CONTRACT-Continued. assenting party. (C. P.) Campbell v. Philadelphia, 221.
Mutual promises for an extension of time for the performance of a contract are a sufficient consideration for the agreement. McNish v. Reynolds, 24.
An order by a customer to a stock broker to sell a hundred shares "short," when it appears from all the evidence in the case that there was no intention to deliver real stock, is manifestly a wagering transac- tion, and cannot be made the basis of an action by the broker against the customer to recover the loss upon the transaction. Dickson v. Thomas, 112.
Where an infant deposits moneys with a broker as margins to protect the broker in speculations upon the infant's account, such margins may be subse- quently recovered by the infant, even though the speculations result in a loss. Ruchizky v. De Haven, 109.
A contract by county commissioners to pay attor- neys a large contingent fee in the event of success in a litigation in which the county is interested is void, as against public policy. Chester County v. Barber, 350.
A contract made by a physician with another physi- cian purchasing his practice, not to practice his pro- fession within a radius of five miles of a certain place, will be specifically enforced by injunction. Bett's Appeal, 431.
If one deliver money or personal property to an- other under the promise of the latter to deliver it over to a third person who has a beneficial interest therein, or to convert it into money and pay him the proceeds, the third person can maintain an action therefor against the promisor. Wynn v. Wood, 345.
The doctrine that where an infant has executed a contract and enjoyed the benefit of it, and afterwards, on coming of age, seeks to avoid it, he must first re- store the consideration received, applies in certain cases, but as a g neral rule is unsound. Ruchizky v. De Haven, 109.
Contract of suretyship construed under particular phraseology to be a continuing contract. (0. C.) Bentz's Estate, 16.
A contract to marry without specification of time is a contract to marry within a reasonable time, and a refusal to fulfil the engagement may be manifested as unmistakably by conduct as by words. When so manifested, a formal demand is not a necessary pre- requisite to bringing an action for breach of promise. Wagenseller v. Simmers, 353.
A delivery of personal property on credit, at stipu- lated prices, to be paid for by instalments under a written agreement that the goods shall remain the property of the vendor until paid for, is a sale, not a bailment, and a bona fide purchaser from the vendee without notice of the agreement takes a good title as against the vendor. Stadtfield v. Huntsman, 216.
A sale and delivery of personal property with an agreement that the ownership shall remain in the vendor until the purchase-money is paid, will enable the creditors of the vendee to seize and sell the same for the payment of his debts. Brunswick v. Hoover, 219.
Contract to waive right of appeal, when not enforced. Wetter v. Kiley, 59. Lunatic, liability of upon accommodation indorse- See BILLS AND NOTES. Wirebach v. Bank, 143. See ASSUMPSIT. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. CONTRIBUTION. See EQUITY. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
CONVERSION. The rule that the surplus pro- ceeds of the land of a decedent sold at sheriff's sale, shall be paid to his executor or administrator and by him be distributed as real estate, is confined to the first transmission, and the money having once vested in the persons entitled, is no longer to be treated as real estate. Squire's Appeal, 118.
Where land descending to an infant from his father was sold by the sheriff under a prior incumbrance, and the surplus proceeds paid to the guardian of the minor; upon the death of the minor, his mother was entitled to this fund to the exclusion of the heirs ex parte paterna. Ib.
Where the proceeds of sale of realty are impressed with a trust, those who are entitled to it may follow and claim the fund wherever it can with certainty be recognized and identified, no matter what alteration of form it may have undergone. (C. P.) Wynkoop v. Wynkoop, 65.
COPYRIGHT. The violation of the provisions of § 4965 of the Revised Statutes by an agent does not reuder the principal liable to the penalty imposed by the Act of Congress. (U. S. D. C.) Schreiber v. Sharpless, 403.
CORPORATIONS. An association organized to pay premiums to members upon marriage, is not a beneficial association within the meaning of the Act of 29 April, 1874. (C. P.) In re Quaker City Mar- riage Benefit Association, 467.
The formation of such associations is not to be en- couraged, and a charter will be refused, as against public policy and morality. Ib.
