MUNICIPAL CORPORATION - Continued.
Highways during his term of office. Baldwin v. Phila-
delphia, 558.

An ordinance of City Councils is not a law within
the prohibition of Art. III.. § 13, of the Constitution. Ib.
In order that the return of an ordinance to councils
by the mayor of a city of the third class may be effec-
ti e as a veto, such return must be made within fif.
teen days after he has received the same. A return
made after that period, although before the next meet-
ing of councils is ineffective. Penna. Globe Gas-
light Co. v. Scranton, 269.

The City Controller, under the Act of 23 May, 1874,
is not merely a ministerial officer, but is invested with
discretionary powers. When called upon to counter-
sgu a warrant he must approve it as one having
deliberative and discretionary powers, and as the
guardian of the city treasury, and h's judgment there-
on is not reviewable by the Courts. Runkle v. Com-
monwealth, 213.

The filing of a duly approved bond by the Clerk of
Select Councils of Reading, is a condition precedent
to his entry upon his office, and until it is done, his
predecessor is entitled to hold over. Howell v. Com-
monwealth, 215.

Liability of for damages for opening streets. See
ROADS, HIGHWAYS, AND BRIDGES. Pusey v. Allegheny,

561.

NEGLIGENCE-Continued.

except, perhaps, at a crossing, it owes no such duty to
the public. Ib.

Toe jumping by a passenger from a street car while
it is in motion is contributory negligence on his part,
for which the refusal or neglect of the conductor to
stop when requested is no ju-tification. (C. P.)
Hagan v. Phila. and Gray's Ferry Pass. R. W. Co.,
360.

Where in an action for the loss of a mill alleged to
have been destroyed by the n gligent construction of
the defendant's dam, the defence is that the loss was
occasioned by a storm of unprecedented character,
which swelled the creek upon which the dam was
situated, evidence is inadmissible to show that other
neighboring creeks were at the same time violently
and unprecedently swelled by the same storm. Min-
nequa Springs Co. v. Coon, 502.

The taking of an acknowledgment by a notary pub-
lic, under the law of this State is a judicial ac1, and
his liability for issuing an erroneous or false certificate
is only that of any officer performing a judicial act.
Commonweal h v. Haines, 392.

A gratuitous bailee is liable only for gross negli-
gence, while a bailee for hire is liable for slight negli-
gence; whether the bailment is gratuitous or for hire
is a question for the jury. Swar'z v. Hauser, 434.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT See BILLS

NECESSARIES. Action for. See HUSBAND
AND WIFE. Carn v. Fillman, 152.

NEGLIGENCE. Where a passenger on a ferry
boat, standing in the cabin door was thrown down by the
shock produced by the boat str king the slip with
violence, a referee found that the company was guilty
of negligence, and that the plaintiff was not guilty of
contributory negligence. Upon error, the Supreme
Court held that the referee's findings upon these ques-
tions of fact were equivalent to a verdict of a jury.
Camden Ferry Co. v. Monaghan, 46.

A railroad company is not liable for damages result-
ing from the ordinary, legitimate, and lawful use of
their road. Hence, when a horse, being driven by the
side of a track is frightened by escaping steam, ruus
off and injures the occupants, the railroad company is
not liable. Drayton v. North Penna. R. R. Co., 55.
Although a master does not warrant the safety of
his servants, he is under an implied contract to fur-
nish such instruments, means, and places for conduct-
ing the business, that they can perform their duties
safely and without exposure to danger which is not
within the reasonable scope of their employment.
Green St. P. R. W. Co. v. Bresner, 379.

In an action against a passenger railway company
to recover damages for an injury occasioned by the
kick of a vicious mare belonging to the defendant,
evidence is admissible in order to show that the com-
pany knew of the character of the mare, that the de-
fendant's stable-boss knew of it, and had a conversation
with the company's superintendent relative to her
sale. Ib.

When in an action to recover damages for the death
of another, alleged to have been caused by the negli
gence of the defendant or his servants, there is no
evidence of such negligence, or, at most, a scintilla
only, it is the duty of the Court to give the jury bind-
ing instructions to find for the defendant. Phila. and
R. R. Co. v. Schertle, 125. Baker v. Fehr, 56.

