Philippine Autonomy Act by the Governor General as Senator to represent the Twelfth district, a district composed of non-Christian tribes in the northern part of Luzon and the Moros in the department of Mindanao and Sulu. At the time he took his seat in the Senate, another Senator, Vicente de Vera, made a speech on the credentials of Senator Alejan-to rescind its resolution and to readmit Aledrino, in which he said some things which jandrino to the Senate as an active member. Alejandrino resented. At night, and after the It may be suggested, as an objection to our session of the Senate concluded, and away vacating the action of the court below, and from the Senate chamber, Alejandrino as-directing the dismissal of the petition as havsaulted de Vera because of his remarks made ing become a moot case, that while the lapse in the Senate. The resolution complained of of time has made unnecessary and futile a was because of this assault. writ of mandamus to restore Senator Alejan By section 12 of the Autonomy Act (Comp.drino to the Island Senate, there still remains St. § 3813), the general legislative powers in the Philippines, with certain exceptions, are vested in a Legislature consisting of two a right on his part to the recovery of his emoluments, which were withheld during his suspension, and that we ought to retain the case |