Any man or a number of men who are the owners of any kind of property may form an association with others, and sell that property to the association at any price that may be agreed on between them, no matter what it may have originally cost, provided there be no fraudulent representation made by the vendors to their associates. They are not bound to disclose the profits which they may realize by the transaction. There is no confidentia relation between the parties and they deal at arm's length with each other. Pennell's Ap- peal, 297.
The writ of quo warranto is not issuable upon the suggestion of a private relator where the question in- volves the existence of the corporation. Common- wealth ex rel. Hoffman v. Phila. and Chester County R.R. Co., 400.
Under the charter of the Philadelphia and Reading R.R. Co, it is not necessary that a majority of the stockholders should be present at a meeting called specially under section 5 of the charter to elect officers when the annual meeting was not held at the ap- pointed time. Gowen's Appeal, 85.
During the pendency of a writ of error to proceed- ings upon a quo warranto to determine the title to an office, the title to the office legally remains in doubt. Runkle v. Commonwealth, 2 3.
The capital stock of a corporation whether fully paid up or partly outstanding in the hands of sub- scribers thereto, is a trust fund for the benefit of creditors. Macungie Savings Bank v. Bastian, 71. Stang's Appeal, 409.
Hence, stockholders who diminish that fund with- out first providing for the payment of all indebtedness, receive it impressed with the trust which a court of equity will enforce. Stang's Appeal, 409.
This principle depends upon the receipt of the funds, hence a stockholder who has not shared in the distri- bution is not subject to its application. Ib.
The trust is enforceable in favor of a creditor whose claim was not liquidated, nor even in suit, at the time
when the distribution among the stockholders was made. Ib.
Although all of the stockholders who have shared in the distribution of funds, impressed with this trust for creditors, are liable to contribute their proportion eventually to the payment of the demands of the complaining creditor, yet each stockholder is bound to restore his part in toto, and the equity of the creditor being superior to the equity of the stockholders sued for contribution from those not sued, it is not neces- sary that all the stockholders should be joined in the suit. A creditor is entitled to a decree against the stockholders sued for the full amount of the shares respectively received by them. Ib.
A cash dividend declared by a corporation out of the proceeds of sale of a portion of their property and franchises, is to be treated as capital and not income in the settlement of an estate between a life tenant and the remainder mau. (C. P.) Estate of Sarah Vinton, 49.
The proceeds of the sale of an option to subscribe to a new issue of the stock of North America Ins. Co., is to be treated as capital and not income in a contest between a life-tenant and a remainder man. (0. C.) Condy's Estate, 319.
Fraudulent pledge of corporation stock by agent entrusted with its possession and muniments of title; what sufficient evidence of notice to pledgee. (C. P.) Wallace v. Boyd, 256.
The power of a railroad company to borrow money does not include the power to issue irredeemable in- come bonds entitling the holder merely to a contin- gent interest in the net profits. U. S. C. C.) McCal- mont v. Phila. and Reading Railroad Company, 338.
Foreign. A corporation chartered by Congress and doing business in Pennsylvania is not a foreign cor- poration under the 16th section of the Act of 7 June, 1879, and hence is not liable to pay a license tax. Commonwealth v. Texas and Pacific Railway Com- pany, 405.
If a foreign corporation doing business in this State does not file in the office of the Secretary of the Com- monwealth a statement showing, inter alia, its location and the name of its authorized agent, a service made upon it in accordance with the Act of 21 March, 1849, is good. Hagerman v. Empire State Co., 491.
A foreign corporation neglecting to comply with the provisions of the Act of April 22, 1874, cannot be per- mitted to reap the benefit of its own wrong. Ib.
Service of process cannot be made upon a life in- surance company outside of the county in which the writ is issued. The provisions of the Acts of 24 April, 1857, and 8 April, 1868, only app'y to fire in surance companies. (C. P.) Anspach v. Guardian Aid Society, 568.
See BANKS AND BANKING, BUILDING Societies, InSUR- ANCE, RAILROADS, TAXES AND TAXATION.
COSTS. An attorney's fee is not taxable in pro- ceedings before a justice of the peace. (C. P.) Lar- kins v. Coffee, 537.
Upon a sheriff's interpleader, the claimant having obtained a verdict for the goods, may on entering a judgment issue a fi. fa. for the costs. (C. P.) Craig v. Building Association, 296.
