16. To decide that a limited partnership formed in Chile is a citizen of Chile, but that an association of precisely the same kind (except that it cannot sue and be sued in its company name), formed in the United States, is not a citizen of the United States, is to adopt one rule for Chile and another for the United States, which certainly is not according to "the public law, justice and equity." It is a principle of international law that it is the duty of a nation to protect its citizens in a foreign country from injury by illegal acts of such country. In dealing with international questions arising under this conceded right, it is absolutely necessary, then, that whatever may be the local law, the word "citizen," as applied to corporations, companies, or any other association, must have the same meaning everywhere. The right of one government to intercede with another, on account of injury to any person by the acts of the latter, is confined to the cases of persons who have the nationality of the intervening government. It cannot intervene in behalf of any one not having its distinct nationality. It is not sufficient for the corporation, company, or association to be domiciled in the country, nor that, for some municipal or local reason, it is treated as a citizen, but it must have nationality within a uniform rule that can be applied internationally. The circumstances or characteristics which confer citizenship or nationality upon it in one country, must according to international law, confer citizenship upon it in all other countries which recognize that law. Otherwise, there could be no common rule of action in the treatment of these associations internationally. Those having the characteristics and attributes of corporations, if they have nationality in one country must, under international law, have nationality in all countries. Those associations having the characteristics and attributes of partnerships, if they have nationality in one country must, under international law, have nationality in all countries. Or, to state it differently, the same characteristics and attributes which confer nationality upon a corporation or association, organized in one country, must confer nationality upon a corporation or association organized in any other country. We have sought to point out (paragraph 5) for what reasons these corporations and companies do have nationality within the purview of the "public law." If such a uniform rule be not adopted, then France, for instance, would have the right to protect a company formed in its territory and on which it had conferred "juridical rights," and the United States or Great Britain, could not protect such a company having precisely the same, characteristics and attributes under its law, but upon which it had not conferred "juridical rights." To illustrate what would be the result of such a rule, let us suppose a convention, between the United States and France, identical with the one under which this Commission was organized. And suppose two claims to be presented to that Commission, one on behalf of the Government of France, and one on behalf of the Government of the United States, for substantially the same amount, and arising from similar injuries committed by the respective Governments. The claim presented against the United States is one in behalf of a limited partnership organized and domiciled in France and composed of three persons, one a citizen of France, one of Great Britain, and one of the United States. The partnership is termed a "juridical person" by the Code of France, and hence the Commission holds that it has the nationality of France, and makes an award in favor of all these people-Americans, British, and French. On the other hand, the claim presented on behalf of the United States is a claim for injury to the property of a partnership, formed under the laws of the United States, and domiciled there, and composed just as the other was. The law under which it was formed is taken from the French code, and is identical with it, except that it does not provide that the partnership shall be a "juridical person.' The Commission, therefore, holds that the copartnership has no nationality in the United States; that the American has a right to recover on account of injury to his interest, and refuse relief to the others, because they are not citizens of the United States. If the same cases came before the State Departments of the respective Governments, no such rule would be adopted. Each would make claim, and could only make claim touching the interest of its own citizens in each copartnership. Let us take another illustration. Suppose Alsop & Co., instead of being injured by Chile, had been injured by acts committed by the United States; could Chile, on behalf of Alsop & Co., composed entirely of American citizens, as it was, present any claim to the State Department of the United States or before this Commission on that account? We are (a) That only such corporations and companies as are created by charter, patent, or decree of the sovereign power of the country have nationality, and hence the citizenship of that country. (b) That a business corporation or company to be endowed with the nationality of a country must also have "perpetual succession." (c) Alsop & Co. was not created by charter, or by decree of the President of Chile. It did not have "immortality," in the corporate sense. It was not, therefore, a citizen of Chile. II. The equitable, beneficial interest in the property injured in this case by the acts of Chile, was at the time of the injury |