There is no duty on the part of a railroad company
to ballast its track for the safety of its employés, and

NONSUIT. Where a plaintiff has been non-
suited in a former action for the same cause, the pro-
per practice is to take a rule for stay of proceedings.
(C. P.) Keen ». Bockius, 260.
NOTARY PUBLIC. Liability of, for false cer-
t'ficate of search. See NEGLIGENCE. Commonwealth
v. Haines, 392.

NOTICE. Of unrecorded mortgage, when suffi-
cient. See MORTGAGE. Phillipsburg Savings Bank's
Appeal, 265.

To agent, when binding on principal. See PRINCIPAL
AND AGENT. Phillipsburg Savings Bank's Appeal, 265.
See LIS PENDENS. Dovey's Appeal, 389.

NUISANCE. Injunction to restrain. See EQUITY.

ORPHANS' COURT. The Orphans' Court has
no jurisdiction over an executor de son tort. (O. C.)
Power's Estate, 208.

The Orphans' Court has sole jurisdiction over the
settlement of the accounts of executors, and hence
where a distributive share is claimed by an attaching
creditor of the distributee, and also by his assignee,
they must present their claims in that Court. Lex's
Appeal, 209.

A guardian cannot be compelled to file an account
unless funds have come into his hands as such. (0.
C.) Portuondo's Estate, 174.

The Orphans' Court has jurisdiction to compel a
testamentary guardian to file an account, even though
the will was proved in another State, when the guar-
dian, ward, and estate are within the jurisdiction.
(0. C.) Aaron Mayer's Estate, 261.

The legal discretion of the Orphans' Court in the
appointment of guardians is not reviewable in the
Supreme Court. Gray's Appeal, 248.

A minor upon arriving at the age of fourteen has
not the naked legal right to make choice of a new
guardian in the place of one previously appointed.
Ib.

Where a purchaser proceeds in the Orphans' Court
by bill or petition under the Act of 24 February,
1834, to enforce specific performance of a decedent's
contract for the sale of land, notice to the heirs or

ORPHANS' COURT- Continued.
devisees of the real estate is requisite, as well as no-
tice to the executors or administrators. Hoffner v.
Wynkoop, 3.

As to heirs or devisees not so notified, the proceed-
ings are void. Their title will not pass by the deed
executed in pursuance of the decree of the Orphans'
Court. Ib.

The Act of 1836 confers upon the Orphans' Court no
power to make distribution of a minor's estate among
parties making claim against it as creditors.
C.) Shore's Estate, 572.

(O.

Under what circumstances an issue will be directed
from the Orphans' Court to the Common Pleas to de-
termine the kinship of a petitioner, claiming partition,
to the deceased owner of the estate. (0. C.) Arm-
strong's Estate, 571.

The Orphans' Court has no power to discharge a
dower right charged upon real estate sold under the
order of the Court, by directing payment of the prin-
cipal sum to the administrator. (0. C.) Soley's
Estate, 67.

Under what circumstances an order will be made
for the payment of an allowance to a minor. (O. C.)
Mayer's Estate, 264.

Under what circumstances an amendment of a return
to an order of sale will not be allowed. (0. C.)
Fritz's Estate, 51.

PARTNERSHIP-Continued.

of partnership assets under an assignment for the
benefit of creditors, no one is entitled to share but a
firm creditor. Strickler's Appeal, 535.

Partnership property cannot be taken in execution
upon a judgment-note signed in the firm name by one
partner, and given for his individual indebtedness.
(C. P.) Vandegrift v. Redheffer, 484.

PASSENGER RAILWAY. Taxation of horses
and cars of. See TAXES AND TAXATION. (C. P.)
Citizens' Pass. R. W. v. Donohugh, 62.
See NEGLIGENCE.

PAYMENT. Presumption of. See JUDGMENT.

LEGACY.

PHILADELPHIA. The City Councils cannot
by ordinance, granting to an individual a special privi-
lege, authorize an encroachment upon a highway.
(C. P.) Commonwealth v. Harris, 10.

PILOTAGE. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. (U. S.
D. C.) Chambers v. The Clymene, 537.

PLEADING. In an action by the Commonwealth
to the use of Martin, City Treasurer, a declaration,
averring an indebtedness to Martin, is bad. (C. P.)
Commonwealth v. Leonard, 537.

