[M'Bride v. Hoey.]

of the court to give this value to the deed, the United States law was violated, or set at nought. The object was to show, that with this deed, and possession of the land, he should have been allowed to redeem the land from the tax sale under which William Hoey claimed. A mere possession of lands gives a right to redeem, 8 Cranch, 249; 7 Wheat. 59.

The courts of Pennsylvania having decided that the plaintiff in error, having this deed, had not a right to redeem, does not this present a question within the jurisdiction of this Court, holding under a deed executed under a law of the United States? The construction of this title under the law, comes into question; not whether the plaintiff in error had a right to hold the land, but whether he had not a right to redeem it. A person having a colour of title may redeem. The effect of the deed was brought before the court; and this places the case within the rules of this Court as to the provisions of the 25th section of the judiciary act of 1789. Cited 1 Wheat. 304, 357; 6 Cranch, 286; 3 Wheat. 208; cited also 6 Smith's Laws of Pennsylvania, 301.

Mr. Chief Justice TANEY delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case comes before the Court on a writ of error, directed to the judges of the supreme court of Pennsylvania for the western district.

The material facts in the case may be stated in a few words; William Hoey, the defendant in error, brought an action of ejectment in the court of common pleas of Mercer county, for the land in question; claiming under a deed from Aaron Hakney, treasurer of the county, upon a sale made for taxes due on the said land to the state of Pennsylvania. This deed is dated October 14, 1822. The defendant offered in evidence a deed to him from Theophilus T. Ware, collector of the United States direct taxes, for the 10th collection district of the state of Pennsylvania, dated July 3, 1821; and also offered evidence, that on the 10th of June, 1824, he had paid to the treasurer of the county the taxes due on the land to the state, and for which it had been sold, as above stated, in order to redeem it.

It appears from the exception, that the defendant admitted that the sale made by the United States collector, was not warranted by the act of congress, and that the deed was invalid. But although the deed was inoperative, and did not convey the title to him, yet as he was in possession under this deed, claiming title, and the deed upon

[M'Bride v. Hoey.]

the face of it purported to convey the land to him; he insisted that the deed, coupled with the possession under it, was sufficient evidence of title to authorize him to redeem the land, within the time li.nited for redemption by the laws of Pennsylvania, after a sale or state taxes; and that having paid the taxes within that time, the title of the lessor under his deed was defeated.

The court of common pleas gave judgment in favour of the plaintiff; and the case being removed by writ of error to the supreme court of Pennsylvania for the western district, the judgment of the court of common pleas was there affirmed.

The statement of the case shows, that the question upon which the case turned, and which was decided by the supreme court, depended entirely upon the laws of Pennsylvania; and not upon the act of congress. The question brought before the state court, and there decided against the plaintiff in error, was this. Is a person in possession of land in Pennsylvania, claiming title to it, under a deed, which upon the face of it appears to be a good one, but which is inoperative and invalid, entitled to redeem the land after it has been sold for taxes due to the state; so as to defeat the title of the purchaser under the state law? It is evident that such a question must depend altogether upon the laws of the state, and not upon any law of the United States. The exception states that the plaintiff in error admitted that the sale and conveyance made by the United States collector was not warranted by the act of congress, and that his deed was invalid. No question was raised or decided by the court, upon the validity or construction of the act of congress, nor upon the authority exercised under it. The only question raised or decided in the state court was the one above stated; and upon such a question, depending altogether upon the state laws, this Court have no power to revise the decision of the state court, in this form of proceeding. The writ of error must therefore be dismissed.

On consideration of the motion made in this cause yesterday, and of the arguments of counsel thereupon had, as well in support of, as against the motion; it is now here considered, ordered and adjudged by this Court, that this writ of error to the supreme court of Pennsylvania for the western district be, and the same is hereby dismissed for the want of jurisdiction.

THE POSTMASTER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES V. STEPHEN TRIGG, ADMINISTRATOR OF ELIAS RECTOR.

Mandamus, Motion for a rule on the district judge of the district court of the United States for the Missouri district, to show cause why a mandamus should not issue from this Court, commanding him to order an execution to issue on a judgment entered in that court in the case of The Postmaster General of the United States v. Rector's administrator. The motion was founded on an attested copy of the record of the proceedings in the district court, by which it appeared that the district judge, on the motion of the district attorney of the United States for an order for an execution on this judgment," after mature deliberation thereon," overruled the motion. The rule to show cause was refused. The Court have looked into the practice of this Court upon motions of this sort, and it does not appear to have been satisfactorily settled. For any thing that appears in this case, there may have been sufficient reason for the decision of the district court overruling the motion for an execution; and there is nothing in the record to create a prima facie case of mistake, misconduct, or omission of duty, on the part of the district court. In such a state of facts, the Court are bound to presume that every thing was rightly done by the court, until some evidence is offered to show the contrary; and they cannot, upon the evidence before the Court, assume that there is any ground for its interposition.

