[470] pavement; and that the second claim of the | linger; and that the Van Camp patent showed only blocks formed in moulds, and removable Other testimony as to prior public use was introduced in this case, taken from the record in the case of Schillinger v. Phillip Best Brewing Co., in the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, which testimony was also introduced in the case against the Greenway Brewing Company, having been taken in November, 1882. In the decision in the latter case, it was correctly said of that testimony: "So far as it refers to prior use in Germany, not shown in a patent or printed publication, it was duly objected to in this case and must be excluded. As to the cement malt floor which Row laid in Baltimore twenty-five years ago, he shows that it was not made in sections detachable by free joints. The testimony of Botzler as to a prior malt floor laid by him in Chicago is too indefinite to amount to sufficient evidence to defeat a patent." So far as that testimony related to a pavement used in Germany, it was objected to at the time it was introduced in this case, as incompetent. It was clearly inadmissible under section 4923 of the Revised Statutes, because it did not show anything that had been patented or described in a printed publication. An examinaton of the patents put in evidence by the defendant, in connection with the testimony in regard to them, shows that the Claridge pavement was not a concrete pavement, and was not formed in detachable blocks, but was a continuous asphalt pavement; that the D'Harcourt pavement was not a concrete pavement laid in detached blocks or sections, nor We do not think that the reissued patent, could one section be removed without disturb as it stood after the filing of the disclaimer, ing adjacent sections; that the Russ patent was open to the objection that it was not for shows a concrete foundation for a stone pave the same invention as that of the original pament, the pavement proper being constructed tent. Whatever there was of objectionable of granite or syenite placed on top of the con- matter inserted in the specification or the first crete foundation, such concrete foundation claim of the reissue, when it was granted, was not being formed in detachable blocks, but removed by the disclaimer. The re-issue was only being provided at certain places with re-granted within ten months after the original. movable panels, consisting of frames filled with The single claim of the original patent was reconcrete, to be lifted out to give access to water peated in the reissue as the second claim of the pipes or for other purposes; that the Chesneau latter; and the first claim of the reissue, as it pavement was not a concrete pavement laid in stood after the disclaimer, did not expand bedetached sections or blocks, but was a contin-yond the claim of the original what was claimed uous pavement, provided with panels to give in the reissue. access in certain places to gas and water pipes, As to the amount of the decree, we think the the panels being made of sections set in frames, court properly awarded the sum of 4 cents per which were removably inserted in the sur-square foot as the profits of the defendant, and [472] rounding pavement, and there was no arrange ment of tar-paper or its equivalent between adjoining blocks of concrete, for the purpose set forth in the Schillinger patent; that the Coignet patent did not show a concrete pavement, made in detachable blocks after the manner of Schillinger's, and built on the ground where it was to remain; that the De la Haichois pavement was not a concrete pavement laid in de- In Elizabeth v. Nicholson Pavement Co. 97 U. tachable blocks or sections, or having the ar- S. 126, 139 [24:1000,1006], it is said that “When rangement of tar-paper or its equivalent between the entire profit of a business or undertaking adjoining blocks of concrete like that of Schil-results from the use of the invention, the pat that it was right to give to the plaintiff the [527] entec will be entitled to recover the entire | tions of the respondents to the libel be overprofits if he elects that remedy.' This lan- ruled. Affirmed. guage was quoted with approval in Root v. The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. Frank Goodwin and Eugene P. The law regards the rights of passengers and holds the carrier to the highest degree of care possible and requires him to make good all damages suffered through want of that care. Pa. Co. v. Roy, 102 Ū. S. 451 (26: 141). The decree of the Circuit Court is affirmed. JOHN HASKELL BUTLER, Admr., ET AL., v. THE BOSTON AND SAVANNAH SAME v. SAME. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 527-558.) Limited liability of ship owners-libel for lim- The courts of the United States, down to the Act of 1851, did not recognize the rule of the ancient or general maritime law, but refused to adopt it either in admiralty or common law. Del. Col. v. Arnold, 3 U. S. 3 Dall. 333 (1: 624); The Amiable Nancy, 1 Paine. 111, 118; Pope v. Nickerson, 3 Story, 465, 480, 492; Hale v. Washington Ins. Co. 2 Story, 176; New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants Bank, 47 U. S. 6 How. 435 (12: 465). The Limited Liability Act is not to be extended, even in respect to goods, by construction. Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. The Tangier, 6 Am. Law Reg. 504, 510; King v. Am. Transp. Co. 1 Western Law Monthly, 186; S. C. 1 Flipp. 1; The Egypt, 25 Fed. Rep. 320; The Mamie, 5 Fed. Rep. 813; 8 Fed. Rep. 367; 105 U. S. 773 (26: 937); Gibson v. Shufeldt, 122 U. S. 32, 33 (30: 1085); Carroll v. Staten Island R. Co. 58 N. Y. 126; Walker v. Western Transp. Providence & N. Y. S. S. Co. 54 How. Pr. 146; Co. 70 U. S. 3 Wall. 153 (18:174); Haegi v. Dougan v. Champlain Transp. Co. 56 N. Y. 6; Chamberlain v. Western Transp. Co. 44 N. Y. 305; Wallace v. Providence &. C. S. 8. Co. 14 Fed. Rep. 56. The liability of owners is not restricted by the Act of Congress providing for the security of passengers on steamboats. The Act does not take away any common-law liability. 1. The law of limited liability of ship owners ap- sel. 4. The law of limited liability was enacted by Congress as a part of the maritime law of this country, and, in its operation, extends wherever public navigation extends. 5. A statute of a State cannot neutralize or affect the admiralty or maritime jurisdiction or the oper ation of the maritime law in maritime cases. Caldwell v. New Jersey Steamboat Co. 47 N. Y. 292; Swarthout v. New Jersey Steamboat Co. 48 N. Y. 209; Curran v. Cheeseman, 1 Cinc. Super. Ct. (Ohio) 52; Carroll v. Staten Island R. Co. 58 N. Y. 141; Houston & G. Nav. Co. v. Co. 5 Fed. Rep. 599, 624; The Alpena, 8 Fed. Rep. 280; Rounds v. Providence & S. Steamship Co. 14 R. I. 344; The Amsterdam, 23 Fed. Rep. 112; Briggs v. Day, 21 Fed. Rep. 727, 728, 730, 731; Craig v. Continental Ins. Co. 26 Fed. Rep. 798; Ex parte Phoenix Ins. Co. 118 U. S. 610 (30: 6. The Limited Liability Act applies to the pres-274); Johnson v. Chicago & P. Elevator Co. 119 7. This court expresses no opinion as to whether [Nos. 244, 340.] 1889. APPEALS When the meaning is plain, the courts cannot look to the statutes which have been revised to see if Congress erred in that revision. The Montana, 22 Fed. Rep. 730; Thommasen v. Whitwill, 12 Fed. Rep. 903; The Marine City, 6 Fed. Rep. 413: McDona'd v. Horey, 110 U. S. 628-630 (28: 272); Pentlarge v. Kirby, 20 Fed. Rep. 900. When, in a statute, general words follow particular ones, the rule is to construe them as applicable to subjects ejusdem generis. 2 Pars. Cont. 7th ed. 501; Ala. v. Montague, 117 U. S. 609-611 (29:1003). sachusetts, affirming decrees of the District 1528] The appellees have separate and distinct de- | steamship City of Columbus, on Devil's crees in their favor depending on separate and Bridge, near Gay Head, at the western extremdistinct claims. ity of Martha's Vineyard, and near the mouth of Vineyard Sound, on the 18th of January, 1884. Most of the passengers and cargo were lost, and amongst the passengers lost was Elizabeth R. Beach, a single woman, of Mansfield, in the State of Connecticut. The appellants [529] represent her, Nathaniel Beach being appoint ed administrator of her estate in Connecticut, Butler being appointed ancillary administrator in Massachusetts, and the other two appellants being, one an aunt, and the other a niece of the deceased, dependent on her for support. The appellees, The Boston and Savannab Steamship Company, were the owners of the ship. Davis v. The Seneca, Gilpin, 38; 8. C. but on other points, 3 Wall. Jr. 395; Westcot v. Bradford, 4 Wash. C. C. 492; Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U. S. 6 How. 201, 203 et seq. (12: 404); French v. Shoemaker, 79 U. S. 12 Wall. 86, 98 (20:270, 271); Bronson v. La Crosse & N. R. Co. 67 U. S. 2 Black, 531 (17: 360); Blossom v. Milwaukee & C. R. Co. 68 U. S. 1 Wall. 657 (17: 674); Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U. S. 61 (29: 329); Henderson v. Wadsworth, 115 U. S. 276 (29:379); Hassall v. Wilcox, 115 U. S. 593 (29:504); Benjamin v. Dubois, 118 U. S. 