A replication which neither pursues the declaration
nor fortifies it, is bad on demurrer (C. P.) Eckel v.
Association, 64.

The Orphans' Court has no jurisdiction upon a pe-
tition for a review under the Act of Oct. 13, 1840, to
vacate a decree confirming an auditor's report dis-
tributing a fund, after actual payment to the distribu-
tees in accordance with the decree. Lehr's Appeal,

282.

Under what circumstances a guardian will be at-
tached for a contempt. Leiter's Appeal, 225.

PAROL TRUSTS. See TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES.
Fricke v. Magee, 50.

PARTITION. Owelty in partition constitutes a
first lien on the purpart of the former tenant in com-
mon, and is entitled to priority over a mortgage of his
undivided interest given by the tenant before the
partition. Appeal of McCandless's Executors, 563.

Discharge of dower by decree of Orphans' Court.
See ORPHANS' COURT. (O. C.) Soley's Estate, 67.
PARTNERSHIP. The members of an incor-
porated Masonic lodge are not as such partners, and
so liable for all debts contracted on account of the
lodge; but each member of a committee of the lodge
giving an order, and each member of the lodge as-
senting to the action of the committee, is liable. Ash
v. Guie, 198.

Acts of Assembly relative to competency of wit-
nesses in actions against surviving partners construed.
See EVIDENCE. Ash v. Guie, 198.

A promise by partners who purchase the assets of a
firm for a fixed price to be distributed among the
creditors of the old firm pro rata is not a promise to
pay the debt of another, and hence need not be in
writing. Wynn v. Wood, 345.

In the distribution of a fund produced by the sale

tion is that the trial was had on the amended narr.,
and that the mere fact that the Court did not order
the plaintiff on the trial to elect under which narr. he
would try, afforded no ground of reversal. Carn v.
Fillman, 152.

Pleas in abatement cannot be joined with those in
bar. (C. P.) Gallagher v. Thornley, 189.

A plea by a defendant in a mechanics' lien as owner
that he is not the owner is bad. (C. P.) Spare v.
Walz, 82.

A plea of lis pendens is a plea in abatement, and
not in bar. (C. P.) Holtzner v. Byrne, 101.

Where a judgment has been obtained against an
unincorporated society, and no execution issued, and
subsequently the members of such society are sned
for the same claim, a plea of former recovery on their
part is a nullity. Ash v. Guie, 198.

Evidence that after the bringing of an action, the
defendant signed a judgment note for the same cause
of action, upon which judgment was subsequently en-
tered, is good under a plea of former recovery. Jones
v. Ellison, 205.

Evidence of "former recovery," though not admissi-
ble under the plea of “accord and satisfaction," is ad-
missible under the general issue in assumpsit. Ib.
A plea of puis darrein continuance is a waiver of all
former pleas of the party pleading it.
Woods v.
White, 19.

A replication must be filed to a plea concluding
with a verification, or the cause will not be at issue.
(C. P.) Klein v. McGeough, 482.

See CRIMES.

POWER. A devise to executors to hold in trust
for a period specified, and then at their discretion to
sell the land devised and the proceeds to divide
among parties named, is a power of sale to make dis-
tribution vested in the executors virtute officii, and
survives to an administrator d. b. n. c. t. a. Dorff's
Appeal, 335.

POWER-Continued.

When a discretion as to the application of a fund
for charitable purposes is vested in executors, and
the executors die during the pendency of a prior life
estate, and before the occasion for the exercise of the
discretion arises, the power is dead. Appeal of Chil-
dren's Hospital, 313.

Although there be a clause in the will authorizing
the executors to fill vacancies occurring among them,
and conferring upon such successors "all the power
and authority" of the original executors, yet in the
absence of executors so nominated, an administrator
d. b. n. c. t. a. cannot exercise the discretion. Ib.

It is not necessary that in the execution of a power
there should be a recital of the fact that it is an exe-
cution of such power. It is enough if from the entire
transaction an intent to execute it is shown. (C. P.)
Wynkoop ". Wynkoop, 65.

