"The man who stole Mr. Brown's watch has been discovered; he (the plaintiff meaning) lives in the white house just across the bridge. He (the plaintiff meaning) is a great scoundrel and has done a great many other mean things;1 and I have no doubt but that he (the plaintiff meaning) is the thief, and stole Brown's watch." By means of the speaking of which false, malicious and defamatory words, the plaintiff has been and is greatly injured in his good name and credit, and brought into public scandal and disgrace amongst his neighbors and the public.2 Wherefore the plaintiff demands judgment against the defendant for the sum of $2,000 damages, besides costs. H. HARRIS, Plaintiff's Attorney. The plaintiff need not select out of the whole conversation those expressions only which involve the slanderous charge; but may allege all that was said at the time, that, when proved, the jury may be able to determine what was intended. (Deyo v. Brundage, 13 How., 221; 20 Wend., 690.) A statement of the tenor and effect of the words complained of is bad pleading. The words spoken should be stated. (Forsyth v. Edmiston, 5 Duer, 653. ) 2 If a libel or slanderous words be of themselves actionable, the plaintiff may recover although no special damage be stated or proved. But where the libel or verbal slander is not in itself actionable, and the action is sustainable merely in respect of special damages, they must be stated. The special damage alleged must be the legal and natural consequence of the words spoken, and it must be particularly specified in the complaint. (1 Saund., 243; 3 Espn., 133; 8 East., 3; 8 T. R., 130; 2 John., 115; 10 John., 281; 20 Wend., 225; 1 Wend., 506; 13 Wend., 253.) A general averment of loss of customers is not a sufficient allegation of special damage, and no proof can be given under it. (Tobias v. Harland, 4 Wend., 537.) The customers lost must be named in the complaint, and the plaintiff cannot prove the loss of others; and he must show that the loss is wholly attributable to the words spoken by the defendant. (Hallock v. Miller, 2 Barb., 630. ) 1 (No. 59.) For a libel. SUPERIOR COURT-CITY OF NEW-YORK. Charles T. Shelton agt. Hiram Fuller. The complaint of the plaintiff shows to this court: That on or about the 6th day of July, 1854, the defendant, Hiram Fuller, was the editor, proprietor and publisher of a certain newspaper, printed and published in the city of New-York, under the name of the Evening Mirror, and that on or about the said day, the said defendant printed and published in the said newspaper, the Evening Mirror, a false, malicious and defamatory libel, hereinafter set forth, of and concerning the plaintiff, and against his good fame and character. That previous to the day last mentioned, the plaintiff had been a trustee and manager, and the president, of the Empire Stone Dressing Company, a corporation existing by and under the laws of the State of New-York, and that he was duly elected by the stockholders thereof, but that on the said 6th day of July, 1854, the plaintiff was not the president of said company. That previous to the above mentioned day, Robert Schuyler, of said city, as president of the New-York and New Haven Railroad Company, was reported to have committed great frauds upon said last mentioned company, and to have fraudulently converted to his own use, embezzled and squandered the moneys of said corporation, and to have fraudulently issued and forged certificates of stock and bonds of said corporation, purporting to have been made, created and issued by said corporation, and to have sold and pledged the same, and converted fraudulently to his own use the proceeds therefrom, and to have secretly fled to places unknown, and absconded, to keep himself concealed for the purpose of avoiding the disgrace, danger and punishment of his fraudulent and wrongful acts, committed as aforesaid, and such reports were printed in the public newspapers, and extensively circulated throughout the said city and elsewhere. That previous to the aforesaid day, divers other persons, officers and managers, and persons concerned in the management of the Parker Vein Coal and Mining Company, and of the New-York and Harlem Railroad Company, were reported to have abused their trusts, and to have fraudulently issued, or caused to be issued, certificates of stock in said companies, over and above, and in addition to, the certificates of stock which the said companies were by their charters allowed to issue, and to have used such illegal and fraudulent scrip or certificates of stock for their own advantage, to the great damage of many innocent persons, and the injury of the public credit. which reports were in like manner printed in the newspapers, and extensively circulated.1 1 Though by the Code the averment of extrinsic facts is no longer necessary to show the application of the words charged to the plaintiff, yet it is still necessary to aver, by way of inducement, any extrinsic fact necessary to show the words charged to be libelous. (Culver v. Van Anden, 4 Abbott, 375; Blaisdell v. Raymond, 14 How., 265; Caldwell v. Raymond, 2 Abbott, 193, and see note, ante, p. 463.) The complaint in an action for libel, for words not on their face libelous, must distinctly aver the extrinsic fact on which plaintiff relies to show the alleged libelous character of the words complained of, and it is not sufficient that this fact is alleged by way of inuendo. It must show that the defendant had actual knowledge of the particu That the false, defamatory and malicious libel above mentioned was published by the defendant of and concerning the plaintiff, and of and concerning him as manager, trustee and president of the Empire Stone Dressing Company, and of and concerning the embezzlement, fraud and flight of the said Schuyler, and of and concerning the frauds, fraudulent over issue of stock, and the matters and things hereinbefore set forth. That the said libel was in the words and figures following, to wit: "More Schuylerizing (meaning that frauds and embezzlements, fraudulent and wrongful acts, like those committed by said Schuyler, had been committed by the plaintiff). Charles T. Shelton (the plaintiff meaning), president of the Empire Stone Dressing Company, (meaning that plaintiff had been, and was at that time, president of said Empire Stone Dressing Company), non est inventus; he has left for parts unknown; gone into the country for his health. An overissue of stock, to the amount of $100,000, has been discovered (meaning that the plaintiff had wrongfully, fraudulently and secretly fled and absconded to places unknown, to avoid the danger, shame and punishment of his fraudulent acts, and that the plaintiff had wrongfully and fraudulently issued, or caused to be issued, certificates of stock in said company, over and above, and in addition to, the certificates representing the lawful capital stock of said company, and that such wrongful and fraudulent issue had been lar extrinsic fact relied on, and it is not sufficient to allege that the words were published "falsely and maliciously." So held in Caldwell v. Raymond, (2 Abbott, 193,) by JAMES, J. 1 It is not necessary in a complaint for libel to set out the whole of the obnoxious publication, but the pleader may extract only particular passages complained of, provided their sense be clear. (Culver v. Van Anden, 4 Abbott, 375; see, also, Pleadings, 271-273, and cases there cited.) detected). "Paper to the amount of $50,000 was protested yesterday. The liabilities of the company amount to $95,000. This has been known as 'crack stock' in the market, having sold as high as 130, and having paid 20 to 30 per cent dividends for the past two or three years." And this complaint further sets forth, that by reason of the printing and publishing of said false, malicious, slanderous and defamatory words, the said plaintiff has sustained great injury to his good name, fame, credit and character, to the damage of said plaintiff of $20,000. Wherefore the plaintiff demands judgment against the defendant for said sum of $20,000, with costs. SANFORD & BRACE, Plaintiff's Attorneys. (No. 60.) For a libel against a coroner, and for verbal slander.1 SUPREME COURT-GREENE COUNTY. Edwin P. Green William Telfair. The plaintiff shows to this court that on the 4th day of March, A. D. 1852, at Cairo, Greene county, and for a long time prior thereto, the said plaintiff had used and occupied, and still holds, and ever since that time has 1 A cause of action for libel may be joined with a cause of action for slander, both being for injuries to character. (Code, § 167, subd. 4. ) |