in filing the first bill of complaint against the 'defendant Charles H. Roiser alone, without making any claim that he had, or ever had had in his possession, any assignment of the Rich contract signed by Mrs. Roiser, is very significant. It is almost inconceivable that a man possessing his acquaintance with real estate affairs, and knowing as he did that the premises were held by said defendants as tenants by the entireties, that he should not have seen and appreciated the importance of alleging the possession of the assignment of Mrs. Roiser if he supposed at that time any such paper was in existence, or that it was intended to be used in the proposed exchange of properties.

Full faith and credit cannot be given to the testimony of these parties as a whole upon either side; but, after a careful examination of the entire record, we find ourselves in so much doubt as to whether Mrs. Roiser ever signed the assignment with the intention that it should have the effect of assigning to plaintiff the Rich contract, in exchange of that property for the Barnard property, that we are constrained to agree with the trial court in holding that the plaintiff has not sustained the burden of proof resting upon him, and that the decree below should be affirmed.

It is hardly necessary to refer to authorities in support of the proposition that property held as this property was, could not be conveyed, or any interest therein conveyed without the wife joining with the husband. We need cite but a single case, that of Auditor General v. Fisher, 84 Mich. 128, and cases there cited, where it is held, in substance, that the interest of a husband and wife in a land contract in which their names appear as vendees, is an entirety and not a tenancy in common. This view of the case renders it unnecessary to consider whether the other defendants are bona fide purchasers or not of these premises.

There are innumerable circumstances upon both sides which we have considered and that might be referred to, but it is sufficient to say that, in our opinion, the plaintiff has failed to make out a case against defendant Alice L. Roiser, and that the decree below should be affirmed with costs to the defendants.

OSTRANDER, C. J., and BIRD, MOORE, STEERE, BROOKE, FELLOWS, and KUHN, JJ., concurred.

PEOPLE v. WILLIAMSON.

1. NEW TRIAL-APPEAL AND ERROR-EXCEPTIONS.

A motion for a new trial, where the record is silent as to its disposition, and there are no exceptions to any refusal to grant such motion, will not be reviewed by the appellate court.

2. CRIMINAL LAW-CARRYING CONCEALED WEAPONS-INTENT. The intent required to make one punishable under the statutes against carrying concealed weapons, is an intent to do the act prohibited, viz., to carry weapons concealed upon the person; the ultimate purpose being immaterial.

3. SAME TRIAL-CONCEALMENT-INTENT-INSTRUCTIONS-GIST OF OFFENSE.

In a prosecution for carrying concealed weapons under Act No. 274, Pub. Acts 1911, as amended (3 Comp. Laws 1915, § 15236), where the court, in his charge to the jury, repeatedly called their attention to the question of concealment, asking, "Did the defendant have the gun on his person concealed as stated by the people's witnesses?" it is not open to the objection that the court did not suffi

ciently define the offense charged, since concealment implies an assent of mind and purpose.

4. SAME

LOADED WEAPON-GIST OF OFFENSE.

The authorities are agreed that a revolver or pistol need not be loaded to come within the statute against carrying concealed weapons.

De

Error to the recorder's court of Detroit; Jeffries, J. Submitted January 17, 1918. (Docket No. 189.) cided March 27, 1918.

Robert Williamson was convicted of carrying concealed weapons and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than two years in the Detroit house of correction. Affirmed.

A. W. Sempliner and P. W. Grose, for appellant.

Alexander J. Groesbeck, Attorney General, Charles H. Jasnowski, Prosecuting Attorney, and De Witt H. Merriam, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

STONE, J. The defendant was convicted in the recorder's court of the city of Detroit of the offense of wilfully and unlawfully going armed with an offensive and dangerous weapon, to wit, a revolver concealed upon his person at the city of Detroit on April 13, 1917, not then and there having a license to go armed, in violation of the provisions of section 15236, 3 Comp. Laws 1915, being Act No. 274 of the Public Acts of 1911, as amended; the title of the act being in part as follows:

"An act to prohibit the sale, keeping for sale, loaning, giving away or carrying of certain dangerous weapons; to prevent the carrying of concealed weapons except in certain specified cases when a license is issued therefor; to provide punishment for the violation of the provisions hereof," etc.

The provisions of said section applicable to the case are as follows:

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"It shall be unlawful for any person, except as hereinafter provided, to go armed with a volver * * * or other offensive and dangerous weapons or instruments concealed upon his person.'

Upon the trial of the case the sole testimony (except that of the proper officer that no license to carry concealed weapons had been issued to defendant) was that of a police officer who testified that he arrested defendant about 3:10 p. m. of April 13, 1917, in the city of Detroit. And further:

"I searched him and found that gun on him. (Gun produced and marked exhibit 1, and offered in evidence.) He had the gun in his inside pocket on the right-hand side of his coat. The pocket was a short pocket, up high. I could not see it. I asked him what. authority he had to have a revolver. He said he had no authority. He had a badge on, 'Metropolitan Detective Agency.' He said there was a foreigner down there going away with some woman.'

On cross-examination the witness testified:

"I examined the gun as soon as I saw it. It was not loaded, and he did not have any cartridges upon his person."

Thereupon the people rested, and there was no evidence offered on behalf of defendant.

Among other things, the trial court charged the jury as follows:

"Now, gentlemen, the law prohibits any person from carrying any weapon that is a dangerous weapon, such as a dagger, sword, pistol, revolver, metallic-knuckles, pocket-billy, sand-bag, skull-cracker, slung shot, razor, without a permit; in fact, no person is allowed to carry any weapon that is concealed, without a permit, coming within the meaning of the statute.

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"Now this is a very simple issue in this case. Did the defendant have the gun concealed as stated by the people's witness, and if he did, did he have a permit to carry a gun, or to carry one from the proper authorities? If you find that he had this gun on his

person concealed as testified to by the people, and you believe that beyond a reasonable doubt, it makes no difference, gentlemen, whether it is loaded or unloaded. If you believe that it (the gun) was found upon his (respondent's) person, as testified to by the people, and you believe, further, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he had no permit to carry this gun, then your duty, gentlemen of the jury, if you believe that beyond a reasonable doubt, is to convict this defendant on the charge in the information.

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"I will charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that as a matter of law, that it makes no difference whether the gun was loaded or unloaded. If you find that he was carrying it, and carrying it concealed, as I told you, beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to convict him; if you further find, as I have already said to you, that he had no permit to carry one."

There was a motion to direct a verdict of not guilty for the reason that the weapon was not loaded, and that no harm was intended, and that it was not a dangerous weapon, which motion was refused.

After defendant's conviction he was sentenced to be confined in the Detroit house of correction for a period of not less than six months nor more than two years, with a recommendation that he serve six months. There was a motion for a new trial; but the record is silent as to whether the motion was ever heard or not, and there are no exceptions to any refusal to grant such motion. We cannot, therefore, consider such motion.

The defendant has brought the case here upon writ of error, and error is assigned upon the parts of the charge above set forth. Also, that the court erred in refusing to direct a verdict of not guilty on the ground that there was no evidence that the defendant did go armed with a dangerous weapon, and, also, upon the ground that the weapon was not loaded, and was not a dangerous weapon.

Counsel for defendant contend that a distinction