An appeal from the prothonotary's taxation of costs brings up the merits of the taxation. (C. P.) Bal- linger v. Killam, 372.
COUNTY. Where a county is divided, pending proceedings before a referee appointed under the Act of April 6, 1869, in an ejectment, a certified copy of the record may be transferred to the Common Pleas of
the new county, and proceedings taken therein to en- force the award of the referee as fully as in the Court where the action was instituted. Heath v. Gardner, 495.
County Commissioners have no power to bind the county to pay an excessive contingent fee to attor- neys employed to prosecute a suit for the county. Chester County ». Barber, 350.
COURTS. Effect of division of county on pending litigation. See COUNTY. Heath v. Gardner, 495.
Where a court of equity has jurisdiction of a de- fendant's person, it has authority to enjoin proceedings at law, and may use the writ of injunction to prevent the commencement of oppressive and unjust litigation before other tribunals. But, where suits have actu- ally been begun, and are pending before another tri- bunal having full power to grant equitable relief, then no other Court can interfere by injunction with the prosecution of such suits. (C. P.) Fallon v. Rem- ington. 119.
The Courts of Common Pleas have no jurisdiction to pass upon exceptions filed to the report of a referee under the Act of May 14, 1874. Such report can only be reviewed direc ly by the Supreme Court upon a writ of error taken to the referee's report when filed. Philadelphia v. Linnard, 148.
Although Associate Judges have no power to over- rule the previous act of the President Judge, where the question of the granting of a new trial is referred by the President to the Associate Judges, they have the power to pass upon the question, and their order when made is conclusive. Van Vliet v. Conrad, 464. Waiver of right to appeal from justice of peace, agreement for, when not enforced. Wetter v. Kiley, 59.
Under the Act of June 16, 1836, the Court of Quar- ter Sessions has jurisdiction in cases of indictinent for the receiving of stolen goods. The Act of March 31, 1860, is but a re-enactment of the former provision, and under its terms a like ju isdiction exists. Fulmer v. Commonwealth, 437.
Under what circumstances a defaulting guardian will be attached as for a contempt, see GUARDIAN AND WARD. Leiter's Appeal, 225. See ORPHANS' COURT.
CRIMES, CRIMINAL LAW, AND PRO- CEDURE. Upon a trial for larceny, the father of the defendant, in order to show lack of motive to per- petrate the crime, having testified that he supplied his son with money every time he asked for it, it was competent for the Commonwealth in cross-examina- tion to ask the witness, if the defendant was not in need of money and owed pressing debts. Fulmer v. Commonwealth, 437.
Obstructing the process of a justice of the peace is an indictable offence, an the justice has power sum- marily to hold the offender to bail to answer in court. (Q. S.) Commonwealth v. McClure, 466.
A principal is not liable to the penalty imposed by the Act of Congress for a violation of the copyright laws, where the act is the act of an agent committed without the knowledge of the principal. (U. S. D. C.) Schreiber v. Sharpless, 403.
A search warrant for stolen articles, describing them as "jewelry and other personal effects," is a sufficient compliance with Art. I., § 8, of the Constitution, re- quiring that no search warrant shall issue, unless the goods are described as near as may be. Moore v. Coxe, 135.
A count in an indictment for larceny charging the defendant with the larceny of several distinct arti-
CRIMES, CRIMINAL LAW, AND PROCE-DAMAGES, MEASURE OF—Continued.
cles belonging to different owners, when the time and place of the taking of each are the same, is good, and will not be quashed for duplicity. Fulmer v. Com- monwealth, 437.
An indictment for obstructing process of a justice, need not set forth particularly in what way the justice was obstructed. (Q. S.) Commonwealth v. McClure, 466.
A conviction under an indictment for conspiring to cheat A. of $2400, by inducing him to deposit the money in a bank under false representations of its solvency, does not authorize a judgment of restitution under the 179th section of the Act of 1860. Hunt- zinger v. Commonwealth, 98.
To warrant an order of restitution, the record should show that the money has been taken by the defend- ants. Ib.
