tiffs in a plea of trespass on the case. For that whereas, the said Peter W. Radcliff, in his lifetime and at the time of the committing of the grievances hereinafter mentioned, was lawfully possessed of certain lands, under cultivation and enclosed by a fence, and upon which were situated a dwelling-house and certain fixtures and improvements appertaining thereto, or used upon the said premises for the support of shrubbery and otherwise in gardening, viz, a privy, a summer-house, grape vine, fences, and the like, to wit, in the city of Brooklyn and county of Kings aforesaid, which said premises were adjacent to the East river, but a considerable distance above the same, and were sustained on that side by a natural bank, having a gradual descent from said premises to said river. And the said defendants well knowing the same, but contriving and intending to deprive him of the use and advantage of his said premises and the appurtenances, to wit, on the eleventh day of May, in the year one thousand eight hundred and thirty-eight, and at various times thereafter, during the lifetime of the said Peter W. Radcliff, wrongfully and injuriously did dig away, or cause or procure to be dug away, the said bank or natural support of the premises of the said Peter W. Radcliff, and did undermine the said premises, whereby a part of the said garden or enclosed ground, to wit, two thousand square feet of superficial measure, together with the shrubbery, fixtures and improvements, and the fence along the said bank fell in and became and were wholly lost to the said Peter W. Radcliff, and he was thereby, also, during his natural life, necessarily put to great expense in endeavoring to restore the said premises, and the said plaintiffs, his executors, have, since the death of the said Peter W. Radcliff, been at further expense in filling up the ground and building a wall to sustain the said premises, to wit, the sum of ten thousand dollars. And also,' for that whereas, the said Peter W. Radcliff, in his life, became legally possessed of the premises and appurtenances situate, as in the first count mentioned, to wit, on the said eleventh day of May, in the year one thousand eight hundred and thirty-eight, and at various times subsequent thereto, in the year aforesaid, and in the lifetime of the said Peter W. Radcliff the said defendants intending and contriving wrongfully and injuriously to deprive him of the use and advantage thereof, did undertake to make a street or road along the said premises, and in so doing, so negligently, incautiously and improvidently managed the same, that for the want of due care and precaution by themselves and their agents in that behalf, the said premises of the said Peter W. Radcliff, were undermined, and a part of the same, to wit, two thousand square feet of the surface fell in, together with the improvements and fixtures thereon, and the fence along the side so undermined, and the same were wholly lost to the said Peter W. Radcliff, and he was, during his lifetime and the said plaintiffs, his executors, since his death, have been obliged to pay a large sum of money for restoring said premises and sustaining the same, to wit, ten thousand dollars. By reason of all which several matters, the said plaintiffs say, that the said Peter W. Radcliff, deceased, was injured, and the said plaintiffs, as executors as aforesaid. have sustained damages to fifteen thousand dollars, and therefore they bring suit, &c.2 This is the second count in the declaration in which it will be observed that the same cause of action is set forth in a different manner. The first count alleges the act to have been simply a wrongful act; and the second, that the defendant undertaking to make a street, did it negligently, &c. This mode of duplicating a cause of action in the same complaint, is no longer allowable. (See ante note to page 18.) 2 The foregoing declaration set forth two other counts, slightly varied from the foregoing, though similar in substance, which I have omitted. And the said plaintiffs bring here into court the letters testamentary granted to the said plaintiffs, by the surrogate of Kings county, whereby it fully appears to the said court here, that the said plaintiffs are the executors of the said last will and testament of the said Peter W. Radcliff, deceased, and have the execution thereof, &c.1 (No. 4.) Form of a libel in personam in admiralty, for damages arising from negligent collision. The mere formal parts of the pleading, or such as are peculiar to the court, are in italics. To the Hon. Samuel R. Betts, Judge of the District Court of the United States for the Southern district of New-York. The libel and complaint of Ichabod Rogers, John C. Dormandy and George H. Powers, of the city of Hudson, county of Columbia and State of New-York, owners of the sloop Betsy and Ann, her tackle, apparel and furniture, against Amos Comstock, master of the steamboat Commerce, in a cause of collision, civil and maritime. And thereupon the said Ichabod Rogers, John C. Dormandy, and George H. Powers allege and articulately propound as follows: I The foregoing clause is the usual profert required to be made in pleading letters testamentary, or of administration, a deed or other sealed instrument. The omission to make profert was ground of special demurrer. Profert is now no longer necessary. (Plead., 790; Welles v. Webster, 9 How., 251.) Instead of the foregoing, the complaint should contain in the body thereof, the allegation that the plaintiffs were named as executors in the will, and duly qualified as such, and took upon themselves the execution thereof. (Seldon v. Hoy, 11 How., 11.) First. That on or about the twenty-fifth day of June, 1848, the sloop Betsy and Ann, whereof John C. Dormandy was master, was lying at anchor in the Hudson, or North river, in the southern district of New-York, within the ebb and flow of the tide, and within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of this honorable court, at the distance of four or five miles below the town of Catskill. That the said sloop lay close under the west shore of said river, heading up. That she had her sails down, and at her shrouds, at least ten feet above her deck, had a good and sufficient light burning, and was at said place safely anchored, and in all respects tight, staunch and strong, well manned, tackled appareled and appointed. Second. That on the said twenty-fifth day of June, and at or about dawn, and between the hours of two and five o'clock in the morning, the steamboat Commerce, whereof the said Amos Comstock was then master, having in tow one or more barges or canal boats, coming down the river from a point above where the said Betsy and Ann lay at anchor, was negligently and with great force and violence run against and into the said sloop Betsy and Ann, and the said canal boat and barges, or one of them, was violently thrown against and run into the said sloop, whereby the bowsprit and the bowsprit shrouds of the latter were broken off, and the said shrouds, composed of iron links or chain, were thrown into the river and lost by said collision, and the jib sail of said sloop thereby torn, and the hull of said sloop greatly damaged. Third. That the cost and expense of reparing the said sloops bowsprit and shrouds and jib sails, amounts to the sum of fifty dollars or thereabouts, and that the hull of said vessel was damaged to the amount of ten dollars or thereabouts. That by reason of said damage to said sloop, she was unable to continue her course, and had to lie by for three days, and that by reason of said sloop having been thus run foul of and damaged as aforesaid, the libellants have sustained damage in the whole amounting to ninety dollars. Fourth. That the libellants have duly notified the owners and master of said steamboat of said damage to said sloop and requested them to pay the amount thereof, which they have refused to do. Fifth. That all and singular the premises are true, and within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of this honorrable court, in verification whereof, if denied, the libellants crave leave to refer to the depositions and other proofs to be by them exhibited in this cause.1 Wherefore the libellants pray that a warrant of arrest may issue against the said Amos Carpenter, and he be compelled to give security according to law and the practice of this court, and also to appear and answer, all and singular, the matters above propounded, and that this court would be pleased to pronounce for the damages aforesaid, and for such other and different relief in the premises as shall in law and justice appertain, and also to condemn the said Comstock in costs.2 JOHN C. DORMANDY. 1 This is mere matter of form and entirely unnecessary. 2 The pleadings in cases of libel in the admiralty courts are entirely analogous to pleadings under the Code. Indeed the mode of allegation is the same, and with the exception of the formal parts of the commencement and conclusion (which are in italics above) an admiralty pleading would answer in all respects as a pleading under the Code. In regard to the rules regulating admiralty pleadings and the analogy between them and pleadings under the Code, see Plead. pp. 336-340. It will be observed that the various allegations or propositions which together constitute the cause of action, are set forth in sepa |