speculation and peradventure regarding the cause of a disability manifesting itself long after the happening of the accident. One of the purposes of the time limit imposed by the various subdivisions of section 16 was to cause an early submission to the commissioners of the injuries to the employee, so that the commissioners by their own observation and with the aid of expert testimony might determine, not only the condition of the applicant at that time, but the probable future results of the accident. This policy is manifest from the fact that where no disability has occurred at the time of the hearing, but is likely to do so in the future, the commission may retain jurisdiction. (Section 25 [c].) In other words, prompt inquiry regarding the injuries in all their details by the commission was evidently intended by the lawmakers".

The supreme court of Illinois has had this question of limitation of time for filing claim for compensation before it and has held such provision mandatory, and the claim barred unless made within the time. Haiselden v. Industrial Board, 275 Ill. 114; Bushnell v. Industrial Board, 276 Ill. 262.

The New York act differs from our act with reference to the giving of notice and patterns after the idea of the English act. It contains this provision (section 18, art. 2, chap. 41, Laws of New York, 1914):

"The failure to give such notice unless excused by the commission either on the ground that notice for some sufficient reason could not have been given, or on the ground that the State fund, insurance company, or employer, as the case may be, has not been prejudiced thereby, shall be a bar to any claim under this chapter."

But it was held that the commission might not arbitrarily excuse the failure to give notice. Prokopiak v. Buffalo Gas Co., 176 App. Div. 128; Sicardi v. Sarnoff Hat Co., 176 App. Div. 13, and in Bloomfield v. November, 219 N. Y. 374, it was said in the majority opinion of the court of last resort:

"We do not intend to qualify what has often been said by this court to the effect that the compensation law should be liberally construed to the end of accomplishing the purpose for which it was enacted, and that the course of the claimant should not be beset with technicalities. The legislature, however, has deemed it proper and essential, under ordinary circumstances, that a written notice of disability and claim should be promptly served so as to give an employer the opportunity to investigate the circumstances of the claim. This requirement ought not to be treated as a mere formality or be dispensed with as a matter of course whenever there has been a failure to serve such notice."

Upon principle, we are persuaded that the defendant must prevail in its contention. When the bolt fell, striking the plaintiff on the head, it fractured his skull. That was the injury. The formation of an abscess, the accumulation of pus, the softening of the bone, were the results of that fracture-of the injury received; while these results rendered the injury more severe, the injury was there from the first and subsequent want of care but aggravated it. Had the plaintiff then made his claim for compensation and had proper medical treatment, which his employer was bound to pay for under the provisions of section 4, it is highly probable he would have been saved much pain, and a serious and expensive operation would have been obviated. This would have been beneficial

alike to him and his employer.

While the words "accident" and "injury" are not synonymous, the accident produced the injury and in point of time they were concurrent. We are compelled to hold, must hold, unless we resort to judicial legislation, that the legislature by these two sections fixed the date of the injury at the date of the accident, and not some remote date thereafter when the injured employee became definitely satisfied that he was disabled as a result of the accident.

It follows that the award for compensation and for medical services rendered nearly a year after the date of the injury must be reversed and vacated.

OSTRANDER, C. J., and BIRD, MOORE, STEERE, BROOKE, and STONE, JJ., concurred. KUHN, J., did not sit.

MCMULLEN v. GAVETTE CONSTRUCTION CO.

MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW-MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL SERVICES-LIMITATION.

An award of compensation, under the workmen's compensation law, for medical and hospital services, is limited, by section 4, part 2, of the act, to the first three weeks after the accident. Cooke v. Holland Furnace Co., ante, 192.

Certiorari to Industrial Accident Board. Submitted January 18, 1918. (Docket No. 130.) Decided March 27, 1918.

Roy McMullen presented his claim for compensation against the Gavette Construction Company for medical and hospital services. From an order awarding compensation, defendant and the Globe Indemnity Company, insurer, bring certiorari. Reversed.

Douglas, Eaman & Barbour, for appellants.

Herbert W. Smith, for appellee.

FELLOWS, J. But a single question is presented upon this record. The weekly compensation seems to have

been agreed upon. The amount allowed by the award here reviewed is for medical and hospital services performed after the first three weeks after the accident. The accident occurred November 20, 1916. The services here involved were performed during the three weeks following the 5th of January, 1917. The plaintiff, a carpenter, slipped on a frosty roof and fell 20 feet to the ground, causing serious injury. The defendant construction company sent a physician to examine and treat him. It is a controverted question as to whether the physician properly examined and properly treated him. We think it may also fairly be said that the necessity of the particular operation was a controverted question. The board found with the plaintiff as to both of these questions, and we are bound by such findings. It is undisputed that all of the items included in the award were furnished or performed after the first three weeks after the accident and during the three weeks succeeding January 5th.

We have fully considered the question here involved in the case of Cooke v. Holland Furnace Co., ante, 192, and there held that the date of the accident fixed the date of the injury under section 4, part 2, of the workmen's compensation act (2 Comp. Laws 1915, § 5434), and that the board was not authorized by the act to award and compensate the employee for medical and hospital services performed more than three weeks after the accident. The authority for such allowance by the board does not exist, except per force of the statute, and the legislative judgment has limited the allowance to such services as are performed during the first three weeks after the injury. Nor has the board authority to award as damages the amount paid for such services performed at a later date, upon the theory ingeniously advanced that the failure to furnish proper medical and hospital services created a

liability for the payment of such services so performed which may be awarded by the board as damages. The board is an administrative body created to carry the provision of the act into effect. Mackin v. DetroitTimkin Axle Co., 187 Mich. 8, and, while it may determine the compensation to be paid in a given case, it must do so pursuant to the terms of the act, and circumscribed by its provisions. It has no power given it by the act to fix and measure such compensation by the amount of damages provable, as in an action at law for a breach of either statutory or common law duty. Andrejwski v. Wolverine Coal Co., 182 Mich. 298.

The injury in the instant case was a serious one, the operation and hospital services expensive. The language of Mr. Justice BIRD, speaking for this court, in Hirschkorn v. Fiege Desk Co., 184 Mich. 239, is applicable here:

"The award made by the board was a very equitable one, and is one which we would prefer to sustain, if we could do so without attempting to amend the law by judicial construction. It appears to be, however, an exigency which the law has not provided for. We think the relief in such cases lies with the legislature, rather than with the courts."

The case is controlled by the Cooke Case, supra, and the award must be vacated.

OSTRANDER, C. J., and BIRD, MOORE, STEERE, BROOKE, STONE, and KUHN, JJ., concurred.