Where an allocatur for a writ of error in a criminal case is refused by the Supreme Court, this cannot be considered as an adjudication that error does not exist. Hence when such an allocatur is allowed subsequently, and a writ of error taken in consequence, the action of the Court in the first instance presents no bar to a review of the case upon its merits. Ib.
The provisions of the Act of February 18, 1785, re- lating to the discharge of prisoners under the two-term rule only applies to the interval between the commit- ment and the first trial. Commonwealth v. Superin- tendent, 53.
CUSTOM. See EVIDENCE. SHIPPING. BROKER.
DAMAGES, MEASURE OF. Where a mill was destroyed through the careless construction of the defendant's dam, the plaintiff is entitled to show the original cost of each item of property destroyed, but the measure of damages is the value of the property at the time of loss. Minnequa Springs Co. v. Coon, 502. Where a lessor fails to give to the lessee possession of a portion of the demised premises, the measure of the lessee's right to damages is the amount of money actually expended by him on the faith of the contract, and if no such money has been paid, the damages are but nominal. Allegaert v. Smart, 29.
The Act of March 24, 1824, imposing treble damages upon any one cutting and converting to his own use timber upon the land of another without the owner's consent, applies even though the offender did not know at the time that the cutting was not on his own land. Kramer v. Goodlander, 469.
But treble damages cannot be recovered where the owner of the land has misled the one cutting as to the extent of his title. Ib.
be set back at some future period, should be consid- ered as an element of the present value. Ib.
In proceedings under the Act of March 24, 1869, to appropriate turnpike roads to the use of the public, a corporation owning such road will still be entitled to damages for the taking thereof, though its stock may have no market value, and the property itself be un- productive. In re Kensington & Oxford Turnpike Co., 177.
See ROADS, HIGHWAYS, AND Bridges.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. Whether an as- signment of securities by a debtor to a creditor is in payment or as collateral security is a question of in- tention. In the absence of evidence of intention, it is a presumption of law that the assignment was only as collateral. The duty of establishing the contrary is affirmative, and it rests upon the debtor. Eby v. Hoopes, 315.
The fact that the transaction was between husband and wife, and that the assignment of a security was absolute in form, affords no ground to rebut the pre- sumption. Ib.
While it is true that taking a security as collateral for an antecedent debt does not make the creditor a holder for value so as to give him the rights of a bona fide purchaser, yet the rule is otherwise where it is taken in payment or extinguishment of the debt. Dovey's Appeal, 389.
Where the pledgee of collateral securities refuses to surrender them after the satisfac ion of the debt for which they were pledged, the owner may proceed to recover them specifically by a bill in equity. (C. P.) Ward v. Mooney, 256.
The rule of law which, in the absence of appropria- tion by the parties, appropriates payments in the way most advantageous to the creditor, will not be applied to the prejudice of a surety. Weightman's Appeal, 155.
The mere receipt of an account without returning an objection is only prima facie evidence of its cor- rectness; it does not necessarily preclude the debtor from setting up the bar of the Statute of Limitations, and does not amount to an equitable estoppel. Ver- rier v. Guillou, 477.
A bill in equity to set aside a fraudulent conveyance may be filed by creditors, even though the grantor be dead. (C. P.) Saving Fund v. Dillon, 506.
Whether a debtor assigning his property has done so with fraudulent intent as against his creditors, is a question for the jury. Barr v. Boyles, 253.
Rule in Twyne's case. Whether a contract is to be regarded as a sale or bailment. See CONTRACT. Stadtfeld v. Huntsman, 216. Brunswick v. Hoover,
Measure of damages in salvage cases. See SALVAGE. 219. (U. S. D. C.) The Mary E. Long, 192.
Eminent domain. In a proceeding to recover damages for property taken by the widening of Chest- nut Street, in the city of Philadelphia, the measure of damages was the difference between the market value of the property as it stood before the alteration, and the market value as it stood after the alteration. Philadelphia v. Linnard, 148.
Inconvenience to occupants caused by the recession of the front, and the difficulty of procuring tenants, are both to be considered as elements of damage; but if the building as set back is of greater value than the building as it stood on the old line, no damages are recoverable. Ib.
