fect reason must perceive it perfectly, and must, from his independency and all-sufficiency, act in every case towards his creatures accordingly. If it is absolutely impossible to conceive perfect reason to act unreasonably, and if it is evidently unreasonable to prefer misery to happiness, then how can ever God have such a preference? Does it not rather appear from his very nature that he must be intensely desirous of promoting the latter, and equally averse to promoting the former ?—I can scarcely think of a stronger argument for the goodness of the Deity.-It shews that his goodness is an inseparable attribute of his Being, and that it is as certain that he is per fectly good, as it is certain that we say right, when we say that he is perfectly intelligent. Well then, do the Scriptures assert what is more literally true than is generally imagined, that God is love?'

SECONDLY, the goodness of God appears from the benevolent dispositions which he hath implanted in the human race. Goodness in this world, is considerably exercised and cherished by many, and approved of and applauded by almost all. But if this

amiable and excellent principle exists, in any degree, in us, it must supereminently exist in our Creator, from whom this and all other virtues are derived. As without a first cause, we could never have had a being, and as without a living, powerful, and wise cause, we could never have had life, and strength, and intelligence, so with out a gracious and good cause, we could never have had the tender affections of gel nerosity and benevolence. As sure then as God is the Maker and Father of us all so sure it is that goodness ranks among his other perfections. He hath inspired every animal of every order with a natural love for its offspring, and in men he hath made this love extend, not only to the offspring of their bodies, but also to the produc

To the work which

tions of their minds.
they have ingeniously contrived, skilfully
formed, ably executed, they often feel fond-
ly attached as to an only child. Thisi dis-
position seems wisely ordered. It seems
necessary to promote and preserve the gel
neral good; and must, therefore, be right
and laudable in itself, when directed to
proper objects, and guided by discretion.
It is impossible then that this blessed dis-

position (but void of all weakness and imperfection), will not for ever actuate that glorious Being who is the great cause of us and of all our innocent and laudable affections.- It was justly remarked by a distinguished philosopher of antiquity,* that an artist loves the work of his hands better than his work (though it were endowed with life and mind) would love him and that commonly the generous Benefactor feels far more kindly towards the person who is the object of his beneficence than that person feels towards him. The same holds true of the affections of parents and children. The child, in general, by no means loves the parent with the same degree of tenderness and intensity that the parent does the child. And yet, at first sight, one would be apt to think that the principle of gratitude would here naturally come in, and make the love of him who receives favour, greater than the love of him by whom the favour is conferred. But experience plainly shews us that this

* Πας τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον ἀγαπᾶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγαπηθείη ἂν ὑπὸ τῆς ἔργα, εμψύχω γενομένων Arister, Eth, Nίς, ικ.

is by no means the case. It seems to be a general law in the animal and moral world, that love descends more than it ascends. Now I would here apply this observation to God and to ourselves. I infer this as an unquestionable truth, that our gracious and merciful Father in heaven loves us unspeakably more than the most tender and dutiful among us are capable of loving Him. He satisfieth the desire of every living thing. How excellent is his loving • kindness! How precious are his thoughts unto the children of men! How great • is the sum of them!'

AGAIN, the goodness of God appears from considering, that were he not good, he would be more imperfect and worse than the most imperfect and worst of his intelligent creatures. In men, every transgression, and particularly the transgression of the law of kindness and beneficence, arises from false views and from the strong impulse of passion. The sinner fixes his desires upon some improper object's: upon these his whole soul is bent: he is impatient to be gratified; and overlooking all the evil consequences of his conduct, he is

hurried on in the fatal path of error, under the lawless influence of his corrupted nature. The man, for instance, who defrauds and injures his neighbour, thinks only of his present advantage; is misled by partial views, and does not seriously consider those baleful effects upon his mind which his present conduct is fitted to produce, nor those awful sufferings to which it renders him obnoxious.The eyes of his understanding are evidently darkened: he labours under a strong delusion, and foolishly mistakes a present and temporary gratification for future and lasting good, In no case can we suppose that he chooses evil merely because it is evil, and refuses good merely because it is good. He refuses good because he imagines it to be contrary to his immediate interest; and he chooses evil, because he feels it agreeable now, and flatters himself that he will not suffer for it hereafter. But could we suppose that God is not good, then we must suppose from his being neither liable to mistake nor influenced by passion, that he chooses evil purely as evil. If he knows perfectly what is best, and can have no temptation to disincline him to promote it,