48 (30: 52); Dainese v. Kendall, 119 U. S. 54 (30: 305); Gibson v. Shufeldt, 122 U. S. 27 (30: 1083); Ex parte Phoenix Ins. Co. 117 U. S. 369 (29: 924). Mr. Charles Theodore Russell, Jr., for appellee: Under the Limited Liability Act, the limitation is extended to all losses by any act of the master done without the owner's order. Maclachlan, Shipping, 118, 119; Norwich & N. Y. Transp. Co. v. Wright, 80 U. S. 13 Wall. 116 (20:589); The Epsilon, 6 Ben. 378; The Rebecca, 1 Ware, 188. Soon after the disaster occurred, and early in against the steamship company, in the Supe- Loss of life under the Massachusetts statute and Vance, and against all other persons who Am. Steamboat Co. v. Chace, 83 U. S. 16 Insurance for a mortgagee adds nothing to the owner's interest in the vessel. she was employed, namely, as a passenger and freight steamship between Boston and Savannah, her sca-worthiness, her being well and thoroughly officered and manned and furnished and equipped as the law required. It stated that on the 17th of January, 1884, she Jones, Mortg. § 400; Hazard v. Draper, 7 Al- left Boston on a voyage to Savannah, having len, 267; Carter v. Rockett, 8 Paige, 437; Crom-on board about 83 passengers and considerable well v. Brooklyn F. Ins. Co. 44 N. Y. 42; Nich- merchandise, a list of the former, as far as ols v. Baxter, 5 R. I. 491; Vernon v. Smith, 5 known, and a schedule of the latter, being anBarn. & Ald. 1; Providence Co. Bank v. Ben- nexed to the libel. It stated that whilst prosson, 24 Pick. 204; Re Sands Ale Brewing Co. 3 ecuting said voyage, and while on the high Biss. 175; City Sav. Bank v. Pa. F. Ins. Co. 122 seas, to wit, in or near Vineyard Sound, the Mass. 165; Williams v. Ocean Ins. Co. 2 Met. steamship struck on the rocks near and off the 303; Rider v. Ocean Ins. Co. 20 Pick. 259. shore at Gay Head, in Martha's Vineyard, in the district of Massachusetts, about half past three in the morning of January 18th, 1884, and in a very few minutes thereafter heeled over, filled with water, and sunk, becoming a total wreck and loss; that most of the passengers and crew, about 100 in number, were drowned and lost, those surviving claiming to have suffered great injury, and that all the property [530] and effects of the passengers and crew, and all the cargo on board (except a small part, salved in a damaged condition, and of little value), together with said steamship, its machinery, tackle, apparel and furniture, were destroyed and lost. The insurance money cannot be claimed by May, Ins. §§ 6, 116; White v. Brown, 2 Cush. The claim of these sufferers by the loss of Spring v. Haskell, 14 Gray, 309; Farnsworth v. Boston, 126 Mass. 1; Read v. Cambridge, 126 Mass. 427. Mr. Justice Bradley delivered the opinion of the court: These two cases are so intimately connected, both in the proceedings and in the questions arising therein, that it will be most convenient to consider them together. They arose out of the stranding, sinking and total loss of the The libel propounded other articles, as follows, to wit: "Fifth. All said great loss of life, injury and damage to persons on board, and loss of and damage to property, were occasioned and incurred without the privity or knowledge of the libelant, the owner of said steamship. Sixth. The libelant further alleges that, as ship and her freight then pending, as by law it is informed and believes, certain persons or Upon the filing of this libel a monition was duly issued and published, and an injunction against actions and suits was granted, issued and published. The monition was returnable to the first day of July, 1884. Notwithstanding these proceedings the appellants, on the 27th of September, 1884, filed a libel against the steamship company, in the same District Court for the District of Massachusetts, to recover damages for the death of said Elizabeth R. Beach. This is the other suit now before us on appeal. After stating the engagement of passage by Miss Beach on the steamship from Boston to Savannah, the charac "Eighth. The losses and damage to persons and property incurred and occasioned by the said stranding, sinking, and loss of said steam-ter of the vessel as a coast wise sea-going steamship, and the alleged claims and liabilties made ship in the coasting trade, under enrollment against the libelant, by reason thereof, greatly and license, and the circumstances of the exceed the amount or value of the interest of stranding and loss, and the drowning of Miss the libelant, as owner, in said steamship, her Beach, the libel of the appellants averred and