CONSTRUCTION. § 7. LIFE-Custom-Estoppel.-The plaintiff became the agent of the company "by his acceptance of a circular, which contained this language: The usual compensation of agents, so far as we know, is ten per cent. commission on the premiums, with one dollar for each policy, and five per cent. on the premiums on the renewal of policies.' In about a year afterwards he received another circular, which, like the former, had much of instruction as to his agency, and which contained, in lieu of the language above cited, the following: 'For your services, as above, you will be allowed a commission of ten per cent. on the first premiums (cash and note,) and five per cent. on all subsequent renewal premiums, so long as you continue the agent of this company,'" and acted on this latter paper fifteen years, until he was discharged, and after that claimed "the five per cent. commission on the renewal premiums of policies, originally made by him as agent, which had been received by the company since he was discharged," and "to support his claim he undertook to prove, by other insurance agents, that such was the custom as between insurance companies and their agents."-Held that, as a matter of law, there was an express contract, and custom could not be admitted; that the latter circular was substituted as a new contract instead of the first one, "and that its fair construction was to limit the agency to the pleasure of the company, and to terminate the right of the agent to commissions on renewal premiums with the revocation of his agency," and that after having received and acted upon it for fifteen years he is estopped to deny that it was the contract under which he acted. Stagg vs. The Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. * UNITED STATES S. C. 8. LIFE-Policy-Death from Intemperance.The policy contained the following clauses: "Provided Decision Rendered February 13th. * * * * always, and it is hereby declared to be the true intent and meaning of this policy, and the same is accepted by the assured, upon these representations, that in case the said James A. Miller shall * die by reason of intemperance from the use of intoxicating liquors * this policy shall be void, null and of no effect."-Held that the jury were properly instructed that "the policy must be construed strictly against the defendant, and if you find that Miller's death was only contributed to by the intemperate use of liquors, then you must find for the plaintiff on this branch of the case," and that when several causes contribute to death, as a result, the death is to be attributed to the proximate and not the mediate cause. Oather vs. Springfield Fire Ins. Co., 1 Sumner, C. C., 434; Wilson vs. Conway Fire Ins. Co., 4 R. I., 142. Miller vs. The Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. -22. 9. LIFE-Policy and Premium Notes.-Held that "the policy and the notes given at the same time for the cash premium, were part of the same transaction, and together made the contract of the parties. They should be read together, if necessary, to ascertain the minds and agreement of the parties." Baker vs. The Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. - 1. 10. LIFE LIFE-Statute Married Women-Policy.Where a husband procured a policy upon his life, payable to the sole and separate use of his wife after his death, the annual premiums upon which were paid by himself, and were more than three hundred dollars, which policy the husband assigned as collateral security for borrowed money, his wife joining with him in the assignment,Held that under the following sections of the statutes: 15. "It shall be lawful for any married woman, by herself and in her name, or in the name of any third person, with his assent as her trustee, to cause to be insured for her sole use, the life of her husband for any definite period or for the term of his natural life; and in case of her surviving her hushand, the sum or net amount of insurance becoming due and payable by the terms of the insurance, shall be payable to her and for her own use, free from the claims of the representatives of her husband or of any of his creditors; but such exemptions shall not apply when the amount of premiums annually paid shall exceed three hundred dollars." 18. "Any policy of insurance heretofore or hereafter made by any insurance company on the life of any person, expressed to be for the benefit of any married woman, whether the same be effected by herself, or by her hushand, or by any third person in her behalf, shall inure to her separate use and benefit, and that of her children, if any, independently of her husband and his creditors and representatives, and also independently of such third person effecting the same in her behalf, his creditors and representatives; and a trustee may be appointed by the circuit court for the county in which such married woman resides, to hold and manage the interest of any married woman in any such policy, or the proceeds thereof."