A rule to show cause, is a rule upon the judge to explain his conduct; and implies that a case had been made out which makes it proper that this Court should know the reasons for his decision. Wherr the record does not show mistake, misconduct, or omission of duty on the part of the court, unless such a prima facie case to the contrary is made out, supported by affidavit; as would make it the duty of the Court to interpose, such a rule ought not to be granted.

Mr. Butler, Attorney-general, moved the Court for a rule on the district judge of the United States for the district of Missouri, to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not be issued, commanding him to order an execution to issue on the judgment of the said district court in this case.

Mr. Chief Justice TANEY delivered the opinion of the Court.

A motion has been made in this case by the attorney-general of the United States, for a rule on the judge of the district court of the United States, for the Missouri district, to show cause why a mandamus should not issue from this Court, commanding him to order an execution to issue on the judgment entered in that court in the case of the Postmaster General v. Trigg, administrator, &c.

The motion is founded upon an attested copy of the record of the proceedings in the district court, by which it appears that at Septem

[United States v. Trigg, administrator.]

ber term, 1834, the postmaster general recovered in the said court a judgment against the above named defendant, for the sum of 1,595 dollars 53 cents, the damages assessed by the jury and costs of suit. That at March term, 1835, the attorney of the United States moved the court to order the clerk to issue a fieri facias on this judgment, against the goods and chattels, lands and tenements of the said Elias Rector, deceased, in the hands of the said administrator, to be administered. At September term, 1835, the court decided upon this motion; and the record states that "after mature deliberation thereupon had," the court overruled the motion. This is the only evidence filed here by the attorney-general, in support of the motion for a rule to show cause why a mandamus should not issue.

The Court have looked into the practice of this Court upon motions of this sort, and it does not appear to have been satisfactorily settled: and we have therefore thought it a fit occasion, when the Court is full, to deliberate on the subject; and to state the principles by which the Court will be guided.

The district court, upon which the rule is proposed to be laid, is a court of record, and the proceedings in the case before us appear to have been conducted in regular form; and the decision which has given rise to this motion, to have been made after mature deliberation. For any thing that appears before us, there may have been sufficient reason for this decision; and there is nothing in the record to create a prima facie case of mistake, misconduct, or omission of duty on the part of the district court. In such a state of facts, we think that we are bound to presume that every thing was rightfully done by the court, until some evidence is offered to show the contrary; and cannot, upon the proof before us, assume that there is any ground for the interposition of this Court. A rule to show cause, is a call upon the judge to explain his conduct; and implies that a case had been made out which makes it proper that this Court should know the reasons for his decision. We think, that in a case like this, such a rule ought not to be granted, where the record does not show mistake, misconduct, or omission of duty on the part of the court; unless such a prima facie case to the contrary is made out, supported by affidavit, as would make it the duty of this Court to interpose.

-The rule is therefore refused; and it may be proper, in order to settle the practice in cases of this description, to state that the Court unanimously concur in this opinion.

THE STEAMBOAT ORLEANS, HENRY FORSYTH ET AL. CLAIMANTS, APPELLANTS V. THOMAS PHOEBUS.

Admiralty. It is very irregular, and against the known principles of courts of admiralty, to allow in a libel, in rem, and, quasi, for possession, the introduction of any other matters of an entirely different character; such as an account of the vessel's earnings, or the claim of the part owner for his wages and advances as

master.

The admiralty has no jurisdiction in matters of account between part owners. The master, even in a case of maritime services, has no lien upon the vessel for the payment of them.

The jurisdiction of courts of admiralty in cases of part owners having unequal interests and shares, is not, and never has been, applied to direct a sale upon any dispute between them as to the trade and navigation of the ship engaged in maritime voyages, properly so called. The majority of the owners have a right to employ the ship on such voyages as they please, giving a stipulation to the dissenting owners for the safe return of the ship; if the latter, upon a proper libel filed in the admiralty, require it: and the minority of the owners may employ the ship in the like manner, if the majority decline to employ her at all.

The admiralty has no jurisdiction over a vessel not engaged in maritime trade and navigation; though on her voyages she may have touched at one terminus of them in tide water, her employment having been substantially on other waters. The true test of its jurisdiction in all cases of this sort, is, whether the vessel is engaged, substantially, in maritime navigation, or in interior navigation and trade, not on tide waters.

The jurisdiction of courts of admiralty is limited in matters of contract, to those and those only, which are maritime.

The case of the Steamboat Jefferson, 10 Wheaton 429, 6 Cond. Rep. 175, cited and approved.

By the maritime law, the master has no lien on the ship even for maritime wages. The case of Peyroux v. Howard et al. 7 Peters, 343, cited.

The local laws of a state can never confer jurisdiction on the courts of the United States. They can only furnish rules to ascertain the rights of the parties, and thus assist in the administration of the proper remedies where the jurisdiction is vested by the laws of the United States.

AN appeal from the district court of the United States, for East Louisiana.

Thomas Phoebus, who is the owner of one-sixth part of the steamboat Orleans, on the 30th of November, 1835, filed a libel in the district court of the United States for the district of Louisiana, against the appellants, who are the owners of the other five-sixths of said