The damage is to be estimated as of the date when the injury was complete and compensation was due; but the possibility that the adjoining houses would
Circumstances under which it is for the jury to say whether a vendor of personalty has so far made de- livery of the possession thereof as to render the sale good as against subsequent execution creditors. Barr v. Boyles, 253. Rothermel v. Marr, 421. See JOINT DEBTORS.
DECEDENTS' ESTATES. An adopted child, although possessed of the right to inherit, has no right to demand letters of administration upon the estate of the adopted parent. McCully's Appeal, 80.
In granting letters of administration, the Register is not at liberty to disregard the clearly expressed wishes of the parties preferred by the law and entitled to the estate, even if they be non-residents. If a to- tal stranger has been appointed, the Register, upon application of the next of kin, should vacate the let- ters granted and appoint some suitable nominee of
DECEDENTS' ESTATES-Continued. such parties in whom they can confide. Jones's Ap- peal, 249.
Where the class primarily entitled to administra- tion upon a decedent's estate consists of several per- sons, it is the duty of the Register to grant letters to such one or more of them as he shall judge will best administer the estate. He may thus grant letters to them all jointly, if they so desire; or in his discretion, he may select one of them, and commit the adminis- tration to him alone to the exclusion of the others, and when properly exercised, this discretion is not the subject of review. Brubaker's Appeal, 251.
An executor de son tort, while liable to creditors and legatees as well as to the rightful executor for such assets as may come into his hands, is not liable to citation before the Orphans' Court. (O, C.) Pow- er's Estate, 208.
The Orphans' Court has no power to direct the Register to issue letters testamentary to an executor named in a will only upon condition of his entering security for the faithful performance of his duties. Harberger's Appeal, 281.
It is only in the case of non-resident executors that a bond can be required of an executor, before the is suing of letters; the Acts of Assembly authorizing the requiring of security from insolvent executors only apply to proceedings to be instituted after the grant- ing of letters. Ib.
Executors cannot be required to enter security for the protection of remaindermen in the absence of proof of insolvency, waste, or mismanagement. (O. C.) Lindsay's Estate, 36.
Under what circumstances a bailee of securities is justified in surrendering them to the foreign executor of the bailee. Shakespeare v. Fidelity Co., 17.
Bonds of the United States, wherever deposited, are simply evidences of indebtedness, and cannot, there- fore, acquire a situs different from the domicile of their owner. Orcutt's Appeal, 164.
Presumptively an executor makes an honest use of the assets of the estate coming into his possession. Fishburn's Appeal, 489
A devise to executors in trust to hold for purposes mentioned, then to sell at discretion and to divide the proceeds among children, is a power of sale to make distribution vested in the executors virtute officii; and such a power survives to an administrator c. t. a. Dorff's Appeal, 335.
An appraisement of real estate must be demanded by a widow in order to entitle her to the $300 exemp- tion out of the proceeds of the real estate of her hus- band. (O. C.) Andress's Estate, 52.
When a purchaser proceeds in the Orphans' Court by bill or petition under the Act of February 24, 1834, to enforce specific performance of a decedent's contract for the sale of land, notice to the heirs or devisees of the real estate is requisite as well as notice to the ex- ecutors or administrator. Hoffner v. Wynkoop, 3.
As to heirs or devisees not so notified, the proceed- ings are void. Their title will not pass by the deed executed in pursuance of the decree of the Orphans' Court. Hoffner v. Wynkoop, 3.
What not sufficient evidence to charge an executor with the receipt of property known to have been in the posse sion of the testator a short time prior to her death. Milligan's Appeal, 203.
DECEDENTS' ESTATES-Continued. Act was not intended to change the rules of evidence or regulate the quantum of proof, but to make the claim a preferred claim when established in the ordi- nary mode. McConnell's Appeal, 1. Construction of a bequest of a residuary estate for the construction of a monument. See WILL. Bain- bridge's Appeal, 443.
Legacy charged on land, when discharged by a sheriff's sale. See LEGACY. Woods v. White, 19. Distribution of balance of proceeds of sheriff's sale of real estate of a decedent after payment of liens of record. See CONVERSION. Squire's Appeal, 118.