A power of revocation contained in a deed of trust
is well executed by a will whereby the trust estate is
devised to other uses than those declared in the deed,
even though in the will there is no express allusion
to the deed or the power of revocation. Taylor's Ap-
peal, 48.

PRACTICE. Service of process upon corpora-
tions. See CORPORATIONS. Ins. Co. v. Storrs, 304.
Hagerman v. S ate Co. 491. Anspach v. Ins. Co., 568.
The right of a defendant arrested upon a capias to
enter a plea of freehold is not limited to the quarto
die post. It may be done within any reasonable time.
(C. P.) Ingersoll v. Campbell, 553.

A discontinuance will not be permitted if done to
vex the defendant. (C. P.) Brooks v. Prentzel, 319.
A non pros. for want of a narr. entered through the
negligence of the plaintiff's attorney will not be taken
off after the lapse of over three years. (C. P.) Bax-
ter v. Seeley, 208.

The Court will not direct the Prothonotary to set
out in full upon the appearance docket matters which
are contained in the original papers constituting the
record. (C. P.) Myer v. Verner, 138.

Depositions read in a cause belong to the Court, and
must be filed forthwith. (C. P.) O'Conner v. Weeks,
372.

An order will not be made upon the application of
the defendant requiring the personal attendance of
the use plaintiff at the trial. (C. P.) Girard Life
Ins. Co. v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 136.

Before service of a subpoena in divorce by the sher-
iff of a county other than that in which the libel was
filed, an order must be made in the Court of original
jurisdiction. (C. P.) Fillman v. Fillman, 222.

Plea of former recovery, when good. See PLEADING.
Ash v. Guie, 198. Jones v. Ellison, 205. Keen v.
Bockius, 260.

Trial and its incidents. The fact that a person
drawn as a juror is the second cousin of the husband
of a daughter and legatee of defendant's decedent,
constitutes good ground for a principal challenge by
the plaintiff. But if the plaintiff challenge the juror
to the favor, and the question be by agreement of the
parties submitted to the Court in place of trial, its de-
cision rests upon the conscience and discretion of the
Court, and is not reviewable. Wirebach's Executor
v. Bank, 143.

An application to have a case improperly on the
trial list stricken off should be made to the Judge sit-
ting for that period. (C. P.) Burke v. Allen, 138.
Under what circumstances a nonsuit entered in the
absence of the plaintiff's counsel will be stricken off.
(C. P.) Klein v. McGeough, 482.

An amendment of the plaintiff's bill of particulars

Where parties proceed to trial with the pleadings
in a defective condition, every presumption will be
taken hold of to sustain a verdict. Carn v. Fillman,
152.

Method of objecting to the admission of incompetent
evidence. See EVIDENCE. Baumgardner v. Burnham,
445.

A misdirection by which the rights of a party are
not prejudiced is not the ground for a reversal of the
judgment. Swartz v. Hauser, 434.

Remarks made by counsel to the jury in summing
up are dehors the record; and, no matter how im-
proper, constitute no ground of reversal on error.
Fulmer v. Commonwealth, 437.

Judicial comments disparaging to witnesses or par-
ties, and not grounded upon facts in evidence, or any
other judicial remarks similarly without foundation,
which may tend to mislead and prejudice the jury,
are improper and erroneous, and constitute ground
for reversal. Stokes v. Miller, 241.

Province of Court and jury in negligence cases.
See NEGLIGENCE. Baker v. Fehr, 56. Phila. & Read.
R. R. Co. v. Schertle, 125.

A Court has power after verdict to strike out sur-
plus matters erroneously introduced into it by the
jury. Watkins v. Building Association, 414.

Associate Judges. Practice sur motion for a new
trial in counties having Associate Judges. Van Vliet
v. Conrad, 464.

Reserved point. It is error for the Court to re-
serve a point of law without a finding of facts by the
jury, or a statement agreed upon, so that they may
appear upon the record. Verrier v. Guillou, 477.

A motion in arrest of judgment is technically a
waiver of a motion for a new trial; but where the es-
tablished practice has been to allow both motions, the
Court will not depart from it. (C. P.) Rohrbacker
v. Pugh, 275.

Other matters. An appeal from the Prothonotary's
taxation of costs brings up the merits of the taxation.
(C. P.) Ballinger v. Killam, 372.

