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Wherefore the plaintiff demands judgment that partition and division of the above described premises may be made, according to the course and practice of this court and the statute in such case made and provided, by commissioners, to be appointed for that purpose. And in case it shall appear that a partition thereof cannot be made without material injury to the rights of the parties interested therein, then that the said premises may be adjudged to be sold under the direction of this court, and the proceeds of the sale, after paying the costs and charges of this suit, be divided among the said parties according to their respective rights and interests therein; and that, to that end, the rights and interests of the parties interested in the said premises, or in the proceeds thereof, may be ascertained and declared by the judgment of this court; and that the said plaintiff may have such other relief or such further relief in the premises as the nature of the case may require.

B. H. HALL,

Plaintiff's Attorney,

Troy, N. Y.

RENSSELAER COUNTY, ss: B. H. Hall, of the city of Troy, attorney for the plaintiff, being duly sworn says: That the said plaintiff is not a resident of the county of Rensselaer, where said deponent resides, and that the said

1 The complaint in a partition suit may set up the claim of one of the defendants to a specific lien for moneys paid to extinguish liens on the premises sought to be partitioned, and ask for an account to be taken of such advances. And the claims of the defendant may be disputed by either of his codefendants, as well as the plaintiff, and their claims may be tried and settled in a partition suit, if they involve interests in or liens on the property sought to be partitioned. (Bogardus v. Parker and others, 8 How., 305.)

plaintiff is absent from the said county of Rensselaer, as deponent believes, and therefore this verification is made by deponent; that the foregoing complaint is true to deponent's knowledge, except as to the matters therein stated on information and belief, and as to those matters he believes it to be true; that the grounds of this deponent's belief are, that he has had personal inspection of most of the written instruments referred to in the said complaint, and has the original of the sheriff's deed, referred to in said complaint, in his possession, and as to the rest of the matters set forth on information and belief, deponent has of some of the matters personal knowledge, and of the residue has obtained information from the plaintiff in this suit and from various persons of credibility, in answer to particular inquiries made in respect thereto.

Sworn before me this 21st day

of September, 1857.

CHARLES L. Alden,

B. H. HALL.

Commissioner of Deeds, Troy, N. Y.

(No. 54.)

For partition of real estate by plaintiffs claiming title under a will of original owner, and also under a marriage settlement and subsequent will by devisee of original owner, a married woman; plaintiffs claiming to own one-half as tenants, in common with devisees and heirs of original testator, all of whom are made parties defendants together with the executors of the last testator (who have power to sell); and owners unknown1 with prayer to set off plaintiffs' shares in common, pursuant to chapter 430, Laws of

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The abovenamed plaintiffs complain of the abovenamed defendants, as follows, that is to say:

That Abraham Slingerland, now deceased, late of the town of Kinderhook, county of Columbia, was seized in his lifetime and at the time of his death, in fee simple, of

1 As to making owners unknown parties, and proceedings in such cases, see 2 Revised Statutes, part 3, chapter 5, title 3; 2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 289. In an action for partition, in which the plaintiff is obliged to make unknown owners defendants, he may proceed by publication under section 135 of the Code, where a proper designation of those parties are given. (11 How. Pr. R., 277.)

a certain farm of land, situate in the towns of Kinderhook and Stuyvesant, consisting of three several pieces, and described and bounded was follows, to wit: [Insert description.]

That said Abraham Slingerland being so seized and possessed of said premises in his lifetime, made his last will and testament, a copy of which is hereto annexed, and forms part of this complaint.1

That after the said will was executed, the said Abraham Slingerland, in his lifetime, and being so seized and possessed of said real estate, made a codicil to the will, a copy of which is hereto annexed, and forms part of this complaint.2

That said Abraham Slingerland, the testator, as aforesaid, died on or about the month of September, 1837, seized and possessed of said real estate, as aforesaid; and that on or about the 11th day of December, in the same year, the said will and codicil were duly admitted to probate, as a will and codicil of real and personal property, by the surrogate of Columbia county, according to law.

The plaintiffs further allege, that Sarah Slingerland, widow of the said testator, died on or about the 1st day of April, 1850, possessed of said real estate, and seized in her own right, in fee simple, of one equal, undivided half thereof, under and by virtue of said instrument, having first made, published and declared, in due form, her last

1 The will devises to his wife, Sarah, half his real estate in fee, and a life estate in the other half, with remainder to his two brothers, Albert and Peter, and $500 to Abraham Slingerland, payable one year after his wife's death, and chargeable on the share of Albert and Peter.

2 The codicil invests the executors (who are made parties to the complaint) with a power to sell the one-half of the real estate after the death of the testator, and, after paying Abraham Slingerland $500, to pay the residue of the proceeds to the testator's two brothers, Albert and Peter.

will and testament, which was subsequently, and on or about the 12th day of November, 1850, duly admitted to probate, by the surrogate of Columbia county, as a will of real and personal property, according to law, a copy of which is hereto annexed, and forms part of this complaint.1

That said Sarah, after the death of her said husband, Abraham Slingerland, intermarried with one William Fox; that prior to said marriage, an antenuptial contract was entered into, and executed in due form, by and between the said Sarah and the parties therein named, on or about the 19th of July, 1841, by which instrument, among other things, the power to bequeath and devise her real and personal property was reserved to said Sarah, and which instrument is in the following words and figures:2

1 The will, after charging $200 on her real estate for Margaret Dollar (one of the defendants mentioned in the complaint), devises the whole of her real estate in trust for her husband during his life, and, after his death, in fee to his heirs, who are plaintiffs in this suit; the defendants being the heirs and executors of Abraham Slingerland.

2 The following is a copy of the anti-nuptial contract:

"An agreement made and concluded by and between William Fox of the First part, and Sarah Slingerland of the Second part, and David Burhans of the Third part. Whereas, a marrage is intended to be had and solemized by and between the said first & Second parties; and whereas, the said second party does own Money, Goods, Chattels, Sundry articles of personal property, debts due her, and real Estate, she is Seized and possessed of; now therefore, in consideration of the premises, the said first party agrees, to and with the third party, that in case said marrage is celebrated, that the said party of the first part, or his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns shall not nor will not take, use or have the said real or personal property belonging to the said second party at the time said marrage shall take place; and also, that the said party of the second part shall be allowed to use, enjoy, dispose of said money, real and personal property, as she was and might do as if she was sole and unmarried; and that she shall be fully authorized and empowered, by her last will & testament,

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