machinery, tackle, apparel and furniture, im- charged that the disaster was caused by negli [531] mediately after said loss, and in her freight gence on the part of those employed by the then pending. Upon and after the happening steamship company in managing the ship, and of said loss, said steamship, her machinery, by inefficiency in the discipline of the officers tackle, apparel and furniture, became a wreck and crew, and that no proper measures were and total loss, and, the libelant is informed taken to save the passengers. The libel further and believes, were then practically worthless, alleged that at the time of the disaster the secand the libelant's interest therein became and ond mate, one Harding, was in charge of the was of little or no value. The gross freight ship, and was not a pilot for those waters; that then pending on the voyage of said steamship it was a part of his duty to take charge of the to Savannah was of the value of about $1,000. ship alternately with the first mate; that it was "Ninth. The libelant, while not admitting an omission of duty on the part of the owner to but denying that it is under any liablity for the intrust to the second mate the charge of the ship acts, losses and damages aforesaid, and desir- without the aid of the special pilot; and that no ing and claiming the right in this court to con- pilot was on duty on the ship at the time of the test any such liability of itself or of said steam-accident. The libel further alleged that "There ship, claims and is entitled to have limited its was not proper apparatus on the vessel for liability, as owner therefor (if any such liabil-launching the boats;" "that the ship was not ity shall hereafter be found to exist), to the amount or value of its interest, as owner, in such steamship after said loss, and her freight then pending. "Tenth. Said steamship, in her damaged and wrecked condition, now lies sunken near the shore at Gay Head, Martha's Vineyard, within this district, and within the jurisdiction and process of this honorable court.' properly constructed in respect to bulkheads and The libel further set out a statute of Massa- The libelant thereupon claimed and peti- [533] [534] be liable in damages not exceeding five thou- | the steamship company in the cause of limited The libel further alleged that after the vessel struck, said Elizabeth R. Beach suffered great mental and bodily pain upon the vessel and was afterwards washed into the sea and drowned; that the value of her clothing and baggage lost was $150; and that by virtue of the premises and under the general admiralty jurisdiction of the United States the libelants were entitled to recover $50,000, and by virtue of the statute of Massachusetts, $5,000. The steamship company, thereupon, on the 10th day of October, 1884, filed an exception and plea to this libel, setting up in bar the record and proceedings of the cause of limited liability previously instituted by them in the same district court, and then pending. tled an Answer, Petition and Exceptions, and Afterwards, on the 19th of January, 1885, part payment of the mortgage notes, and the Upon these pleadings the parties agreed upon "Statement of agreed facts. "In the above entitled causes the following facts are agreed by the Boston and Savannah Steamship Company and John Haskell Butler, administrator, et al., party excepting to said libel of said company: "First. All the allegations contained in the teenth, twenty-third, and twenty-fourth arti- To meet this exception, the appellants, on On the same day, the 16th of December, 1884, the appellants appeared to the libel of "Second. Except as relieved or affected by the Limited Liability Act of 1851 (U. S. Rev. Stats. SS 4283-5) and the Rules of the United States Supreme Court thereunder, the libelant, ship owner, is liable for all loss and damage caused by the stranding of said steamship 'City of Columbus.’ "Third. In respect to the cause of the disaster alleged, the respondents claim, in addition to the concession by libelant, the B. and S. Steamship Company, of negligence on the part of their agents and servants, as above agreed, that at the time of disaster the second mate was in charge of the ship; that he was not a pilot for the waters upon which the ship was then going, and was not licensed as a pilot by the inspectors of steamboats; and that no pilot was on duty on said ship at the time of the disaster; and, further, that the disaster was owing to the unfitness, gross negligence, or carelessness of the servants or agents of the libelant, who [535] [536] |