joint and separate property of the said Sebastian V. Talcott and Henry H. Hale as that provided for in said assignment has been made and annexed thereto; on the contrary, these defendants aver, that forthwith, after the execution and delivery of said assignment, separate schedules were made and completed, with all reasonable dispatch, of the copartnership and joint property and effects of the said firm of Talcott & Hale, and of the individual property and effects of the said Sebastian V. Talcott, and were, and still are, annexed to the said original assignment, as by reference to said assignment and schedules, now in the possession of the said George Talcott and Andrew T. Hale, will more fully appear. That schedules were also made showing the several creditors of the said firm of Talcott & Hale, and the individual creditors of the defendant, Sebastian V. Talcott, and the amount due to each respectively, and were also and still are annexed to said assignment. That the defendant, Henry H. Hale, had no individual creditors, to the knowledge or belief of these defendants. And these defendants, further answering, deny, that the said assignment is merely colorable, or that it was made with intent to hinder, delay and defraud the creditors of the said Sebastian V. Talcott and Henry H. Hale; on the contrary, they aver that the same was made, executed, delivered and received in good faith for the benefit of the creditors of the said Sebastian V. Talcott and Henry H. Hale, and without any intent whatever to hinder, delay or defraud their creditors. P. CAGGER, Defendants' Attorney. (No. 50.) Part of an answer to a complaint for an injunction to restrain defendant from diverting a water-course.1 Title of the Cause. The defendant denies that the stream of water mentioned in plaintiff's complaint, with the power and privilege therein mentioned, belong to and are the property of the said plaintiff. And the said defendant, further answering, says, that he has and owns, and had and owned at the time of the commencement of this suit, the mill-dam upon a certain piece or parcel of land described in a deed from Ebenezer Wiswall to Stephen Warren, bearing date the 31st day of October, 1829, and recorded in Rensselaer county clerk's office, and the apparatus and aqueduct upon said last mentioned premises, constructed for the purpose of conducting the stream of water running on said premises to the grist-mill which belonged to the late Ephraim Morgan at the time of his death, or to any mill or machinery which may have been built or constructed instead thereof, or near the same in lieu thereof, and also the right at all times to the use of said water in said aqueduct and to continue the said dam and aqueduct and apparatus upon the said last mentioned premises, or to construct instead thereof, and continue, any necessary and proper dam, aqueduct and apparatus upon said last mentioned premises for the purposes aforesaid, and for the purpose of conducting said stream of water from said last mentioned premises in the manner and to the place above set forth, and also the right forever to enter upon said last mentioned premises for the purpose of repairing, relaying To complaint, Hoyt v. Carter, No. 17, Part II., ante, p. 100. and rebuilding the said dam, aqueduct and apparatus instead of those in use at the time of the date of said deed, for the purpose of raising a head, and conducting said water from said last mentioned premises to the mill of said Ephraim Morgan aforesaid, or to any mill or machinery which may have been built or constructed instead thereof, or near the same in lieu thereof; and that the lot, piece or parcel of land, of which the said plaintiff in his complaint claims to be seized in fee and possessed, is part and parcel of the piece or parcel of land described in the said deed from Ebenezer Wiswall to Stephen Warren. And the said defendant, further answering, says, that he has and owns, and at the time of the commencement of this suit did have and own, the right, privilege and title to dig a canal or water-course and lay down logs and trunks through which to divert the stream of water, in said complaint mentioned, from its natural course as it now runs, or as it has run at any time since the 1st day of May, 1838, and that the person and persons under and through whom the said defendant acquired and derived said right, privilege and title, also had and owned such right, privilege and title. JOHN E. TAYLOR, Defendant's Attorney. (No. 51.) Answer to a complaint in an action brought to prove and establish a lost will.1 SUPREME COURT. Daniel Cronk agt. Catharine Cronk, George C. Cronk, John John Cronk, one of the abovenamed defendants, for separate answer to the complaint of the plaintiff in the above entitled cause: Denies that the said real estate, whereof the said Nathan Cronk died seized and possessed, was, as set forth in plaintiff's complaint, worth, at the time of the decease of the said Nathan Cronk, the sum of $7,000, or that the personal property whereof the said Nathan Cronk was possessed at the time of his decease was worth the sum of $1,000. The said defendant, further answering, denies, that the said Nathan Cronk made his last will and testament on or about the 20th day of November, 1849, or at any other time, of his real and personal estate, or that he was, at the alleged time of executing the same, of sound and disposing mind and memory, or that he was competent to devise real estate; but the defendant says, according to the best of his knowledge, information and belief that the said Nathan Cronk, at the time set forth in said complaint as the period of making said will and testament, and for a long time previous thereto, was not of sound and dis To Complaint No. 46, Part II., ante, p. 213. posing mind and memory, or in any wise competent to make or execute a last will and testament, and he charges the fact to be that the said Nathan Cronk, at the time aforesaid, was so enfeebled and debilitated by disease, sickness and other causes, that the mind of the said Nathan Cronk became so disordered, unbalanced and unsettled, that he was incompetent to make and execute a last will and testament, and so continued until the time of his decease. The defendant, further answering, says, that he has not sufficient knowledge or information to be able to form a belief whether the will, in plaintiff's complaint alleged to have been made and executed by the said Nathan Cronk, was in substance or effect as set forth in said complaint, and therefore he denies the same. The said defendant, further answering, says, that he has not sufficient knowledge or information to be able to form a belief whether the said will was duly executed according to the laws of the State of New-York, or whether the execution or attestation thereof was substantially as set forth in plaintiff's complaint, and therefore he denies the same. The defendant, for a further answer, denies, that the will of the said Nathan Cronk, in plaintiff's complaint set forth, was in existence at or for some time subsequent to his death, or was opened, or read, or heard read, or was seen or known to be in existence by persons interested in its provisions, or by any of the persons named in the complaint; but the said defendant admits and charges the fact to be, that at and subsequent to the decease of the said Nathan Cronk there was a paper writing, purporting to be the last will and testament of the said Nathan Cronk, which was opened and read and heard read, and seen and known to be in existence by the persons in plaintiff's complaint mentioned, but the defendant avers that at the time |