meaning they were intended to convey, in any instance, must be agreeable to the nature of the subject, on which they were employed.

226. Rule 3d. The true interpretation of a writing often requires a knowledge of the character of its author. His peculiar bent of mind, his temperament, his vocation, and especially his political or religious tenets, may have had an influence, for which some allowance should be made.

227. Rule 4th. If the writing to be interpreted be of ancient date, the interpreter should ascertain the genuineness of his text; whether it has descended to him as it came from the author, without any corruptions or interpolations from other hands.

228. Rule 5th. The interpreter should also be well acquainted with the history of the country and of the period, in which his author wrote. Words have different meanings in different ages; and writers are insensibly influenced by the existing fashions, and other circumstances of a local and temporary nature.

229. Rule 6th. The mind of the interpreter should be wholly free from all antecedent bias in favour of any system, doctrine, or creed,

which might influence his judgment, in the interpretation he is about to make.

230. Rule 7th. In making the interpretation of a document, the subject and predicate of each proposition should be carefully distinguished, the various sentences and clauses should be construed in reference to each other; and the resulting sense of all the parts should be connected and consistent.

231. Rule 8th. Words, which admit of different senses, should be taken in their most common and obvious meaning, unless such a construction lead to absurd consequences, or be inconsistent with the known intention of the writer.

232. Rule 9th. When any word or expression is ambiguous, and may, consistently with common use, be taken in different senses, it must be taken in that sense, which is agreeable to the subject, of which the writer was treating.

233. Rule 10th. Doubtful words and phrases must always be construed in such a sense as will make them produce some effect; and not in such a sense as will render them wholly nugatory.

234. Rule 11th. Violations of the rules of grammar do not vitiate a writing, in which the sense is distinctly expressed. When a passage is imperfect, or unintelligible, the interpreter is at liberty to supply such words, as are manifestly necessary to render its sense complete. But he is not allowed, in a similar case, to expunge certain words from the text, in order to give an intelligible meaning to those that remain.

235. Rule 12th. When there are no special reasons for the contrary, words should be construed in their literal, rather than in their figurative sense; relative words should be referred to the nearest, rather than to a remote antecedent; and words, which are capable of being understood in either, should be taken in their generick, rather than in their specifick

sense.

236. Rule 13th. However general may be the words, in which a covenant is expressed, it comprehends those things, only, on which it appears the parties intended to contract, and not those, which they had not in view. But when the object of the covenant is an universality of things, it comprehends all the particu

lar things, which compose that universality, even those, of which the parties had no knowledge.

237. Rule 14th. Whatever is obscure or doubtful in a covenant should be interpreted by the intention of the parties. If the intention of the parties does not appear from the words of the covenant, it should be inferred from the existing customs and usages of the place, in which it was made. If the words of a covenant contradict the well known intention of the parties, this intention must be regarded rather than the words.*

238. Rule 15th. When former interpreters are appealed to, in order to establish the sense of an ancient writing, those, cæteris paribus, should be preferred, who were nearest the author, in time or place, as his children, pupils, correspondents, or countrymen; and who had, therefore, better advantages for knowing his mind, than more distant commentators.

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Sarti, Dialect. Instit. Kirwan, Logick. Le Clerc, Ars Critica. Vattel, Law of Nations. Rutherforth, Lectures on Grotius. Gilbert, Law of Evidence. Pothier on Obligations. Domat on the Civil Law.

CONCLUDING REMARKS.

In the preceding summary, an attempt has been made to state and explain those rules of intellectual discipline, which may guide and improve the reasoning faculties. As the work is intended to be strictly elementary, general principles only have been given, with such plain examples, as might limit and illustrate their meaning. The following remarks are subjoined for the use of those, who may wish to extend their inquiries on the subject of logick, and the philosophy of the human mind.

Dr. Reid's analysis of Aristotle's Logick contains a brief but comprehensive exposition of the syllogistick system. A more full account of the categories, together with the various laws of syllogistick reasoning, may be found in the logical treatises of Burgersdicius and of Le Clerc.

Of modern systems of logick, those of Watts and of Duncan have been most approved. A more recent and valuable treatise, than either of these, is that of Kirwan.

It is essential to accurate reasoning to distinguish those first principles of human knowl