Under what circumstances it is the duty of a sheriff
to make a special return. (C. P.) Building Asso-
ciation v. Steel, 238.

Exceptions to a report of a referee appointed under
the Act of May 14, 1874, should be taken directly to
the Supreme Court. Philadelphia v. Linnard, 148.

An auditor's report should be filed and exceptions
thereto heard by the Court in the first instance. (C.
P.) In re Nathan's Estate, 138.

Rule upon a purchaser to bring ejectment within
ninety days. See EJECTMENT.

See AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENCE LAW. AMENDMENT. AT-
TACHMENT. EQUITY. ERRORS AND APPEALS. EXECUTION.
EVIDENCE. JUDGMENT. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE. OR-
PHANS' COURT. PLEADING.

PRESUMPTION. In favor of the existence of
a separate estate of a wife, there is no legal presump-
tion; the husband on the contrary is presumed to be
the owner of the property of which he and his wife
have joint possession. Wilson v. Silkman, 364.

The fact that a transaction was between husband
and wife in no wise tends to rebut the presumption
that an assignment of securities was intended as
collateral and not in absolute payment of a debt.
Eby v. Hoopes, 315.

There is a presumption in favor of the regularity
and correctness of a judicial act, and the burden of

PRESUMPTION-Continued.

proving negligence is on him who asserts it.
monwealth v. Haines, 392.

RAILROADS-Continued.

Presumption of payment of legacy. See LEGACY.
Bentley's Estate, 224.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. Where a master
directs a servant to write a letter in terms capable of
a double construction, he is bound to see that the
servant has in writing the letter placed such a con-
struction on his orders as the master intended. If
the master fail to do this, he will be bound by a con-
tract entered into by him in such letter, even though
the opposite construction of his orders to what he
intended has been placed upon them by the servant
in writing the letter. McConn v. Lady, 493.

Where a person assuming without authority to act
as agent for another, enters into a contract either in
his own name or in that of his alleged principal, the
party with whom he contracts upon discovering the
lack of authority may sue in tort, or elect to consider
him as the principal in the contract, and hold him
liable thereon. Ib.

The infringement of the copyright laws by an agent
does not render a principal ignorant of the acts of such
agent liable to the penalty imposed by the Revised
Statutes. (U. S. D. C.) Schreiber v. Sharpless, 403. |
What not sufficient evidence to charge one whom
it is sought to hold liable as an agent. Milligan's
Appeal, 203.

Where one accepts a note signed by the maker as
agent with the understanding that the principal is to
be looked to for payment, no recovery can be had
against the agent. (C. P.) Janeway v. Moss, 337.

What not sufficient evidence of agency, to charge
the principal with notice of facts brought home to the
agent in the course of his employment. Phillips-
burg Savings Bank's Appeal, 265.

Where a person deals bona fide with an agent as
owner without knowledge of his agency, he may set
off any claim he may have against the agent in
answer to the demand of the principal. Frame v.
William Penn Coal Co., 331.

Confidential relation between promoters of a cor-
poration and the corporation. See CORPORATION. Pen-
nell's Appeal, 297.

As between stock broker and customer. See CON-

TRACT.

PRINCIPAL AND SURETY. See SURETY.
PRISON INSPECTORS. Action against for
false imprisonment. (C. P.) Reinhart v. Vaux, 222.
PURCHASER FOR VALUE While taking
a security as collateral for an antecedent debt does
not make the creditor a holder for value so as to
give him the rights of a bona fide purchaser, yet the
rule is otherwise where it is taken in payment or ex-
tinguishment of the debt. Dovey's Appeal, 389.

QUO WARRANTO. The writ of quo warranto
is not issuable upon the suggestion of a private relator
where the question involves the existence of a cor-
poration. Commonwealth ex rel. Hoffman v. Phila-
delphia and C. C. R. R. Co., 400.

RAILROADS. The grant of a right to construct
a railroad carries with it, by necessary implication,
the right to construct all works and appendages usual
in the convenient operation of a railroad. Sidings
leading to manufacturing or mining establishments
held by private owners are among such works, and
for this purpose the corporation may take, by virtue
of the delegated power of eminent domain in it re-

A railroad company in the absence of express char-
ter authority has no power to issue an irredeemable
obligation. (U. S. C. C.) McCalmont v. Phila. and
Read. R. R. Co., 338.