-[2 Wagner's St., p. 396.] Section 18 makes the exemption in section 15 apply to all policies, whether the same were effected by the wife herself, or by her husband for her benefit; that the law did not intend the husband should withdraw any greater amount than an annual premium of $300 from his means or from his creditors, and that as the premium was greater in this case, the policy is withdrawn from the operation of the statutes and the assignment should be held valid. Kerman vs. Howard, 23 Wis., 108; Eadie vs. Slimmon, 26 New York, 9. The Charter Oak Life Ins. Co. vs. Brant. -26. 11. LIFE-Statute - Married Woman-PolicyAssignment.-Plaintiff insured his life for the benefit of his wife. Subsequently, with the consent of the company, the husband and wife joined in an assignment of the policy to the defendant to secure the indebtedness of the husband. At the date of the assignment the policy was non-forfeitable. Prior to the institution of the suit, the plaintiff was appointed by the Circuit Court trustee for his wife, and brought the suit in behalf of herself and her children.-Held that in the following section of the statute: 18. "Any policy of insurance heretofore or hereafter made by any insurance company on the life of any person, expressed to be for the benefit of any married woman, whether the same be effected by herself, or by her husband, or by any third person in her behalf, shall inure to her separate use and benefit, and that of her children, if any, independently of her husband and his creditors and representatives, and also independently of such third person effecting the same in her behalf, his creditors and representatives; and a trustee may be appointed by the circuit court for the county in which such married woman resides, to hold and manage the interest of any married woman in any such policy, or the proceeds thereof."-[2 Wagner's St., p. 396.] "The language that the policy shall inure to the separate use and benefit of the wife and her children, applies simply to the manner of the decent and distribution. After the wife has received and reduced the money to possession, and she dies, it shall go to her children, and not to the husband's representatives," and that the law gives the insurance to the wife and allows her to keep and retain it, if she choses to do so, without molestation, but that there are no terms of restraint used, nor any provisions against voluntary alienation on her part, or against an assignment of it by the husband and wife conjointly. Baker, Tr., vs. Young.* Mo. S. C. 12. FIRE-In the clause of a policy "That all claims under this policy are barred, unless prosecuted within one year from date of loss," the parties to the policy used the word "prosecuted" as equivalent to suit or action. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. vs. Lacroix. † TEXAS S. C. $ 13. LIFE "In the known violation of any law”. Avoidance of Policy-Death in known violation of law.— The policy upon the life of the assured contained a proviso that the policy should be null and void in case the * Decision Rendered April 3. To appear in 47 Mo. † Decision Rendered April insured should die "by his own hand, or in consequence of a duel, or by reason of intemperance from the use of intoxicating liquors, or by the hands of justice, or in the known violation of any law of these States, or of the United States," &c. The insured demanded of a boy, seventeen or eighteen years old, between whose father and himself there had been some difficulty, the payment of a bill, which he claimed the father owed him, and upon the boy's refusing payment, he attempted to take possession of a pair of horses the boy was driving, and while so engaged was shot by the boy and killed.-Held that in order to bring the case within that part of the proviso concerning "the known violation of any law of these States," it is not necessary that the death should occur, or the cause thereof happen while the assured is engaged in the known violation of the criminal law of the State, but that the proviso includes the known violation of a law for the protection of civil rights of parties, the only sanction of which is a civil action for redress, and that the representatives of the assured cannot recover under the policy. Cluff vs. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 13 Allen, 308. N. Y. C. A. 14. FIRE "Property"-Avoidance of PolicyAlienation -Two policies were issued to the insured upon his property generally: one in his favor, as "owner," and both "upon his four two-story brick stores." At the time of obtaining the policies, the insured had mortgaged the property. There was a condition in each of the policies, "that in case of any change or transfer of title in the property insured, the policy should be void, and cease."-Held that "when the word 'property' is used in the clause forbidding alienation, it is used to designate the thing insured, and not the interest of the insured," and that "the change or transfer of title in the property insured, intended in the clause under * Decision Rendered April 25th. To appear in 45 N. Y. |