and being in New Hartford (formerly Whitestown), in the county of Oneida and State of New-York, and bounded as follows, to wit: [Describing the premises.] That, as plaintiff is informed and believes, on or about the 29th day of December, in the year 1830, the said Charles Giles became and was indebted to The New-York Life Insurance and Trust Company in the sum of $720, or thereabouts, and, being so indebted, the said Charles Giles, in order to secure the payment of the said sum of money, with the lawful interest thereon, did make and execute, under his hand and seal, and deliver to the said New-York Life Insurance and Trust Company a certain bond or writing obligatory, bearing date the day and year aforesaid, with a penalty and with a condition thereunder, written in the usual form, for the payment of the said sum of money, with the lawful interest on the same from the date of said bond, at the times and in the manner therein mentioned. That, as plaintiff is also informed and believes, the said Charles Giles, in order further to secure the payment of the said sum of money last abovementioned, with the lawful interest, as aforesaid, executed and delivered unto the said New-York Life Insurance and Trust Company a certain indenture of mortgage, bearing date the day and year last aforesaid, made by the said Charles Giles and Chloe, his wife, of the first part, and the said New-York Life Insurance and Trust Company of the second part, in and by which said indenture of mortgage the said parties of the first part did convey, in the usual form, by mortgage, unto the said party of the second part, the premises hereinbefore bounded and described, conditioned for the payment of the said sum of money and the lawful interest on the same, according to the terms of the condition of the said bond, that in case of the non-payment of the same, according to the terms of the said condition, the said party of the second part was authorized, in the usual form, to sell and convey the premises aforesaid, at public auction; and that, after the execution of the said indenture of mortgage, the same was duly acknowledged by the said parties of the first part, and recorded in the office of the clerk of the county of Oneida, at the city of Utica. That, as plaintiff is also informed and believes, the said New-York Life Insurance and Trust Company did, after the execution of the said bond and mortgage, and on or about the 18th day of September, 1833, sell, assign and transfer the said bond and mortgage to one William H. Halsted, and all their right, title and interest therein, for the sum of $760.18, or thereabouts, with full power and authority to receive and collect the moneys due or to become due on the same, and to enforce the same as fully as the said New-York Life Insurance and Trust Company could do, and that the said indenture of assignment, after the execution thereof, was duly acknowledged by the said New-York Life Insurance and Trust Company, and recorded in the office of the clerk of the county of Oneida, in the city of Utica. That, as plaintiff is also informed and believes, the said William H. Halsted, on or about the 2d day of October, in the year 1833, filed his bill of complaint in the Court of Chancery of the State of New-York, for the foreclosure of the mortgage above described, and the sale of the mortgaged premises therein mentioned and set forth, by reason of a default in the performance of the condition of said bond as aforesaid; that there were made parties defendants to said bill of complaint, and the proceedings in said suit subsequent thereto, the said Charles Giles and Chloe his wife, mortgagors as aforesaid, and Schureman Halsted, Samuel Halsted and Lewis Green, judgment creditors of said Charles Giles; that in the papers on file in said cause, and in the records of said Court of Chancery, no other persons appear to have been made parties to said suit; that such proceedings were thereupon had, that on the 16th day of April, in the year 1834, the said premises, by virtue of a decree entered in said cause, were sold by Chester Hayden, Esq., one of the Masters of said court, to the said Schureman Halsted, for the sum of $800; that the amount due on said bond and mortgage, as aforesaid, on the day of said sale, was $770.93; that the cost of said suit of foreclusure, including Masters fees, were $126.32, or thereabouts, and that the said Master then and there executed and delivered to the said Schureman Halsted a Master's deed of said premises so sold as aforesaid, and that said Master's deed, after the execution thereof, was duly acknowledged by the said Master, and recorded in the office of the clerk of the county of Oneida, at the city of Utica. That no subpoena to appear and answer in said suit of foreclosure, and no notice of any kind whatsoever of said suit, or of any proceedings therein, was at any time served upon this plaintiff, and that the said plaintiff was, and for a long time thereafter remained, entirely ignorant of the filing of said bill of complaint, and of the proceedings in said suit subsequent thereto, and of the sale of said premises by virtue of the decree aforesaid. That, as plaintiff is also informed and believes, the said Schureman Halsted, the purchaser of said premises, as aforesaid, conveyed the said premises by an absolute deed to one Phineas Hall, on or about the 20th day of October, in the year 1838, for the sum of $1,200, and that said deed of conveyance to the said Phineas Hall, after the execution thereof, was duly acknowledged by the said Schureman Halsted, and recorded in the office of the clerk of the county of Oneida, at the city of Utica. That, as plaintiff is also informed and believes, the said Phineas Hall conveyed the said premises by absolute deed to the defendants, William Cooper, Jr., and John E. Cooper, as joint purchasers, in or about the spring of the year 1841 (but at what particular time in said spring the plaintiff is unable to state), for the sum $1,550, or thereabouts. That being entitled as aforesaid, and being willing and desirous to redeem said premises so incumbered, mortgaged and sold as aforesaid, and to pay to the said William Cooper, Jr., and John E. Cooper, all the principal money and interest, and all other money, legally due and owing to them on the said premises, so mortgaged and sold as aforesaid, in order to enable the plaintiff to redeem the same, he has frequently and in a friendly manner applied to the said William Cooper, Jr., and John E. Cooper, and desired them to inform him what sum was to be paid to discharge the amount due and owing on said premises prior to the lien of the plaintiff, so that the plaintiff might be able to redeem said premises, but that the plaintiff has not been able to obtain any satisfactory answer respecting the same. And the plaintiff alleges, on information and belief, that the amount due and owing on said premises, in order to enable him to redeem the same, is the amount due on the mortgage at the time of said Master's sale, with the lawful interest on the same from the date of said sale to the present time, together with the value of all permanent improvements upon said premises since said sale, after deducting from the sum total of the above items of principal, interest and improvements the amount of the rents and profits which have accrued from said premises since the time of said Master's sale, together with the lawful interest on the same;1 which rents and profits the plaintiff charges 1 These allegations are also in the nature of legal inferences or conclusions, and should properly be omitted. have been received and enjoyed, since the date of the said Master's sale, by the said Schureman Halstead and his grantees, to a large amount above the aggregate of the interest which has accrued on said mortgage and the value of said permanent improvements, but the exact sum the plaintiff has not been able to ascertain. That on the 4th day of July, in the year 1842, the plaintiff called on the said William Cooper, Jr., and John E. Cooper, and offered to pay to them the sum of $500, as being the amount due on said premises, as aforesaid, prior to the lien of the plaintiff, and tendered to them the same, and at the same time offered to pay such other or further sum as might be due and owing upon the same, in order to entitle the plaintiff to redeem said premises, if any such other or further sum was so due and owing, and requested them to receive the same, but that the said William Cooper, Jr., and the said John E. Cooper, utterly refused to receive the same or any part thereof, or to have anything to do with said matter in any manner whatsoever. That plaintiff has been at all times since said interview with the said William Cooper, Jr., and John E. Cooper, on the fourth day of July, 1842, as aforesaid, and still continues, ready and willing and desirous to pay to the said William Cooper, Jr., and John E. Cooper, all such sum or sums of money as shall equitably belong to them, in order to enable the plaintiff to redeem said premises, according to the lien of his judgment as aforesaid.1 1 "If the defendant had discharged a prior mortgage, the redeeming creditor must have offered to repay, because the premises are benefited to that amount. Upon the same principle, equity compels the redeeming creditor to pay for such improvements as have been put upon the premises. We can see no reason why any other honest expenditure of money, by which the redeeming creditor would be |