Where the net earnings of a railroad company which
is under a receivership are sufficient to purchase neces-
sary rolling stock and equipments, they should be so
applied, and the receivers will not be authorized to
create a loan secured by a car trust for their purchase,
merely in order to allow the earnings of the road to
be applied to the interest due the bondholders. (U.
S. C. C.) Taylor v. P. & R. R. R. Co., 554.
Action against by owner of horse frightened by a
locomotive. See NEGLIGENCE. Drayton v. North
Penna. R. R. Co., 55.

Action against passenger railway by one injured in
jumping from a car in motion, See NEGLIGENCE. (C.
P.) Hagan v. Phila. and Gray's Ferry P. R. W. Co.,
360.

Action against passenger railway by one kicked by
a horse. See NEGLIGENCE. Green and Coates Passenger
Railway Co. v. Bresmer, 379.

Action against railroad by brakeman thrown under
train. See NEGLIGENCE. Phila. & Read. R. R. Co. v.
Sche tle, 125.
See

Injunction to restrain work of construction.
INJUNCTION. Hoffmann's Appeal, 401.
Injunction to restrain grade crossing. See INJUNC-
TION. Baltimore & C. R. R. Co.'s Appeal, 530.

Injunction to restrain obstruction of highway. See
INJUNCTION. (C. P.) Cox v. P. W. & B. R. R. Co.,
552.

RECEIVER. See RAILROAD.

RECORDER OF DEEDS. Limitation of lia-
bility of recorder of deeds for false search. See LIMI-
TATIONS. (C. P.) Ashton v. Walton, 452.

REFEREE. Findings of facts by a referee are as
conclusive as the verdict of a jury. Camden Ferry Co.
v. Monaghan, 46.

Exceptions to the report of a referee under Act of
May 14, 1874, should be taken directly to the Supreme
Court. Philadelphia r. Linnard, 148.

Conditional award of a referee in ejectment. See
EJECTMENT. Heath v. Gardner, 495.
REGISTER OF WILLS.

ESTATES.

See DECEDENTS'

RES ADJUDICATA. The finding of an au-
well as of law having been confirmed by the Court,
ditor upon a question involving matters of fact as
and being unappealed from, is conclusive in subse-
quent proceedings. (C. P.) Hoopes's Estate, 223.

The sustaining of a demurrer to a bill in equity is
simply a decision that the complainant has not set
out a case entitling him to relief. It is not a decision
on the merits, and hence cannot be put in evidence
against the complainant in a subsequent proceeding
in the same cause of action as a bar to his relief or
recovery. Detrick v. Sharrar, 287.

The affirmance of a judgment in a road case heard

RES ADJUDICATA-Continued.

before the Supreme Court on certiorari, and not on
the merits, is not conclusive of any question involved
in the merits. (C. P.) Philadelphia v. Kensington
T. P. Co., 357.

TRUSTEES.

RIVERS. Jurisdiction of State over marginal
waters. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. (U. S. C. C.)
Chambers v. Clymene. 537. Comth. v. Ferry Co. 509.
ROADS, HIGHWAYS, AND BRIDGES.
Where a property owner through whose land a street
has been run is injured, both by reason of the taking
of part of his land for the construction of the street,
and also by reason of the cutting and grading thereof,
he must in proceedings to recover damages submit his
whole claim to the viewers and the Court, and that
part thereof which he neglects so to submit must be
taken to have been waived, and no second process
can be had for its recovery. Pusey v. Allegheny, 561.
Where grading occurs as a separate act of the pub-
lic authorities, and so long after the opening of the
street that the assessment of the damages at the time
of the appropriation cannot include those resulting
from the grading, the latter may be ascertained in a
subsequent proceeding instituted in accordance with
the provisions of the Act of May 1, 1876. Ib.

The Supreme Court will not on error to a judgment
in an appeal under the Act of June 13, 1874, from the
report of viewers appointed to assess damages result-
ing from the opening and grading of a street, take
notice of the fact that such grading was done subse-
quently to the report of the viewers appealed from,
where nothing to that effect appears upon the record.
Ib.

