Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and VirtueMatthias Steup Oxford University Press, 1 Μαρ 2001 - 272 σελίδες This volume gathers eleven new and three previously unpublished essays that take on questions of epistemic justification, responsibility, and virtue. It contains the best recent work in this area by major figures such as Ernest Sosa, Robert Audi, Alvin Goldman, and Susan Haak. |
Περιεχόμενα
The Ethics of Belief Reconsidered | 21 |
Epistemic and Moral Duty | 34 |
Epistemic Justification and Normativity | 49 |
Deciding to Believe | 63 |
Voluntary Belief and Epistemic Evaluation | 77 |
Internalism Exposed | 115 |
Epistemic Duty Evidence and Internality | 134 |
Truth as the Epistemic Goal | 151 |
Value Monism in Epistemology | 170 |
Reflective Knowledge in the Best Circles | 187 |
Commonsensism in Ethics and Epistemology | 204 |
Knowing People | 221 |
Recovering Understanding | 235 |
| 253 | |
Άλλες εκδόσεις - Προβολή όλων
Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification ... Matthias Steup Περιορισμένη προεπισκόπηση - 2001 |
Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification ... Matthias Steup Περιορισμένη προεπισκόπηση - 2001 |
Συχνά εμφανιζόμενοι όροι και φράσεις
accept action agent Alston Alvin Goldman Alvin Plantinga argue argument belief formation causal Chisholm claim cognitive coherence coherentism commonsense beliefs compatibilists concept of epistemic concept of justification consider count deciding to believe deontological deontological conception Descartes desire doxastic epistemic concepts epistemic duty epistemic goal epistemic judgments epistemic justification epistemic obligations epistemic principles epistemic value Ernest Sosa essay ethics of belief evaluation evidence evidential example external fact faculties false Feldman forming a belief Gettier Goldman imply internalism internalists justified belief justified in believing justified true belief kind KJ constraint knowability knowl normative not-p perception person Philosophical Plantinga problem proposition question rational reason to believe relevant reliabilism reliable requires seems sense skepticism sort special-case thesis Suppose theory of justification Theory of Knowledge thing tion tive truth truth-goal understanding University Press unjustified value monism virtue epistemology voluntarism voluntary control William Alston wrong
Αναφορές για αυτό το βιβλίο
Blameworthy Belief: A Study in Epistemic Deontologism Nikolaj Nottelmann Περιορισμένη προεπισκόπηση - 2007 |