(No. 41.) Answer denying conversion in an action to recover damages for converting personal property.1 Title of the Cause. First. The defendant, in answer to the plaintiff's complaint, denies that he has sold the watch delivered to him by plaintiff, and mentioned in said complaint. Second. For further answer, the defendant alleges that he has repaired said watch pursuant to plaintiff's directions, and has the same in his possession, ready to deliver the same to the plaintiff on his demand, and payment to defendant of his reasonable charges for repairing the said watch. (No. 42.) Answer in ejectment; equitable defence to a legal cause of action.2 Title of the Cause. The defendant, in answer to the plaintiff, complains: First. Denies that he unlawfully withholds from said plaintiff the possession of the premises mentioned in said complaint, or any part thereof. Second. For a second and further answer, the defendant alleges that on or about the 1st April, A. D. 1839, the 1 To Complaint No. 71, Part III., ante, p. 492. 2 To complaint No. 73, Part III., ante, p. 496. plaintiff, then being the owner of the premises mentioned in the said complaint, part and parcel of a farm owned by said plaintiff, of about acres, sold and conveyed to one J. D. a portion of said farm, to wit, fifty acres, at and for the price of $—. That at the time of said sale and conveyance it was mutually agreed and understood, between said plaintiff and said J. D., that the premises so sold and conveyed were bounded and described as follows, [describing them ;] and that such boundary and description included the identical premises mentioned in said complaint, and to recover the possession of which this action is brought. That by the mutual mistake of the said plaintiff and the said J. D., which occurred by reason of, [setting forth the circumstances under which the mistake arose, as far as may be necessary,] the deed of conveyance executed by plaintiff to the said J. D. does not include the premises mentioned in said complaint, but embraces only the premises described as follows: [Setting forth description.] That said J. D. entered into the possession of the whole of the premises, so agreed to be conveyed by plaintiff to him, and, being in possession thereof, executed a lease of the same to this defendant, under which he entered upon the possession thereof, at the time mentioned in said complaint, as the tenant of said J. D., and has ever since continued and still is in possession thereof, as tenant of said J. D., and under his right and title to the possession of said premises,1 The action for possession of real estate must be brought against the tenant in possession. The landlord, if he chooses, may come in and defend. (See Pleadings, p. 176-179.) Under such circumstances the landlord might properly interpose the same defence by way of counterclaim, and pray, as affirmative relief, that the conveyance be reformed and corrected by making the description correspond with the real (No. 43.) Answer in a Justices' Court, showing that title to land will come in question, and to remove a cause to County Court. Title of the Cause. First. The defendant, in answer to the plaintiffs' complaint, says, that the plaintiffs ought not to have or maintain an action against him, because the close and fishery mentioned in said complaint, in which the said alleged trespasses are supposed to have been committed, and the soil of the said Reichard Lake, at the time when said alleged trespasses are supposed to have been committed, were the close, soil and freehold of William P. Van Rensselaer, and not of the said plaintiffs, or any or either of them, and that said lake is not a navigable stream or body of water. And said defendant says, that said plaintiffs, at the time when, &c., were trespassers upon said close, and agreement and true intentions of the parties. (Bartlett v. Judd, 23; Barb. 262. See such a form of prayer, post, No. 65.) The foregoing answer is defensive merely, and requires no reply. In an action to recover the possession of real estate, the defendant may set up as a defence that he is equitably the owner of the premises and entitled to a conveyance thereof. As for example, the plaintiff having proved legal title to the premises in dispute, occupied by the defendant, the latter may be allowed to show that the land was included in the purchase by him or his lessor of the adjacent premises from the plaintiffs' grantors, and that by a mutual mistake of the parties it was not included in the conveyance thereof, and that in equity, defendant (or his lessor) is entitled, as against the plaintiff and his grantors, to a conveyance of the premises. (Crary v. Goodman, 2 Kernan, 266.) 'The answer is to a complaint in an action of trespass, for damages caused to plaintiffs' nets, by defendant wrongfully, as alleged, putting scythes and other sharp instruments into a lake claimed by defendant as a part of the freehold of another, and not a common or public fishery. were in and upon said close and fishery, in their own wrong, wherefore he says the said plaintiffs ought not to have or maintain their said action against him. Second. And for a second and further answer, the defendant says, that the said Reichard Lake, where the said supposed trespasses are alleged to have been committed, was, at the time when said supposed trespasses are alleged to have been committed, and is, a private fishery, and not a common or public fishery, and that said plaintiffs were not, nor was either or any of them, the owner or owners thereof; but, at the time when, &c., the said plaintiffs were trespassers upon said fishery, and entered therein without authority or license from the owner or owners of said close and fishery, and the damages, if any sustained by them, were sustained in consequence of their unlawful entry upon said close and fishery, and in their own wrong. (No. 44.) Answer in action for slander; denial that the words were spoken of the plaintiff; justification of their truth, and mitigating circumstances.1 The defendant, in answer to the plaintiff's complaint in this action : 'To Complaint No. 58, Part III., ante, p. 462. First. Denies that the words, in said complaint alleged to have been spoken, were spoken by the defendant of and concerning the plaintiff.' Second. And for a second and further defence, the defendant alleges that before the time of the speaking of the words mentioned in said complaint, to wit, on or about the day of, a certain gold watch, of the value of $100, the property of one John Brown, had been feloniously carried away and stolen from his possession at the town of, and the said plaintiff was the person who feloniously carried away and stole said watch from said Brown, to wit, at the time and place last aforesaid. Wherefore the defendant says, that the alleged slanderous words mentioned in said complaint are true, and that said plaintiff did, &c., [as in the complaint stated]; and the defendant therefore further alleges that he spoke the said several words for the cause aforesaid, as it was lawful for him to do.2 This denial is sufficient to put the plaintiff upon proof that the words mentioned in the complaint were spoken of and concerning the plaintiff. (Code, § 164.) The mere proof of speaking the words, which do not appear upon their face to be applicable to the plaintiff, is not sufficient, and he must prove extrinsic circumstances sufficient to satisfy the jury of their application to the plaintiff, to the exclusion of any other person. (See note, No. 2, ante, p. 462.) 2 It will be observed that this answer admits, by not denying, that the words were spoken "of and concerning the plaintiff." This implied admission, however, does not destroy the denial in the first answer. The rule I understand to be universal, as lately very clearly laid down in Swift v. Kingsley (24 Barb., 541), that where there are several answers, an admission made in one is not available against the others. Each answer must stand by itself as a complete defence, and the plaintiff must recover upon the whole record. An admission in one answer, therefore, will not conclude the defendant nor estop him from establishing the matters of defence set up in another. Though where the charges in a libel are specific (as in No. 46, post), a general averment of their truth in the answer is sufficient; yet, if the |