Under the Acts of April 21, 1855, and April 1, 1864,
allowing damages and benefits to land-owners for the
opening and widening of streets, the actual taking of
land is the ultimate basis of the right to have dam-
ages; hence, where the opening of the street is not a
legal possibility, there can be no recovery. In re
Thirty-ninth St., 384.

Amount of damages recoverable for compelling a
property owner making alterations to recede to the
south line of Chestnut Street as now established. See
DAMAGES. Philadelphia v. Linnard, 148.

Since the Act of May 3, 1869, it is the duty of the
Court of Quarter Sessions of Philadelphia County to
specify which exceptions are sustained and which
dismissed, as well as to state that the report of view-
ers is set aside in pursuance of exceptions sustained.
In re Germantown Avenue, 433.

The award of a road jury cannot be attacked in a
collateral proceeding. Scott v. Philada., 317.

In proceedings under the Act of March 24, 1869, to
appropriate turnpike roads to the use of the public, a
corporation owning such road will still be entitled to
damages for the taking thereof, though its stock may
have no market value, and the property itself be un-
productive. In re Kensington Turnpike Co., 177.

Under the Act of May 3, 1869, the Courts of Quarter
Sessions cannot set aside the verdicts of road juries
for matter dehors the record. Ib.

Where in a road case the report of appraisers is
filed, and exceptions are filed thereto by the city
against whom the award has been made, at the same
term as that in which the report has been filed, and
then by agreement of all parties, the exceptions are

SALE. In a sale of growing timber, where no im-
mediate severance is contemplated, the timber is to
be deemed to continue real estate. Wilson v. Doug-
lass, 527.

Distinction between a conditional sale and a bail-
ment. See CONTRACT. Stadtfeld v. Huntsman, 216.
Brunswick v. Hoover, 219.

SALVAGE. In salvage cases the measure of
compensation is what both parties would have con-
tracted for, and is proportionate to the risk run by
the salvor in saving and that incurred by the saved
vessel in declining assistance at the time of the peril.
(U. S. D. C.) The Mary E. Long, 192.

SCHOOLS. Right of colored children to admission
to public schools. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. (C. P.)
Commonwealth v. Davis, 156.
See

Sufficiency of.

SEARCH WARRANT.
CRIMINAL LAW. Moore v. Coxe, 135.
SET-OFF. Under what circumstances a claim
against an agent may be set off against the principal.
See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. Frame v. Coal Co., 331.

An attorney at-law or in fact employed to collect a
claim, when he has received or recovered the money,
has no right to set off an antecedent debt or claim in
his own right against his constitunt. Simpson v.
Pinkerton, 423.

Under what circumstances one judgment may not
be set off against another. (C. P.) Windle v. Moore,
387,

Set-off, when not allowed in replevin. (C. P.)
Reeves v. Pritchard, 523.

What may be set off as against claim for rent. See
LANDLORD AND TENANT. Allegaert v. Smart, 29.

Right of mortgagor who conveys subject to mort-
gage to set off usurious interest paid by him to mort-
gagee on other mortgages given to secure the same
debt. Parker v. Sulouff, 26.

Limitation to claim of set off. See LIMITATIONS.
Verrier v. Guillou, 477.

The board of directors in an insolvent bank having
duly made an assessment on unpaid stock subscrip-
tions for the purpose of meeting the liabilities of a
bank, a depositor cannot set off the amount due him
on account of his deposit against the amount of assess-
ment due by him on account of unpaid stock subscrip-
tions. Bank v. Bastian, 71.

SHERIFF. Liability of for wrongful seizure.
See TREspass.

SHERIFF'S SALES. See EXECUTION.

SHIPPING. Cargo loaded on deck, when jetti-
soned, is entitled to the benefit of contribution, if
there is a general custom so to load. (U. S. C. C )
Wood v. Phoenix Iron Co., 277.

See SALVAGE. The Mary E. Long, 192.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. See EQUITY.
Mitchell v. Steinmetz, 43. Of contract of decedent.
See DECEDENTS' ESTATES. Hoffner v. Wynkoop, 3.

STATUTES. Title of, when not sufficient. See
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Ruth's Appeal, 498.

Where the meaning of certain words in a statute