Power of an auditor to inquire into the validity of a deed conveying the interest of a distributee of an interest in decedent's estate, alleged to have been fraudulently obtained. See AUDITOR. McGetrick's Appeal, 460.
The collateral inheritance tax is payable only upon estates passing by a will operative within this State, or under the intestate laws thereof, or by deed or grant intended to take effect after the death of the decedent. Orcutt's Appeal, 164.
The collateral inheritance tax does not attach to the very articles of property of which the deceased died possessed; it is only imposed upon what remains for distribution after payment of expenses and debts. Ib.
Bonds of the United States belonging to one who died domiciled in New Jersey, but left for safe keeping with a trust company in Philadelphia, are not subject to a collateral inheritance tax in Pennsylvania. Ib.
The collateral inheritance taxes imposed upon the estates of the life-tenant and remainder-man are sepa- rate and independent. (O. C.) Wharton's Estate, 105.
Although under ordinary circumstances, in case of deficiency of assets, all legacies must abate propor- tionately, the rule does not apply to a legacy given in consideration of services rendered. (O. C.) Gass- man's Estate, 275.
Stock dividends, whether to be awarded to life- tenant or remainder-man. See CORPORATIONS. (C. P.) Vinton's Estate, 49. (0. C.) Condy's Estate, 319.
Where the contest as to the validity of a testamen- tary paper is substantially between two sets of lega- tees the executor has no right to espouse the interests of either party, and will not be entitled to credit for lega expenses incured by him in successfully main- taining the validity of the instrument. Rankin's Appeal, 235.
An agreement by one of two executors to charge no commissions is not binding upon the co-executor. (O. C.) Porter's Estate, 276.
An executor who converts the funds of the estate to his own use and fails to account until compelled so to do is not entitled to commissions. Milligan's Appeal, 203
See ORPHANS' COURT. WILL.
DEED. Evidence of misdescription of property covered by a mortgage is inadmissible where the pur- pose is to make the mortgage a lien upon property against which, after the execution of the mortgage, judgment creditors have obtained a lien. Wentz's Appeal, 284.
A deed of trust authorizing the trustee to mortgage the premises with the consent of the cestui que trust, The Act of 1834, which makes wages for one year a a married woman, in order to pay off part of the pur- preferred claim, is not inconsistent with the presump-chase-money, does not validate a bond and warrant tion that, when a servant leaves the employ of his given by the cestui que trust and married woman to master without demanding wages, there has been a secure a party advancing money to pay off the pur- payment of such wages as they were earned. The chase-money. Grosser v. Hornung, 463.
An indenture of apprenticeship, whereby a man and wife covenanted that the apprentice was to be their adopted child, and to be brought up and educated as their own child, is not such a deed of adoption as will confer the right of inheritance; its effect is limited to the lifetime of the adopting parents. McCully's Ap- peal, 80.
A conveyance, absolute upon its face, but in fact intended as security for money loaned, is in fact a mortgage. Distribution of proceeds of sale of mort- gaged property as between judgment creditors of the mortgagor and a mortgagee of the interest of the grantee under the deed having notice of the facts. Merkel and Smith's Appeal, 116.
Acknowledgment of married woman, sufficiency of. See HUSBAND AND WIFE. McCully's Appeal, 80. Pow- ell's Appeal, 485.
DIVORCE. See HUSBAND AND WIFE. DOWER. See HUSBAND AND WIFE.
EJECTMENT. A bill quia timet to set aside an agreement concerning lands, on the ground that the same is a cloud upon complainant's title, will not lie where there is no allegation of fraud, accident, or mistake. The right of a party to have a trial by jury cannot be taken away by this expedient. Meck's Appeal, 397.
Where surveys have been made and returned.as a block, the location of each tract therein may be proved by proving the location of the block. The inquiry is not where a tract should or might have been located, but where it was actually located. Every mark on the ground tending to show the location of any tract in the block is some evidence of the location of the whole block, and therefore of every tract therein. Coal Co. v. Clement, 321.
A practical surveyor is competent to testify whether, in his opinion, certain marks on trees, piles of stones on the ground, were intended as monuments of boun- daries. Ib.
