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in said complaint; and upon the second point of construction, this defendant claims and insists, and asks, that by the judgment of the court it be declared that the bequests and devises in said will to this defendant are valid bequests and devises, notwithstanding anything to the contrary thereof contained in said codicil, and that the plaintiff, as executor, be directed to distribute and set over to this defendant the various articles of personal property bequeathed to him in and by said last will and testament; and upon the third and fourth points of construction asked, this defendant submits himself to the judgment of the court, and prays that said judgment may be, in all respects, so far as the same concerns or relates to the rights and interests of this defendant, in accordance with the claims hereinbefore set forth and made by him.

PIERSON, BEACH & SMITH,

Atty. for Def't Dewitt.

(No. 55.)

Answer of the widow of testator, in the same action as the foregoing.

SUPREME COURT.

Daniel Clint, executor, etc., of John Clint,
deceased,
agt.

Magdalen Clint, John S. Clint and others.

The answer of Magdalen Clint, one of the defendants in the above entitled cause, alleges and states:

That she is the widow of John Clint, deceased, and the mother of the defendant, Dewitt Clint.

That about the time of the making of the codicil mentioned in the plaintiff's complaint, and for a short time previous thereto, the defendant, Dewitt Clint, was paying his addresses to a young lady in the vicinity, with a view, as this defendant is informed and believes, to matrimony; that this course of conduct of said Dewitt was disapproved both by said testator and this defendant, and occasioned the making of said codicil, and was the "course of conduct" mentioned in said codicil as being grievous to said testator and this defendant.

And this defendant, further answering, says, that the said Dewitt did, in the lifetime of said testator, and to the full satisfaction of him, the testator, and also of this defendant, desist from such course of conduct and abandon the object which caused the necessity of said codicil, and did entirely cease paying his addresses to said young lady, and has ceased to do so to the present time, and during the lifetime of said testator made full satisfaction to him in regard thereto, and also to this defendant.

And this defendant joins in the prayer of the complaint for a full construction of all and singular the questions arising upon the said will and codicil, and every part thereof, and submits her rights under the same to the judgment of the court.

P. CAGGER,

Atty. for def't, Magdalen Clint.

(No. 56.)

Answer of certain other defendants, having adverse interests in the same action as the foregoing.

SUPREME COURT.

Daniel Clint, executor, etc., of the last will and testament of John Clint, deceased,

agt.

Magdalen Clint, John S. Clint and Emeliza his wife, Aaron Clint and Eliza his wife, William Snyder and Elizabeth his wife, Gilbert B. Thorn and Ann Uriah his wife, Nelson Dater and Barbara his wife, William A. Kilmer and Almira M. his wife, Dewitt Clint and Margaret Clint.

The defendants, Gilbert B. Thorn and Ann Uriah his wife, William A. Kilmer and Almira his wife, and Nelson Dater and Barbara his wife, for answer to the plaintiff's complaint in this action, say:

That the said testator, at the time of his death, was indebted to some extent, but to what extent, or whether in an amount insufficient to require the sale or disposition of any portion of his real estate, or any portion of the personal property bequeathed to the defendant, Dewitt Clint, these defendants have no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief.

And they deny, that between the date of the said codicil and the death of the said testator, or at any other time, the said Dewitt Clint did, in all respects, fulfill the condition mentioned in said codicil, according to the true intent and meaning thereof, or to the satisfaction of his mother and the testator, or either of them, or that he thereby or by any other means, or in any other manner, became, or

was, or now is, reinstated in all or any of his rights or privileges, according to the provisions of said will, the same as though no such codicil had ever been made.

And they submit and insist, as to the claim of said Dewitt, set forth in said complaint, that said claim is invalid in law, and cannot legally be established, by parol proof or otherwise, in explanation of the written instrument, and they claim the same benefit and advantage of this their answer, in respect thereto, as though they had demurred to the same.

And the defendants further insist and submit to the court, that by the true construction of the said codicil, the devise and bequest of the real and personal estate, in and by the said will devised and bequeathed to the said Dewitt Clint, absolutely revoked, and the said real and personal estate, so devised and bequeathed by the said will to the said Dewitt Clint, either descends to the heirs-at-law and next of kin of the said testator, other than the plaintiff and the said Dewitt Clint, or passes to the sons and daughters of the said testator, named in said will, with the exception of the plaintiff and the said Dewitt Clint.

And they demand judgment of this court, to this effect, with their costs in said action.1

ROMEYN & TABER,

Defendants' Attorneys.

The foregoing answer contained also a statement of the making and execution of the will, the death of the testator, and the probate of the will, substantially as set forth in the complaint, and a series of denials of certain legal propositions, presented by the questions in the complaint, propounded to the court for construction. I have omitted all these, as they are not properly pleaded under the Code. It is redundant to reassert, in the answer, facts set forth in the complaint, and it is not allowable to deny any mere legal proposition or conclusion of law. (See Pleadings, 416, et seq.)

The latter part of the answer I regard as properly pleaded, though not, in strictness, either the denial of an allegation of the plaintiff, or

P

(4.) ANSWERS BY WAY OF COUNTERCLAIM.

(No. 57.)

Answer by executors to a complaint for work and labor, alleging debts due from plaintiff to defendants' testator by way of set-off.1

SUPREME COURT.

Justus H. Aikin

agt.

Elihu G. Aikin and others, executors, &c.,

of James Aikin, deceased.

The defendants, answering the plaintiff's complaint, deny, &c., [setting up the defences relied on ].

Second. The defendants, for a second and further answer, say, that the said plaintiff was indebted to said James Aikin, in his lifetime, in the sum of $3,000, for meat, drink, washing, lodging, board, medicine and medical attendance, furnished and provided by said James Aikin to said plaintiff, and his servants, and at his, said plaintiff's, special instance and request. Also in the further sum of $3,000, for the keeping, board and pasturing of

statement of new matter. It may be considered in the light of a prayer of the defendants for affirmative relief, and for the judgment to which they consider themselves entitled, in the construction of the will and codicil.

1 To Complaint No. 14, Part III., ante, p. 376.

2 The allegations in this answer would probably be held insufficient on a motion to make the pleading more definite and certain. The setoff should be pleaded substantially the same as the cause of action would be stated in a complaint. (See Nos. 30 to 44, Part III., ante, pp. 423 to 438, and notes.)

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