The location of a junior warrant may throw light upon the location of a senior warrant which it calls to adjoin, where the division-line between the two was returned as of the same length in each return, and where both warrants having been in the surveyor's hands at the same time were located by the same surveyor. Ib.
Where the location of a tract long before surveyed has, up to the time of bringing a suit in reference thereto, been generally recognized to be as claimed by one of the parties, evidence to the effect that sur- veyors and other parties interested, including the opposite party, had forinerly recognized its location to be such, is admissible to prove that that is its true location, even though there may be other evidence in the case showing that that is not the true location. Kramer v. Goodlander, 469.
EJECTMENT-Continued. same effect as a conditional verdict. Heath v. Gard- ner, 495.
In ejectment for purchase-money, a conditional ver- diet or report of a referee may be entered providing that on failure of defendant to comply with the terms therein stipulated, the plaintiff shall be entitled to a sale of the real estate in question in order that from the proceeds he may realize the balance due him. Ib. Before a party can obtain the benefit of the Act of June 11, 1879, compelling a purchaser at sheriff's sale to bring an ejectment within ninety days, the rule taken under the Act must be made absolute, and final judgment entered thereon. Hence an ejectment brought pending a rule under the Act to show cause is in time, although issued more than ninety days af- ter service of the rule to show cause upon the pur- chaser. Dewees v. Letchford, 61.
Practice in proceedings under a rule upon a sheriff's vender to bring an ejectment, under the Act of June 11, 1879. When rule to be made returnable. (C. P.) Love v. Building Association, 257.
A rule to bring a second ejectment cannot be taken against the parties successful in the first suit. (C. P.) Wynkoop v. Hoffner, 173.
ELECTIONS. See CORPORATIONS. Gowen's Ap- peal, 85.
EMINENT DOMAIN. See DAMAGES, MEAS URE OF. RAILROADS, ROADS, HIGHWAYS, and BRIDGES. EQUITABLE EJECTMENT. See EJECTMENT EQUITY. Specific performance will not be de creed in favor of a vendee, unless he is able to offer a title marketable beyond a reasonable doubt; against a vendee where he is able to show any cir cumstances which would make it inequitable to do so Mitchell e. Steinmetz, 43.
A court of equity has power to compel executors t carry out the provisions of a will in reference to th building of a church, and where a discretion is vester in the trustees which they fail to exercise, the Cour will exercise the discretion in their place. (C. P. Swinney v. Fidelity Co., 290.
An interpleader will not be granted in equity unles the plaintiff show that he is ignorant of the rights the respective parties who are called upon by bim 1 interplead, or at least that there is a reasonable doul in point of fact as to which claimant is entitled to ti money, so that he cannot safely pay a fund in h hands to one without risk of being required to ps again to another. Jordan's Appeal, 37.
A bill, quia timet, to set aside an agreement co cerning lauds on the ground that the same is a clot upon complainant's title, will not lie where there no allegation of fraud, accident, or mistake. Meck Appeal, 397.
A bill in equity may be maintained to secure 1 demption of co laterals when the debt for which th were pledged has been satisfied. (C. P.) Ward Mooney, 256.
The declarations of a deceased surveyor, made by him on the ground and at the time of examining a A contract for the sale of land will be rescinded line, are admissible in evidence. Kramer v. Good-equity only where there has been mutual mistake lander, 474.
Where a party claims title to real estate under a sale of an unseated tract, whereof it is alleged to be a part, for taxes, evidence that said real estate was included at the time of sale within the described limits of an adjoining seated tract whereon taxes had been regularly paid, is admissible to show want of title thereto in the party claimant. Kramer v. Goodlander, 469, 474.
In ejectment for purchase-money, a referee under the Act of April 6, 1869, may file a report having the
misrepresentation and fraud; unless the evidence these be so clear as to leave no room for hesitation doubt in the mind of the Court, the parties should remitted to their legal remedies. Lynch's Appeal, 36
A chancellor may refuse to enforce the execution a contract on the ground of improvidence, surpri or hardship; but sh uld rescind a contract only fraud, illegality, or mistake. Ib.
Under what circumstances a decree will be ma ordering the satisfaction and cancellation of a mo gage. (C. P.) Clark v. Gibson, 522.
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